2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
128 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = {
131 tls1_setup_key_block,
132 tls1_generate_master_secret,
133 tls1_change_cipher_state,
134 tls1_final_finish_mac,
135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
136 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
146 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
147 * http, the cache would over fill
149 return (60 * 60 * 2);
156 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
160 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
163 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
166 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
170 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
173 s->version = s->method->version;
176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
178 static int nid_list[] = {
179 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
180 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
181 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
182 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
183 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
184 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
185 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
186 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
187 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
188 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
189 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
190 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
191 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
192 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
193 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
194 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
195 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
196 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
197 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
198 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
199 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
200 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
201 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
202 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
203 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
206 static int pref_list[] = {
207 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
208 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
209 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
211 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
212 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
213 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
214 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
216 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
217 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
218 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
219 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
221 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
222 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
223 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
224 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
225 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
226 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
228 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
229 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
230 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
231 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
232 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
237 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
238 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
239 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
241 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
242 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
243 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
246 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
248 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */
249 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
250 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
252 return nid_list[curve_id - 1];
255 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
257 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */
259 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
261 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
263 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
265 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
267 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
269 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
271 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
273 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
275 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
277 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
279 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
281 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
285 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
287 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
291 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
293 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
295 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
297 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
299 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
301 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
303 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
305 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
307 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
313 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
318 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
319 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
322 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
323 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
325 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
328 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
329 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
331 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
334 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
335 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
338 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
341 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
342 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
343 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
344 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
346 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
347 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
348 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
349 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
351 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
352 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
353 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
355 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
356 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
360 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
362 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
364 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
368 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
369 unsigned char *limit)
372 unsigned char *orig = buf;
373 unsigned char *ret = buf;
375 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
376 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
382 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
384 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
385 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
386 unsigned long size_str;
390 * check for enough space.
391 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
392 * 2 for servernamelist length
393 * 1 for the hostname type
394 * 2 for hostname length
398 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
400 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
403 /* extension type and length */
404 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
405 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
407 /* length of servername list */
408 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
410 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
411 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
413 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
417 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
418 if (s->renegotiate) {
421 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
426 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
429 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
432 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
439 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
440 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
441 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
442 * Client Hello message */
444 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
445 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
451 * check for enough space.
452 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
453 * 1 for the srp user identity
454 * + srp user identity length
456 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
459 /* fill in the extension */
460 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
461 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
462 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
463 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
468 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
469 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) {
471 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
475 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
477 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax)
479 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) {
480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
484 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
485 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1, ret);
486 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
487 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
488 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
489 ret += s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
491 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) {
493 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
497 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
499 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax)
501 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) {
502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
506 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
507 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
509 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
510 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
511 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
512 ret += s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
514 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
516 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
518 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
519 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
520 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
521 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
522 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
523 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
524 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
526 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
527 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
528 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
531 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
532 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
535 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
538 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
540 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
543 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
549 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
550 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
552 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
553 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
554 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
555 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
556 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
558 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
559 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
560 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
562 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
564 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
567 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
570 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
575 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
576 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
578 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
582 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
583 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
584 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
590 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
591 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
597 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
599 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
600 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
602 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
603 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
605 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
606 /* save position of id len */
607 unsigned char *q = ret;
608 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
609 /* skip over id len */
611 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
617 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
619 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
620 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
621 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
623 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
627 * 1: peer may send requests
628 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
630 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
631 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
633 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
636 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
637 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
639 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
640 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
642 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
644 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
649 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
650 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
653 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
655 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
658 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
661 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
669 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
670 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
671 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
674 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
675 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
677 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
678 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
681 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
683 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
690 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
692 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
697 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
700 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
704 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
705 unsigned char *limit)
708 unsigned char *orig = buf;
709 unsigned char *ret = buf;
710 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
711 int next_proto_neg_seen;
715 * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation
717 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
722 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
724 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
725 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
726 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
729 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
733 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
736 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
741 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
744 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
747 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
754 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
755 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) {
757 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
761 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
763 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax)
765 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) {
766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
770 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
771 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1, ret);
772 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
773 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
774 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
775 ret += s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
779 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
782 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
784 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
785 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
787 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
791 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
792 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
794 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
797 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
798 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
799 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
801 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
803 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
806 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
809 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
814 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
815 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
818 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
820 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
823 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
826 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
834 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
835 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
836 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
837 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
838 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
839 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
840 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
841 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
842 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
843 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
845 if (limit - ret < 36)
847 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
851 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
852 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
853 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
854 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
856 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
860 * 1: peer may send requests
861 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
863 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
864 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
866 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
871 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
872 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
873 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
874 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
875 const unsigned char *npa;
879 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
881 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
882 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
883 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
885 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
887 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
889 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
894 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
897 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
901 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
903 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
904 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
905 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
910 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
911 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
912 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
913 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
915 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
916 const unsigned char *limit)
918 unsigned short type, size;
919 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
920 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
921 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
922 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
923 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
924 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
925 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
927 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
928 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
929 0x01, /* 1 point format */
930 0x00, /* uncompressed */
933 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
934 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
935 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
936 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
937 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
938 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
939 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
940 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
941 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
942 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
945 if (limit - data <= 2)
949 if (limit - data < 4)
954 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
957 if (limit - data < size)
961 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
962 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
963 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
965 if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
967 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
969 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
972 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
974 if (limit - data != (int)(len))
976 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
980 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
982 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
984 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
985 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
990 unsigned char *data = *p;
991 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
994 s->servername_done = 0;
995 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
996 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
997 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1000 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1001 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1002 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1005 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1006 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1007 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit);
1008 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1010 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1011 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1012 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1013 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1017 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1022 if (limit - data < 2)
1027 if (limit - data != len)
1030 while (limit - data >= 4) {
1034 if (limit - data < size)
1037 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
1039 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1040 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1042 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1044 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1045 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1046 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1047 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1048 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1049 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1050 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1051 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1052 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1053 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1054 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1055 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1056 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1057 * the value of the Host: field.
1058 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1059 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1060 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1062 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1066 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1067 unsigned char *sdata;
1080 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1087 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1088 switch (servname_type) {
1089 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1091 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1094 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1095 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1098 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1099 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1100 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1103 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1104 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
1105 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1106 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1107 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1108 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1111 s->servername_done = 1;
1114 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1115 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1116 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1117 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1131 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1132 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1133 if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1))
1135 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1137 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
1139 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1140 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
1142 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1147 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1148 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1149 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1150 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1152 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1155 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
1156 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1157 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1159 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1160 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
1161 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
1162 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1165 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
1166 ecpointformatlist_length;
1167 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
1168 ecpointformatlist_length);
1172 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ",
1173 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1174 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1175 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1176 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
1177 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
1179 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
1180 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1181 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1182 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1184 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1185 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
1186 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
1187 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
1191 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1194 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1195 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
1196 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
1197 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1200 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
1201 ellipticcurvelist_length;
1202 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
1203 ellipticcurvelist_length);
1207 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ",
1208 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1209 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1210 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1211 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
1212 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
1215 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1216 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1217 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1218 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
1219 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1222 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1225 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1226 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
1227 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1231 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1232 /* shouldn't really happen */
1233 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1236 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1237 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1238 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
1240 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
1241 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1242 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
1243 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1248 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1249 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1250 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
1251 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1253 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1256 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1257 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1259 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1260 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
1262 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1267 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1269 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1271 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1272 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
1277 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1279 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1280 const unsigned char *sdata;
1282 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1289 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
1290 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
1292 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
1295 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
1296 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
1297 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1301 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
1310 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1316 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
1319 if (data != sdata) {
1320 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1323 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
1324 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1325 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1330 /* Read in request_extensions */
1339 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1340 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1341 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1344 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1345 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
1346 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
1351 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
1354 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1356 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1357 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
1359 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1360 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1362 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1363 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1364 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1367 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1372 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1373 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1374 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
1376 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1379 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1380 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1381 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1382 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1383 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1384 * anything like that, but this might change).
1386 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1387 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1388 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1389 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1390 * Finished message could have been computed.)
1392 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1396 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1397 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1398 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
1399 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
1400 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
1408 /* Spurious data on the end */
1416 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1418 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1419 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1420 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1422 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1428 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1432 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1434 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1435 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
1436 * fill the length of the block.
1438 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1440 unsigned int off = 0;
1453 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
1456 unsigned short length;
1457 unsigned short type;
1458 unsigned short size;
1459 unsigned char *data = *p;
1460 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1461 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1463 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1464 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1466 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1468 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1469 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1470 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1473 if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
1477 if ((d + n) - data != length) {
1478 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1482 while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
1486 if ((d + n) - data < size)
1489 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1490 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1492 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1493 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
1494 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1497 tlsext_servername = 1;
1499 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1500 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1501 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1502 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1504 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1505 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
1506 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1510 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1511 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
1512 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1513 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
1514 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
1515 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1518 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
1519 ecpointformatlist_length;
1520 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
1521 ecpointformatlist_length);
1525 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1526 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1527 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1528 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
1529 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
1532 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1534 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1535 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1536 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
1537 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1539 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1542 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1544 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1547 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1549 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1550 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1551 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
1552 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1555 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1558 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1559 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
1560 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1564 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1565 /* shouldn't really happen */
1566 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1568 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
1569 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1570 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
1572 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
1573 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1576 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
1577 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1582 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1583 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
1585 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
1588 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
1589 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1592 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1593 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1595 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1596 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1597 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
1598 unsigned char *selected;
1599 unsigned char selected_len;
1601 /* We must have requested it. */
1602 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
1603 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1606 /* The data must be valid */
1607 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
1608 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1612 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
1614 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
1615 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1616 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1619 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1620 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
1621 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1624 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1625 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1626 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1629 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1630 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1632 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1634 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1635 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
1637 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
1638 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1640 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
1641 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1642 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1645 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1650 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1651 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
1652 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
1660 if (data != d + n) {
1661 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1665 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
1666 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
1667 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
1668 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1669 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
1670 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1674 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1685 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
1686 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
1687 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
1688 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
1689 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
1690 * initial connect only.
1692 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1693 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1694 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1696 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1703 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1705 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1707 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
1708 * suite, send the point formats and elliptic curves we support.
1713 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1714 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1716 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1717 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1719 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1720 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1721 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1722 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1727 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1729 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
1730 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1731 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) {
1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1733 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1736 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1737 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1738 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] =
1739 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1740 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] =
1741 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1743 /* we support all named elliptic curves in RFC 4492 */
1744 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
1745 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1746 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
1747 sizeof(pref_list) / sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
1748 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
1749 OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
1750 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1752 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1755 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
1756 sizeof(pref_list) / sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++) {
1757 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
1761 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1763 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1767 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
1768 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
1770 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1775 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1776 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1777 /* shouldn't really happen */
1778 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1781 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
1782 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1783 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
1785 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
1786 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
1787 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1789 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
1790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1791 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1794 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len =
1795 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1800 * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate
1801 * server opaque PRF input
1803 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
1804 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1811 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1813 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1815 * If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats
1816 * we support if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note
1817 * that the server is not supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1820 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1821 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1822 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1823 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1824 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1827 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
1828 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1829 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) {
1830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1831 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1834 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1835 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1836 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] =
1837 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1838 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] =
1839 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1841 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1846 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
1848 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1849 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1851 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1853 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
1854 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1857 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
1858 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1862 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1864 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
1865 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1866 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
1867 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1869 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
1871 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1873 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1876 * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we
1877 * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this
1878 * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early().
1883 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
1884 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
1886 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1888 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1889 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1894 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1895 /* shouldn't really happen */
1896 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1898 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1900 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1901 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1902 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len ==
1903 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) {
1905 * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF
1906 * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input!
1909 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
1910 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1911 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
1913 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
1914 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
1915 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1917 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
1918 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1919 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1922 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
1923 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1927 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
1929 * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we
1930 * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the
1933 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1934 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1941 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1942 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1945 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1946 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
1949 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1950 s->servername_done = 0;
1956 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
1958 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1962 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1963 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has
1964 * changed, and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because
1965 * this may influence which certificate is sent
1967 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
1969 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
1970 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
1971 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1972 if (certpkey == NULL) {
1973 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1977 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1978 * et al can pick it up.
1980 s->cert->key = certpkey;
1981 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1983 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1984 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1985 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1987 /* status request response should be sent */
1988 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1989 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1990 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1992 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1994 /* something bad happened */
1995 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1996 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1997 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2001 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2005 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2006 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2009 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2010 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2018 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2020 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2021 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2023 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2025 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2026 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2027 * must contain uncompressed.
2029 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2030 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2031 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2032 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2033 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2034 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2035 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2036 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2037 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2039 unsigned char *list;
2040 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2041 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2042 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2043 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2044 found_uncompressed = 1;
2048 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2050 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2054 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2055 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2057 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2059 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2060 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2061 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2062 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2064 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2066 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2068 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2069 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) {
2071 * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on
2072 * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a
2073 * value from the server too.
2076 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2077 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2078 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2082 * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to
2083 * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size.
2085 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2086 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len !=
2087 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
2088 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2089 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2095 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2098 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2099 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2102 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2105 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
2106 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2107 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2109 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2110 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2112 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2113 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2116 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2117 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2122 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2123 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2126 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2127 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2130 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2131 s->servername_done = 0;
2138 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2139 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2140 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2142 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2143 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2144 * extension, if any.
2145 * len: the length of the session ID.
2146 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2147 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2148 * point to the resulting session.
2150 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2151 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2152 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2155 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2156 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2157 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2158 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2159 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2160 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2161 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2164 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2165 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2166 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2167 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2168 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2169 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2171 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2172 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2174 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2175 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2179 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2182 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2185 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2187 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2191 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2192 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2200 /* Skip past cipher list */
2206 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2212 /* Now at start of extensions */
2216 while (limit - p >= 4) {
2217 unsigned short type, size;
2220 if (limit - p < size)
2222 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2226 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2229 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2232 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2234 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2235 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2236 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2237 * calculate the master secret later.
2241 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2243 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2244 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2246 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2248 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2249 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2251 default: /* fatal error */
2261 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2263 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2264 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2265 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2266 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2267 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2268 * point to the resulting session.
2271 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2272 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2273 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2274 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2276 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2277 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2278 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2281 unsigned char *sdec;
2282 const unsigned char *p;
2283 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2284 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2287 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2289 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2290 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2291 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2292 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2293 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2294 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2303 /* Check key name matches */
2304 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2306 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2307 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2308 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2309 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2312 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
2315 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2317 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2320 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
2321 if (eticklen <= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) {
2322 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2323 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2328 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2329 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2330 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2331 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2332 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
2333 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2336 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2337 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2338 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2339 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2340 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2342 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2345 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2346 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
2347 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2352 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2355 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2359 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
2360 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
2361 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
2365 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2366 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2375 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
2380 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2387 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2388 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2389 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2391 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2392 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2394 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2395 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2396 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2398 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2399 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2400 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2404 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2405 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2406 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2408 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2409 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2411 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2412 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2416 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2419 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
2420 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2427 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2430 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
2431 if (table[i].id == id)
2432 return table[i].nid;
2438 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
2444 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2445 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2448 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2451 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2452 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2456 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2458 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2459 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2462 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2465 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2466 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2469 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2470 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2471 return EVP_sha224();
2473 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2474 return EVP_sha256();
2476 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2477 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2478 return EVP_sha384();
2480 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2481 return EVP_sha512();
2489 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2491 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2496 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2497 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2499 /* Should never happen */
2503 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2504 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2505 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2506 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2508 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2) {
2509 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i + 1];
2512 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2513 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2514 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2517 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2518 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2519 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2522 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2523 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2531 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
2532 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2534 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2535 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2536 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2543 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2544 * supported it stays as NULL.
2546 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2547 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2548 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2550 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2551 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
2552 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2553 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2556 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2557 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2558 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2566 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2568 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
2569 unsigned short hbtype;
2570 unsigned int payload;
2571 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2573 if (s->msg_callback)
2574 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2575 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
2576 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2578 /* Read type and payload length first */
2579 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2580 return 0; /* silently discard */
2583 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2584 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
2587 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
2588 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
2592 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
2593 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
2595 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2598 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
2599 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
2601 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
2603 /* Random padding */
2604 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) {
2605 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
2609 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
2610 3 + payload + padding);
2612 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
2613 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2614 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
2615 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2617 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
2621 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
2625 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
2626 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
2630 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
2632 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
2639 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2641 unsigned char *buf, *p;
2643 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
2644 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2646 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
2647 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
2648 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
2649 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
2653 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
2654 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
2655 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
2659 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
2660 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
2661 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2666 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
2667 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
2669 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
2672 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
2673 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
2674 * some random stuff.
2675 * - Message Type, 1 byte
2676 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
2677 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
2678 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
2681 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2684 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
2685 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
2687 /* Sequence number */
2688 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
2689 /* 16 random bytes */
2690 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) {
2691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2695 /* Random padding */
2696 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) {
2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2701 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
2703 if (s->msg_callback)
2704 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2705 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
2706 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2708 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;