2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
136 #include <openssl/x509.h>
137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
138 #include <openssl/dh.h>
140 #include <openssl/bn.h>
141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
142 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
144 #include <openssl/md5.h>
146 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
148 static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
151 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
153 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
154 return(SSLv3_server_method());
159 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
161 ssl_undefined_function,
162 ssl3_get_server_method)
164 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
167 unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
168 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
170 int new_state,state,skip=0;
172 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
176 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
178 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
179 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
181 /* init things to blank */
183 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
197 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
199 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
203 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
204 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
207 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
209 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
214 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
216 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
218 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
223 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
231 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
238 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
240 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
248 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
249 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
251 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
252 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
254 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
255 * client that doesn't support secure
258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
259 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
265 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
266 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
267 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
268 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
272 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
276 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
277 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
278 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
279 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
282 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
285 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
289 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
290 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
291 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
294 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
295 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
297 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
301 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
302 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
303 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
304 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
305 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
308 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
309 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
311 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
315 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
318 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
322 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
323 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
324 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */
325 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)
326 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
328 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
329 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
331 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
332 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
334 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
339 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
346 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
351 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
353 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
355 /* clear this, it may get reset by
356 * send_server_key_exchange */
357 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
360 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
362 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
363 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
364 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
365 * be able to handle this) */
366 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
368 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
371 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
372 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
374 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
375 * message only if the cipher suite is either
376 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
377 * server certificate contains the server's
378 * public key for key exchange.
380 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
382 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
384 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
385 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
386 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
392 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
393 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
402 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
403 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
404 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
405 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
406 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
407 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
408 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
409 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
410 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
411 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
412 * and in RFC 2246): */
413 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
414 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
415 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
416 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
417 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
418 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
420 /* no cert request */
422 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
423 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
427 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
428 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
429 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
430 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
431 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
433 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
434 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
440 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
441 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
442 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
443 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
444 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
445 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
449 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
451 /* This code originally checked to see if
452 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
453 * and then flushed. This caused problems
454 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
455 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
456 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
457 * still exist. So instead we just flush
461 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
462 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
467 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
469 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
472 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
473 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
474 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
475 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
479 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
481 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
483 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
484 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
487 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
491 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
492 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
493 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
498 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
499 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
500 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
501 * message is not sent.
503 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
508 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
511 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
512 * a client cert, it can be verified
514 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
515 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
516 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
517 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
518 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
519 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
523 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
524 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
526 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
527 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
528 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
530 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
534 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
535 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
536 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
537 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
538 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
542 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
543 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
546 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
551 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
552 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
553 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
554 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
555 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
559 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
561 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
562 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
563 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
570 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
572 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
573 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
574 { ret= -1; goto end; }
576 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
577 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
579 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
580 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
583 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
584 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
592 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
593 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
594 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
595 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
596 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
597 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
598 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
599 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
601 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
603 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
608 /* clean a few things up */
609 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
611 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
614 /* remove buffering on output */
615 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
619 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
621 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
622 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
626 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
628 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
630 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
632 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
646 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
650 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
655 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
659 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
666 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
670 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
674 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
678 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
680 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
681 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
686 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
687 /* number of bytes to write */
692 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
693 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
696 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
701 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
703 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
709 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
710 * so permit appropriate message length */
711 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
717 if (!ok) return((int)n);
718 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
719 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
721 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
722 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
724 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
726 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
727 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
730 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
731 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
733 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
734 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
737 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
743 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
745 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
746 unsigned int cookie_len;
749 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
754 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
756 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
757 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
758 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
759 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
762 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
764 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
767 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
768 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
769 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
770 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
771 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
774 if (!ok) return((int)n);
776 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
778 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
779 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
780 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
783 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
784 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
787 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
789 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
790 s->version = s->client_version;
792 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
796 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
797 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
798 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
800 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
802 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
804 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
805 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
807 if (cookie_length == 0)
811 /* load the client random */
812 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
815 /* get the session-id */
819 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
820 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
821 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
822 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
823 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
824 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
825 * an earlier library version)
827 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
829 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
834 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
836 { /* previous session */
843 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
850 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
856 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
857 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
858 * does not cause an overflow.
860 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
863 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
868 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
869 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
872 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
874 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
876 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
879 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
880 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
881 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
884 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
886 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
887 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
889 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
890 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
891 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
902 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
904 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
905 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
911 /* not enough data */
912 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
916 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
923 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
924 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
927 id=s->session->cipher->id;
930 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
932 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
934 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
936 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
937 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
945 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
946 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
949 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
951 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
952 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
953 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
954 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
955 * enabled, though. */
956 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
957 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
959 s->session->cipher = c;
966 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
967 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
968 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
978 /* not enough data */
979 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
986 if (p[j] == 0) break;
993 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1000 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1002 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1004 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1009 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1014 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1015 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1016 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1017 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1019 if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
1020 { /* See if we have a match */
1021 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1023 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1024 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1026 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1039 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1045 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
1046 #if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
1047 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
1048 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
1049 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1053 /* wrong number of bytes,
1054 * there could be more to follow */
1055 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1062 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1067 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1068 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1070 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1072 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1073 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1074 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1075 if (ciphers == NULL)
1077 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1082 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1083 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1087 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1091 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1095 /* Session-id reuse */
1096 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1097 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1098 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1099 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1101 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1103 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1104 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1106 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1107 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
1109 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1113 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1114 else if (ec != NULL)
1115 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1117 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1121 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1124 /* we now have the following setup.
1126 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1127 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1128 * compression - basically ignored right now
1129 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1130 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1131 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1132 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1139 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1142 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1146 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1149 unsigned char *p,*d;
1151 unsigned long l,Time;
1153 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1155 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1156 p=s->s3->server_random;
1157 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1159 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1161 /* Do the message type and length last */
1164 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1165 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1168 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1169 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1171 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1172 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1173 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1174 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1175 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1176 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1177 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1179 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1180 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1181 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1182 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1183 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1186 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1188 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1190 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1191 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1197 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1200 /* put the cipher */
1201 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1204 /* put the compression method */
1205 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1208 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1211 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1213 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1214 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1223 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1226 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1227 /* number of bytes to write */
1232 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1233 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1236 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1240 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1242 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1245 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1250 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1251 /* number of bytes to write */
1256 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1257 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1260 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1266 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1273 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1274 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1277 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1280 unsigned char *p,*d;
1290 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1291 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1293 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1298 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1300 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1301 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1304 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1306 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1307 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1308 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1311 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1320 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1326 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1331 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1334 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1335 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1336 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1337 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1340 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1345 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1351 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1358 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1359 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1360 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1362 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1371 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1372 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1373 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1374 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1387 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1389 const EC_GROUP *group;
1391 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1392 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1394 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1395 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1396 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1400 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1405 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1411 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1417 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1423 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1424 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1425 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1426 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1428 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1430 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1435 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1436 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1437 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1443 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1444 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1450 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1451 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1452 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1455 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1462 /* Encode the public key.
1463 * First check the size of encoding and
1464 * allocate memory accordingly.
1466 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1467 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1468 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1471 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1472 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1473 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1474 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1481 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1482 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1483 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1484 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1486 if (encodedlen == 0)
1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1492 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1494 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1495 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1496 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1497 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1502 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1503 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1511 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1513 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1517 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1519 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1523 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1525 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1528 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1531 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1539 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1544 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1547 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1555 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1557 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1558 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1559 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1560 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1561 * the actual encoded point itself
1563 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1571 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1572 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1574 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1582 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1583 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1585 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1589 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1591 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1592 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1593 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1594 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1595 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1596 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1597 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1598 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1599 (unsigned int *)&i);
1603 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1604 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1614 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1615 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1618 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1619 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1620 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1621 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1622 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1623 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1633 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1634 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1636 /* let's do ECDSA */
1637 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1638 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1639 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1640 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1641 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1642 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1653 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1654 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1660 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1663 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1669 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1670 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1671 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1673 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1676 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1677 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1679 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1683 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1685 unsigned char *p,*d;
1687 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1691 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1695 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1697 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1699 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1708 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1712 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1714 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1715 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1716 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1721 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1722 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1725 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1732 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1733 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1739 /* else no CA names */
1740 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1743 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1744 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1747 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1752 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1753 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1756 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1763 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1766 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1767 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1772 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1780 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1782 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1788 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1790 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1791 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1792 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1793 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1794 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1797 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1798 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1799 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1800 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1804 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1805 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1807 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1812 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1813 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1815 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1816 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1817 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1818 * be sent already */
1821 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1829 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1830 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1831 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1832 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1834 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1841 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */
1842 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION &&
1843 s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1848 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1860 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1864 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1866 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1867 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1870 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1872 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1873 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1874 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1875 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1876 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1878 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1879 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1880 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1882 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1883 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1885 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1886 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1887 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1888 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1889 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1890 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1891 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1897 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1898 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1899 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1901 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1902 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1903 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1904 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1908 s->session->master_key_length=
1909 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1910 s->session->master_key,
1912 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1917 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1922 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1924 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1934 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1936 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1942 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1944 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1949 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1952 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1955 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1959 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1967 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1972 s->session->master_key_length=
1973 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1974 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1975 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1979 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1982 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1983 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1984 krb5_data authenticator;
1986 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1987 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1988 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1989 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1990 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1991 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1993 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1994 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1996 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1998 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2001 enc_ticket.length = i;
2003 if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6)
2005 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2006 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2010 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2011 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2014 authenticator.length = i;
2016 if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6)
2018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2019 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2023 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2024 p+=authenticator.length;
2028 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2031 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2034 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2037 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2041 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2042 enc_pms.length + 6))
2044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2045 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2049 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2053 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2054 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2056 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2057 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2063 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2064 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2066 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2067 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2070 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2071 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2073 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2074 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2080 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2087 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2088 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2090 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2094 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2096 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2099 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2102 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2103 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2105 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2106 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2109 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2112 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2115 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2118 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2122 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2125 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2128 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2130 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2131 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2132 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2133 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2134 * the protocol version.
2135 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2136 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2138 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2141 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2146 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2148 s->session->master_key_length=
2149 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2150 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2152 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2154 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2155 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2157 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2158 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2163 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2164 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2165 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2166 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2170 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2173 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
2178 const EC_GROUP *group;
2179 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2181 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2182 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2185 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2189 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2192 /* use the certificate */
2193 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2197 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2198 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2200 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2203 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2204 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2206 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2207 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2214 /* Let's get client's public key */
2215 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2218 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2224 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2228 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2232 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2234 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2236 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2237 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2238 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2239 * never executed. When that support is
2240 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2241 * received in the certificate is
2242 * authorized for key agreement.
2243 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2244 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2247 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2249 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2253 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2254 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2260 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2264 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2265 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2267 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2270 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2274 /* Get encoded point length */
2279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2283 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2284 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2290 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2291 * currently, so set it to the start
2293 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2296 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2297 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2298 if (field_size <= 0)
2300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2304 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2312 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2313 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2314 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2315 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2316 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2318 /* Compute the master secret */
2319 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2320 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2322 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2328 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2330 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2336 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2337 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2341 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2342 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2343 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2344 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2345 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2350 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2352 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2359 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2360 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2361 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2366 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2368 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2370 peer=s->session->peer;
2371 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2372 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2380 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2382 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2383 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2385 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2396 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2400 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2403 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2407 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2410 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2414 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2415 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2421 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2425 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2426 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2429 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2434 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2436 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2437 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2441 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2447 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2455 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2457 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2458 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2459 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2463 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2471 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2473 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2474 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2475 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2479 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2481 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2489 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2498 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2501 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2505 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2507 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2509 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2510 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2512 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2514 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2521 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2523 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2525 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2526 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2529 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2532 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2533 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2536 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2539 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2543 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2545 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2549 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2551 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2560 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2564 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2567 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2569 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2575 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2578 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2583 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2587 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2596 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2598 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2599 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2601 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2605 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2606 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2607 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2610 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2616 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2619 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2625 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2626 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2627 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2628 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2630 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2631 * when we arrive here. */
2632 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2634 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2635 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2641 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2642 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2643 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2644 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2645 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2653 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2656 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2657 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2661 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2666 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2668 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2670 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2671 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2672 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2673 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2679 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2680 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2685 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2686 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2691 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2692 static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
2694 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2695 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2697 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2699 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2701 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2703 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2705 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2707 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2709 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2711 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2713 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2715 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2717 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2719 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2721 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2723 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2725 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2727 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2729 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2731 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2733 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2735 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2737 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2739 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2741 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2743 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2745 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
2752 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2753 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2755 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
2757 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
2762 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2763 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2764 unsigned char key_name[16];
2766 /* get session encoding length */
2767 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2768 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2773 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2774 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2775 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2776 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2777 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2778 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2780 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
2781 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
2782 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
2784 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
2788 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
2790 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2792 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
2793 /* Skip message length for now */
2795 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2796 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2797 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
2798 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
2801 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2803 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
2812 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
2813 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2814 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
2815 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2816 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2817 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
2819 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
2820 /* Skip ticket length for now */
2822 /* Output key name */
2824 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
2827 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
2828 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2829 /* Encrypt session data */
2830 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
2832 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
2834 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2836 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
2837 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
2838 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2841 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
2843 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2844 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
2845 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
2847 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
2849 /* number of bytes to write */
2851 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
2856 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
2857 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2860 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
2862 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
2865 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2866 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
2867 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
2870 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
2873 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2876 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
2877 /* message length */
2878 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
2880 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
2881 /* length of OCSP response */
2882 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
2883 /* actual response */
2884 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
2885 /* number of bytes to write */
2886 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
2887 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
2891 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
2892 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));