3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123 #include <openssl/rand.h>
125 /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
126 static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1, const unsigned char *v2)
128 int ret, sat, brw, i;
130 if (sizeof(long) == 8)
140 if (is_endian.little)
142 /* not reached on little-endians */
144 * following test is redundant, because input is always aligned,
145 * but I take no chances...
147 if (((size_t)v1 | (size_t)v2) & 0x7)
160 ret = (int)v1[7] - (int)v2[7];
162 brw = ret >> 8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
164 for (i = 6; i >= 0; i--) {
165 brw += (int)v1[i] - (int)v2[i];
170 for (i = 6; i >= 0; i--) {
171 brw += (int)v1[i] - (int)v2[i];
176 brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
181 return brw + (ret & 0xFF);
184 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
186 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
187 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
188 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
189 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
191 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
192 unsigned short *priority,
193 unsigned long *offset);
195 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
196 unsigned char *priority);
197 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
199 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
200 static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
202 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
204 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
206 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
209 s->packet = rdata->packet;
210 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
211 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
212 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
214 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
215 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
221 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
223 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
226 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
227 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
230 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
231 item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
232 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) {
238 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
242 rdata->packet = s->packet;
243 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
244 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
245 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
250 /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
251 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
252 (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
253 || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) {
254 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO,
255 sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
260 s->packet_length = 0;
261 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
262 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
264 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
265 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
266 if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
267 OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
273 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
274 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) {
275 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
276 if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
277 OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
286 static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
290 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
292 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
294 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
304 * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not
307 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
308 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
309 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
312 * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie,
315 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
316 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
317 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
319 static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
324 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
325 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
328 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
330 /* Check if epoch is current. */
331 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
332 return 1; /* Nothing to do. */
339 * We've still got data from the current packet to read. There could
340 * be a record from the new epoch in it - so don't overwrite it
341 * with the unprocessed records yet (we'll do it when we've
342 * finished reading the current packet).
348 /* Process all the records. */
349 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
350 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
351 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
352 if (bitmap == NULL) {
354 * Should not happen. This will only ever be NULL when the
355 * current record is from a different epoch. But that cannot
356 * be the case because we already checked the epoch above
358 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS,
359 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
363 /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
364 if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
368 * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. We did this
369 * check once already when we first received the record - but
370 * we might have updated the window since then due to
371 * records we subsequently processed.
373 replayok = dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap);
376 if (!replayok || !dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
377 /* dump this record */
379 s->packet_length = 0;
383 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
384 s->s3->rrec.seq_num) < 0)
390 * sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been
393 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
394 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
401 static int dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
405 (((PQ_64BIT) s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
406 ((PQ_64BIT) s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
408 /* if we're not (re)negotiating, nothing buffered */
412 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
413 if (item && item->priority == priority) {
415 * Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be a
416 * handshake record, since data records as passed up without
419 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
420 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
421 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
423 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
424 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
426 s->packet = rdata->packet;
427 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
428 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
429 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
431 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
434 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
443 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
449 unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
450 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
456 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
457 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
459 rr->input = &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
462 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
463 * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
464 * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
465 * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
469 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
470 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
473 /* check is not needed I believe */
474 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
475 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
476 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
480 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
481 rr->data = rr->input;
483 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
486 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
487 * 1: if the padding is valid
488 * -1: if the padding is invalid
491 /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
493 s->packet_length = 0;
497 printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
500 for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
501 printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
506 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
507 if ((sess != NULL) &&
508 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
509 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
510 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
511 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
512 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
513 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
516 * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type
518 orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8);
521 * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
522 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
523 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
524 * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
526 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
527 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
528 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
529 orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
530 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
531 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
535 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
537 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
538 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
539 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
540 * contents of the padding bytes.
543 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
544 rr->length -= mac_size;
547 * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals
548 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
551 rr->length -= mac_size;
552 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
555 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
556 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
557 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
559 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
564 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
566 s->packet_length = 0;
570 /* r->length is now just compressed */
571 if (s->expand != NULL) {
572 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
573 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
574 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
575 SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
578 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
579 al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
580 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
585 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
586 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
587 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
593 * So at this point the following is true
594 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
595 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
596 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
597 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
601 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
602 s->packet_length = 0;
604 /* Mark receipt of record. */
605 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
610 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
616 * Call this to get a new input record.
617 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
618 * or non-blocking IO.
619 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
620 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
621 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
622 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
624 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
625 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
627 int ssl_major, ssl_minor;
630 unsigned char *p = NULL;
631 unsigned short version;
632 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
633 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
639 * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records.
640 * This is a non-blocking operation.
642 if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s))
645 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
646 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
649 /* get something from the wire */
650 /* check if we have the header */
651 if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
652 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
653 n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
654 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
656 return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
658 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
659 if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
660 s->packet_length = 0;
664 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
668 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
672 version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
674 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
677 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
682 /* Lets check version */
683 if (!s->first_packet) {
684 if (version != s->version) {
685 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
687 s->packet_length = 0;
692 if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) {
693 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
695 s->packet_length = 0;
699 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
700 /* record too long, silently discard it */
702 s->packet_length = 0;
706 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
709 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
711 if (rr->length > s->packet_length - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
712 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
714 n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
715 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
718 s->packet_length = 0;
723 * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length ==
724 * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
727 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
729 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
730 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
731 if (bitmap == NULL) {
733 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
734 goto again; /* get another record */
736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
737 /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
738 if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
741 * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. Don't check if
742 * we're listening and this message is a ClientHello. They can look
743 * as if they're replayed, since they arrive from different
744 * connections and would be dropped unnecessarily.
746 if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
747 s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
748 s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
749 !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) {
751 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
752 goto again; /* get another record */
754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
758 /* just read a 0 length packet */
763 * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a
764 * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be
765 * processed at this time. However, do not buffer anything while
769 if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) {
770 if (dtls1_buffer_record
771 (s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num) < 0)
775 s->packet_length = 0;
779 if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
781 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
782 goto again; /* get another record */
790 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
791 * 'type' is one of the following:
793 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
794 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
795 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
797 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
798 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
800 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
801 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
802 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
803 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
804 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
805 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
806 * Change cipher spec protocol
807 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
809 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
811 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
812 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
813 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
814 * Application data protocol
815 * none of our business
817 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
822 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
824 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
825 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
828 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
829 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
830 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
831 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
832 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
837 * check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting
839 if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
843 * Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
848 * Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read app data with
851 if ((!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
852 (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
853 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
854 || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)
855 && s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
857 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
860 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
861 i = s->handshake_func(s);
865 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
871 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
874 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
875 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
876 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
877 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
882 * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
883 * during the last handshake in advance, if any.
885 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0) {
887 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
889 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
890 /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
891 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
892 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
893 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO,
894 sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
898 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
900 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
905 /* Check for timeout */
906 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
909 /* get new packet if necessary */
910 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
911 ret = dtls1_get_record(s);
913 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
914 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
922 if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
928 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
929 * record that isn't an alert.
931 if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0)
932 s->s3->alert_count = 0;
934 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
936 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
937 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
938 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
940 * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely
941 * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application
942 * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection.
944 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num) <
946 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
954 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
957 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
959 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
963 if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
964 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
966 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
967 * doing a handshake for the first time
969 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
970 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
971 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
979 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
982 n = (unsigned int)len;
984 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
988 if (rr->length == 0) {
989 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
993 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
995 * We were about to renegotiate but had to read belated application
996 * data first, so retry.
998 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
999 rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
1000 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
1001 || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)) {
1002 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1003 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1004 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1008 * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered
1009 * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read
1010 * anymore, finally set shutdown.
1012 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
1013 s->d1->shutdown_received
1014 && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1015 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1023 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1024 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
1028 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1029 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1032 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
1033 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1034 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1036 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1037 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1038 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1039 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
1040 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1041 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
1042 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
1043 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
1045 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1046 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
1047 dtls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1049 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1051 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1052 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1053 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1057 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
1058 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1060 * Application data while renegotiating is allowed. Try again
1063 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
1065 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1066 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1067 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1068 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1069 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1073 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
1074 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1075 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1079 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1081 * XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello may be
1082 * fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes
1084 if (rr->length < dest_maxlen) {
1085 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1087 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
1088 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
1089 * non-existing alert...
1093 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1098 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1099 for (k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) {
1100 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1103 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
1108 * s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1109 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1110 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1113 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1115 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1116 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1117 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1118 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1120 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1121 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1122 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1123 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1129 * no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages
1132 if (s->msg_callback)
1133 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1134 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1135 s->msg_callback_arg);
1137 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1138 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1139 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1140 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1142 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1143 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1144 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
1149 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1153 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1154 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1157 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1158 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1159 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1160 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1162 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1163 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1164 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1165 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1172 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1173 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1178 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1179 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
1180 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
1182 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1184 if (s->msg_callback)
1185 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1186 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1188 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1189 cb = s->info_callback;
1190 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1191 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1194 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1195 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1198 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1199 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1201 s->s3->alert_count++;
1202 if (s->s3->alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1203 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1204 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1208 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1211 * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
1212 * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so
1213 * that nothing gets discarded.
1215 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
1216 BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1217 s->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
1218 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1219 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1220 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1224 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1228 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
1229 /* now check if it's a missing record */
1230 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
1232 unsigned int frag_off;
1233 unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
1238 dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1239 dtls1_get_queue_priority
1240 (frag->msg_header.seq, 0), frag_off,
1242 if (!found && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1244 * fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s));
1247 * requested a message not yet sent, send an alert
1250 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1251 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1255 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1258 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1259 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
1261 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1262 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1263 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1264 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1265 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1268 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1276 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1278 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1283 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1284 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1285 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1287 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1289 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1293 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
1294 * what the record payload has to look like
1296 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1297 if ((rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
1298 (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
1299 i = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1300 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1306 if (s->msg_callback)
1307 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1308 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1311 * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages
1312 * are still missing, so just drop it.
1314 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok) {
1318 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
1320 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
1321 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1324 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1325 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1327 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1328 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1332 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
1333 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
1336 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
1343 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1345 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1347 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1349 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1350 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1351 if (rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) {
1357 * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client
1358 * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1360 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
1361 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
1364 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1369 if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1370 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1371 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences
1372 * are not as expected (and because this is
1373 * not really needed for clients except for
1374 * detecting protocol violations): */
1375 s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server)
1376 ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1378 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1383 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1391 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1392 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1395 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1396 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1397 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1398 * problems in the blocking world
1400 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1401 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1402 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1403 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1413 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1414 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
1419 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1422 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1424 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1426 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1427 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
1428 * happen when type != rr->type
1430 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1431 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1433 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1435 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1436 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1437 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1438 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1439 * started), we will indulge it.
1441 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1442 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1443 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1444 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1445 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1446 ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1447 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1448 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1451 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1454 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1462 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1467 int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1473 * Check if we have to continue an interrupted handshake for reading
1474 * belated app data with SCTP.
1476 if ((SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) ||
1477 (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
1478 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
1479 || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)))
1481 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1484 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,
1489 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1494 if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
1499 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1504 * this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1508 have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1512 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1513 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1515 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1516 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1521 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1524 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1527 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1528 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1529 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1537 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
1538 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1540 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
1544 OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
1545 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1546 i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
1550 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1551 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1553 unsigned char *p, *pseq;
1554 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
1562 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
1563 * will happen with non blocking IO
1565 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0) {
1566 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1567 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
1570 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1571 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
1572 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1575 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1578 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1581 wr = &(s->s3->wrec);
1582 wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
1585 if ((sess == NULL) ||
1586 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
1592 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
1597 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
1600 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
1602 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
1603 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1606 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
1607 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
1610 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
1612 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
1613 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
1614 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
1617 prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
1618 if (prefix_len <= 0)
1621 if (s->s3->wbuf.len <
1622 (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) {
1623 /* insufficient space */
1624 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1629 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1632 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1634 /* write the header */
1636 *(p++) = type & 0xff;
1639 *(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
1640 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1642 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1646 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1649 * Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC. (this is a bit of a
1650 * boundary violation, but what the heck).
1652 if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
1653 (EVP_CIPHER_mode(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
1654 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
1658 wr->data = p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1659 wr->length = (int)len;
1660 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
1663 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
1666 /* first we compress */
1667 if (s->compress != NULL) {
1668 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
1669 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1673 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
1674 wr->input = wr->data;
1678 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
1679 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
1683 if (mac_size != 0) {
1684 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + bs]), 1) < 0)
1686 wr->length += mac_size;
1689 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1693 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1694 if (bs) { /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
1695 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, bs);
1697 * master IV and last CBC residue stand for the rest of randomness
1702 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
1705 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1707 * if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && !
1711 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1713 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1717 * else s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq);
1720 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1722 s2n(wr->length, pseq);
1725 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1728 wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1729 wr->length += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1731 #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
1732 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1733 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1734 dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
1735 *((PQ_64BIT *) & (s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
1738 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1740 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1742 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1748 /* now let's set up wb */
1749 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1753 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1756 s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
1757 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
1758 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
1759 s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
1761 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1762 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
1767 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1771 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1773 cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
1775 memcpy(s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8);
1776 return 1; /* this record in new */
1779 if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
1780 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1781 else if (bitmap->map & (1UL << shift))
1782 return 0; /* record previously received */
1784 memcpy(s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8);
1788 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1792 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1794 cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
1797 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
1798 bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
1801 memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num, seq, 8);
1804 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
1805 bitmap->map |= 1UL << shift;
1809 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1812 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1813 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1814 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1816 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
1818 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1819 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1820 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1822 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1823 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
1824 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1826 if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0)
1828 * waiting for a new msg
1831 s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
1836 "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",
1837 s->d1->handshake_read_seq, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
1839 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1843 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
1845 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1846 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1848 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1849 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1850 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1853 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1855 if (s->msg_callback)
1856 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1857 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1859 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1860 cb = s->info_callback;
1861 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1862 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1865 j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
1866 cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
1872 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
1873 unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1878 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1879 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1880 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1883 * Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch and only if we
1884 * have already processed all of the unprocessed records from the last
1887 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1888 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch &&
1889 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1891 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1899 dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
1900 unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset)
1903 /* alerts are passed up immediately */
1904 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1908 * Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway. (this implies that
1909 * Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up immediately)
1911 if (SSL_in_init(s)) {
1912 unsigned char *data = rr->data;
1913 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1914 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1915 rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1916 unsigned short seq_num;
1917 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1918 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1920 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1921 dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
1922 seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
1923 *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
1925 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
1926 seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
1931 * this is either a record we're waiting for, or a retransmit of
1932 * something we happened to previously receive (higher layers
1933 * will drop the repeat silently
1935 if (seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1937 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
1938 seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1939 msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
1941 else if (seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1942 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
1943 msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
1946 *priority = seq_num;
1949 } else /* unknown record type */
1957 void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1960 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1962 if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) {
1963 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1965 memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1966 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1969 * We must not use any buffered messages received from the previous
1972 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
1974 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1975 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq,
1976 sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1980 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);