// MallocOverflowSecurityChecker.cpp - Check for malloc overflows -*- C++ -*-=// // // The LLVM Compiler Infrastructure // // This file is distributed under the University of Illinois Open Source // License. See LICENSE.TXT for details. // //===----------------------------------------------------------------------===// // // This checker detects a common memory allocation security flaw. // Suppose 'unsigned int n' comes from an untrusted source. If the // code looks like 'malloc (n * 4)', and an attacker can make 'n' be // say MAX_UINT/4+2, then instead of allocating the correct 'n' 4-byte // elements, this will actually allocate only two because of overflow. // Then when the rest of the program attempts to store values past the // second element, these values will actually overwrite other items in // the heap, probably allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary code. // //===----------------------------------------------------------------------===// #include "ClangSACheckers.h" #include "clang/AST/EvaluatedExprVisitor.h" #include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/BugReporter/BugReporter.h" #include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/Checker.h" #include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/PathSensitive/AnalysisManager.h" #include "llvm/ADT/SmallVector.h" using namespace clang; using namespace ento; namespace { struct MallocOverflowCheck { const BinaryOperator *mulop; const Expr *variable; MallocOverflowCheck (const BinaryOperator *m, const Expr *v) : mulop(m), variable (v) {} }; class MallocOverflowSecurityChecker : public Checker { public: void checkASTCodeBody(const Decl *D, AnalysisManager &mgr, BugReporter &BR) const; void CheckMallocArgument( SmallVectorImpl &PossibleMallocOverflows, const Expr *TheArgument, ASTContext &Context) const; void OutputPossibleOverflows( SmallVectorImpl &PossibleMallocOverflows, const Decl *D, BugReporter &BR, AnalysisManager &mgr) const; }; } // end anonymous namespace void MallocOverflowSecurityChecker::CheckMallocArgument( SmallVectorImpl &PossibleMallocOverflows, const Expr *TheArgument, ASTContext &Context) const { /* Look for a linear combination with a single variable, and at least one multiplication. Reject anything that applies to the variable: an explicit cast, conditional expression, an operation that could reduce the range of the result, or anything too complicated :-). */ const Expr * e = TheArgument; const BinaryOperator * mulop = NULL; for (;;) { e = e->IgnoreParenImpCasts(); if (isa(e)) { const BinaryOperator * binop = dyn_cast(e); BinaryOperatorKind opc = binop->getOpcode(); // TODO: ignore multiplications by 1, reject if multiplied by 0. if (mulop == NULL && opc == BO_Mul) mulop = binop; if (opc != BO_Mul && opc != BO_Add && opc != BO_Sub && opc != BO_Shl) return; const Expr *lhs = binop->getLHS(); const Expr *rhs = binop->getRHS(); if (rhs->isEvaluatable(Context)) e = lhs; else if ((opc == BO_Add || opc == BO_Mul) && lhs->isEvaluatable(Context)) e = rhs; else return; } else if (isa(e) || isa(e)) break; else return; } if (mulop == NULL) return; // We've found the right structure of malloc argument, now save // the data so when the body of the function is completely available // we can check for comparisons. // TODO: Could push this into the innermost scope where 'e' is // defined, rather than the whole function. PossibleMallocOverflows.push_back(MallocOverflowCheck(mulop, e)); } namespace { // A worker class for OutputPossibleOverflows. class CheckOverflowOps : public EvaluatedExprVisitor { public: typedef SmallVectorImpl theVecType; private: theVecType &toScanFor; ASTContext &Context; bool isIntZeroExpr(const Expr *E) const { if (!E->getType()->isIntegralOrEnumerationType()) return false; llvm::APSInt Result; if (E->EvaluateAsInt(Result, Context)) return Result == 0; return false; } void CheckExpr(const Expr *E_p) { const Expr *E = E_p->IgnoreParenImpCasts(); theVecType::iterator i = toScanFor.end(); theVecType::iterator e = toScanFor.begin(); if (const DeclRefExpr *DR = dyn_cast(E)) { const Decl * EdreD = DR->getDecl(); while (i != e) { --i; if (const DeclRefExpr *DR_i = dyn_cast(i->variable)) { if (DR_i->getDecl() == EdreD) i = toScanFor.erase(i); } } } else if (isa(E)) { // No points-to analysis, just look at the member const Decl * EmeMD = dyn_cast(E)->getMemberDecl(); while (i != e) { --i; if (isa(i->variable)) { if (dyn_cast(i->variable)->getMemberDecl() == EmeMD) i = toScanFor.erase (i); } } } } public: void VisitBinaryOperator(BinaryOperator *E) { if (E->isComparisonOp()) { const Expr * lhs = E->getLHS(); const Expr * rhs = E->getRHS(); // Ignore comparisons against zero, since they generally don't // protect against an overflow. if (!isIntZeroExpr(lhs) && ! isIntZeroExpr(rhs)) { CheckExpr(lhs); CheckExpr(rhs); } } EvaluatedExprVisitor::VisitBinaryOperator(E); } /* We specifically ignore loop conditions, because they're typically not error checks. */ void VisitWhileStmt(WhileStmt *S) { return this->Visit(S->getBody()); } void VisitForStmt(ForStmt *S) { return this->Visit(S->getBody()); } void VisitDoStmt(DoStmt *S) { return this->Visit(S->getBody()); } CheckOverflowOps(theVecType &v, ASTContext &ctx) : EvaluatedExprVisitor(ctx), toScanFor(v), Context(ctx) { } }; } // OutputPossibleOverflows - We've found a possible overflow earlier, // now check whether Body might contain a comparison which might be // preventing the overflow. // This doesn't do flow analysis, range analysis, or points-to analysis; it's // just a dumb "is there a comparison" scan. The aim here is to // detect the most blatent cases of overflow and educate the // programmer. void MallocOverflowSecurityChecker::OutputPossibleOverflows( SmallVectorImpl &PossibleMallocOverflows, const Decl *D, BugReporter &BR, AnalysisManager &mgr) const { // By far the most common case: nothing to check. if (PossibleMallocOverflows.empty()) return; // Delete any possible overflows which have a comparison. CheckOverflowOps c(PossibleMallocOverflows, BR.getContext()); c.Visit(mgr.getAnalysisDeclContext(D)->getBody()); // Output warnings for all overflows that are left. for (CheckOverflowOps::theVecType::iterator i = PossibleMallocOverflows.begin(), e = PossibleMallocOverflows.end(); i != e; ++i) { BR.EmitBasicReport(D, "malloc() size overflow", categories::UnixAPI, "the computation of the size of the memory allocation may overflow", PathDiagnosticLocation::createOperatorLoc(i->mulop, BR.getSourceManager()), i->mulop->getSourceRange()); } } void MallocOverflowSecurityChecker::checkASTCodeBody(const Decl *D, AnalysisManager &mgr, BugReporter &BR) const { CFG *cfg = mgr.getCFG(D); if (!cfg) return; // A list of variables referenced in possibly overflowing malloc operands. SmallVector PossibleMallocOverflows; for (CFG::iterator it = cfg->begin(), ei = cfg->end(); it != ei; ++it) { CFGBlock *block = *it; for (CFGBlock::iterator bi = block->begin(), be = block->end(); bi != be; ++bi) { if (Optional CS = bi->getAs()) { if (const CallExpr *TheCall = dyn_cast(CS->getStmt())) { // Get the callee. const FunctionDecl *FD = TheCall->getDirectCallee(); if (!FD) return; // Get the name of the callee. If it's a builtin, strip off the prefix. IdentifierInfo *FnInfo = FD->getIdentifier(); if (!FnInfo) return; if (FnInfo->isStr ("malloc") || FnInfo->isStr ("_MALLOC")) { if (TheCall->getNumArgs() == 1) CheckMallocArgument(PossibleMallocOverflows, TheCall->getArg(0), mgr.getASTContext()); } } } } } OutputPossibleOverflows(PossibleMallocOverflows, D, BR, mgr); } void ento::registerMallocOverflowSecurityChecker(CheckerManager &mgr) { mgr.registerChecker(); }