1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
73 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
74 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
75 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
76 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
77 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
78 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
79 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
80 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
81 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
82 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
85 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
91 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
93 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
97 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
99 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
101 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
104 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
105 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
106 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
108 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
114 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
115 * present and that the first entry is in place */
116 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
118 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
119 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
121 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
124 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
125 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
128 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
129 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
130 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
132 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
136 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
137 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
143 /* If we have enough, we break */
144 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
145 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
146 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
150 /* If we are self signed, we break */
151 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
153 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
154 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
156 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
159 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
161 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
164 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
165 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
166 ctx->last_untrusted++;
169 /* reparse the full chain for
177 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
178 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
179 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
181 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
185 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
186 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
187 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
189 /* we have a self signed certificate */
190 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
192 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
193 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
194 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
196 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
197 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
199 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
201 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
202 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
209 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
210 * so we get any trust settings.
214 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
215 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
220 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
221 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
222 ctx->last_untrusted--;
224 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
228 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
231 /* If we have enough, we break */
232 if (depth < num) break;
234 /* If we are self signed, we break */
235 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
237 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
239 if (ok < 0) return ok;
243 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
246 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
252 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
254 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
255 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
257 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
259 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
260 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
262 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
268 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
270 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
271 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
272 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
276 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
282 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
283 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
287 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
289 if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
293 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
294 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
296 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
297 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
300 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
303 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
304 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
307 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
311 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
312 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
314 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
318 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
319 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
320 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
325 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
327 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
328 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
333 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
336 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
340 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
342 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
343 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
349 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
351 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
354 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
355 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
357 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
358 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
362 ctx->current_cert = x;
363 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
364 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
368 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
370 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
372 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
375 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
383 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
384 * with the supplied purpose
387 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
389 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
392 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
394 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
395 int proxy_path_length = 0;
396 int allow_proxy_certs =
397 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
400 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
401 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
402 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
403 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
404 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
405 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
406 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
410 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
412 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
413 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
415 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
416 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
419 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
420 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
421 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
423 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
424 ctx->error_depth = i;
425 ctx->current_cert = x;
429 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
431 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
432 ctx->error_depth = i;
433 ctx->current_cert = x;
437 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
441 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
442 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
445 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
454 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
461 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
465 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
473 ctx->error_depth = i;
474 ctx->current_cert = x;
478 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
480 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->param->purpose,
483 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
486 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
487 ctx->error_depth = i;
488 ctx->current_cert = x;
493 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
494 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
495 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
496 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
498 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
499 ctx->error_depth = i;
500 ctx->current_cert = x;
504 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
505 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
507 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
508 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
509 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
511 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
513 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
516 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
517 ctx->error_depth = i;
518 ctx->current_cert = x;
534 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
536 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
541 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
543 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
544 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
545 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
546 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
547 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
549 ctx->error_depth = i;
550 ctx->current_cert = x;
551 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
552 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
554 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
560 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
563 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
565 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
566 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
569 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
571 ctx->error_depth = i;
572 ok = check_cert(ctx);
578 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
580 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
583 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
584 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
585 ctx->current_cert = x;
586 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
587 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
588 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
593 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
594 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
597 ctx->current_crl = crl;
598 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
600 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
602 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
608 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
610 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
614 ctx->current_crl = crl;
615 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
616 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
620 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
623 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
624 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
630 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
631 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
635 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
637 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
641 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
642 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
648 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
649 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
654 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
659 /* Lookup CRLs from the supplied list. Look for matching isser name
660 * and validity. If we can't find a valid CRL return the last one
661 * with matching name. This gives more meaningful error codes. Otherwise
662 * we'd get a CRL not found error if a CRL existed with matching name but
666 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl,
667 X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
670 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
671 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
673 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
674 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
676 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
679 CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
687 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
693 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a
694 * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later...
696 static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x)
699 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
702 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
703 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, nm, ctx->crls);
710 ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &xobj);
714 /* If we got a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
723 *pcrl = xobj.data.crl;
729 /* Check CRL validity */
730 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
733 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
734 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
735 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
736 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
737 /* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
738 * is next certificate in chain.
741 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
744 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
745 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
746 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
748 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
749 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
756 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
757 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
758 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
760 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
761 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
765 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
766 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
770 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
771 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
776 /* Verify CRL signature */
777 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
779 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
780 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
786 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
797 /* Check certificate against CRL */
798 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
802 STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
804 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */
805 rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
806 /* Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted.
807 * Do this under a lock to avoid race condition.
809 if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked))
811 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
812 sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked);
813 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
815 idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
816 /* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
817 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
821 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
822 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
826 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
829 /* See if we have any critical CRL extensions: since we
830 * currently don't handle any CRL extensions the CRL must be
832 * This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly: applications
836 exts = crl->crl->extensions;
838 for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++)
840 ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
841 if (ext->critical > 0)
844 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
845 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
853 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
856 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
857 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
860 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
863 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
866 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
871 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
873 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
874 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
876 ctx->current_cert = x;
877 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
878 ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
884 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
885 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
886 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
889 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
891 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
892 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
893 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
900 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
905 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
906 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
910 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
913 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
915 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
921 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
923 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
927 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
930 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
932 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
938 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
940 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
947 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
952 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
956 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
957 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
959 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
961 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
967 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
968 ctx->current_cert=xi;
976 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
980 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
985 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
986 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
989 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
991 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
993 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
994 ctx->current_cert=xi;
998 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1000 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1001 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1005 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1009 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1015 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1019 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1020 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1021 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1029 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1037 int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1039 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1042 int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1047 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
1048 int i, j, remaining;
1051 remaining = ctm->length;
1052 str = (char *)ctm->data;
1054 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
1055 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1056 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1057 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1059 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1060 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1061 int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1062 int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1063 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1070 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
1071 int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1072 int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1073 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1081 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
1092 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
1093 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
1094 * Can we just kill them altogether?
1096 if (remaining && *str == '.') {
1099 for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
1100 if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
1109 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
1118 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1120 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
1123 if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
1124 str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
1126 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
1127 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
1131 atm.type = ctm->type;
1132 atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
1133 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
1135 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1138 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1139 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
1141 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1142 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
1151 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
1152 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1158 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1160 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1163 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
1168 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1172 if (s) type = s->type;
1173 if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
1174 if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
1175 return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
1178 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1180 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1183 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1185 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1187 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1190 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1193 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1197 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1203 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1207 /* first, populate the other certs */
1208 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1210 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1211 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1212 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1215 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1216 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1220 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1221 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1223 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1224 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1225 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1226 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1229 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1231 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1234 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1236 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1239 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1244 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1249 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1251 return ctx->error_depth;
1254 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1256 return ctx->current_cert;
1259 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1264 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1268 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1269 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1270 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1272 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1273 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1278 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1283 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1288 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1293 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1295 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1298 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1300 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1303 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1304 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1305 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1306 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1307 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1308 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1309 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1310 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1313 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1314 int purpose, int trust)
1317 /* If purpose not set use default */
1318 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1319 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1323 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1326 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1327 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1330 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1331 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1333 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1336 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1337 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1340 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1342 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1343 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1347 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1350 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1351 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1356 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
1357 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
1361 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1363 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1364 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1367 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1370 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1374 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1376 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
1380 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
1381 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1385 ctx->current_method=0;
1387 ctx->untrusted=chain;
1389 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
1390 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
1394 ctx->explicit_policy=0;
1396 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
1397 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
1400 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
1404 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1408 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
1414 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
1416 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
1420 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1421 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
1427 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
1428 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
1432 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1436 if (store && store->check_issued)
1437 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
1439 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
1441 if (store && store->get_issuer)
1442 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
1444 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
1446 if (store && store->verify_cb)
1447 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1449 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
1451 if (store && store->verify)
1452 ctx->verify = store->verify;
1454 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
1456 if (store && store->check_revocation)
1457 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
1459 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
1461 if (store && store->get_crl)
1462 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
1464 ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
1466 if (store && store->check_crl)
1467 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
1469 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
1471 if (store && store->cert_crl)
1472 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
1474 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
1476 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
1479 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
1480 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
1481 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
1482 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
1483 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
1487 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1493 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
1494 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
1497 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1499 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
1500 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
1503 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1505 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
1506 if (ctx->param != NULL)
1508 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
1511 if (ctx->tree != NULL)
1513 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
1516 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
1518 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
1521 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
1522 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
1525 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
1527 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
1530 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
1532 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
1535 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
1537 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
1540 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1541 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
1543 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
1546 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1551 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1553 return ctx->explicit_policy;
1556 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
1558 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
1559 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
1562 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
1565 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1570 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
1573 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
1577 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
1578 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
1580 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
1582 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
1583 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)