3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123 #include <openssl/rand.h>
125 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
127 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap,
129 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
130 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
131 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
133 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
134 unsigned short *priority,
135 unsigned long *offset);
137 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q, PQ_64BIT * priority);
138 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
139 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER
140 static PQ_64BIT bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes, PQ_64BIT * num);
143 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
144 static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
146 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
148 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
150 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
151 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
153 s->packet = rdata->packet;
154 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
155 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
156 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
158 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
159 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
165 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, PQ_64BIT * priority)
167 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
170 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
171 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
174 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
175 item = pitem_new(*priority, rdata);
176 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) {
182 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
186 rdata->packet = s->packet;
187 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
188 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
189 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
193 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
194 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) {
201 s->packet_length = 0;
202 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
203 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
205 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
206 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
215 static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
219 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
221 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
223 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
233 * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not
236 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
237 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
238 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
241 * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie,
244 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
245 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
246 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
248 static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
252 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
254 /* Check if epoch is current. */
255 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
256 return (1); /* Nothing to do. */
258 /* Process all the records. */
259 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
260 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
261 if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
263 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
264 &s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
269 * sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been
272 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
273 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
280 static int dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
284 (((PQ_64BIT) s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
285 ((PQ_64BIT) s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
287 /* if we're not (re)negotiating, nothing buffered */
291 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
292 if (item && item->priority == priority) {
294 * Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be a
295 * handshake record, since data records as passed up without
298 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
299 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
300 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
302 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
303 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
305 s->packet = rdata->packet;
306 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
307 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
308 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
310 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
313 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
322 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
328 unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
329 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
335 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
336 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
338 rr->input = &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
341 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
342 * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
343 * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
344 * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
348 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
349 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
352 /* check is not needed I believe */
353 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
354 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
355 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
359 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
360 rr->data = rr->input;
362 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
365 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
366 * 1: if the padding is valid
367 * -1: if the padding is invalid
370 /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
372 s->packet_length = 0;
376 printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
379 for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
380 printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
385 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
386 if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (s->read_hash != NULL)) {
387 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
388 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
389 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
390 mac_size = EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
391 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
394 * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type
396 orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8);
399 * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
400 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
401 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
402 * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
404 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
405 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
406 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
407 orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
408 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
409 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
413 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
415 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
416 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
417 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
418 * contents of the padding bytes.
421 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
422 rr->length -= mac_size;
425 * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals
426 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
429 rr->length -= mac_size;
430 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
433 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
434 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
435 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
437 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
442 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
444 s->packet_length = 0;
448 /* r->length is now just compressed */
449 if (s->expand != NULL) {
450 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
451 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
452 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
453 SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
456 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
457 al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
458 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
463 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
464 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
465 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
471 * So at this point the following is true
472 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
473 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
474 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
475 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
479 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
480 s->packet_length = 0;
481 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap)); /* Mark receipt of
486 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
492 * Call this to get a new input record.
493 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
494 * or non-blocking IO.
495 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
496 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
497 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
498 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
500 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
501 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
503 int ssl_major, ssl_minor;
506 unsigned char *p = NULL;
507 unsigned short version;
508 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
509 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
514 * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records.
515 * This is a non-blocking operation.
517 dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
519 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
520 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
523 /* get something from the wire */
525 /* check if we have the header */
526 if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
527 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
528 n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
529 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
531 return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
533 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
534 if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
535 s->packet_length = 0;
539 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
543 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
547 version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
549 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
552 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
557 /* Lets check version */
558 if (!s->first_packet) {
559 if (version != s->version && version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
560 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
562 s->packet_length = 0;
567 if ((version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) &&
568 (version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00)) {
569 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
571 s->packet_length = 0;
575 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
576 /* record too long, silently discard it */
578 s->packet_length = 0;
582 s->client_version = version;
583 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
586 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
588 if (rr->length > s->packet_length - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
589 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
591 n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
592 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
595 s->packet_length = 0;
600 * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length ==
601 * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
604 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
606 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
607 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
608 if (bitmap == NULL) {
610 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
611 goto again; /* get another record */
615 * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. Don't check if we're
616 * listening and this message is a ClientHello. They can look as if
617 * they're replayed, since they arrive from different connections and
618 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
620 if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
621 s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
622 s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
623 !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap, &(rr->seq_num))) {
625 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
626 goto again; /* get another record */
629 /* just read a 0 length packet */
634 * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a
635 * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be
636 * processed at this time. However, do not buffer anything while
640 if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) {
641 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), &rr->seq_num);
644 s->packet_length = 0;
648 if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) {
650 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
651 goto again; /* get another record */
659 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
660 * 'type' is one of the following:
662 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
663 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
664 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
666 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
667 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
669 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
670 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
671 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
672 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
673 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
674 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
675 * Change cipher spec protocol
676 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
678 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
680 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
681 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
682 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
683 * Application data protocol
684 * none of our business
686 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
691 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
693 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
694 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
697 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
698 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
699 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
700 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
701 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
706 * check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting
708 if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
712 * Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
715 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) {
716 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
717 i = s->handshake_func(s);
721 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
727 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
730 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
731 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
732 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
733 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
738 * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
739 * during the last handshake in advance, if any.
741 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0) {
743 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
745 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
747 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
752 /* Check for timeout */
753 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
756 /* get new packet if necessary */
757 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
758 ret = dtls1_get_record(s);
760 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
761 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
769 if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
774 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
776 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
777 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
778 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
780 * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely
781 * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application
782 * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection.
784 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), &rr->seq_num);
790 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
793 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
795 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
799 if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
800 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
802 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
803 * doing a handshake for the first time
805 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
806 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
807 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
808 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
815 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
818 n = (unsigned int)len;
820 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
824 if (rr->length == 0) {
825 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
833 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
834 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
838 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
839 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
842 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
843 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
844 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
846 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
847 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
848 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
849 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
850 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
851 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
852 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
853 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
855 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
856 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
858 * Application data while renegotiating is allowed. Try again
861 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
863 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
864 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
865 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
866 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
867 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
871 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
872 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
873 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
877 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
879 * XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello may be
880 * fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes
882 if (rr->length < dest_maxlen) {
883 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
885 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
886 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
887 * non-existing alert...
891 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
896 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
897 for (k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) {
898 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
901 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
906 * s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
907 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
908 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
911 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
913 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
914 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
915 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
916 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
918 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
919 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
920 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
921 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
922 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
927 * no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages
931 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
932 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
933 s->msg_callback_arg);
935 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
936 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
937 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
938 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
940 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
941 i = s->handshake_func(s);
945 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
946 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
950 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
951 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
954 * In the case where we try to read application data,
955 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
956 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
957 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
959 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
960 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
961 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
962 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
969 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
970 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
975 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) {
976 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
977 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
979 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
982 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
983 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
985 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
986 cb = s->info_callback;
987 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
988 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
991 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
992 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
995 if (alert_level == 1) { /* warning */
996 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
997 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
998 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1002 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
1003 /* now check if it's a missing record */
1004 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
1006 unsigned int frag_off;
1007 unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
1012 dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1013 dtls1_get_queue_priority
1014 (frag->msg_header.seq, 0), frag_off,
1016 if (!found && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1018 * fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s));
1021 * requested a message not yet sent, send an alert
1024 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1025 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1029 } else if (alert_level == 2) { /* fatal */
1032 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1033 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
1035 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1036 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1037 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1038 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1039 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1042 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1050 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1052 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1057 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1058 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1059 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1061 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1064 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
1065 * what the record payload has to look like
1067 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1068 if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1071 if ((rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) || (rr->off != 0)
1072 || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
1073 i = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1074 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1080 if (s->msg_callback)
1081 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1082 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1085 * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages
1086 * are still missing, so just drop it.
1088 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok) {
1092 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
1094 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
1095 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1098 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1099 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1101 if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1102 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1108 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1110 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1112 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1114 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1115 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1116 if (rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) {
1122 * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client
1123 * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1125 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
1126 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
1129 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1134 if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1135 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1136 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences
1137 * are not as expected (and because this is
1138 * not really needed for clients except for
1139 * detecting protocol violations): */
1140 s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server)
1141 ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1143 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1147 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1155 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1156 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1159 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1160 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1161 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1162 * problems in the blocking world
1164 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1165 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1166 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1167 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1177 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1178 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
1183 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1186 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1188 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1190 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1191 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
1192 * happen when type != rr->type
1194 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1197 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1199 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1200 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1201 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1202 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1203 * started), we will indulge it.
1205 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1206 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1207 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1208 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1209 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1210 ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1211 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1212 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1215 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1218 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1226 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1231 int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1235 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) {
1236 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,
1241 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1246 if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
1251 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1256 * this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1260 have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1264 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1265 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1267 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1268 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1273 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1276 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1279 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1280 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1281 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1289 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
1290 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1292 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
1296 OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
1297 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1298 i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
1302 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1303 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1305 unsigned char *p, *pseq;
1306 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
1314 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
1315 * will happen with non blocking IO
1317 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0) {
1318 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1319 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
1322 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1323 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
1324 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1327 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1330 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1333 wr = &(s->s3->wrec);
1334 wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
1337 if ((sess == NULL) ||
1338 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (s->write_hash == NULL))
1344 mac_size = EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
1346 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
1349 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
1351 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
1352 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1355 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
1356 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
1359 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
1361 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
1362 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
1363 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
1366 prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
1367 if (prefix_len <= 0)
1370 if (s->s3->wbuf.len <
1371 (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) {
1372 /* insufficient space */
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1378 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1382 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1384 /* write the header */
1386 *(p++) = type & 0xff;
1389 if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1390 *(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER >> 8, *(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff;
1392 *(p++) = (s->version >> 8), *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1394 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1398 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1401 * Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC. (this is a bit of a
1402 * boundary violation, but what the heck).
1404 if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
1405 (EVP_CIPHER_mode(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
1406 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
1410 wr->data = p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1411 wr->length = (int)len;
1412 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
1415 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
1418 /* first we compress */
1419 if (s->compress != NULL) {
1420 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
1421 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1425 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
1426 wr->input = wr->data;
1430 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
1431 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
1435 if (mac_size != 0) {
1436 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + bs]), 1);
1437 wr->length += mac_size;
1440 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1444 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1445 if (bs) { /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
1446 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, bs);
1448 * master IV and last CBC residue stand for the rest of randomness
1453 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1);
1455 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1457 * if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && !
1461 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1463 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1467 * else s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq);
1470 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1472 s2n(wr->length, pseq);
1475 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1478 wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1479 wr->length += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1481 #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
1482 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1483 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1484 dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
1485 *((PQ_64BIT *) & (s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
1488 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1490 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1492 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1498 /* now let's set up wb */
1499 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1503 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1506 s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
1507 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
1508 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
1509 s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
1511 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1512 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
1517 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap,
1520 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER
1521 PQ_64BIT mask = 0x0000000000000001L;
1523 PQ_64BIT rcd_num, tmp;
1525 pq_64bit_init(&rcd_num);
1526 pq_64bit_init(&tmp);
1528 /* this is the sequence number for the record just read */
1529 pq_64bit_bin2num(&rcd_num, s->s3->read_sequence, 8);
1531 if (pq_64bit_gt(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)) ||
1532 pq_64bit_eq(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num))) {
1533 pq_64bit_assign(seq_num, &rcd_num);
1534 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1535 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1536 return 1; /* this record is new */
1539 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1541 if (pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp) > bitmap->length) {
1542 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1543 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1544 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1546 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_BIGNUM
1549 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1550 pq_64bit_sub_word(&tmp, 1);
1551 offset = pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp);
1552 if (pq_64bit_is_bit_set(&(bitmap->map), offset)) {
1553 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1554 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1559 mask <<= (bitmap->max_seq_num - rcd_num - 1);
1560 if (bitmap->map & mask)
1561 return 0; /* record previously received */
1564 pq_64bit_assign(seq_num, &rcd_num);
1565 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1566 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1570 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1577 pq_64bit_init(&rcd_num);
1578 pq_64bit_init(&tmp);
1580 pq_64bit_bin2num(&rcd_num, s->s3->read_sequence, 8);
1583 * unfortunate code complexity due to 64-bit manipulation support on
1586 if (pq_64bit_gt(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)) ||
1587 pq_64bit_eq(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num))) {
1588 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num));
1589 pq_64bit_add_word(&tmp, 1);
1591 shift = (unsigned int)pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp);
1593 pq_64bit_lshift(&(tmp), &(bitmap->map), shift);
1594 pq_64bit_assign(&(bitmap->map), &tmp);
1596 pq_64bit_set_bit(&(bitmap->map), 0);
1597 pq_64bit_add_word(&rcd_num, 1);
1598 pq_64bit_assign(&(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1600 pq_64bit_assign_word(&tmp, 1);
1601 pq_64bit_lshift(&tmp, &tmp, bitmap->length);
1602 ctx = pq_64bit_ctx_new(&ctx);
1603 pq_64bit_mod(&(bitmap->map), &(bitmap->map), &tmp, ctx);
1604 pq_64bit_ctx_free(ctx);
1606 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1607 pq_64bit_sub_word(&tmp, 1);
1608 shift = (unsigned int)pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp);
1610 pq_64bit_set_bit(&(bitmap->map), shift);
1613 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1614 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1617 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1620 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1621 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1622 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1624 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
1626 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1627 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1628 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1630 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1631 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
1632 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1634 if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0)
1636 * waiting for a new msg
1639 s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
1644 "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",
1645 s->d1->handshake_read_seq, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
1647 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1651 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
1653 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1654 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1656 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1657 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1658 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1661 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1663 if (s->msg_callback)
1664 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1665 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1667 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1668 cb = s->info_callback;
1669 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1670 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1673 j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
1674 cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
1680 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
1681 unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1686 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1687 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1688 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1690 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1691 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1692 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1694 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1702 dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
1703 unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset)
1706 /* alerts are passed up immediately */
1707 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1711 * Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway. (this implies that
1712 * Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up immediately)
1714 if (SSL_in_init(s)) {
1715 unsigned char *data = rr->data;
1716 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1717 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1718 rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1719 unsigned short seq_num;
1720 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1721 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1723 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1724 dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
1725 seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
1726 *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
1728 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
1729 seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
1734 * this is either a record we're waiting for, or a retransmit of
1735 * something we happened to previously receive (higher layers
1736 * will drop the repeat silently
1738 if (seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1740 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
1741 seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1742 msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
1744 else if (seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1745 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
1746 msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
1749 *priority = seq_num;
1752 } else /* unknown record type */
1760 void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1763 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1765 if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) {
1766 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1769 pq_64bit_assign(&(s->d1->bitmap.map), &(s->d1->next_bitmap.map));
1770 s->d1->bitmap.length = s->d1->next_bitmap.length;
1771 pq_64bit_assign(&(s->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num),
1772 &(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num));
1774 pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.map));
1775 pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num));
1776 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1777 pq_64bit_init(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.map));
1778 pq_64bit_init(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num));
1780 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1781 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq,
1782 sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1786 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
1789 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER
1790 static PQ_64BIT bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes, PQ_64BIT * num)
1794 _num = (((PQ_64BIT) bytes[0]) << 56) |
1795 (((PQ_64BIT) bytes[1]) << 48) |
1796 (((PQ_64BIT) bytes[2]) << 40) |
1797 (((PQ_64BIT) bytes[3]) << 32) |
1798 (((PQ_64BIT) bytes[4]) << 24) |
1799 (((PQ_64BIT) bytes[5]) << 16) |
1800 (((PQ_64BIT) bytes[6]) << 8) | (((PQ_64BIT) bytes[7]));