2 * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_local.h"
12 #include "statem_local.h"
13 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
15 #define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION 0
18 * 2 bytes for packet length, 2 bytes for format version, 2 bytes for
19 * protocol version, 2 bytes for group id, 2 bytes for cipher id, 1 byte for
20 * key_share present flag, 4 bytes for timestamp, 2 bytes for the hashlen,
21 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE for transcript hash, 1 byte for app cookie length, app cookie
22 * length bytes, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes for the HMAC of the whole thing.
24 #define MAX_COOKIE_SIZE (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 4 + 2 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + 1 \
25 + SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
28 * Message header + 2 bytes for protocol version + number of random bytes +
29 * + 1 byte for legacy session id length + number of bytes in legacy session id
30 * + 2 bytes for ciphersuite + 1 byte for legacy compression
31 * + 2 bytes for extension block length + 6 bytes for key_share extension
32 * + 4 bytes for cookie extension header + the number of bytes in the cookie
34 #define MAX_HRR_SIZE (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 \
35 + SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH + 2 + 1 + 2 + 6 + 4 \
39 * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
41 int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
42 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
45 const unsigned char *data;
47 /* Parse the length byte */
48 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)
49 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) {
50 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
51 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
55 /* Check that the extension matches */
56 if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) {
57 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
58 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
62 if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
63 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) {
64 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
65 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
69 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
75 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
77 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
78 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
79 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
80 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
81 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
82 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
83 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
84 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
85 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
86 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
87 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
88 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
89 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
90 * the value of the Host: field.
91 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
92 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
93 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
95 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
97 int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
98 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
100 unsigned int servname_type;
101 PACKET sni, hostname;
103 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni)
104 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
105 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
107 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
112 * Although the intent was for server_name to be extensible, RFC 4366
113 * was not clear about it; and so OpenSSL among other implementations,
114 * always and only allows a 'host_name' name types.
115 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
116 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
117 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
119 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
120 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
122 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
123 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
124 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
126 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
131 * In TLSv1.2 and below the SNI is associated with the session. In TLSv1.3
132 * we always use the SNI value from the handshake.
134 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
135 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
136 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
137 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
138 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
142 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
143 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
144 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
145 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
150 * Store the requested SNI in the SSL as temporary storage.
151 * If we accept it, it will get stored in the SSL_SESSION as well.
153 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname);
154 s->ext.hostname = NULL;
155 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->ext.hostname)) {
156 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
157 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
161 s->servername_done = 1;
164 * In TLSv1.2 and below we should check if the SNI is consistent between
165 * the initial handshake and the resumption. In TLSv1.3 SNI is not
166 * associated with the session.
169 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
170 * fall back to a full handshake.
172 s->servername_done = (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL)
173 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname,
174 strlen(s->session->ext.hostname));
180 int tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
181 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
185 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
186 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
187 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
191 /* Received |value| should be a valid max-fragment-length code. */
192 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
193 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
194 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
195 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
200 * RFC 6066: The negotiated length applies for the duration of the session
201 * including session resumptions.
202 * We should receive the same code as in resumed session !
204 if (s->hit && s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode != value) {
205 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
206 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
207 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
212 * Store it in session, so it'll become binding for us
213 * and we'll include it in a next Server Hello.
215 s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
220 int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
225 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I)
226 || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) {
227 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
228 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP,
229 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
234 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
235 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
237 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
238 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP,
239 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
248 int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
249 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
251 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
253 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list)
254 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
255 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS,
256 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
261 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
262 &s->ext.peer_ecpointformats,
263 &s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len)) {
264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
265 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
272 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
274 int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
275 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
277 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb &&
278 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
279 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
280 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
281 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
282 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
289 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
290 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
292 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
294 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
295 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
296 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
297 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
301 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 1)) {
302 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
303 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
310 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
313 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
315 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
316 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
318 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
322 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 0)) {
323 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
324 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
332 int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
333 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
335 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
337 /* We ignore this in a resumption handshake */
341 /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */
345 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) {
346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
347 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
351 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
353 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
355 s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
359 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) {
360 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
361 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
366 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
367 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
369 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
370 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
371 s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
372 if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) {
373 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
374 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
378 s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL;
381 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
384 const unsigned char *id_data;
386 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id)
387 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
389 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
393 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
394 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
395 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
396 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
399 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
403 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
404 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
406 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
411 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) {
412 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
413 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
414 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
420 /* Read in request_extensions */
421 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) {
422 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
423 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
427 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
428 const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
430 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts,
431 X509_EXTENSION_free);
433 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
434 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
435 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
436 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
446 int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
450 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
453 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
461 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN
462 * extension, not including type and length. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
464 int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
467 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
469 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
472 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
473 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
475 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
479 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
481 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
482 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
483 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
484 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
485 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
488 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
490 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
491 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
492 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
493 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
494 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
495 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
496 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
504 int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
507 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
508 unsigned int ct, mki_len, id;
512 /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */
513 if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL)
516 /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */
517 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0
518 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
519 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
520 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
524 srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
525 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
526 /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
527 srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
529 while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
530 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) {
531 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
532 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
537 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
539 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
542 for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) {
543 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof =
544 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
546 if (sprof->id == id) {
547 s->srtp_profile = sprof;
554 /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
555 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) {
556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
557 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
561 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len)
562 || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
563 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
564 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
572 int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
575 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
582 * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
583 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
585 int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
586 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
589 PACKET psk_kex_modes;
592 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes)
593 || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) {
594 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES,
595 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
599 while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) {
600 if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
601 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
602 else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE
603 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX) != 0)
604 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
612 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
613 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
615 int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
619 unsigned int group_id;
620 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
621 const uint16_t *clntgroups, *srvrgroups;
622 size_t clnt_num_groups, srvr_num_groups;
625 if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0)
629 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
631 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
635 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
636 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
637 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
641 /* Get our list of supported groups */
642 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &srvrgroups, &srvr_num_groups);
643 /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
644 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups);
645 if (clnt_num_groups == 0) {
647 * This can only happen if the supported_groups extension was not sent,
648 * because we verify that the length is non-zero when we process that
651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
652 SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION);
656 if (s->s3->group_id != 0 && PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) == 0) {
658 * If we set a group_id already, then we must have sent an HRR
659 * requesting a new key_share. If we haven't got one then that is an
662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
663 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
667 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
668 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
669 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
670 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
671 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
672 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
677 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
678 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
684 * If we sent an HRR then the key_share sent back MUST be for the group
685 * we requested, and must be the only key_share sent.
687 if (s->s3->group_id != 0
688 && (group_id != s->s3->group_id
689 || PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) != 0)) {
690 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
691 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
695 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
696 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 0)) {
697 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
698 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
702 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
703 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrgroups, srvr_num_groups, 1)) {
704 /* Share not suitable */
708 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(group_id)) == NULL) {
709 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
710 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
714 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
716 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
717 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
718 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
720 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
731 int tls_parse_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
734 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
735 unsigned int format, version, key_share, group_id;
738 PACKET cookie, raw, chhash, appcookie;
740 const unsigned char *data, *mdin, *ciphdata;
741 unsigned char hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
742 unsigned char hrr[MAX_HRR_SIZE];
743 size_t rawlen, hmaclen, hrrlen, ciphlen;
744 unsigned long tm, now;
746 /* Ignore any cookie if we're not set up to verify it */
747 if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL
748 || (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
751 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)) {
752 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
753 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
758 data = PACKET_data(&raw);
759 rawlen = PACKET_remaining(&raw);
760 if (rawlen < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
761 || !PACKET_forward(&raw, rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
762 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
763 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
766 mdin = PACKET_data(&raw);
768 /* Verify the HMAC of the cookie */
769 hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
770 pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
771 s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
772 sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext
774 if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
775 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
777 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
778 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
782 hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
783 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0
784 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, data,
785 rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0
786 || hmaclen != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
787 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
789 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
790 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
794 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
797 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(hmac, mdin, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) {
798 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
799 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
803 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &format)) {
804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
805 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
808 /* Check the cookie format is something we recognise. Ignore it if not */
809 if (format != COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
813 * The rest of these checks really shouldn't fail since we have verified the
817 /* Check the version number is sane */
818 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &version)) {
819 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
820 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
823 if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
824 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
825 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
829 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &group_id)) {
830 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
831 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
835 ciphdata = PACKET_data(&cookie);
836 if (!PACKET_forward(&cookie, 2)) {
837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
838 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
841 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id
842 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher
843 != ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, ciphdata, 0)) {
845 * We chose a different cipher or group id this time around to what is
846 * in the cookie. Something must have changed.
848 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
853 if (!PACKET_get_1(&cookie, &key_share)
854 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&cookie, &tm)
855 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&cookie, &chhash)
856 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cookie, &appcookie)
857 || PACKET_remaining(&cookie) != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
858 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
859 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
863 /* We tolerate a cookie age of up to 10 minutes (= 60 * 10 seconds) */
864 now = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
865 if (tm > now || (now - tm) > 600) {
866 /* Cookie is stale. Ignore it */
870 /* Verify the app cookie */
871 if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&appcookie),
872 PACKET_remaining(&appcookie)) == 0) {
873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
874 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
879 * Reconstruct the HRR that we would have sent in response to the original
880 * ClientHello so we can add it to the transcript hash.
881 * Note: This won't work with custom HRR extensions
883 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&hrrpkt, hrr, sizeof(hrr), 0)) {
884 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
885 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
888 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
889 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&hrrpkt)
890 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLS1_2_VERSION)
891 || !WPACKET_memcpy(&hrrpkt, hrrrandom, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
892 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&hrrpkt, s->tmp_session_id,
893 s->tmp_session_id_len)
894 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &hrrpkt,
896 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, 0)
897 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)) {
898 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
899 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
900 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
903 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
904 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
905 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->version)
906 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
907 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
908 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
909 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
913 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
914 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
915 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->s3->group_id)
916 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
917 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
918 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
919 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
923 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
924 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
925 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(&hrrpkt, data, rawlen)
926 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* cookie extension */
927 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* extension block */
928 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* message */
929 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&hrrpkt, &hrrlen)
930 || !WPACKET_finish(&hrrpkt)) {
931 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
932 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
933 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
937 /* Reconstruct the transcript hash */
938 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, PACKET_data(&chhash),
939 PACKET_remaining(&chhash), hrr,
941 /* SSLfatal() already called */
945 /* Act as if this ClientHello came after a HelloRetryRequest */
946 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
954 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
955 int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
956 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
958 PACKET supported_groups_list;
960 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
961 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list)
962 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
963 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
965 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
969 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
970 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_supportedgroups);
971 s->ext.peer_supportedgroups = NULL;
972 s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len = 0;
973 if (!tls1_save_u16(&supported_groups_list,
974 &s->ext.peer_supportedgroups,
975 &s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len)) {
976 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
977 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
978 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
987 int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
990 /* The extension must always be empty */
991 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
992 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
993 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EMS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
997 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
1003 int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1004 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1006 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1007 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1008 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1012 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1013 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1014 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1021 static SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *tick,
1024 SSL_SESSION *tmpsess = NULL;
1026 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1028 switch (PACKET_remaining(tick)) {
1030 return SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1032 case SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH:
1036 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1039 tmpsess = lookup_sess_in_cache(s, PACKET_data(tick),
1040 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
1042 if (tmpsess == NULL)
1043 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1046 return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1049 int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1052 PACKET identities, binders, binder;
1053 size_t binderoffset, hashsize;
1054 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1055 unsigned int id, i, ext = 0;
1056 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1059 * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so
1060 * ignore this extension
1062 if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode
1063 & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0)
1066 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) {
1067 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1068 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1072 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1073 for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) {
1075 unsigned long ticket_agel;
1078 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity)
1079 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) {
1080 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1081 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1085 idlen = PACKET_remaining(&identity);
1086 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL
1087 && !s->psk_find_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(&identity), idlen,
1089 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1090 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1094 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1096 && s->psk_server_callback != NULL
1097 && idlen <= PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1099 unsigned char pskdata[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
1100 unsigned int pskdatalen;
1102 if (!PACKET_strndup(&identity, &pskid)) {
1103 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1104 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1107 pskdatalen = s->psk_server_callback(s, pskid, pskdata,
1109 OPENSSL_free(pskid);
1110 if (pskdatalen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
1111 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1112 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1114 } else if (pskdatalen > 0) {
1115 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1116 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
1119 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
1120 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
1122 cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
1123 if (cipher == NULL) {
1124 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1126 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1130 sess = SSL_SESSION_new();
1132 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(sess, pskdata,
1134 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(sess, cipher)
1135 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(sess,
1137 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1138 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1139 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1142 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1145 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1148 /* We found a PSK */
1149 SSL_SESSION *sesstmp = ssl_session_dup(sess, 0);
1151 if (sesstmp == NULL) {
1152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1153 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1156 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1160 * We've just been told to use this session for this context so
1161 * make sure the sid_ctx matches up.
1163 memcpy(sess->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
1164 sess->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
1167 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
1168 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1170 uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems;
1174 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
1175 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
1176 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
1178 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
1179 || (s->max_early_data > 0
1180 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))
1181 ret = tls_get_stateful_ticket(s, &identity, &sess);
1183 ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
1184 PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0,
1187 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY) {
1188 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1189 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1193 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
1194 || ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) {
1195 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1196 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_NONE || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1202 /* Check for replay */
1203 if (s->max_early_data > 0
1204 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0
1205 && !SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, sess)) {
1206 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1211 ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel;
1212 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
1213 agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time;
1214 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
1215 ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add;
1218 * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the
1219 * client does it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age
1220 * is longer than ours (our ticket age calculation should always be
1221 * slightly longer than the client's due to the network latency).
1222 * Therefore we add 1000ms to our age calculation to adjust for
1226 && sess->timeout >= (long)agesec
1227 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec
1228 && ticket_age <= agems + 1000
1229 && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) {
1231 * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it
1234 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
1238 md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2);
1239 if (md != ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)) {
1240 /* The ciphersuite is not compatible with this session. */
1241 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1243 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1244 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1253 binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1254 hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
1256 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) {
1257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1258 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1262 for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) {
1263 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) {
1264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1265 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1270 if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize) {
1271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1272 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1275 if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1276 binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL, sess, 0,
1278 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1282 s->ext.tick_identity = id;
1284 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
1288 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1292 int tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1293 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1295 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1296 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH,
1297 SSL_R_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_ENCODING_ERR);
1301 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
1307 * Add the server's renegotiation binding
1309 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1310 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1313 if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1314 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1316 /* Still add this even if SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is set */
1317 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1318 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1319 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1320 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1321 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1322 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
1323 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
1324 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1325 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1326 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1327 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1328 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1331 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1334 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1335 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1338 if (s->servername_done != 1)
1339 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1342 * Prior to TLSv1.3 we ignore any SNI in the current handshake if resuming.
1343 * We just use the servername from the initial handshake.
1345 if (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1346 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1348 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1349 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1351 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1352 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1355 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1358 /* Add/include the server's max fragment len extension into ServerHello */
1359 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1360 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1363 if (!USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session))
1364 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1367 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
1368 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
1370 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
1371 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1372 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
1373 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1374 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1375 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1376 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1379 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1383 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1384 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1387 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1388 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1389 int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
1390 && (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats != NULL);
1391 const unsigned char *plist;
1395 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1397 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1398 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1399 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1400 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1401 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1402 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1403 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1404 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1407 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1412 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1413 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1416 const uint16_t *groups;
1417 size_t numgroups, i, first = 1;
1419 /* s->s3->group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */
1420 if (s->s3->group_id == 0)
1421 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1423 /* Get our list of supported groups */
1424 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &numgroups);
1425 if (numgroups == 0) {
1426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1427 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1428 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1431 /* Copy group ID if supported */
1432 for (i = 0; i < numgroups; i++) {
1433 uint16_t group = groups[i];
1435 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1438 * Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If
1439 * so we don't need to add this extension
1441 if (s->s3->group_id == group)
1442 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1444 /* Add extension header */
1445 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1446 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1447 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1448 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1449 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1450 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1451 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1452 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1457 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, group)) {
1458 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1459 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1460 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1461 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1466 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1467 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1468 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1469 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1470 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1473 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1477 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1478 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1481 if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1482 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1483 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1486 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1487 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1488 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1489 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1490 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1493 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1497 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1498 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1501 /* We don't currently support this extension inside a CertificateRequest */
1502 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)
1503 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1505 if (!s->ext.status_expected)
1506 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1508 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0)
1509 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1511 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1512 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1513 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1514 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1515 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1519 * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we
1520 * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a
1523 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
1524 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1525 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1527 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1528 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1529 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1530 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1533 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1538 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1539 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1542 const unsigned char *npa;
1543 unsigned int npalen;
1545 int npn_seen = s->s3->npn_seen;
1547 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
1548 if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL)
1549 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1551 ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1552 s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg);
1553 if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1554 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1555 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1557 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG,
1558 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1559 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1561 s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
1564 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1568 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1569 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1571 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
1572 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1574 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1575 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1576 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1577 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1578 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1579 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1580 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1581 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1582 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1583 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1584 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1587 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1591 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1592 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1595 if (s->srtp_profile == NULL)
1596 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1598 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1599 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1600 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1601 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1602 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1603 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1604 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1605 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1606 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1609 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1613 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1614 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1616 if (!s->ext.use_etm)
1617 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1620 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1621 * for other cases too.
1623 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1624 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1625 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1626 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) {
1628 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1631 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1632 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1633 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM,
1634 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1635 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1638 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1641 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1642 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1644 if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
1645 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1647 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1648 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1649 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS,
1650 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1651 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1654 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1657 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1658 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1661 if (!ossl_assert(SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1663 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1664 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1665 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1668 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1669 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1670 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version)
1671 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1672 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1673 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1674 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1675 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1678 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1681 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1682 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1685 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1686 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1687 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1688 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
1690 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
1692 /* Original key_share was acceptable so don't ask for another one */
1693 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1695 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1696 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1697 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)
1698 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1699 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1700 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1701 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1702 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1705 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1709 /* No key_share received from client - must be resuming */
1710 if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
1711 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1712 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1713 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1715 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1718 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1719 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1720 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
1721 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1722 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1723 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1726 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1729 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1730 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1733 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1734 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1735 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1736 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1738 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1739 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1742 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1743 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1744 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1745 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1746 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1747 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1748 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1750 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1752 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
1753 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
1754 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1755 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1756 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1758 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1760 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1764 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1765 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1768 unsigned char *hashval1, *hashval2, *appcookie1, *appcookie2, *cookie;
1769 unsigned char *hmac, *hmac2;
1770 size_t startlen, ciphlen, totcookielen, hashlen, hmaclen, appcookielen;
1773 int ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1775 if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
1776 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1778 if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL) {
1779 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1780 SSL_R_NO_COOKIE_CALLBACK_SET);
1781 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1784 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
1785 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1786 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1787 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &startlen)
1788 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, MAX_COOKIE_SIZE, &cookie)
1789 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
1790 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION)
1791 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)
1792 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt,
1794 /* Is there a key_share extension present in this HRR? */
1795 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)
1796 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, (unsigned int)time(NULL))
1797 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1798 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashval1)) {
1799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1800 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1801 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1805 * Get the hash of the initial ClientHello. ssl_handshake_hash() operates
1806 * on raw buffers, so we first reserve sufficient bytes (above) and then
1807 * subsequently allocate them (below)
1809 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
1810 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval1, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
1811 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1812 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1815 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hashlen, &hashval2)
1816 || !ossl_assert(hashval1 == hashval2)
1817 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1818 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1819 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH, &appcookie1)) {
1820 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1821 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1822 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1825 /* Generate the application cookie */
1826 if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb(s, appcookie1, &appcookielen) == 0) {
1827 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1828 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1829 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1832 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, appcookielen, &appcookie2)
1833 || !ossl_assert(appcookie1 == appcookie2)
1834 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1835 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &totcookielen)
1836 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &hmac)) {
1837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1838 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1839 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1841 hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
1843 totcookielen -= startlen;
1844 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
1845 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1846 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1847 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1850 /* HMAC the cookie */
1851 hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
1852 pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
1853 s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
1854 sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext
1856 if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
1857 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1858 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1862 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0
1863 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, cookie,
1864 totcookielen) <= 0) {
1865 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1866 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1870 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen + hmaclen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE)) {
1871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1872 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1876 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hmaclen, &hmac2)
1877 || !ossl_assert(hmac == hmac2)
1878 || !ossl_assert(cookie == hmac - totcookielen)
1879 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1880 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1881 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1882 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1886 ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1889 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
1890 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1893 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1897 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1898 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1901 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1902 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1903 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1904 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1905 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1906 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1907 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1910 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80
1911 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81)
1912 || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0)
1913 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1915 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1916 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1917 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1918 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1921 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1924 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1925 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1928 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1929 if (s->max_early_data == 0)
1930 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1932 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1933 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1934 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data)
1935 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1936 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1937 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1938 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1941 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1944 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
1945 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1947 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1948 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1949 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1950 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1951 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1952 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1955 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1958 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1959 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1962 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1964 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1965 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1966 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->ext.tick_identity)
1967 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1968 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1969 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1970 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1973 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;