From 4336be14876615f58f95af255006b37db516584f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: delphij Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2014 10:13:46 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Fix multiple OpenSSL vulnerabilities: The receipt of a specifically crafted DTLS handshake message may cause OpenSSL to consume large amounts of memory. [CVE-2014-3506] The receipt of a specifically crafted DTLS packet could cause OpenSSL to leak memory. [CVE-2014-3507] A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information from the stack. [CVE-2014-3508] OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject to a denial of service attack. [CVE-2014-3510] Security: CVE-2014-3506, CVE-2014-3507, CVE-2014-3508, CVE-2014-3510 Security: FreeBSD-SA-14:18.openssl Approved by: so git-svn-id: svn://svn.freebsd.org/base/releng/9.1@271305 ccf9f872-aa2e-dd11-9fc8-001c23d0bc1f --- UPDATING | 3 ++ crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c | 30 +++++++---- crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c | 16 +++--- crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++--------- crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c | 16 +++++- crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c | 30 ++++++++--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c | 7 +++ sys/conf/newvers.sh | 2 +- 8 files changed, 125 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) diff --git a/UPDATING b/UPDATING index 5aeeb351..26d81f80 100644 --- a/UPDATING +++ b/UPDATING @@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ handbook. Items affecting the ports and packages system can be found in /usr/ports/UPDATING. Please read that file before running portupgrade. +20140909: p18 FreeBSD-SA-14:18.openssl + Fix OpenSSL multiple vulnerabilities. [SA-14:18] + 20140708: p17 FreeBSD-SA-14:17.kmem Fix kernel memory disclosure in control messages and SCTP notifications. [SA-14:17] diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c index 3ac2bc2a..e50501ad 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c @@ -285,16 +285,28 @@ err: ASN1_OBJECT_free(ret); return(NULL); } + ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp, long len) { ASN1_OBJECT *ret=NULL; const unsigned char *p; - int i; - /* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have leading 0x80 in - * subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2 + int i, length; + + /* Sanity check OID encoding. + * Need at least one content octet. + * MSB must be clear in the last octet. + * can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2 */ - for (i = 0, p = *pp; i < len; i++, p++) + if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL || + p[len - 1] & 0x80) + { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING); + return NULL; + } + /* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */ + length = (int)len; + for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++) { if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80))) { @@ -313,20 +325,20 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp, else ret=(*a); p= *pp; - if ((ret->data == NULL) || (ret->length < len)) + if ((ret->data == NULL) || (ret->length < length)) { if (ret->data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ret->data); - ret->data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len ? (int)len : 1); + ret->data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(length); ret->flags|=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA; if (ret->data == NULL) { i=ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; } } - memcpy(ret->data,p,(int)len); - ret->length=(int)len; + memcpy(ret->data,p,length); + ret->length=length; ret->sn=NULL; ret->ln=NULL; /* ret->flags=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; we know it is dynamic */ - p+=len; + p+=length; if (a != NULL) (*a)=ret; *pp=p; diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c index 760af16d..cf5ba2a1 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c @@ -444,11 +444,12 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name) unsigned char *p; char tbuf[DECIMAL_SIZE(i)+DECIMAL_SIZE(l)+2]; - if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) { - buf[0]='\0'; - return(0); - } + /* Ensure that, at every state, |buf| is NUL-terminated. */ + if (buf && buf_len > 0) + buf[0] = '\0'; + if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) + return(0); if (!no_name && (nid=OBJ_obj2nid(a)) != NID_undef) { @@ -527,9 +528,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name) i=(int)(l/40); l-=(long)(i*40); } - if (buf && (buf_len > 0)) + if (buf && (buf_len > 1)) { *buf++ = i + '0'; + *buf = '\0'; buf_len--; } n++; @@ -544,9 +546,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name) i = strlen(bndec); if (buf) { - if (buf_len > 0) + if (buf_len > 1) { *buf++ = '.'; + *buf = '\0'; buf_len--; } BUF_strlcpy(buf,bndec,buf_len); @@ -786,4 +789,3 @@ err: OPENSSL_free(buf); return(ok); } - diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c index b53b6805..7e1118bd 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -580,29 +580,32 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok) return 0; } +/* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes + * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may + * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */ +static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s) + { + unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH; + if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list) + return s->max_cert_list; + return max_len; + } static int -dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) +dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) { hm_fragment *frag = NULL; pitem *item = NULL; int i = -1, is_complete; PQ_64BIT seq64; - unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len; + unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len; - if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len) + if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len || + msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s)) goto err; - /* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set) - * maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum. - */ - if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH < s->max_cert_list) - max_len = s->max_cert_list; - else - max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH; - - if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len) - goto err; + if (frag_len == 0) + return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; /* Try to find item in queue */ pq_64bit_init(&seq64); @@ -632,7 +635,8 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a - * retransmit and can be dropped. + * retransmit and can be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag + * does not need to be freed. */ if (frag->reassembly == NULL) { @@ -652,7 +656,9 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0); - if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len) + if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len) + i=-1; + if (i<=0) goto err; RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off, @@ -680,21 +686,25 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) i = -1; } - pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); + item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); + /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted. + * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were, + * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control + * would never have reached this branch. */ + OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL); } return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; err: - if (frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); - if (item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item); + if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); *ok = 0; return i; } static int -dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) +dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) { int i=-1; hm_fragment *frag = NULL; @@ -714,7 +724,7 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) /* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment, * don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it. */ - if (item != NULL && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len) + if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) item = NULL; /* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is @@ -739,9 +749,12 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) } else { - if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len) + if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok); + if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s)) + goto err; + frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0); if ( frag == NULL) goto err; @@ -753,7 +766,9 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read) */ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, frag->fragment,frag_len,0); - if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len) + if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len) + i = -1; + if (i<=0) goto err; } @@ -765,14 +780,21 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) if ( item == NULL) goto err; - pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); + item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); + /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted. + * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were, + * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either + * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set + * to NULL and it will have been processed with + * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have + * been discarded. */ + OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL); } return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; err: - if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); - if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item); + if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); *ok = 0; return i; } diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c index ac24bfb3..58a3b469 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c @@ -796,6 +796,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) RSA *rsa; unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) + { + /* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp; else @@ -986,6 +993,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt; + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) + { + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto err; + } + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp; else @@ -1226,5 +1240,3 @@ int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s) /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } - - diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c index be05911e..e544853a 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c @@ -328,23 +328,19 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s) * Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have * to read more records to find out. * No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this, - * so we simply assume TLS 1.0 to avoid protocol version downgrade - * attacks. */ + * so we simply reject such connections to avoid + * protocol version downgrade attacks. */ if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6) { -#if 0 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); goto err; -#else - v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR; -#endif } /* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value * which will use the highest version 3 we support. * If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise * this.... */ - else if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) + if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) v[1]=0xff; else v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */ @@ -412,14 +408,34 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s) v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */ v[1] = p[4]; + /* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 + * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS + * record. It's format is: + * Byte Content + * 0-1 msg_length + * 2 msg_type + * 3-4 version + * 5-6 cipher_spec_length + * 7-8 session_id_length + * 9-10 challenge_length + * ... ... + */ n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1]; if (n > (1024*4)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE); goto err; } + if (n < 9) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2); + /* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have + * j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid + * packet bytes. */ if (j <= 0) return(j); ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2); diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c index 8ce62171..81358b5f 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c @@ -1913,6 +1913,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) RSA *rsa; unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) + { + /* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp; else diff --git a/sys/conf/newvers.sh b/sys/conf/newvers.sh index ddb1b3ea..fa5d298e 100644 --- a/sys/conf/newvers.sh +++ b/sys/conf/newvers.sh @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ TYPE="FreeBSD" REVISION="9.1" -BRANCH="RELEASE-p17" +BRANCH="RELEASE-p18" if [ "X${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}" != "X" ]; then BRANCH=${BRANCH_OVERRIDE} fi -- 2.42.0