2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
128 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
131 tls1_setup_key_block,
132 tls1_generate_master_secret,
133 tls1_change_cipher_state,
134 tls1_final_finish_mac,
135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
136 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
153 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
157 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
164 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
168 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
171 s->version = s->method->version;
174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
176 static int nid_list[] =
178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
205 static int pref_list[] =
207 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
208 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
209 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
210 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
211 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
212 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
213 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
214 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
215 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
216 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
217 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
221 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
222 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
223 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
224 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
225 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
230 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
231 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
234 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
236 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
237 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
238 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
240 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
243 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
245 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
248 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
250 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
252 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
254 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
256 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
258 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
260 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
262 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
264 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
266 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
268 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
270 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
272 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
274 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
276 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
278 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
280 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
282 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
286 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
288 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
290 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
292 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
294 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
296 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
302 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
306 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
307 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
310 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
311 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
313 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
316 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
317 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
319 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
322 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
323 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
325 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
328 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
329 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
330 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
331 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
333 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
335 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
336 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
339 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
340 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
343 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
347 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
349 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
351 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
355 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
358 unsigned char *orig = buf;
359 unsigned char *ret = buf;
361 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
362 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
363 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
368 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
370 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
372 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
373 unsigned long size_str;
376 /* check for enough space.
377 4 for the servername type and entension length
378 2 for servernamelist length
379 1 for the hostname type
380 2 for hostname length
384 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
385 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
388 /* extension type and length */
389 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
392 /* length of servername list */
395 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
396 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
398 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
402 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
407 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
413 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
415 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
418 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
427 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
428 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
429 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
430 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
432 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
433 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
439 /* check for enough space.
440 4 for the srp type type and entension length
441 1 for the srp user identity
442 + srp user identity length
444 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
446 /* fill in the extension */
447 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
448 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
449 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
450 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
456 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
458 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
461 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
462 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
463 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
469 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
470 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
471 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
472 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
473 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
475 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
477 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
480 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
481 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
482 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
488 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
489 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
491 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
492 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
493 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
494 * resolves this to two bytes.
496 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
497 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
498 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
500 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
502 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
505 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
506 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
507 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
508 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
510 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
511 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
512 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
514 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
515 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
517 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
521 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
522 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
524 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
527 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
528 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
532 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
538 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
540 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
542 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
543 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
544 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
545 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
546 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
549 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
550 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
551 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
553 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
555 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
557 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
560 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
563 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
568 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
569 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
572 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
576 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
578 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
579 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
585 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
587 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
594 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
595 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
596 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
598 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
599 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
601 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
603 /* save position of id len */
604 unsigned char *q = ret;
605 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
606 /* skip over id len */
608 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
614 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
618 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
619 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
621 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
624 * 1: peer may send requests
625 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
627 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
628 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
630 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
634 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
636 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
637 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
638 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
640 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
646 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
650 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
652 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
654 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
657 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
665 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
666 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
668 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
669 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
671 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
673 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
674 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
675 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
676 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
678 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
680 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
688 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
690 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
695 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
698 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
702 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
705 unsigned char *orig = buf;
706 unsigned char *ret = buf;
707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
708 int next_proto_neg_seen;
711 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
712 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
716 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
718 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
720 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
722 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
726 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
730 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
736 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
738 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
741 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
751 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
753 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
756 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
757 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
758 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
764 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
765 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
766 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
767 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
768 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
771 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
772 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
774 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
775 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
777 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
778 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
782 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
784 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
785 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
789 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
790 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
791 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
793 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
795 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
797 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
800 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
803 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
813 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
815 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
817 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
820 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
829 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
830 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
831 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
832 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
833 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
834 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
835 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
836 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
837 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
838 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
839 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
844 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
845 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
846 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
848 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
850 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
853 * 1: peer may send requests
854 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
856 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
857 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
859 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
865 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
866 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
867 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
869 const unsigned char *npa;
873 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
874 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
876 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
877 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
879 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
881 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
886 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
889 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
893 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
894 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
895 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
896 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
901 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
902 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
903 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
904 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
906 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
907 unsigned short type, size;
908 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
909 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
910 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
911 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
912 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
913 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
914 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
916 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
917 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
918 0x01, /* 1 point format */
919 0x00, /* uncompressed */
922 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
923 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
924 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
925 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
926 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
927 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
928 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
929 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
930 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
931 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
943 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
950 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
952 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
953 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
955 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
957 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
959 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
964 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
966 if (data + len != d+n)
968 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
972 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
974 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
976 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
981 unsigned char *data = *p;
982 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
985 s->servername_done = 0;
986 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
988 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
992 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
993 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
997 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
998 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
999 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1001 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1005 if (data > (d+n-len))
1008 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1013 if (data+size > (d+n))
1016 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1018 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1019 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1020 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1021 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1023 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1024 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1025 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1026 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1027 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1028 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1029 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1030 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1031 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1032 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1033 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1034 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1035 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1036 the value of the Host: field.
1037 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1038 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1039 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1040 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1044 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1046 unsigned char *sdata;
1052 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1059 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1066 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1072 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1075 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1076 switch (servname_type)
1078 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1081 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1083 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1086 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1088 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1091 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1093 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1096 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1097 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1098 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1099 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1100 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1101 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1104 s->servername_done = 1;
1108 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1109 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1110 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1122 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1128 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1130 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1132 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1135 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1137 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1140 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1142 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1143 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1145 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1147 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1153 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1154 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1156 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1157 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1159 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1161 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1166 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1168 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1169 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1171 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1172 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1174 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1177 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1178 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1181 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1182 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1183 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1184 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1185 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1188 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
1190 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1191 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1192 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1194 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1195 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1197 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1202 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1204 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1207 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1208 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1210 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1213 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1214 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1217 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1218 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1219 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1220 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1221 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1224 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1225 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1226 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1227 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1229 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1233 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1236 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1237 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1239 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1243 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1244 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1245 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1246 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1248 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1249 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1251 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1256 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1258 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1259 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1261 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1265 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1267 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1269 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1271 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1274 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1276 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1282 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1284 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1287 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1289 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1293 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1294 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1299 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1303 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1305 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1307 const unsigned char *sdata;
1309 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1314 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1323 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1327 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1331 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1336 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1340 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1345 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1346 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1349 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1350 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1351 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1353 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1354 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1357 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1358 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1360 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1361 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1366 /* Read in request_extensions */
1369 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1376 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1382 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1384 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1385 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1388 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1389 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1391 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1392 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1394 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1399 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1403 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1406 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1410 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1411 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1413 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1414 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1415 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1417 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1423 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1424 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1426 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1429 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1430 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1431 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1432 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1433 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1434 * anything like that, but this might change).
1436 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1437 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1438 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1439 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1440 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1441 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1445 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1447 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1449 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1462 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1464 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1465 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1467 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1469 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1477 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1478 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1479 * the length of the block. */
1480 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1482 unsigned int off = 0;
1496 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1498 unsigned short length;
1499 unsigned short type;
1500 unsigned short size;
1501 unsigned char *data = *p;
1502 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1503 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1506 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1509 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1510 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1511 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1514 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1518 if (data+length != d+n)
1520 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1524 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1529 if (data+size > (d+n))
1532 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1533 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1534 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1536 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1538 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1540 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1543 tlsext_servername = 1;
1546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1547 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1549 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1550 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1552 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1553 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1555 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1560 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1561 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1562 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1564 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1567 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1568 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1571 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1572 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1573 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1574 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1575 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1578 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1580 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1582 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1583 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1585 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1588 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1591 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1594 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1596 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1597 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1598 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1600 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1604 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1607 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1608 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1610 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1614 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1615 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1616 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1617 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1619 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1621 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1623 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1628 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1629 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1631 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1632 * a status request message.
1634 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1636 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1639 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1640 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1642 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1643 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1644 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1646 unsigned char *selected;
1647 unsigned char selected_len;
1649 /* We must have requested it. */
1650 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
1652 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1655 /* The data must be valid */
1656 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1658 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1661 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1663 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1666 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1667 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1669 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1672 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1673 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1674 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1677 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1679 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1681 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1683 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1684 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1688 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
1689 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1691 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
1692 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1693 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1695 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1700 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1701 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1703 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1714 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1718 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1720 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1722 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1724 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1725 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1727 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1733 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1743 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1744 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1745 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1746 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1747 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1748 * absence on initial connect only.
1750 if (!renegotiate_seen
1751 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1752 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1754 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1756 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1764 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1767 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1768 * and elliptic curves we support.
1773 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1774 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1776 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1778 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1780 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1781 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1782 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1788 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1791 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1792 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1794 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1797 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1798 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1799 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1800 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1802 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1803 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1804 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
1805 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1807 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1811 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
1812 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
1814 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
1818 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1820 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1824 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1826 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1831 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1833 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1834 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1836 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1837 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1839 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1840 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1845 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1849 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1850 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1857 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1860 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1861 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1862 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1865 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1866 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1867 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1868 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1872 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1873 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1878 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1879 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1880 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1881 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1883 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1888 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
1890 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1891 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1893 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1894 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1895 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1897 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1898 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1902 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1903 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1904 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1905 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1907 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1909 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1910 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1911 * so this has to happen here in
1912 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
1916 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1918 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1921 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1922 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1927 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1928 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1929 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1931 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1933 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1934 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1936 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1937 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1939 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1940 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1942 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1943 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1945 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1946 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1949 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1953 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1955 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1956 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1957 * abort the handshake.
1959 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1960 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1968 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1969 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1972 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1973 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1976 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1977 s->servername_done=0;
1983 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
1985 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1988 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1989 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1990 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
1991 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
1993 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1996 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
1997 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
1998 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1999 if (certpkey == NULL)
2001 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2004 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2005 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2007 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2008 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2011 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2012 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2013 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2015 /* status request response should be sent */
2016 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2017 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2018 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2020 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2022 /* something bad happened */
2023 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2024 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2025 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2030 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2035 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2036 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2039 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2040 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2048 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2050 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2051 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2054 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2055 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2056 * it must contain uncompressed.
2058 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2059 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2060 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2061 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2062 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2064 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2066 unsigned char *list;
2067 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2068 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2069 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2071 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2073 found_uncompressed = 1;
2077 if (!found_uncompressed)
2079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2083 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2084 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2086 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2087 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2088 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2089 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2091 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2092 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2094 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2095 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2097 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2099 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2100 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2103 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2104 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2105 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2106 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2108 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2109 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2114 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2117 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2118 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2121 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2122 * there is no response.
2124 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2126 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2127 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2129 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2130 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2133 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2134 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2138 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2139 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2145 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2146 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2149 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2150 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2153 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2154 s->servername_done=0;
2160 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2161 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2162 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2164 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2165 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2166 * extension, if any.
2167 * len: the length of the session ID.
2168 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2169 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2170 * point to the resulting session.
2172 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2173 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2174 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2177 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2178 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2179 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2180 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2181 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2182 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2183 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2186 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2187 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2188 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2189 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2190 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2191 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2193 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2194 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2196 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2197 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2201 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2203 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2204 * to permit stateful resumption.
2206 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2208 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2212 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2213 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2220 /* Skip past cipher list */
2225 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2230 /* Now at start of extensions */
2231 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2234 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2236 unsigned short type, size;
2239 if (p + size > limit)
2241 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2246 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2247 * currently have one. */
2248 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2251 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2253 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2254 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2255 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2256 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2257 * calculate the master secret later. */
2260 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2263 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2264 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2266 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2268 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2269 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2271 default: /* fatal error */
2280 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2282 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2283 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2284 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2285 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2286 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2287 * point to the resulting session.
2290 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2291 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2292 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2293 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2295 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2296 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2297 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2300 unsigned char *sdec;
2301 const unsigned char *p;
2302 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2303 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2306 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2307 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2310 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2311 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2312 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2313 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2315 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2316 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2327 /* Check key name matches */
2328 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2330 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2331 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2332 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2333 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2335 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2336 * integrity checks on ticket.
2338 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2341 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2345 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2346 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2347 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2348 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2349 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2351 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2352 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2353 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2354 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2355 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2358 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2361 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2362 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2364 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2369 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2372 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2376 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2377 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2378 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2379 * as required by standard.
2382 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2383 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2391 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2396 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2404 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2406 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2409 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2412 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2413 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2416 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2417 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2421 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2423 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2426 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2429 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2433 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2436 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2438 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2444 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2447 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2449 if (table[i].id == id)
2450 return table[i].nid;
2456 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2461 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2462 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2465 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2468 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2469 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2473 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2475 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2476 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2479 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2484 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2488 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2489 return EVP_sha224();
2491 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2492 return EVP_sha256();
2494 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2495 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2496 return EVP_sha384();
2498 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2499 return EVP_sha512();
2507 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2509 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2514 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2515 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2517 /* Should never happen */
2521 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2522 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2523 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2524 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2526 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
2528 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
2532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2533 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2534 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2538 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2539 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2543 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2551 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2553 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2556 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2557 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2558 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2565 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2566 * supported it stays as NULL.
2568 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2569 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2570 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2573 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2575 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2576 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2580 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2581 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2590 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2592 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
2593 unsigned short hbtype;
2594 unsigned int payload;
2595 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2597 if (s->msg_callback)
2598 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2599 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
2600 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2602 /* Read type and payload length first */
2603 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2604 return 0; /* silently discard */
2607 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2608 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
2611 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
2613 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
2616 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
2617 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
2618 * payload, plus padding
2620 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2623 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
2624 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
2626 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
2628 /* Random padding */
2629 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
2631 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
2633 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
2634 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2635 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
2636 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2638 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
2643 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
2647 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
2648 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
2649 * sequence number */
2652 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
2655 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
2663 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2665 unsigned char *buf, *p;
2667 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
2668 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2670 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
2671 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
2672 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
2674 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
2678 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
2679 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
2685 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
2686 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
2688 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2692 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
2693 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
2695 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
2697 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
2698 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
2699 * some random stuff.
2700 * - Message Type, 1 byte
2701 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
2702 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
2703 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
2706 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2709 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
2710 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
2712 /* Sequence number */
2713 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
2714 /* 16 random bytes */
2715 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
2717 /* Random padding */
2718 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
2720 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
2723 if (s->msg_callback)
2724 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2725 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
2726 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2728 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;