1 /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include "cryptlib.h"
114 #include <openssl/bn.h>
115 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
116 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #if !defined(RSA_NULL) && !defined(OPENSSL_FIPS)
120 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
121 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
122 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
123 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
124 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
125 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
126 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
127 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
128 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
129 static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
130 static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
131 static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
132 "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
133 RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
134 RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
135 RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
136 RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
138 BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
145 NULL /* rsa_keygen */
148 const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
150 return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
153 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
154 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
157 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
158 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
161 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
163 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
167 if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
169 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
173 /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
174 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
176 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
178 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
183 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
186 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
187 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
188 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
189 if (!f || !ret || !buf)
191 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
197 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
198 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
201 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
202 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
205 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
206 i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
209 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
212 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
215 if (i <= 0) goto err;
217 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
219 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
221 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
222 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
226 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
227 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
230 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
231 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
233 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
234 * length of the modulus */
236 i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j]));
237 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
249 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
255 static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
258 int got_write_lock = 0;
260 CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
262 if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
264 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
265 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
268 if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
269 rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
276 if (BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id(ret) == CRYPTO_thread_id())
278 /* rsa->blinding is ours! */
284 /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
286 *local = 0; /* instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert()
287 * that the BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses
288 * require locks, and that the blinding factor must be
289 * stored outside the BN_BLINDING
292 if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
296 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
297 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
301 if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
302 rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
304 ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
309 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
311 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
315 static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
319 /* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor
321 return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
324 /* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor
325 * outside BN_BLINDING. */
327 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
328 ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
329 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
334 static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
337 /* For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
338 * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING.
339 * If BN_BLINDING is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
340 * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor,
341 * and will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING.
342 * In both cases it's safe to access the blinding without a lock.
344 return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
348 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
349 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
351 BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
352 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
353 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
355 int local_blinding = 0;
356 /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
357 * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
358 * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
359 BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
360 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
362 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
365 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
366 num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
367 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
368 if(!f || !ret || !buf)
370 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
376 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
377 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
379 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
380 i=RSA_padding_add_X931(buf,num,from,flen);
383 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
385 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
387 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
390 if (i <= 0) goto err;
392 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
394 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
396 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
397 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
401 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
403 blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
404 if (blinding == NULL)
406 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
411 if (blinding != NULL)
413 if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
415 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
418 if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
422 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
425 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
426 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
427 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
429 if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
436 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
440 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
445 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
446 if(!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
449 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
450 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
454 if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
457 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
459 BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
468 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
469 * length of the modulus */
471 i=BN_bn2bin(res,&(to[num-j]));
472 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
484 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
490 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
491 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
496 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
498 int local_blinding = 0;
499 /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
500 * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
501 * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
502 BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
503 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
505 if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
508 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
509 num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
510 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
511 if(!f || !ret || !buf)
513 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
517 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
518 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
521 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
525 /* make data into a big number */
526 if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
528 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
530 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
534 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
536 blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
537 if (blinding == NULL)
539 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
544 if (blinding != NULL)
546 if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
548 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
551 if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
556 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
559 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
560 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
561 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
563 if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
570 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
573 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
578 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
579 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
581 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
587 if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
591 j=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
595 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
596 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
599 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
600 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
603 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
604 r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
607 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
610 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
614 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
624 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
630 /* signature verification */
631 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
632 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
637 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
640 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
642 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
646 if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
648 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
652 /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
653 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
655 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
657 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
662 if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
665 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
666 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
667 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
668 if(!f || !ret || !buf)
670 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
674 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
675 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
678 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
682 if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
684 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
686 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
690 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
691 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
694 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
695 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
697 if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12))
698 if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) goto err;
705 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
706 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
708 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
709 r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);
712 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
715 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
719 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
729 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
735 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
737 BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
738 BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1;
739 BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1;
743 r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
744 m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
745 vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
748 BIGNUM local_p, local_q;
749 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
751 /* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
752 * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
754 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
758 BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
762 BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
770 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
772 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx))
774 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))
779 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
780 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
783 /* compute I mod q */
784 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
787 BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
788 if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
792 if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
795 /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
796 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
799 BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
803 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
804 rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
806 /* compute I mod p */
807 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
810 BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
811 if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
815 if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
818 /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
819 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
822 BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
826 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
827 rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
829 if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err;
830 /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
831 * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
832 if (BN_is_negative(r0))
833 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
835 if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
837 /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
838 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
841 BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
845 if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
847 /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
848 * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
849 * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
850 * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
851 * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
852 * they ensure p > q [steve]
854 if (BN_is_negative(r0))
855 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
856 if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
857 if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err;
859 if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
861 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
862 /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
863 * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
864 * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
865 * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
866 if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err;
867 if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
868 if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
869 if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
870 if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy))
872 /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
873 * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
874 * mod_exp and return that instead. */
879 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
882 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
886 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,d,rsa->n,ctx,
887 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
896 static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
898 rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
902 static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
904 if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
905 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
906 if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
907 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
908 if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
909 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);