2 * validator/val_nsec3.c - validator NSEC3 denial of existance functions.
4 * Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved.
6 * This software is open source.
8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
12 * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
13 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15 * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
16 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
17 * and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
19 * Neither the name of the NLNET LABS nor the names of its contributors may
20 * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
21 * specific prior written permission.
23 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
24 * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
25 * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
26 * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
27 * HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
28 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
29 * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
30 * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
31 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
32 * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
33 * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
39 * This file contains helper functions for the validator module.
40 * The functions help with NSEC3 checking, the different NSEC3 proofs
41 * for denial of existance, and proofs for presence of types.
45 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_SSL_H
46 #include "openssl/ssl.h"
52 #include "validator/val_nsec3.h"
53 #include "validator/validator.h"
54 #include "validator/val_kentry.h"
55 #include "services/cache/rrset.h"
56 #include "util/regional.h"
57 #include "util/rbtree.h"
58 #include "util/module.h"
59 #include "util/net_help.h"
60 #include "util/data/packed_rrset.h"
61 #include "util/data/dname.h"
62 #include "util/data/msgreply.h"
63 /* we include nsec.h for the bitmap_has_type function */
64 #include "validator/val_nsec.h"
65 #include "ldns/sbuffer.h"
68 * This function we get from ldns-compat or from base system
69 * it returns the number of data bytes stored at the target, or <0 on error.
71 int sldns_b32_ntop_extended_hex(uint8_t const *src, size_t srclength,
72 char *target, size_t targsize);
74 * This function we get from ldns-compat or from base system
75 * it returns the number of data bytes stored at the target, or <0 on error.
77 int sldns_b32_pton_extended_hex(char const *src, size_t hashed_owner_str_len,
78 uint8_t *target, size_t targsize);
81 * Closest encloser (ce) proof results
82 * Contains the ce and the next-closer (nc) proof.
85 /** the closest encloser name */
89 /** NSEC3 record that proved ce. rrset */
90 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ce_rrset;
91 /** NSEC3 record that proved ce. rr number */
93 /** NSEC3 record that proved nc. rrset */
94 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nc_rrset;
95 /** NSEC3 record that proved nc. rr*/
100 * Filter conditions for NSEC3 proof
101 * Used to iterate over the applicable NSEC3 RRs.
103 struct nsec3_filter {
104 /** Zone name, only NSEC3 records for this zone are considered */
106 /** length of the zonename */
108 /** the list of NSEC3s to filter; array */
109 struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list;
110 /** number of rrsets in list */
112 /** class of records for the NSEC3, only this class applies */
116 /** return number of rrs in an rrset */
118 rrset_get_count(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset)
120 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
126 /** return if nsec3 RR has unknown flags */
128 nsec3_unknown_flags(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int r)
130 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
132 log_assert(d && r < (int)d->count);
133 if(d->rr_len[r] < 2+2)
134 return 0; /* malformed */
135 return (int)(d->rr_data[r][2+1] & NSEC3_UNKNOWN_FLAGS);
139 nsec3_has_optout(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int r)
141 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
143 log_assert(d && r < (int)d->count);
144 if(d->rr_len[r] < 2+2)
145 return 0; /* malformed */
146 return (int)(d->rr_data[r][2+1] & NSEC3_OPTOUT);
149 /** return nsec3 RR algorithm */
151 nsec3_get_algo(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int r)
153 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
155 log_assert(d && r < (int)d->count);
156 if(d->rr_len[r] < 2+1)
157 return 0; /* malformed */
158 return (int)(d->rr_data[r][2+0]);
161 /** return if nsec3 RR has known algorithm */
163 nsec3_known_algo(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int r)
165 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
167 log_assert(d && r < (int)d->count);
168 if(d->rr_len[r] < 2+1)
169 return 0; /* malformed */
170 switch(d->rr_data[r][2+0]) {
171 case NSEC3_HASH_SHA1:
177 /** return nsec3 RR iteration count */
179 nsec3_get_iter(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int r)
182 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
184 log_assert(d && r < (int)d->count);
185 if(d->rr_len[r] < 2+4)
186 return 0; /* malformed */
187 memmove(&i, d->rr_data[r]+2+2, sizeof(i));
192 /** return nsec3 RR salt */
194 nsec3_get_salt(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int r,
195 uint8_t** salt, size_t* saltlen)
197 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
199 log_assert(d && r < (int)d->count);
200 if(d->rr_len[r] < 2+5) {
203 return 0; /* malformed */
205 *saltlen = (size_t)d->rr_data[r][2+4];
206 if(d->rr_len[r] < 2+5+(size_t)*saltlen) {
209 return 0; /* malformed */
211 *salt = d->rr_data[r]+2+5;
215 int nsec3_get_params(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int r,
216 int* algo, size_t* iter, uint8_t** salt, size_t* saltlen)
218 if(!nsec3_known_algo(rrset, r) || nsec3_unknown_flags(rrset, r))
220 if(!nsec3_get_salt(rrset, r, salt, saltlen))
222 *algo = nsec3_get_algo(rrset, r);
223 *iter = nsec3_get_iter(rrset, r);
228 nsec3_get_nextowner(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int r,
229 uint8_t** next, size_t* nextlen)
232 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
234 log_assert(d && r < (int)d->count);
235 if(d->rr_len[r] < 2+5) {
238 return 0; /* malformed */
240 saltlen = (size_t)d->rr_data[r][2+4];
241 if(d->rr_len[r] < 2+5+saltlen+1) {
244 return 0; /* malformed */
246 *nextlen = (size_t)d->rr_data[r][2+5+saltlen];
247 if(d->rr_len[r] < 2+5+saltlen+1+*nextlen) {
250 return 0; /* malformed */
252 *next = d->rr_data[r]+2+5+saltlen+1;
256 size_t nsec3_hash_to_b32(uint8_t* hash, size_t hashlen, uint8_t* zone,
257 size_t zonelen, uint8_t* buf, size_t max)
259 /* write b32 of name, leave one for length */
261 if(max < hashlen*2+1) /* quick approx of b32, as if hexb16 */
263 ret = sldns_b32_ntop_extended_hex(hash, hashlen, (char*)buf+1, max-1);
266 buf[0] = (uint8_t)ret; /* length of b32 label */
268 if(max - ret < zonelen)
270 memmove(buf+ret, zone, zonelen);
271 return zonelen+(size_t)ret;
274 size_t nsec3_get_nextowner_b32(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int r,
275 uint8_t* buf, size_t max)
278 size_t nmlen, zonelen;
279 if(!nsec3_get_nextowner(rrset, r, &nm, &nmlen))
281 /* append zone name; the owner name must be <b32>.zone */
282 zone = rrset->rk.dname;
283 zonelen = rrset->rk.dname_len;
284 dname_remove_label(&zone, &zonelen);
285 return nsec3_hash_to_b32(nm, nmlen, zone, zonelen, buf, max);
289 nsec3_has_type(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int r, uint16_t type)
292 size_t bitlen, skiplen;
293 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
295 log_assert(d && r < (int)d->count);
298 if(d->rr_len[r] < skiplen+1)
299 return 0; /* malformed, too short */
300 skiplen += 1+(size_t)d->rr_data[r][skiplen];
301 /* skip next hashed owner */
302 if(d->rr_len[r] < skiplen+1)
303 return 0; /* malformed, too short */
304 skiplen += 1+(size_t)d->rr_data[r][skiplen];
305 if(d->rr_len[r] < skiplen)
306 return 0; /* malformed, too short */
307 bitlen = d->rr_len[r] - skiplen;
308 bitmap = d->rr_data[r]+skiplen;
309 return nsecbitmap_has_type_rdata(bitmap, bitlen, type);
313 * Iterate through NSEC3 list, per RR
314 * This routine gives the next RR in the list (or sets rrset null).
319 * struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset;
320 * for(rrset=filter_first(filter, &rrsetnum, &rrnum); rrset;
321 * rrset=filter_next(filter, &rrsetnum, &rrnum))
325 * o unknown flag NSEC3s
326 * o unknown algorithm NSEC3s.
327 * @param filter: nsec3 filter structure.
328 * @param rrsetnum: in/out rrset number to look at.
329 * @param rrnum: in/out rr number in rrset to look at.
330 * @returns ptr to the next rrset (or NULL at end).
332 static struct ub_packed_rrset_key*
333 filter_next(struct nsec3_filter* filter, size_t* rrsetnum, int* rrnum)
339 if(!filter->zone) /* empty list */
341 for(i=*rrsetnum; i<filter->num; i++) {
342 /* see if RRset qualifies */
343 if(ntohs(filter->list[i]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3 ||
344 ntohs(filter->list[i]->rk.rrset_class) !=
347 /* check RRset zone */
348 nm = filter->list[i]->rk.dname;
349 nmlen = filter->list[i]->rk.dname_len;
350 dname_remove_label(&nm, &nmlen);
351 if(query_dname_compare(nm, filter->zone) != 0)
354 r = (*rrnum) + 1; /* continue at next RR */
355 else r = 0; /* new RRset start at first RR */
356 for(; r < (int)rrset_get_count(filter->list[i]); r++) {
357 /* skip unknown flags, algo */
358 if(nsec3_unknown_flags(filter->list[i], r) ||
359 !nsec3_known_algo(filter->list[i], r))
361 /* this one is a good target */
364 return filter->list[i];
371 * Start iterating over NSEC3 records.
372 * @param filter: the filter structure, must have been filter_init-ed.
373 * @param rrsetnum: can be undefined on call, inited.
374 * @param rrnum: can be undefined on call, inited.
375 * @return first rrset of an NSEC3, together with rrnum this points to
376 * the first RR to examine. Is NULL on empty list.
378 static struct ub_packed_rrset_key*
379 filter_first(struct nsec3_filter* filter, size_t* rrsetnum, int* rrnum)
383 return filter_next(filter, rrsetnum, rrnum);
386 /** see if at least one RR is known (flags, algo) */
388 nsec3_rrset_has_known(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s)
391 for(r=0; r < (int)rrset_get_count(s); r++) {
392 if(!nsec3_unknown_flags(s, r) && nsec3_known_algo(s, r))
399 * Initialize the filter structure.
400 * Finds the zone by looking at available NSEC3 records and best match.
401 * (skips the unknown flag and unknown algo NSEC3s).
403 * @param filter: nsec3 filter structure.
404 * @param list: list of rrsets, an array of them.
405 * @param num: number of rrsets in list.
407 * query name to match a zone for.
408 * query type (if DS a higher zone must be chosen)
409 * qclass, to filter NSEC3s with.
412 filter_init(struct nsec3_filter* filter, struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list,
413 size_t num, struct query_info* qinfo)
419 filter->zone_len = 0;
422 filter->fclass = qinfo->qclass;
423 for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
424 /* ignore other stuff in the list */
425 if(ntohs(list[i]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3 ||
426 ntohs(list[i]->rk.rrset_class) != qinfo->qclass)
428 /* skip unknown flags, algo */
429 if(!nsec3_rrset_has_known(list[i]))
432 /* since NSEC3s are base32.zonename, we can find the zone
433 * name by stripping off the first label of the record */
434 nm = list[i]->rk.dname;
435 nmlen = list[i]->rk.dname_len;
436 dname_remove_label(&nm, &nmlen);
437 /* if we find a domain that can prove about the qname,
438 * and if this domain is closer to the qname */
439 if(dname_subdomain_c(qinfo->qname, nm) && (!filter->zone ||
440 dname_subdomain_c(nm, filter->zone))) {
441 /* for a type DS do not accept a zone equal to qname*/
442 if(qinfo->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS &&
443 query_dname_compare(qinfo->qname, nm) == 0 &&
444 !dname_is_root(qinfo->qname))
447 filter->zone_len = nmlen;
453 * Find max iteration count using config settings and key size
454 * @param ve: validator environment with iteration count config settings.
455 * @param bits: key size
456 * @return max iteration count
459 get_max_iter(struct val_env* ve, size_t bits)
462 log_assert(ve->nsec3_keyiter_count > 0);
463 /* round up to nearest config keysize, linear search, keep it small */
464 for(i=0; i<ve->nsec3_keyiter_count; i++) {
465 if(bits <= ve->nsec3_keysize[i])
466 return ve->nsec3_maxiter[i];
468 /* else, use value for biggest key */
469 return ve->nsec3_maxiter[ve->nsec3_keyiter_count-1];
473 * Determine if any of the NSEC3 rrs iteration count is too high, from key.
474 * @param ve: validator environment with iteration count config settings.
475 * @param filter: what NSEC3s to loop over.
476 * @param kkey: key entry used for verification; used for iteration counts.
477 * @return 1 if some nsec3s are above the max iteration count.
480 nsec3_iteration_count_high(struct val_env* ve, struct nsec3_filter* filter,
481 struct key_entry_key* kkey)
485 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset;
486 /* first determine the max number of iterations */
487 size_t bits = key_entry_keysize(kkey);
488 size_t max_iter = get_max_iter(ve, bits);
489 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3: keysize %d bits, max iterations %d",
490 (int)bits, (int)max_iter);
492 for(rrset=filter_first(filter, &rrsetnum, &rrnum); rrset;
493 rrset=filter_next(filter, &rrsetnum, &rrnum)) {
494 if(nsec3_get_iter(rrset, rrnum) > max_iter)
500 /* nsec3_cache_compare for rbtree */
502 nsec3_hash_cmp(const void* c1, const void* c2)
504 struct nsec3_cached_hash* h1 = (struct nsec3_cached_hash*)c1;
505 struct nsec3_cached_hash* h2 = (struct nsec3_cached_hash*)c2;
508 int c = query_dname_compare(h1->dname, h2->dname);
511 /* compare parameters */
512 /* if both malformed, its equal, robustness */
513 if(nsec3_get_algo(h1->nsec3, h1->rr) !=
514 nsec3_get_algo(h2->nsec3, h2->rr)) {
515 if(nsec3_get_algo(h1->nsec3, h1->rr) <
516 nsec3_get_algo(h2->nsec3, h2->rr))
520 if(nsec3_get_iter(h1->nsec3, h1->rr) !=
521 nsec3_get_iter(h2->nsec3, h2->rr)) {
522 if(nsec3_get_iter(h1->nsec3, h1->rr) <
523 nsec3_get_iter(h2->nsec3, h2->rr))
527 (void)nsec3_get_salt(h1->nsec3, h1->rr, &s1, &s1len);
528 (void)nsec3_get_salt(h2->nsec3, h2->rr, &s2, &s2len);
534 return memcmp(s1, s2, s1len);
538 nsec3_get_hashed(sldns_buffer* buf, uint8_t* nm, size_t nmlen, int algo,
539 size_t iter, uint8_t* salt, size_t saltlen, uint8_t* res, size_t max)
542 /* prepare buffer for first iteration */
543 sldns_buffer_clear(buf);
544 sldns_buffer_write(buf, nm, nmlen);
545 query_dname_tolower(sldns_buffer_begin(buf));
546 sldns_buffer_write(buf, salt, saltlen);
547 sldns_buffer_flip(buf);
549 #if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA1) || defined(HAVE_NSS)
550 case NSEC3_HASH_SHA1:
552 hash_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
554 hash_len = SHA1_LENGTH;
559 (void)SHA1((unsigned char*)sldns_buffer_begin(buf),
560 (unsigned long)sldns_buffer_limit(buf),
561 (unsigned char*)res);
563 (void)HASH_HashBuf(HASH_AlgSHA1, (unsigned char*)res,
564 (unsigned char*)sldns_buffer_begin(buf),
565 (unsigned long)sldns_buffer_limit(buf));
567 for(i=0; i<iter; i++) {
568 sldns_buffer_clear(buf);
569 sldns_buffer_write(buf, res, hash_len);
570 sldns_buffer_write(buf, salt, saltlen);
571 sldns_buffer_flip(buf);
574 (unsigned char*)sldns_buffer_begin(buf),
575 (unsigned long)sldns_buffer_limit(buf),
576 (unsigned char*)res);
578 (void)HASH_HashBuf(HASH_AlgSHA1,
580 (unsigned char*)sldns_buffer_begin(buf),
581 (unsigned long)sldns_buffer_limit(buf));
585 #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA1 or NSS */
587 log_err("nsec3 hash of unknown algo %d", algo);
593 /** perform hash of name */
595 nsec3_calc_hash(struct regional* region, sldns_buffer* buf,
596 struct nsec3_cached_hash* c)
598 int algo = nsec3_get_algo(c->nsec3, c->rr);
599 size_t iter = nsec3_get_iter(c->nsec3, c->rr);
602 if(!nsec3_get_salt(c->nsec3, c->rr, &salt, &saltlen))
604 /* prepare buffer for first iteration */
605 sldns_buffer_clear(buf);
606 sldns_buffer_write(buf, c->dname, c->dname_len);
607 query_dname_tolower(sldns_buffer_begin(buf));
608 sldns_buffer_write(buf, salt, saltlen);
609 sldns_buffer_flip(buf);
611 #if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA1) || defined(HAVE_NSS)
612 case NSEC3_HASH_SHA1:
614 c->hash_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
616 c->hash_len = SHA1_LENGTH;
618 c->hash = (uint8_t*)regional_alloc(region,
623 (void)SHA1((unsigned char*)sldns_buffer_begin(buf),
624 (unsigned long)sldns_buffer_limit(buf),
625 (unsigned char*)c->hash);
627 (void)HASH_HashBuf(HASH_AlgSHA1,
628 (unsigned char*)c->hash,
629 (unsigned char*)sldns_buffer_begin(buf),
630 (unsigned long)sldns_buffer_limit(buf));
632 for(i=0; i<iter; i++) {
633 sldns_buffer_clear(buf);
634 sldns_buffer_write(buf, c->hash, c->hash_len);
635 sldns_buffer_write(buf, salt, saltlen);
636 sldns_buffer_flip(buf);
639 (unsigned char*)sldns_buffer_begin(buf),
640 (unsigned long)sldns_buffer_limit(buf),
641 (unsigned char*)c->hash);
643 (void)HASH_HashBuf(HASH_AlgSHA1,
644 (unsigned char*)c->hash,
645 (unsigned char*)sldns_buffer_begin(buf),
646 (unsigned long)sldns_buffer_limit(buf));
650 #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA1 or NSS */
652 log_err("nsec3 hash of unknown algo %d", algo);
658 /** perform b32 encoding of hash */
660 nsec3_calc_b32(struct regional* region, sldns_buffer* buf,
661 struct nsec3_cached_hash* c)
664 sldns_buffer_clear(buf);
665 r = sldns_b32_ntop_extended_hex(c->hash, c->hash_len,
666 (char*)sldns_buffer_begin(buf), sldns_buffer_limit(buf));
668 log_err("b32_ntop_extended_hex: error in encoding: %d", r);
671 c->b32_len = (size_t)r;
672 c->b32 = regional_alloc_init(region, sldns_buffer_begin(buf),
680 nsec3_hash_name(rbtree_t* table, struct regional* region, sldns_buffer* buf,
681 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec3, int rr, uint8_t* dname,
682 size_t dname_len, struct nsec3_cached_hash** hash)
684 struct nsec3_cached_hash* c;
685 struct nsec3_cached_hash looki;
690 looki.node.key = &looki;
694 looki.dname_len = dname_len;
695 /* lookup first in cache */
696 c = (struct nsec3_cached_hash*)rbtree_search(table, &looki);
701 /* create a new entry */
702 c = (struct nsec3_cached_hash*)regional_alloc(region, sizeof(*c));
708 c->dname_len = dname_len;
709 r = nsec3_calc_hash(region, buf, c);
712 r = nsec3_calc_b32(region, buf, c);
720 rbtree_insert(table, &c->node);
721 log_assert(n); /* cannot be duplicate, just did lookup */
727 * compare a label lowercased
730 label_compare_lower(uint8_t* lab1, uint8_t* lab2, size_t lablen)
733 for(i=0; i<lablen; i++) {
734 if(tolower((int)*lab1) != tolower((int)*lab2)) {
735 if(tolower((int)*lab1) < tolower((int)*lab2))
746 * Compare a hashed name with the owner name of an NSEC3 RRset.
747 * @param flt: filter with zone name.
748 * @param hash: the hashed name.
749 * @param s: rrset with owner name.
750 * @return true if matches exactly, false if not.
753 nsec3_hash_matches_owner(struct nsec3_filter* flt,
754 struct nsec3_cached_hash* hash, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s)
756 uint8_t* nm = s->rk.dname;
757 /* compare, does hash of name based on params in this NSEC3
758 * match the owner name of this NSEC3?
759 * name must be: <hashlength>base32 . zone name
760 * so; first label must not be root label (not zero length),
761 * and match the b32 encoded hash length,
762 * and the label content match the b32 encoded hash
763 * and the rest must be the zone name.
765 if(hash->b32_len != 0 && (size_t)nm[0] == hash->b32_len &&
766 label_compare_lower(nm+1, hash->b32, hash->b32_len) == 0 &&
767 query_dname_compare(nm+(size_t)nm[0]+1, flt->zone) == 0) {
774 * Find matching NSEC3
775 * Find the NSEC3Record that matches a hash of a name.
776 * @param env: module environment with temporary region and buffer.
777 * @param flt: the NSEC3 RR filter, contains zone name and RRs.
778 * @param ct: cached hashes table.
779 * @param nm: name to look for.
780 * @param nmlen: length of name.
781 * @param rrset: nsec3 that matches is returned here.
782 * @param rr: rr number in nsec3 rrset that matches.
783 * @return true if a matching NSEC3 is found, false if not.
786 find_matching_nsec3(struct module_env* env, struct nsec3_filter* flt,
787 rbtree_t* ct, uint8_t* nm, size_t nmlen,
788 struct ub_packed_rrset_key** rrset, int* rr)
792 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s;
793 struct nsec3_cached_hash* hash;
796 /* this loop skips other-zone and unknown NSEC3s, also non-NSEC3 RRs */
797 for(s=filter_first(flt, &i_rs, &i_rr); s;
798 s=filter_next(flt, &i_rs, &i_rr)) {
799 /* get name hashed for this NSEC3 RR */
800 r = nsec3_hash_name(ct, env->scratch, env->scratch_buffer,
801 s, i_rr, nm, nmlen, &hash);
803 log_err("nsec3: malloc failure");
804 break; /* alloc failure */
806 continue; /* malformed NSEC3 */
807 else if(nsec3_hash_matches_owner(flt, hash, s)) {
808 *rrset = s; /* rrset with this name */
809 *rr = i_rr; /* matches hash with these parameters */
819 nsec3_covers(uint8_t* zone, struct nsec3_cached_hash* hash,
820 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int rr, sldns_buffer* buf)
822 uint8_t* next, *owner;
825 if(!nsec3_get_nextowner(rrset, rr, &next, &nextlen))
826 return 0; /* malformed RR proves nothing */
828 /* check the owner name is a hashed value . apex
829 * base32 encoded values must have equal length.
830 * hash_value and next hash value must have equal length. */
831 if(nextlen != hash->hash_len || hash->hash_len==0||hash->b32_len==0||
832 (size_t)*rrset->rk.dname != hash->b32_len ||
833 query_dname_compare(rrset->rk.dname+1+
834 (size_t)*rrset->rk.dname, zone) != 0)
835 return 0; /* bad lengths or owner name */
837 /* This is the "normal case: owner < next and owner < hash < next */
838 if(label_compare_lower(rrset->rk.dname+1, hash->b32,
839 hash->b32_len) < 0 &&
840 memcmp(hash->hash, next, nextlen) < 0)
843 /* convert owner name from text to binary */
844 sldns_buffer_clear(buf);
845 owner = sldns_buffer_begin(buf);
846 len = sldns_b32_pton_extended_hex((char*)rrset->rk.dname+1,
847 hash->b32_len, owner, sldns_buffer_limit(buf));
849 return 0; /* bad owner name in some way */
850 if((size_t)len != hash->hash_len || (size_t)len != nextlen)
851 return 0; /* wrong length */
853 /* this is the end of zone case: next <= owner &&
854 * (hash > owner || hash < next)
855 * this also covers the only-apex case of next==owner.
857 if(memcmp(next, owner, nextlen) <= 0 &&
858 ( memcmp(hash->hash, owner, nextlen) > 0 ||
859 memcmp(hash->hash, next, nextlen) < 0)) {
867 * Given a name, find a covering NSEC3 from among a list of NSEC3s.
869 * @param env: module environment with temporary region and buffer.
870 * @param flt: the NSEC3 RR filter, contains zone name and RRs.
871 * @param ct: cached hashes table.
872 * @param nm: name to check if covered.
873 * @param nmlen: length of name.
874 * @param rrset: covering NSEC3 rrset is returned here.
875 * @param rr: rr of cover is returned here.
876 * @return true if a covering NSEC3 is found, false if not.
879 find_covering_nsec3(struct module_env* env, struct nsec3_filter* flt,
880 rbtree_t* ct, uint8_t* nm, size_t nmlen,
881 struct ub_packed_rrset_key** rrset, int* rr)
885 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s;
886 struct nsec3_cached_hash* hash;
889 /* this loop skips other-zone and unknown NSEC3s, also non-NSEC3 RRs */
890 for(s=filter_first(flt, &i_rs, &i_rr); s;
891 s=filter_next(flt, &i_rs, &i_rr)) {
892 /* get name hashed for this NSEC3 RR */
893 r = nsec3_hash_name(ct, env->scratch, env->scratch_buffer,
894 s, i_rr, nm, nmlen, &hash);
896 log_err("nsec3: malloc failure");
897 break; /* alloc failure */
899 continue; /* malformed NSEC3 */
900 else if(nsec3_covers(flt->zone, hash, s, i_rr,
901 env->scratch_buffer)) {
902 *rrset = s; /* rrset with this name */
903 *rr = i_rr; /* covers hash with these parameters */
913 * findClosestEncloser
914 * Given a name and a list of NSEC3s, find the candidate closest encloser.
915 * This will be the first ancestor of 'name' (including itself) to have a
917 * @param env: module environment with temporary region and buffer.
918 * @param flt: the NSEC3 RR filter, contains zone name and RRs.
919 * @param ct: cached hashes table.
920 * @param qinfo: query that is verified for.
921 * @param ce: closest encloser information is returned in here.
922 * @return true if a closest encloser candidate is found, false if not.
925 nsec3_find_closest_encloser(struct module_env* env, struct nsec3_filter* flt,
926 rbtree_t* ct, struct query_info* qinfo, struct ce_response* ce)
928 uint8_t* nm = qinfo->qname;
929 size_t nmlen = qinfo->qname_len;
931 /* This scans from longest name to shortest, so the first match
932 * we find is the only viable candidate. */
934 /* (David:) FIXME: modify so that the NSEC3 matching the zone apex need
935 * not be present. (Mark Andrews idea).
936 * (Wouter:) But make sure you check for DNAME bit in zone apex,
937 * if the NSEC3 you find is the only NSEC3 in the zone, then this
938 * may be the case. */
940 while(dname_subdomain_c(nm, flt->zone)) {
941 if(find_matching_nsec3(env, flt, ct, nm, nmlen,
942 &ce->ce_rrset, &ce->ce_rr)) {
947 dname_remove_label(&nm, &nmlen);
953 * Given a qname and its proven closest encloser, calculate the "next
954 * closest" name. Basically, this is the name that is one label longer than
955 * the closest encloser that is still a subdomain of qname.
957 * @param qname: query name.
958 * @param qnamelen: length of qname.
959 * @param ce: closest encloser
960 * @param nm: result name.
961 * @param nmlen: length of nm.
964 next_closer(uint8_t* qname, size_t qnamelen, uint8_t* ce,
965 uint8_t** nm, size_t* nmlen)
967 int strip = dname_count_labels(qname) - dname_count_labels(ce) -1;
971 dname_remove_labels(nm, nmlen, strip);
975 * proveClosestEncloser
976 * Given a List of nsec3 RRs, find and prove the closest encloser to qname.
977 * @param env: module environment with temporary region and buffer.
978 * @param flt: the NSEC3 RR filter, contains zone name and RRs.
979 * @param ct: cached hashes table.
980 * @param qinfo: query that is verified for.
981 * @param prove_does_not_exist: If true, then if the closest encloser
982 * turns out to be qname, then null is returned.
983 * If set true, and the return value is true, then you can be
984 * certain that the ce.nc_rrset and ce.nc_rr are set properly.
985 * @param ce: closest encloser information is returned in here.
986 * @return bogus if no closest encloser could be proven.
987 * secure if a closest encloser could be proven, ce is set.
988 * insecure if the closest-encloser candidate turns out to prove
989 * that an insecure delegation exists above the qname.
991 static enum sec_status
992 nsec3_prove_closest_encloser(struct module_env* env, struct nsec3_filter* flt,
993 rbtree_t* ct, struct query_info* qinfo, int prove_does_not_exist,
994 struct ce_response* ce)
998 /* robust: clean out ce, in case it gets abused later */
999 memset(ce, 0, sizeof(*ce));
1001 if(!nsec3_find_closest_encloser(env, flt, ct, qinfo, ce)) {
1002 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 proveClosestEncloser: could "
1003 "not find a candidate for the closest encloser.");
1004 return sec_status_bogus;
1006 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "ce candidate", ce->ce, 0, 0);
1008 if(query_dname_compare(ce->ce, qinfo->qname) == 0) {
1009 if(prove_does_not_exist) {
1010 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 proveClosestEncloser: "
1011 "proved that qname existed, bad");
1012 return sec_status_bogus;
1014 /* otherwise, we need to nothing else to prove that qname
1015 * is its own closest encloser. */
1016 return sec_status_secure;
1019 /* If the closest encloser is actually a delegation, then the
1020 * response should have been a referral. If it is a DNAME, then
1021 * it should have been a DNAME response. */
1022 if(nsec3_has_type(ce->ce_rrset, ce->ce_rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) &&
1023 !nsec3_has_type(ce->ce_rrset, ce->ce_rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)) {
1024 if(!nsec3_has_type(ce->ce_rrset, ce->ce_rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS)) {
1025 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 proveClosestEncloser: "
1026 "closest encloser is insecure delegation");
1027 return sec_status_insecure;
1029 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 proveClosestEncloser: closest "
1030 "encloser was a delegation, bad");
1031 return sec_status_bogus;
1033 if(nsec3_has_type(ce->ce_rrset, ce->ce_rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME)) {
1034 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 proveClosestEncloser: closest "
1035 "encloser was a DNAME, bad");
1036 return sec_status_bogus;
1039 /* Otherwise, we need to show that the next closer name is covered. */
1040 next_closer(qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, ce->ce, &nc, &nc_len);
1041 if(!find_covering_nsec3(env, flt, ct, nc, nc_len,
1042 &ce->nc_rrset, &ce->nc_rr)) {
1043 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3: Could not find proof that the "
1044 "candidate encloser was the closest encloser");
1045 return sec_status_bogus;
1047 return sec_status_secure;
1050 /** allocate a wildcard for the closest encloser */
1052 nsec3_ce_wildcard(struct regional* region, uint8_t* ce, size_t celen,
1056 if(celen > LDNS_MAX_DOMAINLEN - 2)
1057 return 0; /* too long */
1058 nm = (uint8_t*)regional_alloc(region, celen+2);
1060 log_err("nsec3 wildcard: out of memory");
1061 return 0; /* alloc failure */
1064 nm[1] = (uint8_t)'*'; /* wildcard label */
1065 memmove(nm+2, ce, celen);
1070 /** Do the name error proof */
1071 static enum sec_status
1072 nsec3_do_prove_nameerror(struct module_env* env, struct nsec3_filter* flt,
1073 rbtree_t* ct, struct query_info* qinfo)
1075 struct ce_response ce;
1078 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* wc_rrset;
1080 enum sec_status sec;
1082 /* First locate and prove the closest encloser to qname. We will
1083 * use the variant that fails if the closest encloser turns out
1085 sec = nsec3_prove_closest_encloser(env, flt, ct, qinfo, 1, &ce);
1086 if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
1087 if(sec == sec_status_bogus)
1088 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nameerror proof: failed "
1089 "to prove a closest encloser");
1090 else verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nameerror proof: closest "
1091 "nsec3 is an insecure delegation");
1094 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 namerror: proven ce=", ce.ce,0,0);
1096 /* At this point, we know that qname does not exist. Now we need
1097 * to prove that the wildcard does not exist. */
1099 wc = nsec3_ce_wildcard(env->scratch, ce.ce, ce.ce_len, &wclen);
1100 if(!wc || !find_covering_nsec3(env, flt, ct, wc, wclen,
1101 &wc_rrset, &wc_rr)) {
1102 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nameerror proof: could not prove "
1103 "that the applicable wildcard did not exist.");
1104 return sec_status_bogus;
1107 if(ce.nc_rrset && nsec3_has_optout(ce.nc_rrset, ce.nc_rr)) {
1108 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nameerror proof: nc has optout");
1109 return sec_status_insecure;
1111 return sec_status_secure;
1115 nsec3_prove_nameerror(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
1116 struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list, size_t num,
1117 struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey)
1120 struct nsec3_filter flt;
1122 if(!list || num == 0 || !kkey || !key_entry_isgood(kkey))
1123 return sec_status_bogus; /* no valid NSEC3s, bogus */
1124 rbtree_init(&ct, &nsec3_hash_cmp); /* init names-to-hash cache */
1125 filter_init(&flt, list, num, qinfo); /* init RR iterator */
1127 return sec_status_bogus; /* no RRs */
1128 if(nsec3_iteration_count_high(ve, &flt, kkey))
1129 return sec_status_insecure; /* iteration count too high */
1130 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "start nsec3 nameerror proof, zone",
1132 return nsec3_do_prove_nameerror(env, &flt, &ct, qinfo);
1136 * No code to handle qtype=NSEC3 specially.
1137 * This existed in early drafts, but was later (-05) removed.
1140 /** Do the nodata proof */
1141 static enum sec_status
1142 nsec3_do_prove_nodata(struct module_env* env, struct nsec3_filter* flt,
1143 rbtree_t* ct, struct query_info* qinfo)
1145 struct ce_response ce;
1148 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset;
1150 enum sec_status sec;
1152 if(find_matching_nsec3(env, flt, ct, qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len,
1155 if(nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, qinfo->qtype)) {
1156 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "proveNodata: Matching NSEC3 "
1157 "proved that type existed, bogus");
1158 return sec_status_bogus;
1159 } else if(nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME)) {
1160 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "proveNodata: Matching NSEC3 "
1161 "proved that a CNAME existed, bogus");
1162 return sec_status_bogus;
1166 * If type DS: filter_init zone find already found a parent
1167 * zone, so this nsec3 is from a parent zone.
1168 * o can be not a delegation (unusual query for normal name,
1169 * no DS anyway, but we can verify that).
1170 * o can be a delegation (which is the usual DS check).
1171 * o may not have the SOA bit set (only the top of the
1172 * zone, which must have been above the name, has that).
1173 * Except for the root; which is checked by itself.
1175 * If not type DS: matching nsec3 must not be a delegation.
1177 if(qinfo->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS && qinfo->qname_len != 1
1178 && nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA) &&
1179 !dname_is_root(qinfo->qname)) {
1180 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "proveNodata: apex NSEC3 "
1181 "abused for no DS proof, bogus");
1182 return sec_status_bogus;
1183 } else if(qinfo->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS &&
1184 nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) &&
1185 !nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)) {
1186 if(!nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS)) {
1187 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "proveNodata: matching "
1188 "NSEC3 is insecure delegation");
1189 return sec_status_insecure;
1191 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "proveNodata: matching "
1192 "NSEC3 is a delegation, bogus");
1193 return sec_status_bogus;
1195 return sec_status_secure;
1198 /* For cases 3 - 5, we need the proven closest encloser, and it
1199 * can't match qname. Although, at this point, we know that it
1200 * won't since we just checked that. */
1201 sec = nsec3_prove_closest_encloser(env, flt, ct, qinfo, 1, &ce);
1202 if(sec == sec_status_bogus) {
1203 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "proveNodata: did not match qname, "
1204 "nor found a proven closest encloser.");
1205 return sec_status_bogus;
1206 } else if(sec==sec_status_insecure && qinfo->qtype!=LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS){
1207 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "proveNodata: closest nsec3 is insecure "
1209 return sec_status_insecure;
1212 /* Case 3: removed */
1216 wc = nsec3_ce_wildcard(env->scratch, ce.ce, ce.ce_len, &wclen);
1217 if(wc && find_matching_nsec3(env, flt, ct, wc, wclen, &rrset, &rr)) {
1218 /* found wildcard */
1219 if(nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, qinfo->qtype)) {
1220 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nodata proof: matching "
1221 "wildcard had qtype, bogus");
1222 return sec_status_bogus;
1223 } else if(nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME)) {
1224 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nodata proof: matching "
1225 "wildcard had a CNAME, bogus");
1226 return sec_status_bogus;
1228 if(qinfo->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS && qinfo->qname_len != 1
1229 && nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)) {
1230 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nodata proof: matching "
1231 "wildcard for no DS proof has a SOA, bogus");
1232 return sec_status_bogus;
1233 } else if(qinfo->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS &&
1234 nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) &&
1235 !nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)) {
1236 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nodata proof: matching "
1237 "wilcard is a delegation, bogus");
1238 return sec_status_bogus;
1240 /* everything is peachy keen, except for optout spans */
1241 if(ce.nc_rrset && nsec3_has_optout(ce.nc_rrset, ce.nc_rr)) {
1242 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nodata proof: matching "
1243 "wildcard is in optout range, insecure");
1244 return sec_status_insecure;
1246 return sec_status_secure;
1250 /* Due to forwarders, cnames, and other collating effects, we
1251 * can see the ordinary unsigned data from a zone beneath an
1252 * insecure delegation under an optout here */
1254 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nodata proof: no next closer nsec3");
1255 return sec_status_bogus;
1258 /* We need to make sure that the covering NSEC3 is opt-out. */
1259 log_assert(ce.nc_rrset);
1260 if(!nsec3_has_optout(ce.nc_rrset, ce.nc_rr)) {
1261 if(qinfo->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS)
1262 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "proveNodata: covering NSEC3 was not "
1263 "opt-out in an opt-out DS NOERROR/NODATA case.");
1264 else verbose(VERB_ALGO, "proveNodata: could not find matching "
1265 "NSEC3, nor matching wildcard, nor optout NSEC3 "
1266 "-- no more options, bogus.");
1267 return sec_status_bogus;
1269 /* RFC5155 section 9.2: if nc has optout then no AD flag set */
1270 return sec_status_insecure;
1274 nsec3_prove_nodata(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
1275 struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list, size_t num,
1276 struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey)
1279 struct nsec3_filter flt;
1281 if(!list || num == 0 || !kkey || !key_entry_isgood(kkey))
1282 return sec_status_bogus; /* no valid NSEC3s, bogus */
1283 rbtree_init(&ct, &nsec3_hash_cmp); /* init names-to-hash cache */
1284 filter_init(&flt, list, num, qinfo); /* init RR iterator */
1286 return sec_status_bogus; /* no RRs */
1287 if(nsec3_iteration_count_high(ve, &flt, kkey))
1288 return sec_status_insecure; /* iteration count too high */
1289 return nsec3_do_prove_nodata(env, &flt, &ct, qinfo);
1293 nsec3_prove_wildcard(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
1294 struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list, size_t num,
1295 struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey, uint8_t* wc)
1298 struct nsec3_filter flt;
1299 struct ce_response ce;
1303 (void)dname_count_size_labels(wc, &wclen);
1305 if(!list || num == 0 || !kkey || !key_entry_isgood(kkey))
1306 return sec_status_bogus; /* no valid NSEC3s, bogus */
1307 rbtree_init(&ct, &nsec3_hash_cmp); /* init names-to-hash cache */
1308 filter_init(&flt, list, num, qinfo); /* init RR iterator */
1310 return sec_status_bogus; /* no RRs */
1311 if(nsec3_iteration_count_high(ve, &flt, kkey))
1312 return sec_status_insecure; /* iteration count too high */
1314 /* We know what the (purported) closest encloser is by just
1315 * looking at the supposed generating wildcard.
1316 * The *. has already been removed from the wc name.
1318 memset(&ce, 0, sizeof(ce));
1322 /* Now we still need to prove that the original data did not exist.
1323 * Otherwise, we need to show that the next closer name is covered. */
1324 next_closer(qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, ce.ce, &nc, &nc_len);
1325 if(!find_covering_nsec3(env, &flt, &ct, nc, nc_len,
1326 &ce.nc_rrset, &ce.nc_rr)) {
1327 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "proveWildcard: did not find a covering "
1328 "NSEC3 that covered the next closer name.");
1329 return sec_status_bogus;
1331 if(ce.nc_rrset && nsec3_has_optout(ce.nc_rrset, ce.nc_rr)) {
1332 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "proveWildcard: NSEC3 optout");
1333 return sec_status_insecure;
1335 return sec_status_secure;
1338 /** test if list is all secure */
1340 list_is_secure(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
1341 struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list, size_t num,
1342 struct key_entry_key* kkey, char** reason)
1344 struct packed_rrset_data* d;
1346 for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
1347 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)list[i]->entry.data;
1348 if(list[i]->rk.type != htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3))
1350 if(d->security == sec_status_secure)
1352 rrset_check_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, list[i], *env->now);
1353 if(d->security == sec_status_secure)
1355 d->security = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, list[i], kkey,
1357 if(d->security != sec_status_secure) {
1358 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NSEC3 did not verify");
1361 rrset_update_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, list[i], *env->now);
1367 nsec3_prove_nods(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
1368 struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list, size_t num,
1369 struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey, char** reason)
1372 struct nsec3_filter flt;
1373 struct ce_response ce;
1374 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset;
1376 log_assert(qinfo->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS);
1378 if(!list || num == 0 || !kkey || !key_entry_isgood(kkey)) {
1379 *reason = "no valid NSEC3s";
1380 return sec_status_bogus; /* no valid NSEC3s, bogus */
1382 if(!list_is_secure(env, ve, list, num, kkey, reason))
1383 return sec_status_bogus; /* not all NSEC3 records secure */
1384 rbtree_init(&ct, &nsec3_hash_cmp); /* init names-to-hash cache */
1385 filter_init(&flt, list, num, qinfo); /* init RR iterator */
1387 *reason = "no NSEC3 records";
1388 return sec_status_bogus; /* no RRs */
1390 if(nsec3_iteration_count_high(ve, &flt, kkey))
1391 return sec_status_insecure; /* iteration count too high */
1393 /* Look for a matching NSEC3 to qname -- this is the normal
1395 if(find_matching_nsec3(env, &flt, &ct, qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len,
1397 /* If the matching NSEC3 has the SOA bit set, it is from
1398 * the wrong zone (the child instead of the parent). If
1399 * it has the DS bit set, then we were lied to. */
1400 if(nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA) &&
1401 qinfo->qname_len != 1) {
1402 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 provenods: NSEC3 is from"
1403 " child zone, bogus");
1404 *reason = "NSEC3 from child zone";
1405 return sec_status_bogus;
1406 } else if(nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS)) {
1407 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 provenods: NSEC3 has qtype"
1409 *reason = "NSEC3 has DS in bitmap";
1410 return sec_status_bogus;
1412 /* If the NSEC3 RR doesn't have the NS bit set, then
1413 * this wasn't a delegation point. */
1414 if(!nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS))
1415 return sec_status_indeterminate;
1416 /* Otherwise, this proves no DS. */
1417 return sec_status_secure;
1420 /* Otherwise, we are probably in the opt-out case. */
1421 if(nsec3_prove_closest_encloser(env, &flt, &ct, qinfo, 1, &ce)
1422 != sec_status_secure) {
1423 /* an insecure delegation *above* the qname does not prove
1424 * anything about this qname exactly, and bogus is bogus */
1425 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 provenods: did not match qname, "
1426 "nor found a proven closest encloser.");
1427 *reason = "no NSEC3 closest encloser";
1428 return sec_status_bogus;
1431 /* robust extra check */
1433 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nods proof: no next closer nsec3");
1434 *reason = "no NSEC3 next closer";
1435 return sec_status_bogus;
1438 /* we had the closest encloser proof, then we need to check that the
1439 * covering NSEC3 was opt-out -- the proveClosestEncloser step already
1440 * checked to see if the closest encloser was a delegation or DNAME.
1442 log_assert(ce.nc_rrset);
1443 if(!nsec3_has_optout(ce.nc_rrset, ce.nc_rr)) {
1444 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 provenods: covering NSEC3 was not "
1445 "opt-out in an opt-out DS NOERROR/NODATA case.");
1446 *reason = "covering NSEC3 was not opt-out in an opt-out "
1447 "DS NOERROR/NODATA case";
1448 return sec_status_bogus;
1450 /* RFC5155 section 9.2: if nc has optout then no AD flag set */
1451 return sec_status_insecure;
1455 nsec3_prove_nxornodata(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
1456 struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list, size_t num,
1457 struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey, int* nodata)
1459 enum sec_status sec, secnx;
1461 struct nsec3_filter flt;
1464 if(!list || num == 0 || !kkey || !key_entry_isgood(kkey))
1465 return sec_status_bogus; /* no valid NSEC3s, bogus */
1466 rbtree_init(&ct, &nsec3_hash_cmp); /* init names-to-hash cache */
1467 filter_init(&flt, list, num, qinfo); /* init RR iterator */
1469 return sec_status_bogus; /* no RRs */
1470 if(nsec3_iteration_count_high(ve, &flt, kkey))
1471 return sec_status_insecure; /* iteration count too high */
1473 /* try nxdomain and nodata after another, while keeping the
1474 * hash cache intact */
1476 secnx = nsec3_do_prove_nameerror(env, &flt, &ct, qinfo);
1477 if(secnx==sec_status_secure)
1478 return sec_status_secure;
1479 sec = nsec3_do_prove_nodata(env, &flt, &ct, qinfo);
1480 if(sec==sec_status_secure) {
1482 } else if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
1484 } else if(secnx == sec_status_insecure) {
1485 sec = sec_status_insecure;