2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
154 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
155 #include <openssl/rand.h>
156 #include <openssl/objects.h>
157 #include <openssl/evp.h>
158 #include <openssl/md5.h>
160 # include <openssl/fips.h>
162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
163 # include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #include <openssl/bn.h>
166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
167 # include <openssl/engine.h>
170 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
172 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return (SSLv3_client_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
185 ssl_undefined_function,
186 ssl3_connect, ssl3_get_client_method)
188 int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
191 unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
192 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
194 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
196 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
200 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
201 cb = s->info_callback;
202 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
203 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
206 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
211 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
212 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
215 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
216 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
225 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
227 s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
228 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
232 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
233 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
237 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
239 if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
241 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
246 /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
247 s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
249 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
250 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
252 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
255 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
257 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
264 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
269 /* setup buffing BIO */
270 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
272 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
276 /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
278 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
280 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
281 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
283 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
285 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
287 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
290 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
291 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
294 ret = ssl3_client_hello(s);
297 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
300 /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
301 if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
302 s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
306 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
307 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
308 ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
313 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
315 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
316 /* receive renewed session ticket */
317 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
321 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
325 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
326 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
328 /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
329 ret = ssl3_check_finished(s);
334 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
339 /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
343 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
344 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
345 ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
349 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
350 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
352 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
355 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
361 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
366 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
367 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
368 ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
371 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
375 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
378 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
380 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
385 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
386 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
387 ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
390 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
394 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
395 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
396 ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
400 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
401 if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
403 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
404 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
409 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
410 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
412 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
417 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
418 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
419 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
420 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
421 ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
424 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
428 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
429 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
430 ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
434 * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
437 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
438 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
441 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
442 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
443 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
444 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
446 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
447 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
449 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
451 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
452 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
458 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
459 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
460 ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
463 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
467 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
468 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
469 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
471 SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
475 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
476 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
478 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
479 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
481 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
485 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
486 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
487 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
489 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
490 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
492 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
494 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
496 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
500 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
501 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
504 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
510 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
511 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
512 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
513 ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
516 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
520 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
521 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
522 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
523 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
524 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
526 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
528 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
531 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
534 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
536 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
537 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) {
538 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
539 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
540 s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
545 * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
547 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
548 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
552 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
558 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
559 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
560 ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
563 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
567 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
568 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
569 ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
572 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
577 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
578 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
579 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
580 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
581 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
582 SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
587 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
589 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
593 case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
594 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
595 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
599 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
600 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
604 /* clean a few things up */
605 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
607 if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
608 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
613 * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
616 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
617 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
618 /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
624 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
626 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
630 s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect;
631 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
634 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
647 /* did we do anything */
648 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
650 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
654 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
655 new_state = s->state;
657 cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
658 s->state = new_state;
668 cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
672 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
675 unsigned char *p, *d;
678 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
683 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
684 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
685 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
686 if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
687 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
688 !sess->session_id_length ||
691 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
692 * "ticket" without a session ID.
694 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
696 (sess->not_resumable)) {
697 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
700 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
702 p = s->s3->client_random;
704 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
707 /* Do the message type and length last */
711 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
712 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
713 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
714 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
715 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
716 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
717 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
718 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
721 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
722 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
723 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
724 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
725 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
726 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
727 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
728 * know that is maximum server supports.
729 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
730 * containing version 1.0.
732 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
733 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
734 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
735 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
736 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
737 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
738 * the negotiated version.
741 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
742 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
743 s->client_version = s->version;
745 *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
746 *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
750 memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
751 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
757 i = s->session->session_id_length;
760 if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
764 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
768 /* Ciphers supported */
769 i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0);
771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
774 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
776 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
777 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
780 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
781 && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
782 i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
788 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
792 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
793 || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
796 j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
798 for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
799 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
803 *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
807 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
812 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p,
813 buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
822 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
825 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
826 /* number of bytes to write */
827 s->init_num = p - buf;
831 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
832 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
834 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
838 int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
840 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
842 unsigned char *p, *d;
846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
850 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
851 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
852 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, &ok);
857 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
858 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
859 if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) {
860 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
862 } else { /* already sent a cookie */
864 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
871 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
872 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
877 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
879 if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
880 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
881 s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | p[1];
882 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
887 /* load the server hello data */
888 /* load the server random */
889 memcpy(s->s3->server_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
890 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
894 /* get the session-id */
897 if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
898 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
904 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
905 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
906 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
907 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
908 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
909 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
910 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
911 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
912 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
913 * server wants to resume.
915 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
916 s->session->tlsext_tick) {
917 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
918 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
919 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
920 &s->session->master_key_length,
922 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
923 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
924 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
926 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
927 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
931 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
933 if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
934 && memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
935 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
936 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
937 /* actually a client application bug */
938 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
940 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
946 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
947 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
948 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
949 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
950 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
952 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
953 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
954 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
958 s->session->session_id_length = j;
959 memcpy(s->session->session_id, p, j); /* j could be 0 */
962 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
965 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
969 /* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later */
970 if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
971 (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)) {
972 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
976 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
977 if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
978 !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
979 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
983 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
984 p += ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
986 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
987 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
989 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
990 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
996 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
997 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
998 * set and use it for comparison.
1000 if (s->session->cipher)
1001 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1002 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1003 /* Workaround is now obsolete */
1005 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
1008 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1010 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1014 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1016 * Don't digest cached records if TLS v1.2: we may need them for client
1019 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION
1020 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
1021 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1024 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1026 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1028 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1030 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1034 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1035 * using compression.
1037 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1038 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1044 if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) {
1045 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1047 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1052 else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
1053 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1057 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, j);
1059 if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) {
1060 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1062 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1065 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1069 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1070 /* TLS extensions */
1071 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1072 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) {
1073 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */
1074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1077 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1085 /* wrong packet length */
1086 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1093 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1095 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1099 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
1101 int al, i, ok, ret = -1;
1102 unsigned long n, nc, llen, l;
1104 const unsigned char *q, *p;
1106 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1108 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1109 int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
1112 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1115 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1120 if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
1121 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
1122 (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) {
1123 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1127 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
1128 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
1132 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1134 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1140 if (llen + 3 != n) {
1141 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1145 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
1147 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
1148 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1150 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1155 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, l);
1157 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1162 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1164 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1167 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1176 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1177 if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
1178 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1179 && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
1180 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
1181 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1183 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1185 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1188 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1190 sc = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1194 if (s->session->sess_cert)
1195 ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
1196 s->session->sess_cert = sc;
1198 sc->cert_chain = sk;
1200 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1201 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1203 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1206 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1209 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
1211 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
1212 need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
1213 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
1217 fprintf(stderr, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey, x);
1218 fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x, pkey));
1219 fprintf(stderr, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
1220 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
1221 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
1222 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
1223 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1225 if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) {
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1229 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1233 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1234 if (need_cert && i < 0) {
1237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1238 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1243 sc->peer_cert_type = i;
1244 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1246 * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
1249 if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
1250 X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
1251 sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
1252 sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
1254 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
1255 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1256 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1257 s->session->peer = x;
1259 sc->peer_cert_type = i;
1260 sc->peer_key = NULL;
1262 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
1263 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1264 s->session->peer = NULL;
1266 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1273 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1275 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1278 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1280 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1284 int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1286 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1287 unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
1290 unsigned char *param, *p;
1292 long i, param_len, n, alg_k, alg_a;
1293 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1294 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1302 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
1303 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1304 EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1306 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
1309 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1312 * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
1313 * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
1315 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1316 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1317 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1318 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1322 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1324 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
1326 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
1329 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) {
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1331 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1336 * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
1337 * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
1340 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
1341 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1342 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
1343 OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1344 s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1347 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1351 param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1352 if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
1353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1354 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) {
1355 RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
1356 s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
1359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1360 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) {
1361 DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
1362 s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
1365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1366 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) {
1367 EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
1368 s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
1372 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1375 /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
1378 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1380 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1383 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
1385 if (param_len > n) {
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1392 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1393 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1394 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1397 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1398 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1402 if (i > n - param_len) {
1403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1404 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
1409 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
1410 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
1411 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1419 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1421 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1423 if (param_len > n) {
1424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1429 if (i > n - param_len) {
1430 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
1435 if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1441 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1449 if (i > n - param_len) {
1450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
1455 if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1461 if (1 > n - param_len) {
1462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1467 i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
1470 if (i > n - param_len) {
1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
1476 if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1482 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1490 if (i > n - param_len) {
1491 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
1496 if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1503 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
1504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1508 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1509 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1510 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1512 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1513 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1517 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1518 else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
1520 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1521 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
1525 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1526 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1527 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
1528 /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
1529 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
1530 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1534 if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1540 if (param_len > n) {
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1546 if (i > n - param_len) {
1547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
1552 if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n))) {
1553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1558 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1566 if (i > n - param_len) {
1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
1572 if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e))) {
1573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1579 /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
1580 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1582 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1583 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1589 if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey) <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
1590 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1595 s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
1598 #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
1601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1602 else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
1603 if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1609 if (param_len > n) {
1610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1615 if (i > n - param_len) {
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
1621 if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1627 if (BN_is_zero(dh->p)) {
1628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE);
1633 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1641 if (i > n - param_len) {
1642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
1647 if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1653 if (BN_is_zero(dh->g)) {
1654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE);
1658 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1666 if (i > n - param_len) {
1667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
1672 if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1679 if (BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) {
1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE);
1684 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1685 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1687 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1688 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1692 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1693 else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
1695 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1696 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
1699 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1701 s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
1703 } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) {
1704 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1706 SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
1709 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1711 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1712 else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
1714 const EC_GROUP *group;
1716 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
1717 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1722 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1723 * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
1724 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
1728 * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
1729 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
1730 * byte for the length of the encoded point
1733 if (param_len > n) {
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1738 if ((*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
1739 ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)) {
1740 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1742 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1746 ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
1747 if (ngroup == NULL) {
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1751 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
1752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1755 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
1757 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
1759 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1760 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1761 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
1762 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1763 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1769 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1770 if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
1771 ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1776 encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
1779 if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
1780 (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
1781 p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) {
1782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1785 param_len += encoded_pt_len;
1788 p += encoded_pt_len;
1791 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1792 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1796 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1797 else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1799 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1800 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1802 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1803 else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1805 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1806 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
1808 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1809 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
1810 s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
1812 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1814 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
1815 srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1817 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1821 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1823 /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
1825 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1827 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1834 sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1835 /* Should never happen */
1837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1840 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1841 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
1842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1843 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1844 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1847 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
1849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1853 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1866 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1869 * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
1871 if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
1872 /* wrong packet length */
1873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1877 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1878 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1884 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1885 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1886 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
1887 (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1,
1889 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1890 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1891 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1892 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1893 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len) <= 0
1894 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size) <= 0) {
1895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1896 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1897 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1903 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa);
1905 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
1911 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1912 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1918 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1919 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1920 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1921 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1922 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1923 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len) <= 0) {
1924 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1925 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1928 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
1930 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1936 /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
1937 if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
1938 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1941 /* still data left over */
1943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1947 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1948 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1951 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1953 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1954 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1958 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1963 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1964 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
1968 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1969 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1973 int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1976 unsigned long n, nc, l;
1977 unsigned int llen, ctype_num, i;
1978 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1979 const unsigned char *p, *q;
1981 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
1983 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1984 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
1985 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
1986 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1991 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
1993 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
1994 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1996 * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
1997 * wont be doing client auth.
1999 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2000 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
2006 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
2007 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2012 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
2013 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2014 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
2015 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2017 SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
2022 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2024 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2029 /* get the certificate types */
2031 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER)
2032 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
2033 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
2034 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = p[i];
2036 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2039 * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
2042 if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) {
2043 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2045 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2048 if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_process_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) {
2049 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2051 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2057 /* get the CA RDNs */
2062 out = fopen("/tmp/vsign.der", "w");
2063 fwrite(p, 1, llen, out);
2068 if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) {
2069 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2074 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
2076 if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
2077 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2078 goto cont; /* netscape bugs */
2079 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
2086 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) {
2087 /* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
2088 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
2091 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2098 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2100 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2103 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2117 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2118 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2119 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2120 if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
2121 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2122 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2128 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2131 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2135 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2137 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2141 int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
2143 int ok, al, ret = 0, ticklen;
2145 const unsigned char *p;
2147 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
2149 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2150 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
2151 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
2152 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, &ok);
2158 /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
2159 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2164 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2166 n2l(p, ticket_lifetime_hint);
2168 /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
2169 if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
2170 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2175 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
2179 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2180 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2181 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2183 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2186 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2188 * Remove the old session from the cache
2190 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
2191 if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
2192 s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
2195 /* We carry on if this fails */
2196 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2200 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2201 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2206 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2207 s->session = new_sess;
2210 if (s->session->tlsext_tick) {
2211 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
2212 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
2214 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2215 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) {
2216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2219 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
2220 s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2221 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
2223 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2224 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2225 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2226 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2227 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2228 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2229 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2230 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2231 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2233 EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
2234 s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
2235 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2236 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
2243 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2245 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2249 int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
2252 unsigned long resplen, n;
2253 const unsigned char *p;
2255 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2256 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
2257 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
2263 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
2265 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
2266 * tlsext_status_expected is set
2268 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2271 /* need at least status type + length */
2272 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2276 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2277 if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2278 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2283 if (resplen + 4 != n) {
2284 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2288 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
2289 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
2290 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2294 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
2296 if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2298 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2300 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2305 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2312 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2313 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2318 int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
2323 /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
2324 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2325 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
2326 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
2327 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, &ok);
2332 /* should contain no data */
2333 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2335 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2342 int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2344 unsigned char *p, *d;
2346 unsigned long alg_k;
2347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2349 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2351 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2353 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2355 EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
2356 const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
2357 EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
2358 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2359 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
2360 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2363 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
2364 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2367 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2369 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2373 else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2375 unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2377 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
2379 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2382 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2386 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
2387 rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
2390 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
2391 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].
2393 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2394 || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2396 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2397 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2400 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2401 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2404 tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2405 tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2406 if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
2409 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof tmp_buf;
2412 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2413 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
2415 n = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
2416 tmp_buf, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2418 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2420 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2425 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2429 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2430 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2435 s->session->master_key_length =
2436 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2438 session->master_key,
2441 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
2444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2445 else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2446 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2447 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2448 /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
2449 krb5_data *enc_ticket;
2450 krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
2451 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2452 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2453 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2454 unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2455 unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2456 int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
2458 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2461 fprintf(stderr, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
2463 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2466 # ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
2468 authp = &authenticator;
2469 # endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
2471 krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err);
2472 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2477 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
2478 if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
2479 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
2482 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2485 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2491 * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
2492 * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
2494 * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
2495 * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
2496 * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
2497 * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
2498 * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
2500 * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
2501 * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
2502 * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
2503 * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
2505 * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
2506 * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
2507 * optional authenticator omitted.
2510 /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
2511 s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
2512 memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
2513 p += enc_ticket->length;
2514 n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
2516 /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
2517 if (authp && authp->length) {
2518 s2n(authp->length, p);
2519 memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
2521 n += authp->length + 2;
2527 s2n(0, p); /* null authenticator length */
2531 tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2532 tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2533 if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
2537 * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
2538 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
2539 * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
2540 * kssl_ctx->length);
2541 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
2544 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2545 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
2546 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf,
2548 EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
2550 if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
2551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2552 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2555 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2557 /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
2559 memcpy(p, epms, outl);
2563 s->session->master_key_length =
2564 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2566 session->master_key,
2570 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
2571 OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
2574 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2575 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2576 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
2578 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
2579 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2581 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2585 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
2586 dh_srvr = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
2588 /* we get them from the cert */
2589 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2591 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
2595 /* generate a new random key */
2596 if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
2597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2600 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
2601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2607 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2608 * clear it out afterwards
2611 n = DH_compute_key(p, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
2614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2619 /* generate master key from the result */
2620 s->session->master_key_length =
2621 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2623 session->master_key,
2628 /* send off the data */
2629 n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
2631 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
2638 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2639 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2640 const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
2642 int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
2645 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
2646 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2648 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2653 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2654 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2655 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2657 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
2659 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2660 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2661 * To add such support, one needs to add
2662 * code that checks for appropriate
2663 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2664 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2665 * key on the same curve as the server's
2666 * and the key should be authorized for
2669 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2670 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2673 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2674 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2675 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2676 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2680 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
2681 tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
2683 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2685 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
2686 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
2687 if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
2688 || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
2689 || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
2690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2691 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2695 tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
2698 srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2699 srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
2701 if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
2702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2703 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2707 if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2709 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2713 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
2714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2717 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2719 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2720 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2722 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2723 tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
2724 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2725 if (priv_key == NULL) {
2726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2727 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2730 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2735 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2736 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
2737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2744 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2745 * clear it out afterwards
2748 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
2749 if (field_size <= 0) {
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2753 n = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, srvr_ecpoint,
2756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2760 /* generate master key from the result */
2761 s->session->master_key_length =
2762 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2764 session->master_key,
2767 memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
2769 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2770 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2774 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2778 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2779 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2780 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2783 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
2784 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
2785 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
2786 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2788 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2792 /* Encode the public key */
2793 n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2794 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2795 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2796 encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
2798 *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
2799 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2801 /* copy the point */
2802 memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
2803 /* increment n to account for length field */
2807 /* Free allocated memory */
2808 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2809 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2810 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2811 if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
2812 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
2813 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
2815 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
2816 else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2817 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2818 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2821 unsigned int md_len;
2823 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2824 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
2828 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2832 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
2836 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2839 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2843 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
2844 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2845 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2847 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2851 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2853 * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2854 * certificate key for key exchange
2857 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2859 if (pkey_ctx == NULL
2860 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2861 /* Generate session key */
2862 || RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) {
2863 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2865 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2869 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2871 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
2872 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2873 (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
2875 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2882 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2885 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
2886 if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
2887 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94)) <= 0
2888 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2889 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2890 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2891 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2892 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2893 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
2894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2895 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2898 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
2899 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2900 (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
2902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2906 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2908 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2910 *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
2912 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, premaster_secret, 32)
2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2918 if (msglen >= 0x80) {
2920 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2923 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2926 memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
2927 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2928 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2929 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
2930 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2931 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
2933 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2934 s->session->master_key_length =
2935 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2937 session->master_key,
2940 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
2943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2944 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2945 if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
2946 /* send off the data */
2947 n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
2949 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
2952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2953 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2956 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2957 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2958 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2959 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2961 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2965 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2966 SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,
2967 s->session->master_key)) <
2969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2970 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2975 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2976 else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2978 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2979 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2982 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
2983 size_t identity_len;
2984 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2985 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2986 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2990 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2992 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2996 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2997 psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2998 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
3000 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
3001 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
3002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3003 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3005 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
3006 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3007 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
3010 identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
3011 identity_len = strlen(identity);
3012 if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
3013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3014 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3017 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
3018 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
3020 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
3022 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
3026 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
3027 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
3028 s->session->psk_identity_hint =
3029 BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
3030 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL
3031 && s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
3032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3033 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3037 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
3038 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
3039 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
3040 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
3041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3042 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3046 s->session->master_key_length =
3047 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
3049 session->master_key,
3052 s2n(identity_len, p);
3053 memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
3054 n = 2 + identity_len;
3057 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
3058 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
3060 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3066 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3071 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
3074 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
3075 /* number of bytes to write */
3076 s->init_num = n + 4;
3080 /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
3081 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3084 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3085 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
3086 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3087 if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
3088 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
3089 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
3091 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3095 int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
3097 unsigned char *p, *d;
3098 unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
3100 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
3106 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3108 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
3109 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3111 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
3112 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
3113 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3114 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx) <= 0) {
3115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3118 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
3119 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
3120 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
3123 [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
3128 * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
3129 * digest and cached handshake records.
3131 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3134 const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
3135 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3136 if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
3137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3142 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
3145 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3146 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
3147 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
3148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3153 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3156 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3157 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3158 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
3159 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
3160 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
3161 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
3162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
3169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3170 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3171 if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
3172 &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3173 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
3174 (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
3175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
3182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3183 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3184 if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
3185 &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3186 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
3187 (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
3188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
3195 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3196 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3197 unsigned char signbuf[64];
3199 size_t sigsize = 64;
3200 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
3201 NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
3202 if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
3203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3206 for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
3207 p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
3212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3215 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
3218 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
3219 s->init_num = (int)n + 4;
3222 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3223 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3224 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3226 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3227 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3228 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3232 int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3235 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3239 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
3240 if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
3241 (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
3242 (s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
3243 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
3245 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
3248 /* We need to get a client cert */
3249 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
3251 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3252 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3254 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3256 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3259 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3260 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3261 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
3262 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3264 } else if (i == 1) {
3266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3267 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3273 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3275 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3276 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3277 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3280 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3284 /* Ok, we have a cert */
3285 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
3288 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
3289 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
3290 l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
3291 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
3292 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key->x509);
3294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3295 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3296 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3299 s->init_num = (int)l;
3302 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
3303 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3306 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3308 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3312 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3321 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3323 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3324 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3326 /* we don't have a certificate */
3327 if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH | SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3330 sc = s->session->sess_cert;
3332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3335 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3336 rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
3338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3339 dh = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
3342 /* This is the passed certificate */
3344 idx = sc->peer_cert_type;
3345 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3346 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3347 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) {
3349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3356 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
3357 pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
3358 i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
3359 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3361 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3362 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3364 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3368 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3370 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3374 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3375 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
3376 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
3377 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3379 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3381 } else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3382 if (pkey_bits <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3383 if (!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3385 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3389 /* server key exchange is not allowed. */
3390 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3399 if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && dh == NULL) {
3400 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3404 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
3405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3406 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
3409 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3410 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
3411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3412 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
3417 /* Check DHE only: static DH not implemented. */
3418 if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
3419 int dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
3420 if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 1024)
3421 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512)) {
3422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
3426 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
3428 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
3429 pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3430 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3431 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
3433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3434 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
3436 } else if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) >
3437 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3438 /* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */
3439 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
3440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3441 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
3446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3447 if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
3448 if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) >
3449 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3450 /* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */
3451 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
3452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3453 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
3456 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
3457 /* The cert should have had an export DH key. */
3458 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
3459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3460 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
3465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3466 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
3472 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3479 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
3480 * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
3481 * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
3482 * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
3483 * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
3484 * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
3485 * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
3487 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
3491 if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION || !s->tls_session_secret_cb ||
3492 !s->session->tlsext_tick)
3495 /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
3496 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
3498 * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
3499 * so permit appropriate message length.
3500 * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
3501 * and not its length.
3503 s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3506 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3507 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
3512 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3514 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
3517 /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
3518 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3520 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3527 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3528 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
3530 unsigned int len, padding_len;
3533 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) {
3534 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
3535 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3536 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3538 memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
3539 d[5 + len] = padding_len;
3540 memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
3541 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
3542 l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
3543 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
3544 s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
3548 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3550 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
3551 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
3553 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3557 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3558 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3559 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3560 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3565 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3566 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);