/* * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 Apple Computer, Inc. * Copyright (c) 2005 Robert N. M. Watson * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of Apple Computer, Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of * its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived * from this software without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR * ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * * $FreeBSD$ */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* * Hash table functions for the audit event number to event class mask * mapping. */ #define EVCLASSMAP_HASH_TABLE_SIZE 251 struct evclass_elem { au_event_t event; au_class_t class; LIST_ENTRY(evclass_elem) entry; }; struct evclass_list { LIST_HEAD(, evclass_elem) head; }; static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_AUDITEVCLASS, "audit_evclass", "Audit event class"); static struct mtx evclass_mtx; static struct evclass_list evclass_hash[EVCLASSMAP_HASH_TABLE_SIZE]; /* * Look up the class for an audit event in the class mapping table. */ au_class_t au_event_class(au_event_t event) { struct evclass_list *evcl; struct evclass_elem *evc; au_class_t class; mtx_lock(&evclass_mtx); evcl = &evclass_hash[event % EVCLASSMAP_HASH_TABLE_SIZE]; class = AU_NULL; LIST_FOREACH(evc, &evcl->head, entry) { if (evc->event == event) { class = evc->class; goto out; } } out: mtx_unlock(&evclass_mtx); return (class); } /* * Insert a event to class mapping. If the event already exists in the * mapping, then replace the mapping with the new one. * * XXX There is currently no constraints placed on the number of mappings. * May want to either limit to a number, or in terms of memory usage. */ void au_evclassmap_insert(au_event_t event, au_class_t class) { struct evclass_list *evcl; struct evclass_elem *evc, *evc_new; /* * Pessimistically, always allocate storage before acquiring mutex. * Free if there is already a mapping for this event. */ evc_new = malloc(sizeof(*evc), M_AUDITEVCLASS, M_WAITOK); mtx_lock(&evclass_mtx); evcl = &evclass_hash[event % EVCLASSMAP_HASH_TABLE_SIZE]; LIST_FOREACH(evc, &evcl->head, entry) { if (evc->event == event) { evc->class = class; mtx_unlock(&evclass_mtx); free(evc_new, M_AUDITEVCLASS); return; } } evc = evc_new; evc->event = event; evc->class = class; LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&evcl->head, evc, entry); mtx_unlock(&evclass_mtx); } void au_evclassmap_init(void) { int i; mtx_init(&evclass_mtx, "evclass_mtx", NULL, MTX_DEF); for (i = 0; i < EVCLASSMAP_HASH_TABLE_SIZE; i++) LIST_INIT(&evclass_hash[i].head); /* * Set up the initial event to class mapping for system calls. * * XXXRW: Really, this should walk all possible audit events, not all * native ABI system calls, as there may be audit events reachable * only through non-native system calls. It also seems a shame to * frob the mutex this early. */ for (i = 0; i < SYS_MAXSYSCALL; i++) { if (sysent[i].sy_auevent != AUE_NULL) au_evclassmap_insert(sysent[i].sy_auevent, AU_NULL); } } /* * Check whether an event is aditable by comparing the mask of classes this * event is part of against the given mask. */ int au_preselect(au_event_t event, au_class_t class, au_mask_t *mask_p, int sorf) { au_class_t effmask = 0; if (mask_p == NULL) return (-1); /* * Perform the actual check of the masks against the event. */ if (sorf & AU_PRS_SUCCESS) effmask |= (mask_p->am_success & class); if (sorf & AU_PRS_FAILURE) effmask |= (mask_p->am_failure & class); if (effmask) return (1); else return (0); } /* * Convert sysctl names and present arguments to events. */ au_event_t ctlname_to_sysctlevent(int name[], uint64_t valid_arg) { /* can't parse it - so return the worst case */ if ((valid_arg & (ARG_CTLNAME | ARG_LEN)) != (ARG_CTLNAME | ARG_LEN)) return (AUE_SYSCTL); switch (name[0]) { /* non-admin "lookups" treat them special */ case KERN_OSTYPE: case KERN_OSRELEASE: case KERN_OSREV: case KERN_VERSION: case KERN_ARGMAX: case KERN_CLOCKRATE: case KERN_BOOTTIME: case KERN_POSIX1: case KERN_NGROUPS: case KERN_JOB_CONTROL: case KERN_SAVED_IDS: case KERN_OSRELDATE: case KERN_DUMMY: return (AUE_SYSCTL_NONADMIN); /* only treat the changeable controls as admin */ case KERN_MAXVNODES: case KERN_MAXPROC: case KERN_MAXFILES: case KERN_MAXPROCPERUID: case KERN_MAXFILESPERPROC: case KERN_HOSTID: case KERN_SECURELVL: case KERN_HOSTNAME: case KERN_VNODE: case KERN_PROC: case KERN_FILE: case KERN_PROF: case KERN_NISDOMAINNAME: case KERN_UPDATEINTERVAL: case KERN_NTP_PLL: case KERN_BOOTFILE: case KERN_DUMPDEV: case KERN_IPC: case KERN_PS_STRINGS: case KERN_USRSTACK: case KERN_LOGSIGEXIT: case KERN_IOV_MAX: case KERN_MAXID: return ((valid_arg & ARG_VALUE) ? AUE_SYSCTL : AUE_SYSCTL_NONADMIN); default: return (AUE_SYSCTL); } /* NOTREACHED */ } /* * Convert an open flags specifier into a specific type of open event for * auditing purposes. */ au_event_t flags_and_error_to_openevent(int oflags, int error) { au_event_t aevent; /* * Need to check only those flags we care about. */ oflags = oflags & (O_RDONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_RDWR | O_WRONLY); /* * These checks determine what flags are on with the condition that * ONLY that combination is on, and no other flags are on. */ switch (oflags) { case O_RDONLY: aevent = AUE_OPEN_R; break; case (O_RDONLY | O_CREAT): aevent = AUE_OPEN_RC; break; case (O_RDONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC): aevent = AUE_OPEN_RTC; break; case (O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC): aevent = AUE_OPEN_RT; break; case O_RDWR: aevent = AUE_OPEN_RW; break; case (O_RDWR | O_CREAT): aevent = AUE_OPEN_RWC; break; case (O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC): aevent = AUE_OPEN_RWTC; break; case (O_RDWR | O_TRUNC): aevent = AUE_OPEN_RWT; break; case O_WRONLY: aevent = AUE_OPEN_W; break; case (O_WRONLY | O_CREAT): aevent = AUE_OPEN_WC; break; case (O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC): aevent = AUE_OPEN_WTC; break; case (O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC): aevent = AUE_OPEN_WT; break; default: aevent = AUE_OPEN; break; } #if 0 /* * Convert chatty errors to better matching events. Failures to * find a file are really just attribute events -- so recast them as * such. * * XXXAUDIT: Solaris defines that AUE_OPEN will never be returned, it * is just a placeholder. However, in Darwin we return that in * preference to other events. For now, comment this out as we don't * have a BSM conversion routine for AUE_OPEN. */ switch (aevent) { case AUE_OPEN_R: case AUE_OPEN_RT: case AUE_OPEN_RW: case AUE_OPEN_RWT: case AUE_OPEN_W: case AUE_OPEN_WT: if (error == ENOENT) aevent = AUE_OPEN; } #endif return (aevent); } /* * Convert a MSGCTL command to a specific event. */ int msgctl_to_event(int cmd) { switch (cmd) { case IPC_RMID: return (AUE_MSGCTL_RMID); case IPC_SET: return (AUE_MSGCTL_SET); case IPC_STAT: return (AUE_MSGCTL_STAT); default: /* We will audit a bad command. */ return (AUE_MSGCTL); } } /* * Convert a SEMCTL command to a specific event. */ int semctl_to_event(int cmd) { switch (cmd) { case GETALL: return (AUE_SEMCTL_GETALL); case GETNCNT: return (AUE_SEMCTL_GETNCNT); case GETPID: return (AUE_SEMCTL_GETPID); case GETVAL: return (AUE_SEMCTL_GETVAL); case GETZCNT: return (AUE_SEMCTL_GETZCNT); case IPC_RMID: return (AUE_SEMCTL_RMID); case IPC_SET: return (AUE_SEMCTL_SET); case SETALL: return (AUE_SEMCTL_SETALL); case SETVAL: return (AUE_SEMCTL_SETVAL); case IPC_STAT: return (AUE_SEMCTL_STAT); default: /* We will audit a bad command */ return (AUE_SEMCTL); } } /* * Convert a command for the auditon() system call to a audit event. */ int auditon_command_event(int cmd) { switch(cmd) { case A_GETPOLICY: return (AUE_AUDITON_GPOLICY); case A_SETPOLICY: return (AUE_AUDITON_SPOLICY); case A_GETKMASK: return (AUE_AUDITON_GETKMASK); case A_SETKMASK: return (AUE_AUDITON_SETKMASK); case A_GETQCTRL: return (AUE_AUDITON_GQCTRL); case A_SETQCTRL: return (AUE_AUDITON_SQCTRL); case A_GETCWD: return (AUE_AUDITON_GETCWD); case A_GETCAR: return (AUE_AUDITON_GETCAR); case A_GETSTAT: return (AUE_AUDITON_GETSTAT); case A_SETSTAT: return (AUE_AUDITON_SETSTAT); case A_SETUMASK: return (AUE_AUDITON_SETUMASK); case A_SETSMASK: return (AUE_AUDITON_SETSMASK); case A_GETCOND: return (AUE_AUDITON_GETCOND); case A_SETCOND: return (AUE_AUDITON_SETCOND); case A_GETCLASS: return (AUE_AUDITON_GETCLASS); case A_SETCLASS: return (AUE_AUDITON_SETCLASS); case A_GETPINFO: case A_SETPMASK: case A_SETFSIZE: case A_GETFSIZE: case A_GETPINFO_ADDR: case A_GETKAUDIT: case A_SETKAUDIT: default: return (AUE_AUDITON); /* No special record */ } } /* * Create a canonical path from given path by prefixing either the root * directory, or the current working directory. If the process working * directory is NULL, we could use 'rootvnode' to obtain the root directory, * but this results in a volfs name written to the audit log. So we will * leave the filename starting with '/' in the audit log in this case. * * XXXRW: Since we combine two paths here, ideally a buffer of size * MAXPATHLEN * 2 would be passed in. */ void canon_path(struct thread *td, char *path, char *cpath) { char *bufp; char *retbuf, *freebuf; struct vnode *vnp; struct filedesc *fdp; int cisr, error, vfslocked; WITNESS_WARN(WARN_GIANTOK | WARN_SLEEPOK, NULL, "canon_path() at %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__); fdp = td->td_proc->p_fd; bufp = path; cisr = 0; FILEDESC_SLOCK(fdp); if (*(path) == '/') { while (*(bufp) == '/') bufp++; /* Skip leading '/'s. */ /* * If no process root, or it is the same as the system root, * audit the path as passed in with a single '/'. */ if ((fdp->fd_rdir == NULL) || (fdp->fd_rdir == rootvnode)) { vnp = NULL; bufp--; /* Restore one '/'. */ } else { vnp = fdp->fd_rdir; /* Use process root. */ vref(vnp); } } else { vnp = fdp->fd_cdir; /* Prepend the current dir. */ cisr = (fdp->fd_rdir == fdp->fd_cdir); vref(vnp); bufp = path; } FILEDESC_SUNLOCK(fdp); if (vnp != NULL) { /* * XXX: vn_fullpath() on FreeBSD is "less reliable" than * vn_getpath() on Darwin, so this will need more attention * in the future. Also, the question and string bounding * here seems a bit questionable and will also require * attention. */ vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(vnp->v_mount); vn_lock(vnp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td); error = vn_fullpath(td, vnp, &retbuf, &freebuf); if (error == 0) { /* Copy and free buffer allocated by vn_fullpath(). * If the current working directory was the same as * the root directory, and the path was a relative * pathname, do not separate the two components with * the '/' character. */ snprintf(cpath, MAXPATHLEN, "%s%s%s", retbuf, cisr ? "" : "/", bufp); free(freebuf, M_TEMP); } else cpath[0] = '\0'; vput(vnp); VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked); } else strlcpy(cpath, bufp, MAXPATHLEN); }