2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
122 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
123 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
125 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
128 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
129 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
130 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
131 * s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
132 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
144 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
148 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
149 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
150 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
154 /* start with empty packet ... */
157 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
159 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
162 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
163 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
164 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
166 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
167 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
168 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
169 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
170 * overrun can be triggered.
172 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
176 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
177 s->packet_length = 0;
178 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
182 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
183 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
186 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
187 if (left == 0 && extend)
189 if (left > 0 && n > left)
193 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
195 s->packet_length += n;
201 /* else we need to read more data */
203 len = s->packet_length;
204 pkt = rb->buf + align;
206 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
207 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
209 if (s->packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */
210 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left);
212 rb->offset = len + align;
215 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */
216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
220 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
221 if (!s->read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
222 /* ignore max parameter */
227 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
228 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
233 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
234 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
239 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
240 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
241 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
249 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
250 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION
251 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
253 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
258 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
259 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
260 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
262 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION
263 || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
265 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
269 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
272 s->packet_length += n;
273 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
278 * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that
279 * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an
280 * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and
281 * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever.
283 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
286 * Call this to get a new input record.
287 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
288 * or non-blocking IO.
289 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
290 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
291 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
292 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
294 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
295 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
297 int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al;
298 int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1;
302 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
304 unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
306 unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
311 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
312 extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
315 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) {
317 * An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after
318 * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
325 /* check if we have the header */
326 if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
327 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
328 n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
330 return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
331 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
335 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
339 version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
342 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
345 /* Lets check version */
346 if (!s->first_packet) {
347 if (version != s->version) {
348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
349 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
350 && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
351 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
353 * The record is using an incorrect version number, but
354 * what we've got appears to be an alert. We haven't
355 * read the body yet to check whether its a fatal or
356 * not - but chances are it is. We probably shouldn't
357 * send a fatal alert back. We'll just end.
362 * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
364 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
366 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
371 if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
376 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
377 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
382 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
385 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
387 if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
388 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
390 n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
392 return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */
394 * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
399 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
402 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
403 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
405 rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
408 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
409 * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
410 * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
411 * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
415 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
416 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
419 /* check is not needed I believe */
420 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) {
421 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
426 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
427 rr->data = rr->input;
429 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
432 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
433 * 1: if the padding is valid
434 * -1: if the padding is invalid
437 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
442 printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
445 for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
446 printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
451 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
452 if ((sess != NULL) &&
453 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
454 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
455 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
456 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
457 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
458 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
461 * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type
463 orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8);
466 * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
467 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
468 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
469 * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
471 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
472 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
473 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
474 orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
475 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
480 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
482 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
483 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
484 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
485 * contents of the padding bytes.
488 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
489 rr->length -= mac_size;
492 * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals
493 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
496 rr->length -= mac_size;
497 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
500 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
501 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
502 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
504 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size)
510 * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
511 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
512 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should
513 * not reveal which kind of error occured -- this might become
514 * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile)
516 al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
518 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
522 /* r->length is now just compressed */
523 if (s->expand != NULL) {
524 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) {
525 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
529 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
530 al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
536 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) {
537 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
544 * So at this point the following is true
545 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
546 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
547 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
548 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
552 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
553 s->packet_length = 0;
555 /* just read a 0 length packet */
556 if (rr->length == 0) {
557 empty_record_count++;
558 if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
559 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
566 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type,
573 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
578 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
584 rr = &(ssl->s3->rrec);
585 i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp,
586 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data,
597 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
603 wr = &(ssl->s3->wrec);
604 i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data,
605 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
606 wr->input, (int)wr->length);
612 wr->input = wr->data;
618 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
619 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
621 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
623 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
627 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
628 OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
632 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) {
633 i = s->handshake_func(s);
637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
643 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
644 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
645 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
646 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
647 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
648 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
649 * report the error in a way the user will notice
652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
658 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
659 nw = s->max_send_fragment;
663 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
670 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
671 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
673 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
674 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
676 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
686 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
687 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
689 unsigned char *p, *plen;
690 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
695 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
699 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
700 * will happen with non blocking IO
703 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
705 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
706 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
707 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
710 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
714 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
717 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
723 if ((sess == NULL) ||
724 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
725 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
727 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
733 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
739 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
741 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
743 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
744 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
747 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
749 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
750 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
751 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
754 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
759 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
761 /* insufficient space */
762 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
767 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
770 if (create_empty_fragment) {
771 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
773 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
774 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
775 * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
777 align = (long)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
778 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
782 } else if (prefix_len) {
783 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
785 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
786 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
787 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
793 /* write the header */
795 *(p++) = type & 0xff;
798 *(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
800 * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
801 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
803 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
804 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
807 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
809 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
812 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */
813 if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
814 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
815 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
816 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
820 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
821 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
822 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
828 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
829 wr->data = p + eivlen;
830 wr->length = (int)len;
831 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
834 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
837 /* first we compress */
838 if (s->compress != NULL) {
839 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
844 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
845 wr->input = wr->data;
849 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
850 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
855 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
857 wr->length += mac_size;
865 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
867 wr->length += eivlen;
870 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
873 /* record length after mac and block padding */
874 s2n(wr->length, plen);
877 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
880 wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
881 wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
883 if (create_empty_fragment) {
885 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
891 /* now let's set up wb */
892 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
895 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
898 s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
899 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
900 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
901 s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
903 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
904 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
909 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
910 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
914 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
917 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
918 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
919 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
920 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) {
921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
927 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
928 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
929 i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
930 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
931 (unsigned int)wb->left);
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
939 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
940 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION
941 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
942 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
943 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
944 return (s->s3->wpend_ret);
946 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
948 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
949 * using a datagram service
961 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
962 * 'type' is one of the following:
964 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
965 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
966 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
968 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
969 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
971 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
972 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
973 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
974 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
975 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
976 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
977 * Change cipher spec protocol
978 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
980 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
982 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
983 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
984 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
985 * Application data protocol
986 * none of our business
988 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
993 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
995 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
996 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
999 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1000 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1002 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1007 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1008 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1010 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1011 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1016 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1019 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
1022 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1023 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1024 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1029 * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1032 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1033 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1034 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1043 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1046 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1047 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1048 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1049 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
1051 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
1053 /* get new packet if necessary */
1054 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
1055 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1060 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1062 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1063 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1064 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1065 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1071 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1074 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1076 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1080 if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1081 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1083 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1084 * doing a handshake for the first time
1086 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1087 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1088 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1096 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1099 n = (unsigned int)len;
1101 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1105 if (rr->length == 0) {
1106 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1108 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
1109 && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
1110 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1117 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1118 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
1122 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1123 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1126 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1127 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1128 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1130 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1131 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1132 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1133 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1134 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1135 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1136 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1137 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1140 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
1141 tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1143 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1145 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1146 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1147 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1152 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1153 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1155 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1157 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1159 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1163 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1164 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1169 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1170 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1171 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1174 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1176 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1177 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1178 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1179 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1181 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1182 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1183 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1184 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1189 if (s->msg_callback)
1190 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1191 s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1192 s->msg_callback_arg);
1194 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1195 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1196 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1197 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1198 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1199 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1204 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1208 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1209 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1212 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1213 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1214 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1215 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1217 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1218 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1219 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1220 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1227 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1228 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1233 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1234 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1235 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1238 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1239 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1240 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1241 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1242 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1243 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1244 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1246 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1249 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1252 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1253 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1254 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1256 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1258 if (s->msg_callback)
1259 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1260 s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1262 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1263 cb = s->info_callback;
1264 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1265 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1268 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1269 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1272 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1273 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1274 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1275 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1279 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1280 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1281 * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
1282 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1283 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1284 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1286 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1287 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1291 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1292 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1295 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1298 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1299 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1301 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1302 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1303 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1304 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1307 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1315 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1317 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1322 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1324 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
1325 * what the record payload has to look like
1327 if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1328 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
1329 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1334 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1335 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
1336 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1341 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) {
1342 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1347 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1351 if (s->msg_callback)
1352 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1353 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1355 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
1356 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1363 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1365 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) {
1366 if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1367 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1368 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences
1369 * are not as expected (and because this is
1370 * not really needed for clients except for
1371 * detecting protocol violations): */
1372 s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server)
1373 ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1375 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1380 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1388 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1389 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1392 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1393 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1394 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1395 * problems in the blocking world
1397 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1398 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1399 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1400 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1411 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
1412 * an unexpected message alert.
1414 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
1419 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1422 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1424 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1426 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1427 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
1428 * happen when type != rr->type
1430 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1433 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1435 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1436 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1437 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1438 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1439 * started), we will indulge it.
1441 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1442 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1443 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1444 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1445 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1446 ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1447 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1448 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1451 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1454 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1462 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1467 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1473 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1474 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1476 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1478 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) {
1479 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
1480 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1482 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1486 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1487 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
1491 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i))
1495 * we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it
1496 * before we read the finished message
1498 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
1499 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1500 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1502 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1503 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1506 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1508 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1513 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1518 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1520 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1521 desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1522 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1523 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have
1524 * protocol_version alerts */
1527 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1528 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1529 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1531 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1532 s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
1533 s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
1534 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1535 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1537 * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in
1543 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1546 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1548 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
1549 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1551 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1554 * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the
1555 * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not
1558 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1559 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1561 if (s->msg_callback)
1562 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1563 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1565 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1566 cb = s->info_callback;
1567 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1568 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1571 j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
1572 cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);