2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
132 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
133 #include <openssl/rand.h>
134 #include <openssl/objects.h>
135 #include <openssl/evp.h>
136 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
137 #include <openssl/x509.h>
138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
139 #include <openssl/dh.h>
141 #include <openssl/bn.h>
142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
143 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
145 #include <openssl/md5.h>
147 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
149 static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
152 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
154 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
155 return(SSLv3_server_method());
160 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
162 ssl_undefined_function,
163 ssl3_get_server_method)
165 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
168 unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
169 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
171 int new_state,state,skip=0;
173 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
177 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
179 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
180 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
182 /* init things to blank */
184 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
198 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
200 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
204 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
205 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
208 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
210 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
215 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
217 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
219 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
224 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
232 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
239 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
241 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
243 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
244 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
246 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
248 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
249 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
250 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
252 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
253 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
255 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
256 * client that doesn't support secure
259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
260 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
266 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
267 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
268 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
269 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
274 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
277 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
278 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
279 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
280 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
283 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
286 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
290 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
291 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
292 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
295 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
296 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
298 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
302 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
303 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
304 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
305 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
309 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
310 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
312 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
316 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
319 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
323 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
324 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
325 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */
326 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)
327 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
329 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
330 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
332 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
333 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
335 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
340 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
347 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
352 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
353 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
354 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
356 /* clear this, it may get reset by
357 * send_server_key_exchange */
358 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
361 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
362 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
364 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
365 * message only if the cipher suite is either
366 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
367 * server certificate contains the server's
368 * public key for key exchange.
371 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
373 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
374 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
375 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
381 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
382 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
387 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
391 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
392 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
393 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
394 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
395 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
396 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
397 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
398 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
399 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
400 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
401 * and in RFC 2246): */
402 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
403 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
404 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
405 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
406 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
407 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
409 /* no cert request */
411 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
412 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
416 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
417 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
418 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
419 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
420 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
422 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
423 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
429 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
430 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
431 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
432 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
433 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
434 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
438 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
440 /* This code originally checked to see if
441 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
442 * and then flushed. This caused problems
443 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
444 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
445 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
446 * still exist. So instead we just flush
450 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
451 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
456 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
458 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
461 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
462 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
463 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
464 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
468 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
470 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
472 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
473 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
476 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
480 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
481 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
482 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
487 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
488 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
489 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
490 * message is not sent.
492 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
497 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
500 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
501 * a client cert, it can be verified
503 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
504 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
505 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
506 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
507 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
508 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
512 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
513 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
515 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
516 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
517 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
518 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
520 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
524 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
525 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
526 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
527 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
528 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
529 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
533 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
534 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
537 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
542 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
543 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
544 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
545 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
546 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
550 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
551 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
552 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
553 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
554 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
561 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
563 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
564 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
565 { ret= -1; goto end; }
567 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
568 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
570 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
571 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
574 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
575 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
583 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
584 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
585 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
586 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
587 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
588 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
589 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
590 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
592 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
594 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
599 /* clean a few things up */
600 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
602 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
605 /* remove buffering on output */
606 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
610 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
612 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
613 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
617 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
619 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
621 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
623 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
637 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
641 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
646 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
650 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
657 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
661 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
665 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
669 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
671 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
672 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
677 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
678 /* number of bytes to write */
683 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
684 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
687 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
692 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
693 * so permit appropriate message length */
694 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
700 if (!ok) return((int)n);
701 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
702 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
704 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
706 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
711 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
712 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
714 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
716 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
717 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
720 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
721 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
723 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
724 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
727 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
733 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
735 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
736 unsigned int cookie_len;
739 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
744 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
746 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
747 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
748 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
749 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
752 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
754 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
757 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
758 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
759 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
760 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
761 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
764 if (!ok) return((int)n);
766 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
768 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
769 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
770 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
773 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
774 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
777 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
779 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
780 s->version = s->client_version;
782 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
786 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
787 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
788 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
790 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
792 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
794 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
795 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
797 if (cookie_length == 0)
801 /* load the client random */
802 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
805 /* get the session-id */
809 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
810 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
811 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
812 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
813 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
814 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
815 * an earlier library version)
817 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
819 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
824 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
826 { /* previous session */
833 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
840 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
846 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
847 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
848 * does not cause an overflow.
850 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
853 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
858 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
859 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
862 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
864 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
866 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
869 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
870 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
871 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
874 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
876 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
877 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
879 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
880 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
881 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
892 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
894 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
895 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
901 /* not enough data */
902 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
906 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
913 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
914 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
917 id=s->session->cipher->id;
920 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
922 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
924 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
926 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
927 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
935 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
936 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
939 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
941 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
942 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
943 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
944 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
945 * enabled, though. */
946 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
947 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
949 s->session->cipher = c;
956 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
957 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
958 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
968 /* not enough data */
969 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
976 if (p[j] == 0) break;
983 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
990 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
992 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
994 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
999 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
1000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1004 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1005 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1006 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1007 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1009 if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
1010 { /* See if we have a match */
1011 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1013 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1014 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1016 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1029 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1035 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
1036 #if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
1037 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
1038 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
1039 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1043 /* wrong number of bytes,
1044 * there could be more to follow */
1045 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1052 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1057 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1058 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1060 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1062 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1063 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1064 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1065 if (ciphers == NULL)
1067 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1072 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1073 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1077 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1081 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1085 /* Session-id reuse */
1086 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1087 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1088 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1089 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1091 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1093 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1094 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1096 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1097 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
1099 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1103 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1104 else if (ec != NULL)
1105 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1107 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1111 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1114 /* we now have the following setup.
1116 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1117 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1118 * compression - basically ignored right now
1119 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1120 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1121 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1122 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1126 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1127 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1129 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1141 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1144 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1148 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1151 unsigned char *p,*d;
1153 unsigned long l,Time;
1155 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1157 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1158 p=s->s3->server_random;
1159 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1161 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1163 /* Do the message type and length last */
1166 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1167 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1170 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1171 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1173 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1174 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1175 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1176 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1177 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1178 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1179 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1181 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1182 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1183 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1184 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1185 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1188 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1190 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1192 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1193 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1202 /* put the cipher */
1203 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1206 /* put the compression method */
1207 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1210 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1213 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1216 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1225 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1228 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1229 /* number of bytes to write */
1234 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1235 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1238 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1242 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1244 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1247 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1252 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1253 /* number of bytes to write */
1258 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1259 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1262 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1268 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1275 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1276 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1279 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1282 unsigned char *p,*d;
1292 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1293 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1295 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1300 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1303 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1306 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1308 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1309 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1310 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1313 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1322 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1328 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1332 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1333 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1336 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1337 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1338 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1339 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1342 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1347 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1353 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1360 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1361 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1362 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1364 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1373 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1374 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1375 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1376 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1389 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1391 const EC_GROUP *group;
1393 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1394 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1396 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1397 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1398 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1402 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1407 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1413 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1419 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1425 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1426 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1427 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1428 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1430 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1437 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1438 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1439 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1445 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1446 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1452 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1453 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1454 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1457 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1464 /* Encode the public key.
1465 * First check the size of encoding and
1466 * allocate memory accordingly.
1468 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1469 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1470 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1473 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1474 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1475 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1476 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1483 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1484 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1485 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1486 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1488 if (encodedlen == 0)
1490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1494 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1496 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1497 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1498 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1499 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1504 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1505 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1513 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1515 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1519 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1521 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1525 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1527 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1530 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1533 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1541 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1546 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1549 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1557 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1559 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1560 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1561 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1562 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1563 * the actual encoded point itself
1565 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1573 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1574 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1576 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1577 encodedPoint = NULL;
1585 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1586 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1588 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1592 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1594 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1595 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1596 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1597 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1598 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1599 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1600 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1601 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1602 (unsigned int *)&i);
1606 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1607 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1617 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1618 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1621 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1622 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1623 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1624 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1625 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1626 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1636 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1637 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1639 /* let's do ECDSA */
1640 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1641 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1642 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1643 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1644 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1645 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1656 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1657 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1663 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1666 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1672 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1673 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1674 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1676 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1678 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1679 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1680 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1682 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1686 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1688 unsigned char *p,*d;
1690 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1694 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1698 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1700 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1702 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1711 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1715 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1717 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1718 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1719 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1724 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1725 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1728 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1735 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1736 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1742 /* else no CA names */
1743 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1746 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1747 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1750 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1755 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1756 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1761 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1764 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1771 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1774 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1775 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1780 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1788 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1790 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1794 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1796 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1798 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1799 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1800 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1801 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1802 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1805 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1806 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1807 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1808 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1812 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1813 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1815 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1820 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
1822 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
1824 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1825 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1827 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1828 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1829 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1830 * be sent already */
1833 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1834 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1841 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1842 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1843 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1844 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1846 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1853 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */
1854 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION &&
1855 s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1860 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1872 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
1873 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
1874 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
1875 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
1876 * case that the decrypt fails. See
1877 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
1879 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
1880 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
1881 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
1883 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1886 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
1887 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
1888 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
1890 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
1891 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
1892 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1893 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1894 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
1895 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
1896 * decryption error. */
1897 version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
1898 version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
1900 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
1901 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
1902 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
1903 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
1904 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
1905 * support the requested protocol version. If
1906 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1907 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
1909 unsigned char workaround_good;
1910 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
1911 workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
1912 version_good |= workaround_good;
1915 /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
1916 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
1917 decrypt_good &= version_good;
1919 /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
1920 * decrypt_good_mask. */
1921 for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
1923 p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i],
1924 rand_premaster_secret[i]);
1927 s->session->master_key_length=
1928 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1929 s->session->master_key,
1931 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1935 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1936 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1941 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1953 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1955 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1961 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1963 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1964 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1968 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1971 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1978 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1987 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1992 s->session->master_key_length=
1993 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1994 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1995 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1999 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2002 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2003 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2004 krb5_data authenticator;
2006 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2007 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2008 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2009 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2010 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2011 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2013 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2014 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2016 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2018 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2021 enc_ticket.length = i;
2023 if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6)
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2026 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2030 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2031 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2034 authenticator.length = i;
2036 if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6)
2038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2039 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2043 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2044 p+=authenticator.length;
2048 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2051 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2054 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2057 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2061 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2062 enc_pms.length + 6))
2064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2065 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2069 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2073 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2074 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2076 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2077 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2083 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2084 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2086 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2087 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2090 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2091 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2093 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2094 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2100 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2107 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2108 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2110 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2114 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2116 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2119 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2122 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2123 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2126 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2129 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2132 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2135 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2138 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2142 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2145 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2148 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2150 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2151 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2152 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2153 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2154 * the protocol version.
2155 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2156 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2158 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2161 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2166 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2168 s->session->master_key_length=
2169 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2170 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2172 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2174 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2175 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2177 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2178 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2183 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2184 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2185 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2186 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2190 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2193 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
2198 const EC_GROUP *group;
2199 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2201 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2202 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2205 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2209 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2212 /* use the certificate */
2213 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2217 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2218 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2220 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2223 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2224 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2226 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2227 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2234 /* Let's get client's public key */
2235 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2238 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2244 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2248 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2252 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2254 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2256 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2257 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2258 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2259 * never executed. When that support is
2260 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2261 * received in the certificate is
2262 * authorized for key agreement.
2263 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2264 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2267 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2269 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2273 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2274 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2280 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2284 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2285 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2287 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2290 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2294 /* Get encoded point length */
2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2303 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2304 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2310 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2311 * currently, so set it to the start
2313 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2316 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2317 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2318 if (field_size <= 0)
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2324 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2332 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2333 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2334 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2335 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2336 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2338 /* Compute the master secret */
2339 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2340 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2342 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2348 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2350 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2356 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2357 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2361 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2362 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2363 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2364 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2365 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2370 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2372 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2379 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2380 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2381 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2383 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
2386 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2388 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2390 peer=s->session->peer;
2391 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2392 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2400 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2402 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2405 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2416 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2420 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2423 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2427 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2430 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2434 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2435 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2441 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2445 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2446 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2449 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2454 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2456 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2457 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2461 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2467 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2475 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2477 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2478 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2479 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2483 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2491 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2493 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2494 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2495 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2499 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2501 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2509 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2518 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2521 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2525 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2527 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2529 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2530 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2532 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2534 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2541 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2543 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2545 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2546 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2549 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2552 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2553 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2556 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2559 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2563 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2565 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2569 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2571 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2580 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2584 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2587 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2589 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2595 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2603 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2607 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2616 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2618 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2619 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2621 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2625 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2626 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2627 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2629 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2630 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2636 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2639 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2645 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2646 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2647 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2648 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2650 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2651 * when we arrive here. */
2652 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2654 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2655 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2661 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2662 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2663 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2664 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2665 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2673 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2676 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2677 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2681 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2686 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2688 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2690 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2691 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2692 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2693 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2699 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2700 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2705 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2706 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2710 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2711 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2712 static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
2714 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2715 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2717 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2719 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2721 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2723 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2725 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2727 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2729 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2731 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2733 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2735 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2737 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2739 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2741 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2743 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2745 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2747 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2749 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2751 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2753 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2755 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2757 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2759 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2761 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2763 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2765 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
2772 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2773 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2775 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
2777 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
2782 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2783 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2784 unsigned char key_name[16];
2786 /* get session encoding length */
2787 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2788 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2793 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2794 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2795 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2796 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2797 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2798 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2800 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
2801 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
2802 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
2804 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
2808 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
2810 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2812 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
2813 /* Skip message length for now */
2815 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2816 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2817 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
2818 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
2821 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2823 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
2832 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
2833 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2834 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
2835 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2836 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2837 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
2839 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
2840 /* Skip ticket length for now */
2842 /* Output key name */
2844 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
2847 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
2848 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2849 /* Encrypt session data */
2850 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
2852 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
2854 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2856 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
2857 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
2858 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2861 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
2863 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2864 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
2865 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
2867 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
2869 /* number of bytes to write */
2871 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
2876 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
2877 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2880 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
2882 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
2885 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2886 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
2887 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
2890 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
2893 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2896 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
2897 /* message length */
2898 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
2900 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
2901 /* length of OCSP response */
2902 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
2903 /* actual response */
2904 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
2905 /* number of bytes to write */
2906 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
2907 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
2911 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
2912 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));