/* * validator/validator.c - secure validator DNS query response module * * Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved. * * This software is open source. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * Neither the name of the NLNET LABS nor the names of its contributors may * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without * specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT * HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /** * \file * * This file contains a module that performs validation of DNS queries. * According to RFC 4034. */ #include "config.h" #include "validator/validator.h" #include "validator/val_anchor.h" #include "validator/val_kcache.h" #include "validator/val_kentry.h" #include "validator/val_utils.h" #include "validator/val_nsec.h" #include "validator/val_nsec3.h" #include "validator/val_neg.h" #include "validator/val_sigcrypt.h" #include "validator/autotrust.h" #include "services/cache/dns.h" #include "services/cache/rrset.h" #include "util/data/dname.h" #include "util/module.h" #include "util/log.h" #include "util/net_help.h" #include "util/regional.h" #include "util/config_file.h" #include "util/fptr_wlist.h" #include "sldns/rrdef.h" #include "sldns/wire2str.h" #include "sldns/str2wire.h" /* forward decl for cache response and normal super inform calls of a DS */ static void process_ds_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo, struct sock_list* origin); /** fill up nsec3 key iterations config entry */ static int fill_nsec3_iter(struct val_env* ve, char* s, int c) { char* e; int i; free(ve->nsec3_keysize); free(ve->nsec3_maxiter); ve->nsec3_keysize = (size_t*)calloc(sizeof(size_t), (size_t)c); ve->nsec3_maxiter = (size_t*)calloc(sizeof(size_t), (size_t)c); if(!ve->nsec3_keysize || !ve->nsec3_maxiter) { log_err("out of memory"); return 0; } for(i=0; insec3_keysize[i] = (size_t)strtol(s, &e, 10); if(s == e) { log_err("cannot parse: %s", s); return 0; } s = e; ve->nsec3_maxiter[i] = (size_t)strtol(s, &e, 10); if(s == e) { log_err("cannot parse: %s", s); return 0; } s = e; if(i>0 && ve->nsec3_keysize[i-1] >= ve->nsec3_keysize[i]) { log_err("nsec3 key iterations not ascending: %d %d", (int)ve->nsec3_keysize[i-1], (int)ve->nsec3_keysize[i]); return 0; } verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator nsec3cfg keysz %d mxiter %d", (int)ve->nsec3_keysize[i], (int)ve->nsec3_maxiter[i]); } return 1; } /** apply config settings to validator */ static int val_apply_cfg(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* val_env, struct config_file* cfg) { int c; val_env->bogus_ttl = (uint32_t)cfg->bogus_ttl; if(!env->anchors) env->anchors = anchors_create(); if(!env->anchors) { log_err("out of memory"); return 0; } if(!val_env->kcache) val_env->kcache = key_cache_create(cfg); if(!val_env->kcache) { log_err("out of memory"); return 0; } env->key_cache = val_env->kcache; if(!anchors_apply_cfg(env->anchors, cfg)) { log_err("validator: error in trustanchors config"); return 0; } val_env->date_override = cfg->val_date_override; val_env->skew_min = cfg->val_sig_skew_min; val_env->skew_max = cfg->val_sig_skew_max; c = cfg_count_numbers(cfg->val_nsec3_key_iterations); if(c < 1 || (c&1)) { log_err("validator: unparseable or odd nsec3 key " "iterations: %s", cfg->val_nsec3_key_iterations); return 0; } val_env->nsec3_keyiter_count = c/2; if(!fill_nsec3_iter(val_env, cfg->val_nsec3_key_iterations, c/2)) { log_err("validator: cannot apply nsec3 key iterations"); return 0; } if(!val_env->neg_cache) val_env->neg_cache = val_neg_create(cfg, val_env->nsec3_maxiter[val_env->nsec3_keyiter_count-1]); if(!val_env->neg_cache) { log_err("out of memory"); return 0; } env->neg_cache = val_env->neg_cache; return 1; } #ifdef USE_ECDSA_EVP_WORKAROUND void ecdsa_evp_workaround_init(void); #endif int val_init(struct module_env* env, int id) { struct val_env* val_env = (struct val_env*)calloc(1, sizeof(struct val_env)); if(!val_env) { log_err("malloc failure"); return 0; } env->modinfo[id] = (void*)val_env; env->need_to_validate = 1; lock_basic_init(&val_env->bogus_lock); lock_protect(&val_env->bogus_lock, &val_env->num_rrset_bogus, sizeof(val_env->num_rrset_bogus)); #ifdef USE_ECDSA_EVP_WORKAROUND ecdsa_evp_workaround_init(); #endif if(!val_apply_cfg(env, val_env, env->cfg)) { log_err("validator: could not apply configuration settings."); return 0; } return 1; } void val_deinit(struct module_env* env, int id) { struct val_env* val_env; if(!env || !env->modinfo[id]) return; val_env = (struct val_env*)env->modinfo[id]; lock_basic_destroy(&val_env->bogus_lock); anchors_delete(env->anchors); env->anchors = NULL; key_cache_delete(val_env->kcache); neg_cache_delete(val_env->neg_cache); free(val_env->nsec3_keysize); free(val_env->nsec3_maxiter); free(val_env); env->modinfo[id] = NULL; } /** fill in message structure */ static struct val_qstate* val_new_getmsg(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq) { if(!qstate->return_msg || qstate->return_rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) { /* create a message to verify */ verbose(VERB_ALGO, "constructing reply for validation"); vq->orig_msg = (struct dns_msg*)regional_alloc(qstate->region, sizeof(struct dns_msg)); if(!vq->orig_msg) return NULL; vq->orig_msg->qinfo = qstate->qinfo; vq->orig_msg->rep = (struct reply_info*)regional_alloc( qstate->region, sizeof(struct reply_info)); if(!vq->orig_msg->rep) return NULL; memset(vq->orig_msg->rep, 0, sizeof(struct reply_info)); vq->orig_msg->rep->flags = (uint16_t)(qstate->return_rcode&0xf) |BIT_QR|BIT_RA|(qstate->query_flags|(BIT_CD|BIT_RD)); vq->orig_msg->rep->qdcount = 1; } else { vq->orig_msg = qstate->return_msg; } vq->qchase = qstate->qinfo; /* chase reply will be an edited (sub)set of the orig msg rrset ptrs */ vq->chase_reply = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, vq->orig_msg->rep, sizeof(struct reply_info) - sizeof(struct rrset_ref)); if(!vq->chase_reply) return NULL; if(vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count > RR_COUNT_MAX) return NULL; /* protect against integer overflow */ vq->chase_reply->rrsets = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, vq->orig_msg->rep->rrsets, sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*) * vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count); if(!vq->chase_reply->rrsets) return NULL; vq->rrset_skip = 0; return vq; } /** allocate new validator query state */ static struct val_qstate* val_new(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id) { struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)regional_alloc( qstate->region, sizeof(*vq)); log_assert(!qstate->minfo[id]); if(!vq) return NULL; memset(vq, 0, sizeof(*vq)); qstate->minfo[id] = vq; vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; return val_new_getmsg(qstate, vq); } /** * Exit validation with an error status * * @param qstate: query state * @param id: validator id. * @return false, for use by caller to return to stop processing. */ static int val_error(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id) { qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; qstate->return_rcode = LDNS_RCODE_SERVFAIL; return 0; } /** * Check to see if a given response needs to go through the validation * process. Typical reasons for this routine to return false are: CD bit was * on in the original request, or the response is a kind of message that * is unvalidatable (i.e., SERVFAIL, REFUSED, etc.) * * @param qstate: query state. * @param ret_rc: rcode for this message (if noerror - examine ret_msg). * @param ret_msg: return msg, can be NULL; look at rcode instead. * @return true if the response could use validation (although this does not * mean we can actually validate this response). */ static int needs_validation(struct module_qstate* qstate, int ret_rc, struct dns_msg* ret_msg) { int rcode; /* If the CD bit is on in the original request, then you could think * that we don't bother to validate anything. * But this is signalled internally with the valrec flag. * User queries are validated with BIT_CD to make our cache clean * so that bogus messages get retried by the upstream also for * downstream validators that set BIT_CD. * For DNS64 bit_cd signals no dns64 processing, but we want to * provide validation there too */ /* if(qstate->query_flags & BIT_CD) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "not validating response due to CD bit"); return 0; } */ if(qstate->is_valrec) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "not validating response, is valrec" "(validation recursion lookup)"); return 0; } if(ret_rc != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR || !ret_msg) rcode = ret_rc; else rcode = (int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(ret_msg->rep->flags); if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN) { if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) { char rc[16]; rc[0]=0; (void)sldns_wire2str_rcode_buf(rcode, rc, sizeof(rc)); verbose(VERB_ALGO, "cannot validate non-answer, rcode %s", rc); } return 0; } /* cannot validate positive RRSIG response. (negatives can) */ if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG && rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && ret_msg && ret_msg->rep->an_numrrsets > 0) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "cannot validate RRSIG, no sigs on sigs."); return 0; } return 1; } /** * Check to see if the response has already been validated. * @param ret_msg: return msg, can be NULL * @return true if the response has already been validated */ static int already_validated(struct dns_msg* ret_msg) { /* validate unchecked, and re-validate bogus messages */ if (ret_msg && ret_msg->rep->security > sec_status_bogus) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "response has already been validated: %s", sec_status_to_string(ret_msg->rep->security)); return 1; } return 0; } /** * Generate a request for DNS data. * * @param qstate: query state that is the parent. * @param id: module id. * @param name: what name to query for. * @param namelen: length of name. * @param qtype: query type. * @param qclass: query class. * @param flags: additional flags, such as the CD bit (BIT_CD), or 0. * @param newq: If the subquery is newly created, it is returned, * otherwise NULL is returned * @param detached: true if this qstate should not attach to the subquery * @return false on alloc failure. */ static int generate_request(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id, uint8_t* name, size_t namelen, uint16_t qtype, uint16_t qclass, uint16_t flags, struct module_qstate** newq, int detached) { struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)qstate->minfo[id]; struct query_info ask; int valrec; ask.qname = name; ask.qname_len = namelen; ask.qtype = qtype; ask.qclass = qclass; ask.local_alias = NULL; log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "generate request", &ask); /* enable valrec flag to avoid recursion to the same validation * routine, this lookup is simply a lookup. DLVs need validation */ if(qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DLV) valrec = 0; else valrec = 1; if(detached) { struct mesh_state* sub = NULL; fptr_ok(fptr_whitelist_modenv_add_sub( qstate->env->add_sub)); if(!(*qstate->env->add_sub)(qstate, &ask, (uint16_t)(BIT_RD|flags), 0, valrec, newq, &sub)){ log_err("Could not generate request: out of memory"); return 0; } } else { fptr_ok(fptr_whitelist_modenv_attach_sub( qstate->env->attach_sub)); if(!(*qstate->env->attach_sub)(qstate, &ask, (uint16_t)(BIT_RD|flags), 0, valrec, newq)){ log_err("Could not generate request: out of memory"); return 0; } } /* newq; validator does not need state created for that * query, and its a 'normal' for iterator as well */ if(*newq) { /* add our blacklist to the query blacklist */ sock_list_merge(&(*newq)->blacklist, (*newq)->region, vq->chain_blacklist); } qstate->ext_state[id] = module_wait_subquery; return 1; } /** * Generate, send and detach key tag signaling query. * * @param qstate: query state. * @param id: module id. * @param ta: trust anchor, locked. * @return false on a processing error. */ static int generate_keytag_query(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id, struct trust_anchor* ta) { /* 3 bytes for "_ta", 5 bytes per tag (4 bytes + "-") */ #define MAX_LABEL_TAGS (LDNS_MAX_LABELLEN-3)/5 size_t i, numtag; uint16_t tags[MAX_LABEL_TAGS]; char tagstr[LDNS_MAX_LABELLEN+1] = "_ta"; /* +1 for NULL byte */ size_t tagstr_left = sizeof(tagstr) - strlen(tagstr); char* tagstr_pos = tagstr + strlen(tagstr); uint8_t dnamebuf[LDNS_MAX_DOMAINLEN+1]; /* +1 for label length byte */ size_t dnamebuf_len = sizeof(dnamebuf); uint8_t* keytagdname; struct module_qstate* newq = NULL; enum module_ext_state ext_state = qstate->ext_state[id]; numtag = anchor_list_keytags(ta, tags, MAX_LABEL_TAGS); if(numtag == 0) return 0; for(i=0; iname, ta->namelen); if(!(keytagdname = (uint8_t*)regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, dnamebuf, dnamebuf_len))) { log_err("could not generate key tag query: out of memory"); return 0; } log_nametypeclass(VERB_OPS, "generate keytag query", keytagdname, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NULL, ta->dclass); if(!generate_request(qstate, id, keytagdname, dnamebuf_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NULL, ta->dclass, 0, &newq, 1)) { log_err("failed to generate key tag signaling request"); return 0; } /* Not interrested in subquery response. Restore the ext_state, * that might be changed by generate_request() */ qstate->ext_state[id] = ext_state; return 1; } /** * Prime trust anchor for use. * Generate and dispatch a priming query for the given trust anchor. * The trust anchor can be DNSKEY or DS and does not have to be signed. * * @param qstate: query state. * @param vq: validator query state. * @param id: module id. * @param toprime: what to prime. * @return false on a processing error. */ static int prime_trust_anchor(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, int id, struct trust_anchor* toprime) { struct module_qstate* newq = NULL; int ret = generate_request(qstate, id, toprime->name, toprime->namelen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, toprime->dclass, BIT_CD, &newq, 0); if(newq && qstate->env->cfg->trust_anchor_signaling && !generate_keytag_query(qstate, id, toprime)) { log_err("keytag signaling query failed"); return 0; } if(!ret) { log_err("Could not prime trust anchor: out of memory"); return 0; } /* ignore newq; validator does not need state created for that * query, and its a 'normal' for iterator as well */ vq->wait_prime_ta = 1; /* to elicit PRIME_RESP_STATE processing from the validator inform_super() routine */ /* store trust anchor name for later lookup when prime returns */ vq->trust_anchor_name = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, toprime->name, toprime->namelen); vq->trust_anchor_len = toprime->namelen; vq->trust_anchor_labs = toprime->namelabs; if(!vq->trust_anchor_name) { log_err("Could not prime trust anchor: out of memory"); return 0; } return 1; } /** * Validate if the ANSWER and AUTHORITY sections contain valid rrsets. * They must be validly signed with the given key. * Tries to validate ADDITIONAL rrsets as well, but only to check them. * Allows unsigned CNAME after a DNAME that expands the DNAME. * * Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the * trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been * completed. * * @param qstate: query state. * @param env: module env for verify. * @param ve: validator env for verify. * @param qchase: query that was made. * @param chase_reply: answer to validate. * @param key_entry: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). * @return false if any of the rrsets in the an or ns sections of the message * fail to verify. The message is then set to bogus. */ static int validate_msg_signatures(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, struct key_entry_key* key_entry) { uint8_t* sname; size_t i, slen; struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; enum sec_status sec; int dname_seen = 0; char* reason = NULL; /* validate the ANSWER section */ for(i=0; ian_numrrsets; i++) { s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; /* Skip the CNAME following a (validated) DNAME. * Because of the normalization routines in the iterator, * there will always be an unsigned CNAME following a DNAME * (unless qtype=DNAME). */ if(dname_seen && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) { dname_seen = 0; /* CNAME was synthesized by our own iterator */ /* since the DNAME verified, mark the CNAME as secure */ ((struct packed_rrset_data*)s->entry.data)->security = sec_status_secure; ((struct packed_rrset_data*)s->entry.data)->trust = rrset_trust_validated; continue; } /* Verify the answer rrset */ sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry, &reason, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate); /* If the (answer) rrset failed to validate, then this * message is BAD. */ if(sec != sec_status_secure) { log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "validator: response " "has failed ANSWER rrset:", s->rk.dname, ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); errinf(qstate, reason); if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) errinf(qstate, "for CNAME"); else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) errinf(qstate, "for DNAME"); errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin); chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; return 0; } /* Notice a DNAME that should be followed by an unsigned * CNAME. */ if(qchase->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) { dname_seen = 1; } } /* validate the AUTHORITY section */ for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; ian_numrrsets+ chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry, &reason, LDNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY, qstate); /* If anything in the authority section fails to be secure, * we have a bad message. */ if(sec != sec_status_secure) { log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "validator: response " "has failed AUTHORITY rrset:", s->rk.dname, ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); errinf(qstate, reason); errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin); errinf_rrset(qstate, s); chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; return 0; } } /* If set, the validator should clean the additional section of * secure messages. */ if(!env->cfg->val_clean_additional) return 1; /* attempt to validate the ADDITIONAL section rrsets */ for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; irrset_count; i++) { s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; /* only validate rrs that have signatures with the key */ /* leave others unchecked, those get removed later on too */ val_find_rrset_signer(s, &sname, &slen); if(sname && query_dname_compare(sname, key_entry->name)==0) (void)val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry, &reason, LDNS_SECTION_ADDITIONAL, qstate); /* the additional section can fail to be secure, * it is optional, check signature in case we need * to clean the additional section later. */ } return 1; } /** * Detect wrong truncated response (say from BIND 9.6.1 that is forwarding * and saw the NS record without signatures from a referral). * The positive response has a mangled authority section. * Remove that authority section and the additional section. * @param rep: reply * @return true if a wrongly truncated response. */ static int detect_wrongly_truncated(struct reply_info* rep) { size_t i; /* only NS in authority, and it is bogus */ if(rep->ns_numrrsets != 1 || rep->an_numrrsets == 0) return 0; if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[ rep->an_numrrsets ]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) return 0; if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[ rep->an_numrrsets ] ->entry.data)->security == sec_status_secure) return 0; /* answer section is present and secure */ for(i=0; ian_numrrsets; i++) { if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[ i ] ->entry.data)->security != sec_status_secure) return 0; } verbose(VERB_ALGO, "truncating to minimal response"); return 1; } /** * For messages that are not referrals, if the chase reply contains an * unsigned NS record in the authority section it could have been * inserted by a (BIND) forwarder that thinks the zone is insecure, and * that has an NS record without signatures in cache. Remove the NS * record since the reply does not hinge on that record (in the authority * section), but do not remove it if it removes the last record from the * answer+authority sections. * @param chase_reply: the chased reply, we have a key for this contents, * so we should have signatures for these rrsets and not having * signatures means it will be bogus. * @param orig_reply: original reply, remove NS from there as well because * we cannot mark the NS record as DNSSEC valid because it is not * validated by signatures. */ static void remove_spurious_authority(struct reply_info* chase_reply, struct reply_info* orig_reply) { size_t i, found = 0; int remove = 0; /* if no answer and only 1 auth RRset, do not remove that one */ if(chase_reply->an_numrrsets == 0 && chase_reply->ns_numrrsets == 1) return; /* search authority section for unsigned NS records */ for(i = chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i < chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*) chase_reply->rrsets[i]->entry.data; if(ntohs(chase_reply->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS && d->rrsig_count == 0) { found = i; remove = 1; break; } } /* see if we found the entry */ if(!remove) return; log_rrset_key(VERB_ALGO, "Removing spurious unsigned NS record " "(likely inserted by forwarder)", chase_reply->rrsets[found]); /* find rrset in orig_reply */ for(i = orig_reply->an_numrrsets; i < orig_reply->an_numrrsets+orig_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { if(ntohs(orig_reply->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS && query_dname_compare(orig_reply->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, chase_reply->rrsets[found]->rk.dname) == 0) { /* remove from orig_msg */ val_reply_remove_auth(orig_reply, i); break; } } /* remove rrset from chase_reply */ val_reply_remove_auth(chase_reply, found); } /** * Given a "positive" response -- a response that contains an answer to the * question, and no CNAME chain, validate this response. * * The answer and authority RRsets must already be verified as secure. * * @param env: module env for verify. * @param ve: validator env for verify. * @param qchase: query that was made. * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). */ static void validate_positive_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, struct key_entry_key* kkey) { uint8_t* wc = NULL; size_t wl; int wc_cached = 0; int wc_NSEC_ok = 0; int nsec3s_seen = 0; size_t i; struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; /* validate the ANSWER section - this will be the answer itself */ for(i=0; ian_numrrsets; i++) { s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; /* Check to see if the rrset is the result of a wildcard * expansion. If so, an additional check will need to be * made in the authority section. */ if(!val_rrset_wildcard(s, &wc, &wl)) { log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "Positive response has " "inconsistent wildcard sigs:", s->rk.dname, ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; return; } if(wc && !wc_cached && env->cfg->aggressive_nsec) { rrset_cache_update_wildcard(env->rrset_cache, s, wc, wl, env->alloc, *env->now); wc_cached = 1; } } /* validate the AUTHORITY section as well - this will generally be * the NS rrset (which could be missing, no problem) */ for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; ian_numrrsets+ chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; /* If this is a positive wildcard response, and we have a * (just verified) NSEC record, try to use it to 1) prove * that qname doesn't exist and 2) that the correct wildcard * was used. */ if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { if(val_nsec_proves_positive_wildcard(s, qchase, wc)) { wc_NSEC_ok = 1; } /* if not, continue looking for proof */ } /* Otherwise, if this is a positive wildcard response and * we have NSEC3 records */ if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { nsec3s_seen = 1; } } /* If this was a positive wildcard response that we haven't already * proven, and we have NSEC3 records, try to prove it using the NSEC3 * records. */ if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok && nsec3s_seen) { enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_wildcard(env, ve, chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets, chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey, wc); if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Positive wildcard response is " "insecure"); chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; return; } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) wc_NSEC_ok = 1; } /* If after all this, we still haven't proven the positive wildcard * response, fail. */ if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok) { verbose(VERB_QUERY, "positive response was wildcard " "expansion and did not prove original data " "did not exist"); chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; return; } verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Successfully validated positive response"); chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; } /** * Validate a NOERROR/NODATA signed response -- a response that has a * NOERROR Rcode but no ANSWER section RRsets. This consists of making * certain that the authority section NSEC/NSEC3s proves that the qname * does exist and the qtype doesn't. * * The answer and authority RRsets must already be verified as secure. * * @param env: module env for verify. * @param ve: validator env for verify. * @param qchase: query that was made. * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). */ static void validate_nodata_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, struct key_entry_key* kkey) { /* Since we are here, there must be nothing in the ANSWER section to * validate. */ /* (Note: CNAME/DNAME responses will not directly get here -- * instead, they are chased down into individual CNAME validations, * and at the end of the cname chain a POSITIVE, or CNAME_NOANSWER * validation.) */ /* validate the AUTHORITY section */ int has_valid_nsec = 0; /* If true, then the NODATA has been proven.*/ uint8_t* ce = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. This is the proven closest encloser. */ uint8_t* wc = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. wildcard nsec */ int nsec3s_seen = 0; /* nsec3s seen */ struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; size_t i; for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; ian_numrrsets+ chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; /* If we encounter an NSEC record, try to use it to prove * NODATA. * This needs to handle the ENT NODATA case. */ if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { if(nsec_proves_nodata(s, qchase, &wc)) { has_valid_nsec = 1; /* sets wc-encloser if wildcard applicable */ } if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(s, qchase->qname)) { ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qchase->qname, s); } if(val_nsec_proves_insecuredelegation(s, qchase)) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "delegation is insecure"); chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; return; } } else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { nsec3s_seen = 1; } } /* check to see if we have a wildcard NODATA proof. */ /* The wildcard NODATA is 1 NSEC proving that qname does not exist * (and also proving what the closest encloser is), and 1 NSEC * showing the matching wildcard, which must be *.closest_encloser. */ if(wc && !ce) has_valid_nsec = 0; else if(wc && ce) { if(query_dname_compare(wc, ce) != 0) { has_valid_nsec = 0; } } if(!has_valid_nsec && nsec3s_seen) { enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_nodata(env, ve, chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets, chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey); if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NODATA response is insecure"); chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; return; } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) has_valid_nsec = 1; } if(!has_valid_nsec) { verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NODATA response failed to prove NODATA " "status with NSEC/NSEC3"); if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) log_dns_msg("Failed NODATA", qchase, chase_reply); chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; return; } verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated NODATA response."); chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; } /** * Validate a NAMEERROR signed response -- a response that has a NXDOMAIN * Rcode. * This consists of making certain that the authority section NSEC proves * that the qname doesn't exist and the covering wildcard also doesn't exist.. * * The answer and authority RRsets must have already been verified as secure. * * @param env: module env for verify. * @param ve: validator env for verify. * @param qchase: query that was made. * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). * @param rcode: adjusted RCODE, in case of RCODE/proof mismatch leniency. */ static void validate_nameerror_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, struct key_entry_key* kkey, int* rcode) { int has_valid_nsec = 0; int has_valid_wnsec = 0; int nsec3s_seen = 0; struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; size_t i; uint8_t* ce; int ce_labs = 0; int prev_ce_labs = 0; for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; ian_numrrsets+ chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(s, qchase->qname)) has_valid_nsec = 1; ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qchase->qname, s); ce_labs = dname_count_labels(ce); /* Use longest closest encloser to prove wildcard. */ if(ce_labs > prev_ce_labs || (ce_labs == prev_ce_labs && has_valid_wnsec == 0)) { if(val_nsec_proves_no_wc(s, qchase->qname, qchase->qname_len)) has_valid_wnsec = 1; else has_valid_wnsec = 0; } prev_ce_labs = ce_labs; if(val_nsec_proves_insecuredelegation(s, qchase)) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "delegation is insecure"); chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; return; } } else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) nsec3s_seen = 1; } if((!has_valid_nsec || !has_valid_wnsec) && nsec3s_seen) { /* use NSEC3 proof, both answer and auth rrsets, in case * NSEC3s end up in the answer (due to qtype=NSEC3 or so) */ chase_reply->security = nsec3_prove_nameerror(env, ve, chase_reply->rrsets, chase_reply->an_numrrsets+ chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey); if(chase_reply->security != sec_status_secure) { verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NameError response failed nsec, " "nsec3 proof was %s", sec_status_to_string( chase_reply->security)); return; } has_valid_nsec = 1; has_valid_wnsec = 1; } /* If the message fails to prove either condition, it is bogus. */ if(!has_valid_nsec) { verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NameError response has failed to prove: " "qname does not exist"); chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; /* Be lenient with RCODE in NSEC NameError responses */ validate_nodata_response(env, ve, qchase, chase_reply, kkey); if (chase_reply->security == sec_status_secure) *rcode = LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR; return; } if(!has_valid_wnsec) { verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NameError response has failed to prove: " "covering wildcard does not exist"); chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; /* Be lenient with RCODE in NSEC NameError responses */ validate_nodata_response(env, ve, qchase, chase_reply, kkey); if (chase_reply->security == sec_status_secure) *rcode = LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR; return; } /* Otherwise, we consider the message secure. */ verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated NAME ERROR response."); chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; } /** * Given a referral response, validate rrsets and take least trusted rrset * as the current validation status. * * Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the * trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been * completed. * * @param chase_reply: answer to validate. */ static void validate_referral_response(struct reply_info* chase_reply) { size_t i; enum sec_status s; /* message security equals lowest rrset security */ chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; for(i=0; irrset_count; i++) { s = ((struct packed_rrset_data*)chase_reply->rrsets[i] ->entry.data)->security; if(s < chase_reply->security) chase_reply->security = s; } verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validated part of referral response as %s", sec_status_to_string(chase_reply->security)); } /** * Given an "ANY" response -- a response that contains an answer to a * qtype==ANY question, with answers. This does no checking that all * types are present. * * NOTE: it may be possible to get parent-side delegation point records * here, which won't all be signed. Right now, this routine relies on the * upstream iterative resolver to not return these responses -- instead * treating them as referrals. * * NOTE: RFC 4035 is silent on this issue, so this may change upon * clarification. Clarification draft -05 says to not check all types are * present. * * Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the * trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been * completed. * * @param env: module env for verify. * @param ve: validator env for verify. * @param qchase: query that was made. * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). */ static void validate_any_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, struct key_entry_key* kkey) { /* all answer and auth rrsets already verified */ /* but check if a wildcard response is given, then check NSEC/NSEC3 * for qname denial to see if wildcard is applicable */ uint8_t* wc = NULL; size_t wl; int wc_NSEC_ok = 0; int nsec3s_seen = 0; size_t i; struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; if(qchase->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_ANY) { log_err("internal error: ANY validation called for non-ANY"); chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; return; } /* validate the ANSWER section - this will be the answer itself */ for(i=0; ian_numrrsets; i++) { s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; /* Check to see if the rrset is the result of a wildcard * expansion. If so, an additional check will need to be * made in the authority section. */ if(!val_rrset_wildcard(s, &wc, &wl)) { log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "Positive ANY response" " has inconsistent wildcard sigs:", s->rk.dname, ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; return; } } /* if it was a wildcard, check for NSEC/NSEC3s in both answer * and authority sections (NSEC may be moved to the ANSWER section) */ if(wc != NULL) for(i=0; ian_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; /* If this is a positive wildcard response, and we have a * (just verified) NSEC record, try to use it to 1) prove * that qname doesn't exist and 2) that the correct wildcard * was used. */ if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { if(val_nsec_proves_positive_wildcard(s, qchase, wc)) { wc_NSEC_ok = 1; } /* if not, continue looking for proof */ } /* Otherwise, if this is a positive wildcard response and * we have NSEC3 records */ if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { nsec3s_seen = 1; } } /* If this was a positive wildcard response that we haven't already * proven, and we have NSEC3 records, try to prove it using the NSEC3 * records. */ if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok && nsec3s_seen) { /* look both in answer and auth section for NSEC3s */ enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_wildcard(env, ve, chase_reply->rrsets, chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey, wc); if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Positive ANY wildcard response is " "insecure"); chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; return; } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) wc_NSEC_ok = 1; } /* If after all this, we still haven't proven the positive wildcard * response, fail. */ if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok) { verbose(VERB_QUERY, "positive ANY response was wildcard " "expansion and did not prove original data " "did not exist"); chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; return; } verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Successfully validated positive ANY response"); chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; } /** * Validate CNAME response, or DNAME+CNAME. * This is just like a positive proof, except that this is about a * DNAME+CNAME. Possible wildcard proof. * Difference with positive proof is that this routine refuses * wildcarded DNAMEs. * * The answer and authority rrsets must already be verified as secure. * * @param env: module env for verify. * @param ve: validator env for verify. * @param qchase: query that was made. * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). */ static void validate_cname_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, struct key_entry_key* kkey) { uint8_t* wc = NULL; size_t wl; int wc_NSEC_ok = 0; int nsec3s_seen = 0; size_t i; struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; /* validate the ANSWER section - this will be the CNAME (+DNAME) */ for(i=0; ian_numrrsets; i++) { s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; /* Check to see if the rrset is the result of a wildcard * expansion. If so, an additional check will need to be * made in the authority section. */ if(!val_rrset_wildcard(s, &wc, &wl)) { log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "Cname response has " "inconsistent wildcard sigs:", s->rk.dname, ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; return; } /* Refuse wildcarded DNAMEs rfc 4597. * Do not follow a wildcarded DNAME because * its synthesized CNAME expansion is underdefined */ if(qchase->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME && wc) { log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "cannot validate a " "wildcarded DNAME:", s->rk.dname, ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; return; } /* If we have found a CNAME, stop looking for one. * The iterator has placed the CNAME chain in correct * order. */ if (ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) { break; } } /* AUTHORITY section */ for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; ian_numrrsets+ chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; /* If this is a positive wildcard response, and we have a * (just verified) NSEC record, try to use it to 1) prove * that qname doesn't exist and 2) that the correct wildcard * was used. */ if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { if(val_nsec_proves_positive_wildcard(s, qchase, wc)) { wc_NSEC_ok = 1; } /* if not, continue looking for proof */ } /* Otherwise, if this is a positive wildcard response and * we have NSEC3 records */ if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { nsec3s_seen = 1; } } /* If this was a positive wildcard response that we haven't already * proven, and we have NSEC3 records, try to prove it using the NSEC3 * records. */ if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok && nsec3s_seen) { enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_wildcard(env, ve, chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets, chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey, wc); if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "wildcard CNAME response is " "insecure"); chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; return; } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) wc_NSEC_ok = 1; } /* If after all this, we still haven't proven the positive wildcard * response, fail. */ if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok) { verbose(VERB_QUERY, "CNAME response was wildcard " "expansion and did not prove original data " "did not exist"); chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; return; } verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Successfully validated CNAME response"); chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; } /** * Validate CNAME NOANSWER response, no more data after a CNAME chain. * This can be a NODATA or a NAME ERROR case, but not both at the same time. * We don't know because the rcode has been set to NOERROR by the CNAME. * * The answer and authority rrsets must already be verified as secure. * * @param env: module env for verify. * @param ve: validator env for verify. * @param qchase: query that was made. * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). */ static void validate_cname_noanswer_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, struct key_entry_key* kkey) { int nodata_valid_nsec = 0; /* If true, then NODATA has been proven.*/ uint8_t* ce = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. This is the proven closest encloser. */ uint8_t* wc = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. wildcard nsec */ int nxdomain_valid_nsec = 0; /* if true, nameerror has been proven */ int nxdomain_valid_wnsec = 0; int nsec3s_seen = 0; /* nsec3s seen */ struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; size_t i; uint8_t* nsec_ce; /* Used to find the NSEC with the longest ce */ int ce_labs = 0; int prev_ce_labs = 0; /* the AUTHORITY section */ for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; ian_numrrsets+ chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; /* If we encounter an NSEC record, try to use it to prove * NODATA. This needs to handle the ENT NODATA case. * Also try to prove NAMEERROR, and absence of a wildcard */ if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { if(nsec_proves_nodata(s, qchase, &wc)) { nodata_valid_nsec = 1; /* set wc encloser if wildcard applicable */ } if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(s, qchase->qname)) { ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qchase->qname, s); nxdomain_valid_nsec = 1; } nsec_ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qchase->qname, s); ce_labs = dname_count_labels(nsec_ce); /* Use longest closest encloser to prove wildcard. */ if(ce_labs > prev_ce_labs || (ce_labs == prev_ce_labs && nxdomain_valid_wnsec == 0)) { if(val_nsec_proves_no_wc(s, qchase->qname, qchase->qname_len)) nxdomain_valid_wnsec = 1; else nxdomain_valid_wnsec = 0; } prev_ce_labs = ce_labs; if(val_nsec_proves_insecuredelegation(s, qchase)) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "delegation is insecure"); chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; return; } } else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { nsec3s_seen = 1; } } /* check to see if we have a wildcard NODATA proof. */ /* The wildcard NODATA is 1 NSEC proving that qname does not exists * (and also proving what the closest encloser is), and 1 NSEC * showing the matching wildcard, which must be *.closest_encloser. */ if(wc && !ce) nodata_valid_nsec = 0; else if(wc && ce) { if(query_dname_compare(wc, ce) != 0) { nodata_valid_nsec = 0; } } if(nxdomain_valid_nsec && !nxdomain_valid_wnsec) { /* name error is missing wildcard denial proof */ nxdomain_valid_nsec = 0; } if(nodata_valid_nsec && nxdomain_valid_nsec) { verbose(VERB_QUERY, "CNAMEchain to noanswer proves that name " "exists and not exists, bogus"); chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; return; } if(!nodata_valid_nsec && !nxdomain_valid_nsec && nsec3s_seen) { int nodata; enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_nxornodata(env, ve, chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets, chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey, &nodata); if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "CNAMEchain to noanswer response " "is insecure"); chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; return; } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) { if(nodata) nodata_valid_nsec = 1; else nxdomain_valid_nsec = 1; } } if(!nodata_valid_nsec && !nxdomain_valid_nsec) { verbose(VERB_QUERY, "CNAMEchain to noanswer response failed " "to prove status with NSEC/NSEC3"); if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) log_dns_msg("Failed CNAMEnoanswer", qchase, chase_reply); chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; return; } if(nodata_valid_nsec) verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated CNAME chain to a " "NODATA response."); else verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated CNAME chain to a " "NAMEERROR response."); chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; } /** * Process init state for validator. * Process the INIT state. First tier responses start in the INIT state. * This is where they are vetted for validation suitability, and the initial * key search is done. * * Currently, events the come through this routine will be either promoted * to FINISHED/CNAME_RESP (no validation needed), FINDKEY (next step to * validation), or will be (temporarily) retired and a new priming request * event will be generated. * * @param qstate: query state. * @param vq: validator query state. * @param ve: validator shared global environment. * @param id: module id. * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if * not. */ static int processInit(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, struct val_env* ve, int id) { uint8_t* lookup_name; size_t lookup_len; struct trust_anchor* anchor; enum val_classification subtype = val_classify_response( qstate->query_flags, &qstate->qinfo, &vq->qchase, vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip); if(vq->restart_count > VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "restart count exceeded"); return val_error(qstate, id); } verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator classification %s", val_classification_to_string(subtype)); if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL && vq->rrset_skip < vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count) { /* referral uses the rrset name as qchase, to find keys for * that rrset */ vq->qchase.qname = vq->orig_msg->rep-> rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.dname; vq->qchase.qname_len = vq->orig_msg->rep-> rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.dname_len; vq->qchase.qtype = ntohs(vq->orig_msg->rep-> rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.type); vq->qchase.qclass = ntohs(vq->orig_msg->rep-> rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.rrset_class); } lookup_name = vq->qchase.qname; lookup_len = vq->qchase.qname_len; /* for type DS look at the parent side for keys/trustanchor */ /* also for NSEC not at apex */ if(vq->qchase.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS || (vq->qchase.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC && vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count > vq->rrset_skip && ntohs(vq->orig_msg->rep->rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC && !(vq->orig_msg->rep->rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]-> rk.flags&PACKED_RRSET_NSEC_AT_APEX))) { dname_remove_label(&lookup_name, &lookup_len); } val_mark_indeterminate(vq->chase_reply, qstate->env->anchors, qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env); vq->key_entry = NULL; vq->empty_DS_name = NULL; vq->ds_rrset = 0; anchor = anchors_lookup(qstate->env->anchors, lookup_name, lookup_len, vq->qchase.qclass); /* Determine the signer/lookup name */ val_find_signer(subtype, &vq->qchase, vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip, &vq->signer_name, &vq->signer_len); if(vq->signer_name != NULL && !dname_subdomain_c(lookup_name, vq->signer_name)) { log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "this signer name is not a parent " "of lookupname, omitted", vq->signer_name, 0, 0); vq->signer_name = NULL; } if(vq->signer_name == NULL) { log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "no signer, using", lookup_name, 0, 0); } else { lookup_name = vq->signer_name; lookup_len = vq->signer_len; log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "signer is", lookup_name, 0, 0); } /* for NXDOMAIN it could be signed by a parent of the trust anchor */ if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR && vq->signer_name && anchor && dname_strict_subdomain_c(anchor->name, lookup_name)){ lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock); anchor = anchors_lookup(qstate->env->anchors, lookup_name, lookup_len, vq->qchase.qclass); if(!anchor) { /* unsigned parent denies anchor*/ verbose(VERB_QUERY, "unsigned parent zone denies" " trust anchor, indeterminate"); vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_indeterminate; vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; return 1; } verbose(VERB_ALGO, "trust anchor NXDOMAIN by signed parent"); } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE && qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY && query_dname_compare(lookup_name, qstate->qinfo.qname) == 0) { /* is a DNSKEY so lookup a bit higher since we want to * get it from a parent or from trustanchor */ dname_remove_label(&lookup_name, &lookup_len); } if(vq->rrset_skip > 0 || subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME || subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) { /* extract this part of orig_msg into chase_reply for * the eventual VALIDATE stage */ val_fill_reply(vq->chase_reply, vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip, lookup_name, lookup_len, vq->signer_name); if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) log_dns_msg("chased extract", &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply); } vq->key_entry = key_cache_obtain(ve->kcache, lookup_name, lookup_len, vq->qchase.qclass, qstate->region, *qstate->env->now); /* there is no key(from DLV) and no trust anchor */ if(vq->key_entry == NULL && anchor == NULL) { /*response isn't under a trust anchor, so we cannot validate.*/ vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_indeterminate; /* go to finished state to cache this result */ vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; return 1; } /* if not key, or if keyentry is *above* the trustanchor, i.e. * the keyentry is based on another (higher) trustanchor */ else if(vq->key_entry == NULL || (anchor && dname_strict_subdomain_c(anchor->name, vq->key_entry->name))) { /* trust anchor is an 'unsigned' trust anchor */ if(anchor && anchor->numDS == 0 && anchor->numDNSKEY == 0) { vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; val_mark_insecure(vq->chase_reply, anchor->name, qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env); lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock); vq->dlv_checked=1; /* skip DLV check */ /* go to finished state to cache this result */ vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; return 1; } /* fire off a trust anchor priming query. */ verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "prime trust anchor"); if(!prime_trust_anchor(qstate, vq, id, anchor)) { lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock); return val_error(qstate, id); } lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock); /* and otherwise, don't continue processing this event. * (it will be reactivated when the priming query returns). */ vq->state = VAL_FINDKEY_STATE; return 0; } if(anchor) { lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock); } if(key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) { /* response is under a null key, so we cannot validate * However, we do set the status to INSECURE, since it is * essentially proven insecure. */ vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; val_mark_insecure(vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry->name, qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env); /* go to finished state to cache this result */ vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; return 1; } else if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) { /* key is bad, chain is bad, reply is bogus */ errinf_dname(qstate, "key for validation", vq->key_entry->name); errinf(qstate, "is marked as invalid"); if(key_entry_get_reason(vq->key_entry)) { errinf(qstate, "because of a previous"); errinf(qstate, key_entry_get_reason(vq->key_entry)); } /* no retries, stop bothering the authority until timeout */ vq->restart_count = VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT; vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; return 1; } /* otherwise, we have our "closest" cached key -- continue * processing in the next state. */ vq->state = VAL_FINDKEY_STATE; return 1; } /** * Process the FINDKEY state. Generally this just calculates the next name * to query and either issues a DS or a DNSKEY query. It will check to see * if the correct key has already been reached, in which case it will * advance the event to the next state. * * @param qstate: query state. * @param vq: validator query state. * @param id: module id. * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if * not. */ static int processFindKey(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, int id) { uint8_t* target_key_name, *current_key_name; size_t target_key_len; int strip_lab; struct module_qstate* newq = NULL; log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "validator: FindKey", &vq->qchase); /* We know that state.key_entry is not 0 or bad key -- if it were, * then previous processing should have directed this event to * a different state. * It could be an isnull key, which signals that a DLV was just * done and the DNSKEY after the DLV failed with dnssec-retry state * and the DNSKEY has to be performed again. */ log_assert(vq->key_entry && !key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)); if(key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) { if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, vq->qchase.qclass, BIT_CD, &newq, 0)) { log_err("mem error generating DNSKEY request"); return val_error(qstate, id); } return 0; } target_key_name = vq->signer_name; target_key_len = vq->signer_len; if(!target_key_name) { target_key_name = vq->qchase.qname; target_key_len = vq->qchase.qname_len; } current_key_name = vq->key_entry->name; /* If our current key entry matches our target, then we are done. */ if(query_dname_compare(target_key_name, current_key_name) == 0) { vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; return 1; } if(vq->empty_DS_name) { /* if the last empty nonterminal/emptyDS name we detected is * below the current key, use that name to make progress * along the chain of trust */ if(query_dname_compare(target_key_name, vq->empty_DS_name) == 0) { /* do not query for empty_DS_name again */ verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Cannot retrieve DS for signature"); errinf(qstate, "no signatures"); errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin); vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; return 1; } current_key_name = vq->empty_DS_name; } log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "current keyname", current_key_name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN); log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "target keyname", target_key_name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN); /* assert we are walking down the DNS tree */ if(!dname_subdomain_c(target_key_name, current_key_name)) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "bad signer name"); vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; return 1; } /* so this value is >= -1 */ strip_lab = dname_count_labels(target_key_name) - dname_count_labels(current_key_name) - 1; log_assert(strip_lab >= -1); verbose(VERB_ALGO, "striplab %d", strip_lab); if(strip_lab > 0) { dname_remove_labels(&target_key_name, &target_key_len, strip_lab); } log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "next keyname", target_key_name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN); /* The next step is either to query for the next DS, or to query * for the next DNSKEY. */ if(vq->ds_rrset) log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "DS RRset", vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN); else verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No DS RRset"); if(vq->ds_rrset && query_dname_compare(vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, vq->key_entry->name) != 0) { if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, vq->qchase.qclass, BIT_CD, &newq, 0)) { log_err("mem error generating DNSKEY request"); return val_error(qstate, id); } return 0; } if(!vq->ds_rrset || query_dname_compare(vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, target_key_name) != 0) { /* check if there is a cache entry : pick up an NSEC if * there is no DS, check if that NSEC has DS-bit unset, and * thus can disprove the secure delegation we seek. * We can then use that NSEC even in the absence of a SOA * record that would be required by the iterator to supply * a completely protocol-correct response. * Uses negative cache for NSEC3 lookup of DS responses. */ /* only if cache not blacklisted, of course */ struct dns_msg* msg; if(!qstate->blacklist && !vq->chain_blacklist && (msg=val_find_DS(qstate->env, target_key_name, target_key_len, vq->qchase.qclass, qstate->region, vq->key_entry->name)) ) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Process cached DS response"); process_ds_response(qstate, vq, id, LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR, msg, &msg->qinfo, NULL); return 1; /* continue processing ds-response results */ } if(!generate_request(qstate, id, target_key_name, target_key_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, vq->qchase.qclass, BIT_CD, &newq, 0)) { log_err("mem error generating DS request"); return val_error(qstate, id); } return 0; } /* Otherwise, it is time to query for the DNSKEY */ if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, vq->qchase.qclass, BIT_CD, &newq, 0)) { log_err("mem error generating DNSKEY request"); return val_error(qstate, id); } return 0; } /** * Process the VALIDATE stage, the init and findkey stages are finished, * and the right keys are available to validate the response. * Or, there are no keys available, in order to invalidate the response. * * After validation, the status is recorded in the message and rrsets, * and finished state is started. * * @param qstate: query state. * @param vq: validator query state. * @param ve: validator shared global environment. * @param id: module id. * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if * not. */ static int processValidate(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, struct val_env* ve, int id) { enum val_classification subtype; int rcode; if(!vq->key_entry) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validate: no key entry, failed"); return val_error(qstate, id); } /* This is the default next state. */ vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; /* Unsigned responses must be underneath a "null" key entry.*/ if(key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) { verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Verified that %sresponse is INSECURE", vq->signer_name?"":"unsigned "); vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; val_mark_insecure(vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry->name, qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env); key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry, qstate); return 1; } if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) { log_nametypeclass(VERB_DETAIL, "Could not establish a chain " "of trust to keys for", vq->key_entry->name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, vq->key_entry->key_class); vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; errinf(qstate, "while building chain of trust"); if(vq->restart_count >= VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT) key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry, qstate); return 1; } /* signerName being null is the indicator that this response was * unsigned */ if(vq->signer_name == NULL) { log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "processValidate: state has no " "signer name", &vq->qchase); verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Could not establish validation of " "INSECURE status of unsigned response."); errinf(qstate, "no signatures"); errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin); vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; return 1; } subtype = val_classify_response(qstate->query_flags, &qstate->qinfo, &vq->qchase, vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip); if(subtype != VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) remove_spurious_authority(vq->chase_reply, vq->orig_msg->rep); /* check signatures in the message; * answer and authority must be valid, additional is only checked. */ if(!validate_msg_signatures(qstate, qstate->env, ve, &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry)) { /* workaround bad recursor out there that truncates (even * with EDNS4k) to 512 by removing RRSIG from auth section * for positive replies*/ if((subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE || subtype == VAL_CLASS_ANY || subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME) && detect_wrongly_truncated(vq->orig_msg->rep)) { /* truncate the message some more */ vq->orig_msg->rep->ns_numrrsets = 0; vq->orig_msg->rep->ar_numrrsets = 0; vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count = vq->orig_msg->rep->an_numrrsets; vq->chase_reply->ns_numrrsets = 0; vq->chase_reply->ar_numrrsets = 0; vq->chase_reply->rrset_count = vq->chase_reply->an_numrrsets; qstate->errinf = NULL; } else { verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Validate: message contains " "bad rrsets"); return 1; } } switch(subtype) { case VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE: verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a positive response"); validate_positive_response(qstate->env, ve, &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry); verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(positive): %s", sec_status_to_string( vq->chase_reply->security)); break; case VAL_CLASS_NODATA: verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a nodata response"); validate_nodata_response(qstate->env, ve, &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry); verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(nodata): %s", sec_status_to_string( vq->chase_reply->security)); break; case VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR: rcode = (int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(vq->orig_msg->rep->flags); verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a nxdomain response"); validate_nameerror_response(qstate->env, ve, &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry, &rcode); verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(nxdomain): %s", sec_status_to_string( vq->chase_reply->security)); FLAGS_SET_RCODE(vq->orig_msg->rep->flags, rcode); FLAGS_SET_RCODE(vq->chase_reply->flags, rcode); break; case VAL_CLASS_CNAME: verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a cname response"); validate_cname_response(qstate->env, ve, &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry); verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(cname): %s", sec_status_to_string( vq->chase_reply->security)); break; case VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER: verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a cname noanswer " "response"); validate_cname_noanswer_response(qstate->env, ve, &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry); verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(cname_noanswer): %s", sec_status_to_string( vq->chase_reply->security)); break; case VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL: verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a referral response"); validate_referral_response(vq->chase_reply); verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(referral): %s", sec_status_to_string( vq->chase_reply->security)); break; case VAL_CLASS_ANY: verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a positive ANY " "response"); validate_any_response(qstate->env, ve, &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry); verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(positive_any): %s", sec_status_to_string( vq->chase_reply->security)); break; default: log_err("validate: unhandled response subtype: %d", subtype); } if(vq->chase_reply->security == sec_status_bogus) { if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE) errinf(qstate, "wildcard"); else errinf(qstate, val_classification_to_string(subtype)); errinf(qstate, "proof failed"); errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin); } return 1; } /** * Init DLV check. * DLV is going to be decommissioned, but the code is still here for some time. * * Called when a query is determined by other trust anchors to be insecure * (or indeterminate). Then we look if there is a key in the DLV. * Performs aggressive negative cache check to see if there is no key. * Otherwise, spawns a DLV query, and changes to the DLV wait state. * * @param qstate: query state. * @param vq: validator query state. * @param ve: validator shared global environment. * @param id: module id. * @return true if there is no DLV. * false: processing is finished for the validator operate(). * This function may exit in three ways: * o no DLV (aggressive cache), so insecure. (true) * o error - stop processing (false) * o DLV lookup was started, stop processing (false) */ static int val_dlv_init(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, struct val_env* ve, int id) { uint8_t* nm; size_t nm_len; struct module_qstate* newq = NULL; /* there must be a DLV configured */ log_assert(qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor); /* this bool is true to avoid looping in the DLV checks */ log_assert(vq->dlv_checked); /* init the DLV lookup variables */ vq->dlv_lookup_name = NULL; vq->dlv_lookup_name_len = 0; vq->dlv_insecure_at = NULL; vq->dlv_insecure_at_len = 0; /* Determine the name for which we want to lookup DLV. * This name is for the current message, or * for the current RRset for CNAME, referral subtypes. * If there is a signer, use that, otherwise the domain name */ if(vq->signer_name) { nm = vq->signer_name; nm_len = vq->signer_len; } else { /* use qchase */ nm = vq->qchase.qname; nm_len = vq->qchase.qname_len; if(vq->qchase.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS) dname_remove_label(&nm, &nm_len); } log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "DLV init look", nm, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, vq->qchase.qclass); log_assert(nm && nm_len); /* sanity check: no DLV lookups below the DLV anchor itself. * Like, an securely insecure delegation there makes no sense. */ if(dname_subdomain_c(nm, qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->name)) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DLV lookup within DLV repository denied"); return 1; } /* concat name (minus root label) + dlv name */ vq->dlv_lookup_name_len = nm_len - 1 + qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->namelen; vq->dlv_lookup_name = regional_alloc(qstate->region, vq->dlv_lookup_name_len); if(!vq->dlv_lookup_name) { log_err("Out of memory preparing DLV lookup"); return val_error(qstate, id); } memmove(vq->dlv_lookup_name, nm, nm_len-1); memmove(vq->dlv_lookup_name+nm_len-1, qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->name, qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->namelen); log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "DLV name", vq->dlv_lookup_name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DLV, vq->qchase.qclass); /* determine where the insecure point was determined, the DLV must * be equal or below that to continue building the trust chain * down. May be NULL if no trust chain was built yet */ nm = NULL; if(vq->key_entry && key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) { nm = vq->key_entry->name; nm_len = vq->key_entry->namelen; } if(nm) { vq->dlv_insecure_at_len = nm_len - 1 + qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->namelen; vq->dlv_insecure_at = regional_alloc(qstate->region, vq->dlv_insecure_at_len); if(!vq->dlv_insecure_at) { log_err("Out of memory preparing DLV lookup"); return val_error(qstate, id); } memmove(vq->dlv_insecure_at, nm, nm_len-1); memmove(vq->dlv_insecure_at+nm_len-1, qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->name, qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->namelen); log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "insecure_at", vq->dlv_insecure_at, 0, vq->qchase.qclass); } /* If we can find the name in the aggressive negative cache, * give up; insecure is the answer */ while(val_neg_dlvlookup(ve->neg_cache, vq->dlv_lookup_name, vq->dlv_lookup_name_len, vq->qchase.qclass, qstate->env->rrset_cache, *qstate->env->now)) { /* go up */ dname_remove_label(&vq->dlv_lookup_name, &vq->dlv_lookup_name_len); /* too high? */ if(!dname_subdomain_c(vq->dlv_lookup_name, qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->name)) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "ask above dlv repo"); return 1; /* Above the repo is insecure */ } /* above chain of trust? */ if(vq->dlv_insecure_at && !dname_subdomain_c( vq->dlv_lookup_name, vq->dlv_insecure_at)) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "ask above insecure endpoint"); return 1; } } /* perform a lookup for the DLV; with validation */ vq->state = VAL_DLVLOOKUP_STATE; if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->dlv_lookup_name, vq->dlv_lookup_name_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DLV, vq->qchase.qclass, 0, &newq, 0)) { return val_error(qstate, id); } /* Find the closest encloser DLV from the repository. * then that is used to build another chain of trust * This may first require a query 'too low' that has NSECs in * the answer, from which we determine the closest encloser DLV. * When determine the closest encloser, skip empty nonterminals, * since we want a nonempty node in the DLV repository. */ return 0; } /** * The Finished state. The validation status (good or bad) has been determined. * * @param qstate: query state. * @param vq: validator query state. * @param ve: validator shared global environment. * @param id: module id. * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if * not. */ static int processFinished(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, struct val_env* ve, int id) { enum val_classification subtype = val_classify_response( qstate->query_flags, &qstate->qinfo, &vq->qchase, vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip); /* if the result is insecure or indeterminate and we have not * checked the DLV yet, check the DLV */ if((vq->chase_reply->security == sec_status_insecure || vq->chase_reply->security == sec_status_indeterminate) && qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor && !vq->dlv_checked) { vq->dlv_checked = 1; if(!val_dlv_init(qstate, vq, ve, id)) return 0; } /* store overall validation result in orig_msg */ if(vq->rrset_skip == 0) vq->orig_msg->rep->security = vq->chase_reply->security; else if(subtype != VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL || vq->rrset_skip < vq->orig_msg->rep->an_numrrsets + vq->orig_msg->rep->ns_numrrsets) { /* ignore sec status of additional section if a referral * type message skips there and * use the lowest security status as end result. */ if(vq->chase_reply->security < vq->orig_msg->rep->security) vq->orig_msg->rep->security = vq->chase_reply->security; } if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) { /* for a referral, move to next unchecked rrset and check it*/ vq->rrset_skip = val_next_unchecked(vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip); if(vq->rrset_skip < vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count) { /* and restart for this rrset */ verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: go to next rrset"); vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_unchecked; vq->dlv_checked = 0; /* can do DLV for this RR */ vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; return 1; } /* referral chase is done */ } if(vq->chase_reply->security != sec_status_bogus && subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME) { /* chase the CNAME; process next part of the message */ if(!val_chase_cname(&vq->qchase, vq->orig_msg->rep, &vq->rrset_skip)) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: failed to chase CNAME"); vq->orig_msg->rep->security = sec_status_bogus; } else { /* restart process for new qchase at rrset_skip */ log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "validator: chased to", &vq->qchase); vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_unchecked; vq->dlv_checked = 0; /* can do DLV for this RR */ vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; return 1; } } if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security == sec_status_secure) { /* If the message is secure, check that all rrsets are * secure (i.e. some inserted RRset for CNAME chain with * a different signer name). And drop additional rrsets * that are not secure (if clean-additional option is set) */ /* this may cause the msg to be marked bogus */ val_check_nonsecure(qstate->env, vq->orig_msg->rep); if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security == sec_status_secure) { log_query_info(VERB_DETAIL, "validation success", &qstate->qinfo); if(!qstate->no_cache_store) { val_neg_addreply(qstate->env->neg_cache, vq->orig_msg->rep); } } } /* if the result is bogus - set message ttl to bogus ttl to avoid * endless bogus revalidation */ if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security == sec_status_bogus) { /* see if we can try again to fetch data */ if(vq->restart_count < VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT) { int restart_count = vq->restart_count+1; verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validation failed, " "blacklist and retry to fetch data"); val_blacklist(&qstate->blacklist, qstate->region, qstate->reply_origin, 0); qstate->reply_origin = NULL; qstate->errinf = NULL; memset(vq, 0, sizeof(*vq)); vq->restart_count = restart_count; vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; verbose(VERB_ALGO, "pass back to next module"); qstate->ext_state[id] = module_restart_next; return 0; } vq->orig_msg->rep->ttl = ve->bogus_ttl; vq->orig_msg->rep->prefetch_ttl = PREFETCH_TTL_CALC(vq->orig_msg->rep->ttl); if(qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level >= 1 && !qstate->env->cfg->val_log_squelch) { if(qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level < 2) log_query_info(0, "validation failure", &qstate->qinfo); else { char* err = errinf_to_str(qstate); if(err) log_info("%s", err); free(err); } } /* * If set, the validator will not make messages bogus, instead * indeterminate is issued, so that no clients receive SERVFAIL. * This allows an operator to run validation 'shadow' without * hurting responses to clients. */ /* If we are in permissive mode, bogus gets indeterminate */ if(qstate->env->cfg->val_permissive_mode) vq->orig_msg->rep->security = sec_status_indeterminate; } /* store results in cache */ if(qstate->query_flags&BIT_RD) { /* if secure, this will override cache anyway, no need * to check if from parentNS */ if(!qstate->no_cache_store) { if(!dns_cache_store(qstate->env, &vq->orig_msg->qinfo, vq->orig_msg->rep, 0, qstate->prefetch_leeway, 0, NULL, qstate->query_flags)) { log_err("out of memory caching validator results"); } } } else { /* for a referral, store the verified RRsets */ /* and this does not get prefetched, so no leeway */ if(!dns_cache_store(qstate->env, &vq->orig_msg->qinfo, vq->orig_msg->rep, 1, 0, 0, NULL, qstate->query_flags)) { log_err("out of memory caching validator results"); } } qstate->return_rcode = LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR; qstate->return_msg = vq->orig_msg; qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished; return 0; } /** * The DLVLookup state. Process DLV lookups. * * @param qstate: query state. * @param vq: validator query state. * @param ve: validator shared global environment. * @param id: module id. * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if * not. */ static int processDLVLookup(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, struct val_env* ve, int id) { struct module_qstate* newq = NULL; /* see if this we are ready to continue normal resolution */ /* we may need more DLV lookups */ if(vq->dlv_status==dlv_error) verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DLV woke up with status dlv_error"); else if(vq->dlv_status==dlv_success) verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DLV woke up with status dlv_success"); else if(vq->dlv_status==dlv_ask_higher) verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DLV woke up with status dlv_ask_higher"); else if(vq->dlv_status==dlv_there_is_no_dlv) verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DLV woke up with status dlv_there_is_no_dlv"); else verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DLV woke up with status unknown"); if(vq->dlv_status == dlv_error) { verbose(VERB_QUERY, "failed DLV lookup"); return val_error(qstate, id); } else if(vq->dlv_status == dlv_success) { uint8_t* nm; size_t nmlen; /* chain continues with DNSKEY, continue in FINDKEY */ vq->state = VAL_FINDKEY_STATE; /* strip off the DLV suffix from the name; could result in . */ log_assert(dname_subdomain_c(vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->name)); nmlen = vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len - qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->namelen + 1; nm = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, nmlen); if(!nm) { log_err("Out of memory in DLVLook"); return val_error(qstate, id); } nm[nmlen-1] = 0; vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname = nm; vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len = nmlen; /* create a nullentry for the key so the dnskey lookup * can be retried after a validation failure for it */ vq->key_entry = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, nm, nmlen, vq->qchase.qclass, 0, 0); if(!vq->key_entry) { log_err("Out of memory in DLVLook"); return val_error(qstate, id); } if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, vq->qchase.qclass, BIT_CD, &newq, 0)) { log_err("mem error generating DNSKEY request"); return val_error(qstate, id); } return 0; } else if(vq->dlv_status == dlv_there_is_no_dlv) { /* continue with the insecure result we got */ vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; return 1; } log_assert(vq->dlv_status == dlv_ask_higher); /* ask higher, make sure we stay in DLV repo, below dlv_at */ if(!dname_subdomain_c(vq->dlv_lookup_name, qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->name)) { /* just like, there is no DLV */ verbose(VERB_ALGO, "ask above dlv repo"); vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; return 1; } if(vq->dlv_insecure_at && !dname_subdomain_c(vq->dlv_lookup_name, vq->dlv_insecure_at)) { /* already checked a chain lower than dlv_lookup_name */ verbose(VERB_ALGO, "ask above insecure endpoint"); log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "enpt", vq->dlv_insecure_at, 0, 0); vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; return 1; } /* check negative cache before making new request */ if(val_neg_dlvlookup(ve->neg_cache, vq->dlv_lookup_name, vq->dlv_lookup_name_len, vq->qchase.qclass, qstate->env->rrset_cache, *qstate->env->now)) { /* does not exist, go up one (go higher). */ dname_remove_label(&vq->dlv_lookup_name, &vq->dlv_lookup_name_len); /* limit number of labels, limited number of recursion */ return processDLVLookup(qstate, vq, ve, id); } if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->dlv_lookup_name, vq->dlv_lookup_name_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DLV, vq->qchase.qclass, 0, &newq, 0)) { return val_error(qstate, id); } return 0; } /** * Handle validator state. * If a method returns true, the next state is started. If false, then * processing will stop. * @param qstate: query state. * @param vq: validator query state. * @param ve: validator shared global environment. * @param id: module id. */ static void val_handle(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, struct val_env* ve, int id) { int cont = 1; while(cont) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "val handle processing q with state %s", val_state_to_string(vq->state)); switch(vq->state) { case VAL_INIT_STATE: cont = processInit(qstate, vq, ve, id); break; case VAL_FINDKEY_STATE: cont = processFindKey(qstate, vq, id); break; case VAL_VALIDATE_STATE: cont = processValidate(qstate, vq, ve, id); break; case VAL_FINISHED_STATE: cont = processFinished(qstate, vq, ve, id); break; case VAL_DLVLOOKUP_STATE: cont = processDLVLookup(qstate, vq, ve, id); break; default: log_warn("validator: invalid state %d", vq->state); cont = 0; break; } } } void val_operate(struct module_qstate* qstate, enum module_ev event, int id, struct outbound_entry* outbound) { struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)qstate->minfo[id]; verbose(VERB_QUERY, "validator[module %d] operate: extstate:%s " "event:%s", id, strextstate(qstate->ext_state[id]), strmodulevent(event)); log_query_info(VERB_QUERY, "validator operate: query", &qstate->qinfo); if(vq && qstate->qinfo.qname != vq->qchase.qname) log_query_info(VERB_QUERY, "validator operate: chased to", &vq->qchase); (void)outbound; if(event == module_event_new || (event == module_event_pass && vq == NULL)) { /* pass request to next module, to get it */ verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: pass to next module"); qstate->ext_state[id] = module_wait_module; return; } if(event == module_event_moddone) { /* check if validation is needed */ verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: nextmodule returned"); if(!needs_validation(qstate, qstate->return_rcode, qstate->return_msg)) { /* no need to validate this */ if(qstate->return_msg) qstate->return_msg->rep->security = sec_status_indeterminate; qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished; return; } if(already_validated(qstate->return_msg)) { qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished; return; } /* qclass ANY should have validation result from spawned * queries. If we get here, it is bogus or an internal error */ if(qstate->qinfo.qclass == LDNS_RR_CLASS_ANY) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "cannot validate classANY: bogus"); if(qstate->return_msg) qstate->return_msg->rep->security = sec_status_bogus; qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished; return; } /* create state to start validation */ qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; /* override this */ if(!vq) { vq = val_new(qstate, id); if(!vq) { log_err("validator: malloc failure"); qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; return; } } else if(!vq->orig_msg) { if(!val_new_getmsg(qstate, vq)) { log_err("validator: malloc failure"); qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; return; } } val_handle(qstate, vq, ve, id); return; } if(event == module_event_pass) { qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; /* override this */ /* continue processing, since val_env exists */ val_handle(qstate, vq, ve, id); return; } log_err("validator: bad event %s", strmodulevent(event)); qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; return; } /** * Evaluate the response to a priming request. * * @param dnskey_rrset: DNSKEY rrset (can be NULL if none) in prime reply. * (this rrset is allocated in the wrong region, not the qstate). * @param ta: trust anchor. * @param qstate: qstate that needs key. * @param id: module id. * @return new key entry or NULL on allocation failure. * The key entry will either contain a validated DNSKEY rrset, or * represent a Null key (query failed, but validation did not), or a * Bad key (validation failed). */ static struct key_entry_key* primeResponseToKE(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, struct trust_anchor* ta, struct module_qstate* qstate, int id) { struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; struct key_entry_key* kkey = NULL; enum sec_status sec = sec_status_unchecked; char* reason = NULL; int downprot = qstate->env->cfg->harden_algo_downgrade; if(!dnskey_rrset) { log_nametypeclass(VERB_OPS, "failed to prime trust anchor -- " "could not fetch DNSKEY rrset", ta->name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, ta->dclass); if(qstate->env->cfg->harden_dnssec_stripped) { errinf(qstate, "no DNSKEY rrset"); kkey = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, ta->name, ta->namelen, ta->dclass, BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *qstate->env->now); } else kkey = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, ta->name, ta->namelen, ta->dclass, NULL_KEY_TTL, *qstate->env->now); if(!kkey) { log_err("out of memory: allocate fail prime key"); return NULL; } return kkey; } /* attempt to verify with trust anchor DS and DNSKEY */ kkey = val_verify_new_DNSKEYs_with_ta(qstate->region, qstate->env, ve, dnskey_rrset, ta->ds_rrset, ta->dnskey_rrset, downprot, &reason, qstate); if(!kkey) { log_err("out of memory: verifying prime TA"); return NULL; } if(key_entry_isgood(kkey)) sec = sec_status_secure; else sec = sec_status_bogus; verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate keys with anchor(DS): %s", sec_status_to_string(sec)); if(sec != sec_status_secure) { log_nametypeclass(VERB_OPS, "failed to prime trust anchor -- " "DNSKEY rrset is not secure", ta->name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, ta->dclass); /* NOTE: in this case, we should probably reject the trust * anchor for longer, perhaps forever. */ if(qstate->env->cfg->harden_dnssec_stripped) { errinf(qstate, reason); kkey = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, ta->name, ta->namelen, ta->dclass, BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *qstate->env->now); } else kkey = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, ta->name, ta->namelen, ta->dclass, NULL_KEY_TTL, *qstate->env->now); if(!kkey) { log_err("out of memory: allocate null prime key"); return NULL; } return kkey; } log_nametypeclass(VERB_DETAIL, "Successfully primed trust anchor", ta->name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, ta->dclass); return kkey; } /** * In inform supers, with the resulting message and rcode and the current * keyset in the super state, validate the DS response, returning a KeyEntry. * * @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DS. * @param vq: validator query state * @param id: module id. * @param rcode: rcode result value. * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK). * @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info. * @param ke: the key entry to return. It returns * is_bad if the DS response fails to validate, is_null if the * DS response indicated an end to secure space, is_good if the DS * validated. It returns ke=NULL if the DS response indicated that the * request wasn't a delegation point. * @return 0 on servfail error (malloc failure). */ static int ds_response_to_ke(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key** ke) { struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; char* reason = NULL; enum val_classification subtype; if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) { char rc[16]; rc[0]=0; (void)sldns_wire2str_rcode_buf(rcode, rc, sizeof(rc)); /* errors here pretty much break validation */ verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "DS response was error, thus bogus"); errinf(qstate, rc); errinf(qstate, "no DS"); goto return_bogus; } subtype = val_classify_response(BIT_RD, qinfo, qinfo, msg->rep, 0); if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE) { struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds; enum sec_status sec; ds = reply_find_answer_rrset(qinfo, msg->rep); /* If there was no DS rrset, then we have mis-classified * this message. */ if(!ds) { log_warn("internal error: POSITIVE DS response was " "missing DS."); errinf(qstate, "no DS record"); goto return_bogus; } /* Verify only returns BOGUS or SECURE. If the rrset is * bogus, then we are done. */ sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(qstate->env, ve, ds, vq->key_entry, &reason, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate); if(sec != sec_status_secure) { verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "DS rrset in DS response did " "not verify"); errinf(qstate, reason); goto return_bogus; } /* If the DS rrset validates, we still have to make sure * that they are usable. */ if(!val_dsset_isusable(ds)) { /* If they aren't usable, then we treat it like * there was no DS. */ *ke = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, ub_packed_rrset_ttl(ds), *qstate->env->now); return (*ke) != NULL; } /* Otherwise, we return the positive response. */ log_query_info(VERB_DETAIL, "validated DS", qinfo); *ke = key_entry_create_rrset(qstate->region, qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, ds, NULL, *qstate->env->now); return (*ke) != NULL; } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NODATA || subtype == VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR) { /* NODATA means that the qname exists, but that there was * no DS. This is a pretty normal case. */ time_t proof_ttl = 0; enum sec_status sec; /* make sure there are NSECs or NSEC3s with signatures */ if(!val_has_signed_nsecs(msg->rep, &reason)) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "no NSECs: %s", reason); errinf(qstate, reason); goto return_bogus; } /* For subtype Name Error. * attempt ANS 2.8.1.0 compatibility where it sets rcode * to nxdomain, but really this is an Nodata/Noerror response. * Find and prove the empty nonterminal in that case */ /* Try to prove absence of the DS with NSEC */ sec = val_nsec_prove_nodata_dsreply( qstate->env, ve, qinfo, msg->rep, vq->key_entry, &proof_ttl, &reason, qstate); switch(sec) { case sec_status_secure: verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC RRset for the " "referral proved no DS."); *ke = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, proof_ttl, *qstate->env->now); return (*ke) != NULL; case sec_status_insecure: verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC RRset for the " "referral proved not a delegation point"); *ke = NULL; return 1; case sec_status_bogus: verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC RRset for the " "referral did not prove no DS."); errinf(qstate, reason); goto return_bogus; case sec_status_unchecked: default: /* NSEC proof did not work, try next */ break; } sec = nsec3_prove_nods(qstate->env, ve, msg->rep->rrsets + msg->rep->an_numrrsets, msg->rep->ns_numrrsets, qinfo, vq->key_entry, &reason, qstate); switch(sec) { case sec_status_insecure: /* case insecure also continues to unsigned * space. If nsec3-iter-count too high or * optout, then treat below as unsigned */ case sec_status_secure: verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC3s for the " "referral proved no DS."); *ke = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, proof_ttl, *qstate->env->now); return (*ke) != NULL; case sec_status_indeterminate: verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC3s for the " "referral proved no delegation"); *ke = NULL; return 1; case sec_status_bogus: verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC3s for the " "referral did not prove no DS."); errinf(qstate, reason); goto return_bogus; case sec_status_unchecked: default: /* NSEC3 proof did not work */ break; } /* Apparently, no available NSEC/NSEC3 proved NODATA, so * this is BOGUS. */ verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "DS %s ran out of options, so return " "bogus", val_classification_to_string(subtype)); errinf(qstate, "no DS but also no proof of that"); goto return_bogus; } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME || subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER) { /* if the CNAME matches the exact name we want and is signed * properly, then also, we are sure that no DS exists there, * much like a NODATA proof */ enum sec_status sec; struct ub_packed_rrset_key* cname; cname = reply_find_rrset_section_an(msg->rep, qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME, qinfo->qclass); if(!cname) { errinf(qstate, "validator classified CNAME but no " "CNAME of the queried name for DS"); goto return_bogus; } if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)cname->entry.data)->rrsig_count == 0) { if(msg->rep->an_numrrsets != 0 && ntohs(msg->rep-> rrsets[0]->rk.type)==LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) { errinf(qstate, "DS got DNAME answer"); } else { errinf(qstate, "DS got unsigned CNAME answer"); } goto return_bogus; } sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(qstate->env, ve, cname, vq->key_entry, &reason, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate); if(sec == sec_status_secure) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "CNAME validated, " "proof that DS does not exist"); /* and that it is not a referral point */ *ke = NULL; return 1; } errinf(qstate, "CNAME in DS response was not secure."); errinf(qstate, reason); goto return_bogus; } else { verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Encountered an unhandled type of " "DS response, thus bogus."); errinf(qstate, "no DS and"); if(FLAGS_GET_RCODE(msg->rep->flags) != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) { char rc[16]; rc[0]=0; (void)sldns_wire2str_rcode_buf((int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE( msg->rep->flags), rc, sizeof(rc)); errinf(qstate, rc); } else errinf(qstate, val_classification_to_string(subtype)); errinf(qstate, "message fails to prove that"); goto return_bogus; } return_bogus: *ke = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *qstate->env->now); return (*ke) != NULL; } /** * Process DS response. Called from inform_supers. * Because it is in inform_supers, the mesh itself is busy doing callbacks * for a state that is to be deleted soon; don't touch the mesh; instead * set a state in the super, as the super will be reactivated soon. * Perform processing to determine what state to set in the super. * * @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DS. * @param vq: validator query state * @param id: module id. * @param rcode: rcode result value. * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK). * @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info. * @param origin: the origin of msg. */ static void process_ds_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo, struct sock_list* origin) { struct key_entry_key* dske = NULL; uint8_t* olds = vq->empty_DS_name; vq->empty_DS_name = NULL; if(!ds_response_to_ke(qstate, vq, id, rcode, msg, qinfo, &dske)) { log_err("malloc failure in process_ds_response"); vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */ vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; return; } if(dske == NULL) { vq->empty_DS_name = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len); if(!vq->empty_DS_name) { log_err("malloc failure in empty_DS_name"); vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */ vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; return; } vq->empty_DS_len = qinfo->qname_len; vq->chain_blacklist = NULL; /* ds response indicated that we aren't on a delegation point. * Keep the forState.state on FINDKEY. */ } else if(key_entry_isgood(dske)) { vq->ds_rrset = key_entry_get_rrset(dske, qstate->region); if(!vq->ds_rrset) { log_err("malloc failure in process DS"); vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */ vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; return; } vq->chain_blacklist = NULL; /* fresh blacklist for next part*/ /* Keep the forState.state on FINDKEY. */ } else if(key_entry_isbad(dske) && vq->restart_count < VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT) { vq->empty_DS_name = olds; val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, qstate->region, origin, 1); qstate->errinf = NULL; vq->restart_count++; } else { if(key_entry_isbad(dske)) { errinf_origin(qstate, origin); errinf_dname(qstate, "for DS", qinfo->qname); } /* NOTE: the reason for the DS to be not good (that is, * either bad or null) should have been logged by * dsResponseToKE. */ vq->key_entry = dske; /* The FINDKEY phase has ended, so move on. */ vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; } } /** * Process DNSKEY response. Called from inform_supers. * Sets the key entry in the state. * Because it is in inform_supers, the mesh itself is busy doing callbacks * for a state that is to be deleted soon; don't touch the mesh; instead * set a state in the super, as the super will be reactivated soon. * Perform processing to determine what state to set in the super. * * @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DNSKEY. * @param vq: validator query state * @param id: module id. * @param rcode: rcode result value. * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK). * @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info. * @param origin: the origin of msg. */ static void process_dnskey_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo, struct sock_list* origin) { struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; struct key_entry_key* old = vq->key_entry; struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey = NULL; int downprot; char* reason = NULL; if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) dnskey = reply_find_answer_rrset(qinfo, msg->rep); if(dnskey == NULL) { /* bad response */ verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Missing DNSKEY RRset in response to " "DNSKEY query."); if(vq->restart_count < VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT) { val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, qstate->region, origin, 1); qstate->errinf = NULL; vq->restart_count++; return; } vq->key_entry = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *qstate->env->now); if(!vq->key_entry) { log_err("alloc failure in missing dnskey response"); /* key_entry is NULL for failure in Validate */ } errinf(qstate, "No DNSKEY record"); errinf_origin(qstate, origin); errinf_dname(qstate, "for key", qinfo->qname); vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; return; } if(!vq->ds_rrset) { log_err("internal error: no DS rrset for new DNSKEY response"); vq->key_entry = NULL; vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; return; } downprot = qstate->env->cfg->harden_algo_downgrade; vq->key_entry = val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(qstate->region, qstate->env, ve, dnskey, vq->ds_rrset, downprot, &reason, qstate); if(!vq->key_entry) { log_err("out of memory in verify new DNSKEYs"); vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; return; } /* If the key entry isBad or isNull, then we can move on to the next * state. */ if(!key_entry_isgood(vq->key_entry)) { if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) { if(vq->restart_count < VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT) { val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, qstate->region, origin, 1); qstate->errinf = NULL; vq->restart_count++; vq->key_entry = old; return; } verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Did not match a DS to a DNSKEY, " "thus bogus."); errinf(qstate, reason); errinf_origin(qstate, origin); errinf_dname(qstate, "for key", qinfo->qname); } vq->chain_blacklist = NULL; vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; return; } vq->chain_blacklist = NULL; qstate->errinf = NULL; /* The DNSKEY validated, so cache it as a trusted key rrset. */ key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry, qstate); /* If good, we stay in the FINDKEY state. */ log_query_info(VERB_DETAIL, "validated DNSKEY", qinfo); } /** * Process prime response * Sets the key entry in the state. * * @param qstate: query state that is validating and primed a trust anchor. * @param vq: validator query state * @param id: module id. * @param rcode: rcode result value. * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK). * @param origin: the origin of msg. */ static void process_prime_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct sock_list* origin) { struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset = NULL; struct trust_anchor* ta = anchor_find(qstate->env->anchors, vq->trust_anchor_name, vq->trust_anchor_labs, vq->trust_anchor_len, vq->qchase.qclass); if(!ta) { /* trust anchor revoked, restart with less anchors */ vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; if(!vq->trust_anchor_name) vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; /* break a loop */ vq->trust_anchor_name = NULL; return; } /* Fetch and validate the keyEntry that corresponds to the * current trust anchor. */ if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) { dnskey_rrset = reply_find_rrset_section_an(msg->rep, ta->name, ta->namelen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, ta->dclass); } if(ta->autr) { if(!autr_process_prime(qstate->env, ve, ta, dnskey_rrset, qstate)) { /* trust anchor revoked, restart with less anchors */ vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; vq->trust_anchor_name = NULL; return; } } vq->key_entry = primeResponseToKE(dnskey_rrset, ta, qstate, id); lock_basic_unlock(&ta->lock); if(vq->key_entry) { if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry) && vq->restart_count < VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT) { val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, qstate->region, origin, 1); qstate->errinf = NULL; vq->restart_count++; vq->key_entry = NULL; vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; return; } vq->chain_blacklist = NULL; errinf_origin(qstate, origin); errinf_dname(qstate, "for trust anchor", ta->name); /* store the freshly primed entry in the cache */ key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry, qstate); } /* If the result of the prime is a null key, skip the FINDKEY state.*/ if(!vq->key_entry || key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry) || key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) { vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; } /* the qstate will be reactivated after inform_super is done */ } /** * Process DLV response. Called from inform_supers. * Because it is in inform_supers, the mesh itself is busy doing callbacks * for a state that is to be deleted soon; don't touch the mesh; instead * set a state in the super, as the super will be reactivated soon. * Perform processing to determine what state to set in the super. * * @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DLV. * @param vq: validator query state * @param id: module id. * @param rcode: rcode result value. * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK). * @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info. */ static void process_dlv_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo) { struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; verbose(VERB_ALGO, "process dlv response to super"); if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) { /* lookup failed, set in vq to give up */ vq->dlv_status = dlv_error; verbose(VERB_ALGO, "response is error"); return; } if(msg->rep->security != sec_status_secure) { vq->dlv_status = dlv_error; verbose(VERB_ALGO, "response is not secure, %s", sec_status_to_string(msg->rep->security)); return; } /* was the lookup a success? validated DLV? */ if(FLAGS_GET_RCODE(msg->rep->flags) == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && msg->rep->an_numrrsets == 1 && msg->rep->security == sec_status_secure && ntohs(msg->rep->rrsets[0]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DLV && ntohs(msg->rep->rrsets[0]->rk.rrset_class) == qinfo->qclass && query_dname_compare(msg->rep->rrsets[0]->rk.dname, vq->dlv_lookup_name) == 0) { /* yay! it is just like a DS */ vq->ds_rrset = (struct ub_packed_rrset_key*) regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, msg->rep->rrsets[0], sizeof(*vq->ds_rrset)); if(!vq->ds_rrset) { log_err("out of memory in process_dlv"); return; } vq->ds_rrset->entry.key = vq->ds_rrset; vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname = (uint8_t*)regional_alloc_init( qstate->region, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len); if(!vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname) { log_err("out of memory in process_dlv"); vq->dlv_status = dlv_error; return; } vq->ds_rrset->entry.data = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, vq->ds_rrset->entry.data, packed_rrset_sizeof(vq->ds_rrset->entry.data)); if(!vq->ds_rrset->entry.data) { log_err("out of memory in process_dlv"); vq->dlv_status = dlv_error; return; } packed_rrset_ptr_fixup(vq->ds_rrset->entry.data); /* make vq do a DNSKEY query next up */ vq->dlv_status = dlv_success; return; } /* store NSECs into negative cache */ val_neg_addreply(ve->neg_cache, msg->rep); /* was the lookup a failure? * if we have to go up into the DLV for a higher DLV anchor * then set this in the vq, so it can make queries when activated. * See if the NSECs indicate that we should look for higher DLV * or, that there is no DLV securely */ if(!val_nsec_check_dlv(qinfo, msg->rep, &vq->dlv_lookup_name, &vq->dlv_lookup_name_len)) { vq->dlv_status = dlv_error; verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec error"); return; } if(!dname_subdomain_c(vq->dlv_lookup_name, qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->name)) { vq->dlv_status = dlv_there_is_no_dlv; return; } vq->dlv_status = dlv_ask_higher; } /* * inform validator super. * * @param qstate: query state that finished. * @param id: module id. * @param super: the qstate to inform. */ void val_inform_super(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id, struct module_qstate* super) { struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)super->minfo[id]; log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "validator: inform_super, sub is", &qstate->qinfo); log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "super is", &super->qinfo); if(!vq) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "super: has no validator state"); return; } if(vq->wait_prime_ta) { vq->wait_prime_ta = 0; process_prime_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode, qstate->return_msg, qstate->reply_origin); return; } if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS) { process_ds_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode, qstate->return_msg, &qstate->qinfo, qstate->reply_origin); return; } else if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY) { process_dnskey_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode, qstate->return_msg, &qstate->qinfo, qstate->reply_origin); return; } else if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DLV) { process_dlv_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode, qstate->return_msg, &qstate->qinfo); return; } log_err("internal error in validator: no inform_supers possible"); } void val_clear(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id) { if(!qstate) return; /* everything is allocated in the region, so assign NULL */ qstate->minfo[id] = NULL; } size_t val_get_mem(struct module_env* env, int id) { struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)env->modinfo[id]; if(!ve) return 0; return sizeof(*ve) + key_cache_get_mem(ve->kcache) + val_neg_get_mem(ve->neg_cache) + sizeof(size_t)*2*ve->nsec3_keyiter_count; } /** * The validator function block */ static struct module_func_block val_block = { "validator", &val_init, &val_deinit, &val_operate, &val_inform_super, &val_clear, &val_get_mem }; struct module_func_block* val_get_funcblock(void) { return &val_block; } const char* val_state_to_string(enum val_state state) { switch(state) { case VAL_INIT_STATE: return "VAL_INIT_STATE"; case VAL_FINDKEY_STATE: return "VAL_FINDKEY_STATE"; case VAL_VALIDATE_STATE: return "VAL_VALIDATE_STATE"; case VAL_FINISHED_STATE: return "VAL_FINISHED_STATE"; case VAL_DLVLOOKUP_STATE: return "VAL_DLVLOOKUP_STATE"; } return "UNKNOWN VALIDATOR STATE"; }