From eee1c15247aa1bf9905120f6da1644895080527d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: des Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2013 10:15:33 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] In IPv6 and NetATM, stop SIOCSIFADDR, SIOCSIFBRDADDR, SIOCSIFDSTADDR and SIOCSIFNETMASK at the socket layer rather than pass them on to the link layer without validation or credential checks. [SA-13:12] Prevent cross-mount hardlinks between different nullfs mounts of the same underlying filesystem. [SA-13:13] Security: CVE-2013-5691 Security: FreeBSD-SA-13:12.ifioctl Security: CVE-2013-5710 Security: FreeBSD-SA-13:13.nullfs Approved by: so git-svn-id: svn://svn.freebsd.org/base/releng/9.1@255448 ccf9f872-aa2e-dd11-9fc8-001c23d0bc1f --- UPDATING | 11 +++++++++++ sys/conf/newvers.sh | 2 +- sys/fs/nullfs/null_vnops.c | 10 ++++++++++ sys/net/if.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- sys/netinet6/in6.c | 12 ++++++++++++ sys/netnatm/natm.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/UPDATING b/UPDATING index 8022eb3b..9c19ed33 100644 --- a/UPDATING +++ b/UPDATING @@ -9,6 +9,17 @@ handbook. Items affecting the ports and packages system can be found in /usr/ports/UPDATING. Please read that file before running portupgrade. +20130910: p7 FreeBSD-SA-13:12.ifioctl + FreeBSD-SA-13:13.nullfs + + In IPv6 and NetATM, stop SIOCSIFADDR, SIOCSIFBRDADDR, + SIOCSIFDSTADDR and SIOCSIFNETMASK at the socket layer rather + than pass them on to the link layer without validation or + credential checks. [SA-13:12] + + Prevent cross-mount hardlinks between different nullfs mounts + of the same underlying filesystem. [SA-13:13] + 20130822: p6 FreeBSD-SA-13:09.ip_multicast FreeBSD-SA-13:10.sctp FreeBSD-EN-13:03.mfi diff --git a/sys/conf/newvers.sh b/sys/conf/newvers.sh index ce711537..6c533550 100644 --- a/sys/conf/newvers.sh +++ b/sys/conf/newvers.sh @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ TYPE="FreeBSD" REVISION="9.1" -BRANCH="RELEASE-p6" +BRANCH="RELEASE-p7" if [ "X${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}" != "X" ]; then BRANCH=${BRANCH_OVERRIDE} fi diff --git a/sys/fs/nullfs/null_vnops.c b/sys/fs/nullfs/null_vnops.c index b607666d..666aa76f 100644 --- a/sys/fs/nullfs/null_vnops.c +++ b/sys/fs/nullfs/null_vnops.c @@ -815,6 +815,15 @@ null_vptocnp(struct vop_vptocnp_args *ap) return (error); } +static int +null_link(struct vop_link_args *ap) +{ + + if (ap->a_tdvp->v_mount != ap->a_vp->v_mount) + return (EXDEV); + return (null_bypass((struct vop_generic_args *)ap)); +} + /* * Global vfs data structures */ @@ -828,6 +837,7 @@ struct vop_vector null_vnodeops = { .vop_getwritemount = null_getwritemount, .vop_inactive = null_inactive, .vop_islocked = vop_stdislocked, + .vop_link = null_link, .vop_lock1 = null_lock, .vop_lookup = null_lookup, .vop_open = null_open, diff --git a/sys/net/if.c b/sys/net/if.c index 2535e9ca..4ea3d947 100644 --- a/sys/net/if.c +++ b/sys/net/if.c @@ -2542,11 +2542,23 @@ ifioctl(struct socket *so, u_long cmd, caddr_t data, struct thread *td) CURVNET_RESTORE(); return (EOPNOTSUPP); } + + /* + * Pass the request on to the socket control method, and if the + * latter returns EOPNOTSUPP, directly to the interface. + * + * Make an exception for the legacy SIOCSIF* requests. Drivers + * trust SIOCSIFADDR et al to come from an already privileged + * layer, and do not perform any credentials checks or input + * validation. + */ #ifndef COMPAT_43 error = ((*so->so_proto->pr_usrreqs->pru_control)(so, cmd, data, ifp, td)); - if (error == EOPNOTSUPP && ifp != NULL && ifp->if_ioctl != NULL) + if (error == EOPNOTSUPP && ifp != NULL && ifp->if_ioctl != NULL && + cmd != SIOCSIFADDR && cmd != SIOCSIFBRDADDR && + cmd != SIOCSIFDSTADDR && cmd != SIOCSIFNETMASK) error = (*ifp->if_ioctl)(ifp, cmd, data); #else { @@ -2590,7 +2602,9 @@ ifioctl(struct socket *so, u_long cmd, caddr_t data, struct thread *td) data, ifp, td)); if (error == EOPNOTSUPP && ifp != NULL && - ifp->if_ioctl != NULL) + ifp->if_ioctl != NULL && + cmd != SIOCSIFADDR && cmd != SIOCSIFBRDADDR && + cmd != SIOCSIFDSTADDR && cmd != SIOCSIFNETMASK) error = (*ifp->if_ioctl)(ifp, cmd, data); switch (ocmd) { diff --git a/sys/netinet6/in6.c b/sys/netinet6/in6.c index c0437d35..1dea9ba1 100644 --- a/sys/netinet6/in6.c +++ b/sys/netinet6/in6.c @@ -421,6 +421,18 @@ in6_control(struct socket *so, u_long cmd, caddr_t data, case SIOCGIFSTAT_ICMP6: sa6 = &ifr->ifr_addr; break; + case SIOCSIFADDR: + case SIOCSIFBRDADDR: + case SIOCSIFDSTADDR: + case SIOCSIFNETMASK: + /* + * Although we should pass any non-INET6 ioctl requests + * down to driver, we filter some legacy INET requests. + * Drivers trust SIOCSIFADDR et al to come from an already + * privileged layer, and do not perform any credentials + * checks or input validation. + */ + return (EINVAL); default: sa6 = NULL; break; diff --git a/sys/netnatm/natm.c b/sys/netnatm/natm.c index cfcbaa78..c7bebc2b 100644 --- a/sys/netnatm/natm.c +++ b/sys/netnatm/natm.c @@ -339,6 +339,21 @@ natm_usr_control(struct socket *so, u_long cmd, caddr_t arg, npcb = (struct natmpcb *)so->so_pcb; KASSERT(npcb != NULL, ("natm_usr_control: npcb == NULL")); + switch (cmd) { + case SIOCSIFADDR: + case SIOCSIFBRDADDR: + case SIOCSIFDSTADDR: + case SIOCSIFNETMASK: + /* + * Although we should pass any non-ATM ioctl requests + * down to driver, we filter some legacy INET requests. + * Drivers trust SIOCSIFADDR et al to come from an already + * privileged layer, and do not perform any credentials + * checks or input validation. + */ + return (EINVAL); + } + if (ifp == NULL || ifp->if_ioctl == NULL) return (EOPNOTSUPP); return ((*ifp->if_ioctl)(ifp, cmd, arg)); -- 2.45.0