2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
154 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
155 #include <openssl/rand.h>
156 #include <openssl/objects.h>
157 #include <openssl/evp.h>
158 #include <openssl/md5.h>
160 # include <openssl/fips.h>
162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
163 # include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #include <openssl/bn.h>
166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
167 # include <openssl/engine.h>
170 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
172 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return (SSLv3_client_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
185 ssl_undefined_function,
186 ssl3_connect, ssl3_get_client_method)
188 int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
191 unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
192 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
194 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
196 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
200 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
201 cb = s->info_callback;
202 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
203 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
206 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
211 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
212 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
215 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
216 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
225 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
227 s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
228 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
232 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
233 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
237 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
239 if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
241 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
246 /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
247 s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
249 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
250 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
252 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
255 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
257 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
264 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
269 /* setup buffing BIO */
270 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
272 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
276 /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
278 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
280 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
281 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
283 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
285 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
287 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
290 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
291 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
294 ret = ssl3_client_hello(s);
297 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
300 /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
301 if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
302 s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
306 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
307 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
308 ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
313 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
315 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
316 /* receive renewed session ticket */
317 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
321 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
325 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
326 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
328 /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
329 ret = ssl3_check_finished(s);
334 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
339 /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
343 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
344 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
345 ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
349 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
350 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
352 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
355 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
361 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
366 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
367 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
368 ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
371 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
375 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
378 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
380 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
385 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
386 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
387 ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
390 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
394 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
395 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
396 ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
400 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
401 if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
403 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
404 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
409 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
410 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
412 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
417 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
418 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
419 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
420 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
421 ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
424 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
428 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
429 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
430 ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
434 * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
437 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
438 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
441 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
442 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
443 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
444 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
446 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
447 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
449 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
451 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
452 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
458 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
459 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
460 ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
463 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
467 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
468 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
469 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
471 SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
475 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
476 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
478 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
479 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
481 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
485 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
486 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
487 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
489 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
490 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
492 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
494 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
496 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
500 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
501 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
504 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
510 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
511 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
512 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
513 ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
516 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
520 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
521 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
522 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
523 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
524 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
526 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
528 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
531 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
534 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
536 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
537 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) {
538 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
539 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
540 s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
545 * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
547 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
548 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
552 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
558 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
559 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
560 ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
563 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
567 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
568 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
569 ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
572 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
577 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
578 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
579 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
580 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
581 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
582 SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
587 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
589 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
593 case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
594 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
595 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
599 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
600 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
604 /* clean a few things up */
605 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
607 if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
608 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
613 * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
616 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
617 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
618 /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
624 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
626 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
630 s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect;
631 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
634 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
647 /* did we do anything */
648 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
650 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
654 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
655 new_state = s->state;
657 cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
658 s->state = new_state;
668 cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
672 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
675 unsigned char *p, *d;
678 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
683 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
684 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
685 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
686 if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
687 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
688 !sess->session_id_length ||
691 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
692 * "ticket" without a session ID.
694 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
696 (sess->not_resumable)) {
697 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
700 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
702 p = s->s3->client_random;
704 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
707 /* Do the message type and length last */
711 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
712 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
713 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
714 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
715 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
716 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
717 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
718 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
721 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
722 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
723 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
724 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
725 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
726 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
727 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
728 * know that is maximum server supports.
729 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
730 * containing version 1.0.
732 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
733 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
734 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
735 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
736 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
737 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
738 * the negotiated version.
741 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
742 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
743 s->client_version = s->version;
745 *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
746 *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
750 memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
751 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
757 i = s->session->session_id_length;
760 if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
764 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
768 /* Ciphers supported */
769 i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0);
771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
774 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
776 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
777 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
780 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
781 && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
782 i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
788 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
792 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
793 || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
796 j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
798 for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
799 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
803 *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
807 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
812 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p,
813 buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
822 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
825 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
826 /* number of bytes to write */
827 s->init_num = p - buf;
831 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
832 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
834 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
838 int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
840 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
842 unsigned char *p, *d;
846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
850 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
851 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
852 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, &ok);
857 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
858 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
859 if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) {
860 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
862 } else { /* already sent a cookie */
864 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
871 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
872 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
877 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
879 if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
880 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
881 s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | p[1];
882 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
887 /* load the server hello data */
888 /* load the server random */
889 memcpy(s->s3->server_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
890 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
894 /* get the session-id */
897 if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
898 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
904 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
905 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
906 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
907 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
908 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
909 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
910 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
911 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
912 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
913 * server wants to resume.
915 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
916 s->session->tlsext_tick) {
917 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
918 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
919 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
920 &s->session->master_key_length,
922 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
923 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
924 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
926 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
927 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
931 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
933 if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
934 && memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
935 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
936 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
937 /* actually a client application bug */
938 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
940 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
946 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
947 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
948 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
949 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
950 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
952 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
953 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
954 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
958 s->session->session_id_length = j;
959 memcpy(s->session->session_id, p, j); /* j could be 0 */
962 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
965 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
969 /* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later */
970 if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
971 (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)) {
972 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
976 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
977 if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
978 !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
979 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
983 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
984 p += ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
986 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
987 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
989 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
990 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
996 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
997 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
998 * set and use it for comparison.
1000 if (s->session->cipher)
1001 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1002 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1003 /* Workaround is now obsolete */
1005 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
1008 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1010 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1014 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1016 * Don't digest cached records if TLS v1.2: we may need them for client
1019 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION
1020 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
1021 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1024 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1026 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1028 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1030 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1034 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1035 * using compression.
1037 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1038 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1044 if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) {
1045 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1047 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1052 else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
1053 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1057 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, j);
1059 if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) {
1060 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1062 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1065 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1069 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1070 /* TLS extensions */
1071 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1072 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) {
1073 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */
1074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1077 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1085 /* wrong packet length */
1086 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1093 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1095 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1099 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
1101 int al, i, ok, ret = -1;
1102 unsigned long n, nc, llen, l;
1104 const unsigned char *q, *p;
1106 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1108 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1109 int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
1112 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1115 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1120 if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
1121 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
1122 (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) {
1123 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1127 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
1128 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
1132 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1134 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1140 if (llen + 3 != n) {
1141 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1145 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
1146 if (nc + 3 > llen) {
1147 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1149 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1153 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
1154 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1156 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1161 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, l);
1163 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1168 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1170 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1173 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1182 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1183 if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
1184 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1185 && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
1186 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
1187 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1189 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1191 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1194 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1196 sc = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1200 if (s->session->sess_cert)
1201 ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
1202 s->session->sess_cert = sc;
1204 sc->cert_chain = sk;
1206 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1207 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1209 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1212 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1215 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
1217 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
1218 need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
1219 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
1223 fprintf(stderr, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey, x);
1224 fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x, pkey));
1225 fprintf(stderr, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
1226 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
1227 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
1228 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
1229 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1231 if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) {
1234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1235 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1239 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1240 if (need_cert && i < 0) {
1243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1244 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1249 sc->peer_cert_type = i;
1250 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1252 * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
1255 if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
1256 X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
1257 sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
1258 sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
1260 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
1261 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1262 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1263 s->session->peer = x;
1265 sc->peer_cert_type = i;
1266 sc->peer_key = NULL;
1268 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
1269 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1270 s->session->peer = NULL;
1272 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1279 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1281 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1284 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1286 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1290 int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1293 unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
1296 unsigned char *param, *p;
1298 long i, param_len, n, alg_k, alg_a;
1299 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1300 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1308 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
1309 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1310 EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1312 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
1315 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1318 * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
1319 * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
1321 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1322 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1323 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1324 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1328 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1330 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
1332 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
1335 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) {
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1337 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1342 * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
1343 * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
1346 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
1347 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1348 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
1349 OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1350 s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1353 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1357 param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1358 if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
1359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1360 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) {
1361 RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
1362 s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
1365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1366 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) {
1367 DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
1368 s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
1371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1372 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) {
1373 EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
1374 s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
1378 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1381 /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
1384 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1386 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1389 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
1391 if (param_len > n) {
1392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1398 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1399 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1400 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1403 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1404 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1408 if (i > n - param_len) {
1409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1410 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
1415 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
1416 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
1417 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1425 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1427 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1429 if (param_len > n) {
1430 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1435 if (i > n - param_len) {
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
1441 if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1447 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1455 if (i > n - param_len) {
1456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
1461 if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1467 if (1 > n - param_len) {
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1473 i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
1476 if (i > n - param_len) {
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
1482 if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1488 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1496 if (i > n - param_len) {
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
1502 if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1509 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1514 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1515 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1516 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1518 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1519 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1523 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1524 else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
1526 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1527 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
1531 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1533 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
1534 /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
1535 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
1536 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1540 if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1546 if (param_len > n) {
1547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1552 if (i > n - param_len) {
1553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
1558 if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n))) {
1559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1564 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1565 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1572 if (i > n - param_len) {
1573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
1578 if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e))) {
1579 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1585 /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
1586 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1588 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1589 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1595 if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey) <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
1596 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1601 s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
1604 #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
1607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1608 else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
1609 if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
1610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1615 if (param_len > n) {
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1621 if (i > n - param_len) {
1622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
1627 if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1633 if (BN_is_zero(dh->p)) {
1634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE);
1639 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1647 if (i > n - param_len) {
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
1653 if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1659 if (BN_is_zero(dh->g)) {
1660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE);
1664 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1672 if (i > n - param_len) {
1673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
1678 if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1685 if (BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) {
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE);
1690 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1691 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1693 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1694 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1698 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1699 else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
1701 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1702 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
1705 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1707 s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
1709 } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) {
1710 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1712 SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
1715 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1718 else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
1720 const EC_GROUP *group;
1722 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
1723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1728 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1729 * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
1730 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
1734 * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
1735 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
1736 * byte for the length of the encoded point
1739 if (param_len > n) {
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1744 if ((*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
1745 ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)) {
1746 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1748 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1752 ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
1753 if (ngroup == NULL) {
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1757 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1761 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
1763 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
1765 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1766 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1767 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1769 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1775 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1776 if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
1777 ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
1778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1782 encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
1785 if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
1786 (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
1787 p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) {
1788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1791 param_len += encoded_pt_len;
1794 p += encoded_pt_len;
1797 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1798 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1802 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1803 else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1805 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1806 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1808 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1809 else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1811 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1812 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
1814 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1815 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
1816 s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
1818 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1820 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
1821 srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1823 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1827 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1829 /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
1831 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1833 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1840 sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1841 /* Should never happen */
1843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1846 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1847 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
1848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1849 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1850 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1853 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
1855 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1859 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1872 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1875 * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
1877 if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
1878 /* wrong packet length */
1879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1883 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1884 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1890 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1891 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1892 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
1893 (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1,
1895 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1896 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1897 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1898 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1899 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len) <= 0
1900 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size) <= 0) {
1901 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1902 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1903 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1909 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa);
1911 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1912 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
1917 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1918 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1924 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1925 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1926 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1927 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1928 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1929 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len) <= 0) {
1930 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1934 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
1936 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1942 /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
1943 if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
1944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1947 /* still data left over */
1949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1953 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1954 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1957 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1959 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1969 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1970 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
1974 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1975 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1979 int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1982 unsigned long n, nc, l;
1983 unsigned int llen, ctype_num, i;
1984 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1985 const unsigned char *p, *q;
1987 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
1989 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1990 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
1991 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
1992 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1997 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
1999 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
2000 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2002 * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
2003 * wont be doing client auth.
2005 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2006 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
2012 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
2013 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2018 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
2019 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2020 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
2021 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2023 SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
2028 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2030 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2035 /* get the certificate types */
2037 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER)
2038 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
2039 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
2040 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = p[i];
2042 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2045 * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
2048 if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) {
2049 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2051 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2054 if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_process_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) {
2055 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2057 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2063 /* get the CA RDNs */
2068 out = fopen("/tmp/vsign.der", "w");
2069 fwrite(p, 1, llen, out);
2074 if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) {
2075 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2080 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
2081 if (nc + 2 > llen) {
2082 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
2087 if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
2088 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2089 goto cont; /* netscape bugs */
2090 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
2097 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) {
2098 /* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
2099 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
2102 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2109 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2111 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2114 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2129 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2130 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2131 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2132 if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
2133 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2134 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2140 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2144 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2148 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2150 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2153 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2154 int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
2156 int ok, al, ret = 0, ticklen;
2158 const unsigned char *p;
2160 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
2162 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2163 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
2164 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
2165 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, &ok);
2171 /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
2172 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2177 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2179 n2l(p, ticket_lifetime_hint);
2181 /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
2182 if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
2183 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2188 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
2192 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2193 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2194 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2196 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2199 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2201 * Remove the old session from the cache
2203 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
2204 if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
2205 s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
2208 /* We carry on if this fails */
2209 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2213 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2214 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2219 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2220 s->session = new_sess;
2223 if (s->session->tlsext_tick) {
2224 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
2225 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
2227 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2228 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) {
2229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2232 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
2233 s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2234 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
2236 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2237 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2238 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2239 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2240 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2241 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2242 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2243 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2244 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2246 EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
2247 s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
2248 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2249 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
2256 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2258 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2262 int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
2265 unsigned long resplen, n;
2266 const unsigned char *p;
2268 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2269 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
2270 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
2276 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
2278 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
2279 * tlsext_status_expected is set
2281 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2284 /* need at least status type + length */
2285 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2289 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2290 if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2291 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2296 if (resplen + 4 != n) {
2297 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2301 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
2302 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
2303 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2307 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
2309 if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2311 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2313 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2318 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2325 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2326 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2331 int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
2336 /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
2337 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2338 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
2339 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
2340 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, &ok);
2345 /* should contain no data */
2346 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2348 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2355 int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2357 unsigned char *p, *d;
2359 unsigned long alg_k;
2360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2362 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2366 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2368 EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
2369 const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
2370 EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
2371 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2372 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
2373 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2376 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
2377 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2380 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2382 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2385 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2386 else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2388 unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2390 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
2392 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2395 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2399 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
2400 rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
2403 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
2404 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].
2406 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2407 || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2409 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2410 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2413 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2414 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2417 tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2418 tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2419 if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
2422 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof tmp_buf;
2425 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2426 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
2428 n = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
2429 tmp_buf, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2431 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2433 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2438 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2442 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2443 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2448 s->session->master_key_length =
2449 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2451 session->master_key,
2454 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
2457 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2458 else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2459 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2460 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2461 /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
2462 krb5_data *enc_ticket;
2463 krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
2464 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2465 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2466 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2467 unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2468 unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2469 int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
2471 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2474 fprintf(stderr, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
2476 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2479 # ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
2481 authp = &authenticator;
2482 # endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
2484 krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err);
2485 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2490 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
2491 if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
2492 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
2495 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2498 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2504 * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
2505 * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
2507 * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
2508 * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
2509 * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
2510 * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
2511 * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
2513 * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
2514 * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
2515 * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
2516 * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
2518 * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
2519 * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
2520 * optional authenticator omitted.
2523 /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
2524 s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
2525 memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
2526 p += enc_ticket->length;
2527 n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
2529 /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
2530 if (authp && authp->length) {
2531 s2n(authp->length, p);
2532 memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
2534 n += authp->length + 2;
2540 s2n(0, p); /* null authenticator length */
2544 tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2545 tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2546 if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
2550 * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
2551 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
2552 * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
2553 * kssl_ctx->length);
2554 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
2557 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2558 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
2559 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf,
2561 EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
2563 if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
2564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2565 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2568 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2570 /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
2572 memcpy(p, epms, outl);
2576 s->session->master_key_length =
2577 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2579 session->master_key,
2583 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
2584 OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
2587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2588 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2589 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
2591 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
2592 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2594 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2598 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
2599 dh_srvr = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
2601 /* we get them from the cert */
2602 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2604 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
2608 /* generate a new random key */
2609 if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
2610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2613 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
2614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2620 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2621 * clear it out afterwards
2624 n = DH_compute_key(p, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2632 /* generate master key from the result */
2633 s->session->master_key_length =
2634 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2636 session->master_key,
2641 /* send off the data */
2642 n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
2644 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
2651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2652 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2653 const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
2655 int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
2658 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
2659 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2661 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2666 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2667 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2668 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2670 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
2672 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2673 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2674 * To add such support, one needs to add
2675 * code that checks for appropriate
2676 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2677 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2678 * key on the same curve as the server's
2679 * and the key should be authorized for
2682 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2683 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2686 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2687 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2688 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2689 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2693 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
2694 tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
2696 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2698 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
2699 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
2700 if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
2701 || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
2702 || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2704 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2708 tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
2711 srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2712 srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
2714 if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
2715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2716 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2720 if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2722 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2726 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2730 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2732 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2733 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2735 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2736 tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
2737 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2738 if (priv_key == NULL) {
2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2740 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2743 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2748 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2749 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2757 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2758 * clear it out afterwards
2761 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
2762 if (field_size <= 0) {
2763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2766 n = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, srvr_ecpoint,
2769 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2773 /* generate master key from the result */
2774 s->session->master_key_length =
2775 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2777 session->master_key,
2780 memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
2782 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2783 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2787 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2791 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2792 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2793 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2796 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
2797 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
2798 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
2799 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
2800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2801 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2805 /* Encode the public key */
2806 n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2807 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2808 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2809 encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
2811 *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
2812 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2814 /* copy the point */
2815 memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
2816 /* increment n to account for length field */
2820 /* Free allocated memory */
2821 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2822 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2823 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2824 if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
2825 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
2826 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
2828 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
2829 else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2830 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2831 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2834 unsigned int md_len;
2836 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2837 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
2841 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2845 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
2849 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
2851 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2852 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2856 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
2857 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2858 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2860 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2864 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2866 * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2867 * certificate key for key exchange
2870 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2872 if (pkey_ctx == NULL
2873 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2874 /* Generate session key */
2875 || RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) {
2876 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2877 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2878 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2882 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2885 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
2886 if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
2887 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94)) <= 0
2888 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2889 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2890 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2891 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2892 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2893 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
2894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2895 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2898 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
2899 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2900 (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
2902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2906 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2908 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2910 *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
2912 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, premaster_secret, 32)
2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2918 if (msglen >= 0x80) {
2920 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2923 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2926 memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
2927 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2928 s->session->master_key_length =
2929 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2931 session->master_key,
2934 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
2937 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2938 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2939 if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
2940 /* send off the data */
2941 n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
2943 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
2946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2947 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2950 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2951 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2952 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2953 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2954 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2955 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2959 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2960 SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,
2961 s->session->master_key)) <
2963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2964 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2969 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2970 else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2972 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2973 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2976 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
2977 size_t identity_len;
2978 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2979 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2980 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2984 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2985 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2986 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2990 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2991 psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2992 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2994 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2995 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2997 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2999 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
3000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3001 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
3004 identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
3005 identity_len = strlen(identity);
3006 if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
3007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3008 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3011 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
3012 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
3014 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
3016 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
3020 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
3021 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
3022 s->session->psk_identity_hint =
3023 BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
3024 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL
3025 && s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
3026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3027 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3031 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
3032 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
3033 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
3034 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
3035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3036 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3040 s->session->master_key_length =
3041 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
3043 session->master_key,
3046 s2n(identity_len, p);
3047 memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
3048 n = 2 + identity_len;
3051 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
3052 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
3054 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3060 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3065 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
3068 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
3069 /* number of bytes to write */
3070 s->init_num = n + 4;
3074 /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
3075 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3077 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3078 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3079 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
3080 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3081 if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
3082 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
3083 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
3085 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3089 int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
3091 unsigned char *p, *d;
3092 unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
3094 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
3100 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3102 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
3103 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3105 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
3106 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
3107 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3108 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx) <= 0) {
3109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3112 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
3113 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
3114 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
3117 [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
3122 * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
3123 * digest and cached handshake records.
3125 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3128 const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
3129 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3130 if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
3131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3136 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
3139 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3140 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
3141 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
3142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3147 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3150 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3151 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3152 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
3153 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
3154 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
3155 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
3156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
3163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3164 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3165 if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
3166 &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3167 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
3168 (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
3169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
3176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3177 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3178 if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
3179 &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3180 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
3181 (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
3182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
3189 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3190 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3191 unsigned char signbuf[64];
3193 size_t sigsize = 64;
3194 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
3195 NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
3196 if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
3197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3200 for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
3201 p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
3206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3209 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
3212 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
3213 s->init_num = (int)n + 4;
3216 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3217 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3218 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3220 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3221 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3222 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3226 int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3229 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3233 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
3234 if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
3235 (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
3236 (s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
3237 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
3239 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
3242 /* We need to get a client cert */
3243 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
3245 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3246 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3248 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3250 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3253 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3254 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3255 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
3256 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3258 } else if (i == 1) {
3260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3261 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3267 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3269 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3270 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3271 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3274 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3278 /* Ok, we have a cert */
3279 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
3282 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
3283 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
3284 l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
3285 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
3286 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key->x509);
3288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3289 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3290 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3293 s->init_num = (int)l;
3296 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
3297 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3300 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3302 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3306 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3309 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3315 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3317 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3318 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3320 /* we don't have a certificate */
3321 if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH | SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3324 sc = s->session->sess_cert;
3326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3330 rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
3332 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3333 dh = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
3336 /* This is the passed certificate */
3338 idx = sc->peer_cert_type;
3339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3340 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3341 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) {
3343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3350 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
3351 pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
3352 i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
3353 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3355 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3356 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3358 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3362 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3364 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3369 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
3370 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
3371 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3373 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3375 } else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3376 if (pkey_bits <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3377 if (!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3379 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3383 /* server key exchange is not allowed. */
3384 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3393 if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && dh == NULL) {
3394 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3398 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
3399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3400 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
3403 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3404 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
3405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3406 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
3411 /* Check DHE only: static DH not implemented. */
3412 if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
3413 int dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
3414 if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 1024)
3415 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512)) {
3416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
3420 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
3422 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
3423 pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3425 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
3427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3428 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
3430 } else if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) >
3431 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3432 /* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */
3433 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
3434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3435 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
3440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3441 if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
3442 if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) >
3443 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3444 /* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */
3445 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
3446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3447 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
3450 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
3451 /* The cert should have had an export DH key. */
3452 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
3453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3454 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
3459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3460 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
3466 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3473 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
3474 * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
3475 * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
3476 * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
3477 * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
3478 * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
3479 * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
3481 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
3485 if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION || !s->tls_session_secret_cb ||
3486 !s->session->tlsext_tick)
3489 /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
3490 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
3492 * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
3493 * so permit appropriate message length.
3494 * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
3495 * and not its length.
3497 s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3500 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3501 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
3506 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3508 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
3511 /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
3512 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3514 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3521 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3522 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
3524 unsigned int len, padding_len;
3527 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) {
3528 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
3529 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3530 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3532 memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
3533 d[5 + len] = padding_len;
3534 memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
3535 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
3536 l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
3537 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
3538 s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
3542 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3544 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
3545 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
3547 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3551 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3552 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3553 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3554 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3559 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3560 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);