contrib/unbound/validator/val_utils.c

   1 /*
   2  * validator/val_utils.c - validator utility functions.
   3  *
   4  * Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved.
   5  *
   6  * This software is open source.
   7  *
   8  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   9  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  10  * are met:
  11  *
  12  * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
  13  * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  14  *
  15  * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
  16  * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
  17  * and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  18  *
  19  * Neither the name of the NLNET LABS nor the names of its contributors may
  20  * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
  21  * specific prior written permission.
  22  *
  23  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
  24  * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
  25  * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
  26  * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
  27  * HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
  28  * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
  29  * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
  30  * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
  31  * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
  32  * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
  33  * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  34  */
  35
  36 /**
  37  * \file
  38  *
  39  * This file contains helper functions for the validator module.
  40  */
  41 #include "config.h"
  42 #include "validator/val_utils.h"
  43 #include "validator/validator.h"
  44 #include "validator/val_kentry.h"
  45 #include "validator/val_sigcrypt.h"
  46 #include "validator/val_anchor.h"
  47 #include "validator/val_nsec.h"
  48 #include "validator/val_neg.h"
  49 #include "services/cache/rrset.h"
  50 #include "services/cache/dns.h"
  51 #include "util/data/msgreply.h"
  52 #include "util/data/packed_rrset.h"
  53 #include "util/data/dname.h"
  54 #include "util/net_help.h"
  55 #include "util/module.h"
  56 #include "util/regional.h"
  57 #include "util/config_file.h"
  58 #include "sldns/wire2str.h"
  59 #include "sldns/parseutil.h"
  60
  61 enum val_classification
  62 val_classify_response(uint16_t query_flags, struct query_info* origqinf,
  63         struct query_info* qinf, struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip)
  64 {
  65         int rcode = (int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(rep->flags);
  66         size_t i;
  67
  68         /* Normal Name Error's are easy to detect -- but don't mistake a CNAME
  69          * chain ending in NXDOMAIN. */
  70         if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN && rep->an_numrrsets == 0)
  71                 return VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR;
  72
  73         /* check for referral: nonRD query and it looks like a nodata */
  74         if(!(query_flags&BIT_RD) && rep->an_numrrsets == 0 &&
  75                 rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) {
  76                 /* SOA record in auth indicates it is NODATA instead.
  77                  * All validation requiring NODATA messages have SOA in
  78                  * authority section. */
  79                 /* uses fact that answer section is empty */
  80                 int saw_ns = 0;
  81                 for(i=0; i<rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
  82                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)
  83                                 return VAL_CLASS_NODATA;
  84                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS)
  85                                 return VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL;
  86                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS)
  87                                 saw_ns = 1;
  88                 }
  89                 return saw_ns?VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL:VAL_CLASS_NODATA;
  90         }
  91         /* root referral where NS set is in the answer section */
  92         if(!(query_flags&BIT_RD) && rep->ns_numrrsets == 0 &&
  93                 rep->an_numrrsets == 1 && rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR &&
  94                 ntohs(rep->rrsets[0]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS &&
  95                 query_dname_compare(rep->rrsets[0]->rk.dname,
  96                         origqinf->qname) != 0)
  97                 return VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL;
  98
  99         /* dump bad messages */
 100         if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN)
 101                 return VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN;
 102         /* next check if the skip into the answer section shows no answer */
 103         if(skip>0 && rep->an_numrrsets <= skip)
 104                 return VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER;
 105
 106         /* Next is NODATA */
 107         if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rep->an_numrrsets == 0)
 108                 return VAL_CLASS_NODATA;
 109
 110         /* We distinguish between CNAME response and other positive/negative
 111          * responses because CNAME answers require extra processing. */
 112
 113         /* We distinguish between ANY and CNAME or POSITIVE because
 114          * ANY responses are validated differently. */
 115         if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && qinf->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_ANY)
 116                 return VAL_CLASS_ANY;
 117
 118         /* Note that DNAMEs will be ignored here, unless qtype=DNAME. Unless
 119          * qtype=CNAME, this will yield a CNAME response. */
 120         for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
 121                 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR &&
 122                         ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == qinf->qtype)
 123                         return VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE;
 124                 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME)
 125                         return VAL_CLASS_CNAME;
 126         }
 127         log_dns_msg("validator: error. failed to classify response message: ",
 128                 qinf, rep);
 129         return VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN;
 130 }
 131
 132 /** Get signer name from RRSIG */
 133 static void
 134 rrsig_get_signer(uint8_t* data, size_t len, uint8_t** sname, size_t* slen)
 135 {
 136         /* RRSIG rdata is not allowed to be compressed, it is stored
 137          * uncompressed in memory as well, so return a ptr to the name */
 138         if(len < 21) {
 139                 /* too short RRSig:
 140                  * short, byte, byte, long, long, long, short, "." is
 141                  * 2    1       1       4       4  4    2       1 = 19
 142                  *                      and a skip of 18 bytes to the name.
 143                  * +2 for the rdatalen is 21 bytes len for root label */
 144                 *sname = NULL;
 145                 *slen = 0;
 146                 return;
 147         }
 148         data += 20; /* skip the fixed size bits */
 149         len -= 20;
 150         *slen = dname_valid(data, len);
 151         if(!*slen) {
 152                 /* bad dname in this rrsig. */
 153                 *sname = NULL;
 154                 return;
 155         }
 156         *sname = data;
 157 }
 158
 159 void
 160 val_find_rrset_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t** sname,
 161         size_t* slen)
 162 {
 163         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
 164                 rrset->entry.data;
 165         /* return signer for first signature, or NULL */
 166         if(d->rrsig_count == 0) {
 167                 *sname = NULL;
 168                 *slen = 0;
 169                 return;
 170         }
 171         /* get rrsig signer name out of the signature */
 172         rrsig_get_signer(d->rr_data[d->count], d->rr_len[d->count],
 173                 sname, slen);
 174 }
 175
 176 /**
 177  * Find best signer name in this set of rrsigs.
 178  * @param rrset: which rrsigs to look through.
 179  * @param qinf: the query name that needs validation.
 180  * @param signer_name: the best signer_name. Updated if a better one is found.
 181  * @param signer_len: length of signer name.
 182  * @param matchcount: count of current best name (starts at 0 for no match).
 183  *      Updated if match is improved.
 184  */
 185 static void
 186 val_find_best_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset,
 187         struct query_info* qinf, uint8_t** signer_name, size_t* signer_len,
 188         int* matchcount)
 189 {
 190         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
 191                 rrset->entry.data;
 192         uint8_t* sign;
 193         size_t i;
 194         int m;
 195         for(i=d->count; i<d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++) {
 196                 sign = d->rr_data[i]+2+18;
 197                 /* look at signatures that are valid (long enough),
 198                  * and have a signer name that is a superdomain of qname,
 199                  * and then check the number of labels in the shared topdomain
 200                  * improve the match if possible */
 201                 if(d->rr_len[i] > 2+19 && /* rdata, sig + root label*/
 202                         dname_subdomain_c(qinf->qname, sign)) {
 203                         (void)dname_lab_cmp(qinf->qname,
 204                                 dname_count_labels(qinf->qname),
 205                                 sign, dname_count_labels(sign), &m);
 206                         if(m > *matchcount) {
 207                                 *matchcount = m;
 208                                 *signer_name = sign;
 209                                 (void)dname_count_size_labels(*signer_name,
 210                                         signer_len);
 211                         }
 212                 }
 213         }
 214 }
 215
 216 void
 217 val_find_signer(enum val_classification subtype, struct query_info* qinf,
 218         struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip, uint8_t** signer_name,
 219         size_t* signer_len)
 220 {
 221         size_t i;
 222
 223         if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE) {
 224                 /* check for the answer rrset */
 225                 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
 226                         if(query_dname_compare(qinf->qname,
 227                                 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0) {
 228                                 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i],
 229                                         signer_name, signer_len);
 230                                 return;
 231                         }
 232                 }
 233                 *signer_name = NULL;
 234                 *signer_len = 0;
 235         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME) {
 236                 /* check for the first signed cname/dname rrset */
 237                 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
 238                         val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i],
 239                                 signer_name, signer_len);
 240                         if(*signer_name)
 241                                 return;
 242                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME)
 243                                 break; /* only check CNAME after a DNAME */
 244                 }
 245                 *signer_name = NULL;
 246                 *signer_len = 0;
 247         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR
 248                 || subtype == VAL_CLASS_NODATA) {
 249                 /*Check to see if the AUTH section NSEC record(s) have rrsigs*/
 250                 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<
 251                         rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
 252                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC
 253                                 || ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) ==
 254                                 LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
 255                                 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i],
 256                                         signer_name, signer_len);
 257                                 return;
 258                         }
 259                 }
 260         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER) {
 261                 /* find closest superdomain signer name in authority section
 262                  * NSEC and NSEC3s */
 263                 int matchcount = 0;
 264                 *signer_name = NULL;
 265                 *signer_len = 0;
 266                 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->
 267                         ns_numrrsets; i++) {
 268                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC
 269                                 || ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) ==
 270                                 LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
 271                                 val_find_best_signer(rep->rrsets[i], qinf,
 272                                         signer_name, signer_len, &matchcount);
 273                         }
 274                 }
 275         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_ANY) {
 276                 /* check for one of the answer rrset that has signatures,
 277                  * or potentially a DNAME is in use with a different qname */
 278                 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
 279                         if(query_dname_compare(qinf->qname,
 280                                 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0) {
 281                                 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i],
 282                                         signer_name, signer_len);
 283                                 if(*signer_name)
 284                                         return;
 285                         }
 286                 }
 287                 /* no answer RRSIGs with qname, try a DNAME */
 288                 if(skip < rep->an_numrrsets &&
 289                         ntohs(rep->rrsets[skip]->rk.type) ==
 290                         LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) {
 291                         val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[skip],
 292                                 signer_name, signer_len);
 293                         if(*signer_name)
 294                                 return;
 295                 }
 296                 *signer_name = NULL;
 297                 *signer_len = 0;
 298         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) {
 299                 /* find keys for the item at skip */
 300                 if(skip < rep->rrset_count) {
 301                         val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[skip],
 302                                 signer_name, signer_len);
 303                         return;
 304                 }
 305                 *signer_name = NULL;
 306                 *signer_len = 0;
 307         } else {
 308                 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "find_signer: could not find signer name"
 309                         " for unknown type response");
 310                 *signer_name = NULL;
 311                 *signer_len = 0;
 312         }
 313 }
 314
 315 /** return number of rrs in an rrset */
 316 static size_t
 317 rrset_get_count(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset)
 318 {
 319         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
 320                 rrset->entry.data;
 321         if(!d) return 0;
 322         return d->count;
 323 }
 324
 325 /** return TTL of rrset */
 326 static uint32_t
 327 rrset_get_ttl(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset)
 328 {
 329         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
 330                 rrset->entry.data;
 331         if(!d) return 0;
 332         return d->ttl;
 333 }
 334
 335 enum sec_status
 336 val_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 337         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* keys,
 338         uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason)
 339 {
 340         enum sec_status sec;
 341         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
 342                 entry.data;
 343         if(d->security == sec_status_secure) {
 344                 /* re-verify all other statuses, because keyset may change*/
 345                 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset cached",
 346                         rrset->rk.dname, ntohs(rrset->rk.type),
 347                         ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
 348                 return d->security;
 349         }
 350         /* check in the cache if verification has already been done */
 351         rrset_check_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, rrset, *env->now);
 352         if(d->security == sec_status_secure) {
 353                 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset from cache",
 354                         rrset->rk.dname, ntohs(rrset->rk.type),
 355                         ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
 356                 return d->security;
 357         }
 358         log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset", rrset->rk.dname,
 359                 ntohs(rrset->rk.type), ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
 360         sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, keys, sigalg, reason);
 361         verbose(VERB_ALGO, "verify result: %s", sec_status_to_string(sec));
 362         regional_free_all(env->scratch);
 363
 364         /* update rrset security status
 365          * only improves security status
 366          * and bogus is set only once, even if we rechecked the status */
 367         if(sec > d->security) {
 368                 d->security = sec;
 369                 if(sec == sec_status_secure)
 370                         d->trust = rrset_trust_validated;
 371                 else if(sec == sec_status_bogus) {
 372                         size_t i;
 373                         /* update ttl for rrset to fixed value. */
 374                         d->ttl = ve->bogus_ttl;
 375                         for(i=0; i<d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++)
 376                                 d->rr_ttl[i] = ve->bogus_ttl;
 377                         /* leave RR specific TTL: not used for determine
 378                          * if RRset timed out and clients see proper value. */
 379                         lock_basic_lock(&ve->bogus_lock);
 380                         ve->num_rrset_bogus++;
 381                         lock_basic_unlock(&ve->bogus_lock);
 382                 }
 383                 /* if status updated - store in cache for reuse */
 384                 rrset_update_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, rrset, *env->now);
 385         }
 386
 387         return sec;
 388 }
 389
 390 enum sec_status
 391 val_verify_rrset_entry(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 392         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct key_entry_key* kkey,
 393         char** reason)
 394 {
 395         /* temporary dnskey rrset-key */
 396         struct ub_packed_rrset_key dnskey;
 397         struct key_entry_data* kd = (struct key_entry_data*)kkey->entry.data;
 398         enum sec_status sec;
 399         dnskey.rk.type = htons(kd->rrset_type);
 400         dnskey.rk.rrset_class = htons(kkey->key_class);
 401         dnskey.rk.flags = 0;
 402         dnskey.rk.dname = kkey->name;
 403         dnskey.rk.dname_len = kkey->namelen;
 404         dnskey.entry.key = &dnskey;
 405         dnskey.entry.data = kd->rrset_data;
 406         sec = val_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, &dnskey, kd->algo, reason);
 407         return sec;
 408 }
 409
 410 /** verify that a DS RR hashes to a key and that key signs the set */
 411 static enum sec_status
 412 verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 413         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
 414         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, size_t ds_idx, char** reason)
 415 {
 416         enum sec_status sec = sec_status_bogus;
 417         size_t i, num, numchecked = 0, numhashok = 0;
 418         num = rrset_get_count(dnskey_rrset);
 419         for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
 420                 /* Skip DNSKEYs that don't match the basic criteria. */
 421                 if(ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx)
 422                    != dnskey_get_algo(dnskey_rrset, i)
 423                    || dnskey_calc_keytag(dnskey_rrset, i)
 424                    != ds_get_keytag(ds_rrset, ds_idx)) {
 425                         continue;
 426                 }
 427                 numchecked++;
 428                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "attempt DS match algo %d keytag %d",
 429                         ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx),
 430                         ds_get_keytag(ds_rrset, ds_idx));
 431
 432                 /* Convert the candidate DNSKEY into a hash using the
 433                  * same DS hash algorithm. */
 434                 if(!ds_digest_match_dnskey(env, dnskey_rrset, i, ds_rrset,
 435                         ds_idx)) {
 436                         verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS match attempt failed");
 437                         continue;
 438                 }
 439                 numhashok++;
 440                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS match digest ok, trying signature");
 441
 442                 /* Otherwise, we have a match! Make sure that the DNSKEY
 443                  * verifies *with this key*  */
 444                 sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset,
 445                         dnskey_rrset, i, reason);
 446                 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
 447                         return sec;
 448                 }
 449                 /* If it didn't validate with the DNSKEY, try the next one! */
 450         }
 451         if(numchecked == 0)
 452                 algo_needs_reason(env, ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx),
 453                         reason, "no keys have a DS");
 454         else if(numhashok == 0)
 455                 *reason = "DS hash mismatches key";
 456         else if(!*reason)
 457                 *reason = "keyset not secured by DNSKEY that matches DS";
 458         return sec_status_bogus;
 459 }
 460
 461 int val_favorite_ds_algo(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset)
 462 {
 463         size_t i, num = rrset_get_count(ds_rrset);
 464         int d, digest_algo = 0; /* DS digest algo 0 is not used. */
 465         /* find favorite algo, for now, highest number supported */
 466         for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
 467                 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) ||
 468                         !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i)) {
 469                         continue;
 470                 }
 471                 d = ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i);
 472                 if(d > digest_algo)
 473                         digest_algo = d;
 474         }
 475         return digest_algo;
 476 }
 477
 478 enum sec_status
 479 val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 480         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
 481         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason)
 482 {
 483         /* as long as this is false, we can consider this DS rrset to be
 484          * equivalent to no DS rrset. */
 485         int has_useful_ds = 0, digest_algo, alg;
 486         struct algo_needs needs;
 487         size_t i, num;
 488         enum sec_status sec;
 489
 490         if(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ds_rrset->rk.dname_len ||
 491                 query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ds_rrset->rk.dname)
 492                 != 0) {
 493                 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset "
 494                         "by name");
 495                 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name";
 496                 return sec_status_bogus;
 497         }
 498
 499         if(sigalg) {
 500                 /* harden against algo downgrade is enabled */
 501                 digest_algo = val_favorite_ds_algo(ds_rrset);
 502                 algo_needs_init_ds(&needs, ds_rrset, digest_algo, sigalg);
 503         } else {
 504                 /* accept any key algo, any digest algo */
 505                 digest_algo = -1;
 506         }
 507         num = rrset_get_count(ds_rrset);
 508         for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
 509                 /* Check to see if we can understand this DS.
 510                  * And check it is the strongest digest */
 511                 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) ||
 512                         !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) ||
 513                         (sigalg && (ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i) != digest_algo))) {
 514                         continue;
 515                 }
 516
 517                 /* Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and
 518                  * algorithm, we cannot return INSECURE (with a
 519                  * "null" KeyEntry). */
 520                 has_useful_ds = 1;
 521
 522                 sec = verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(env, ve, dnskey_rrset,
 523                         ds_rrset, i, reason);
 524                 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
 525                         if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
 526                                 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i))) {
 527                                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS matched DNSKEY.");
 528                                 return sec_status_secure;
 529                         }
 530                 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) {
 531                         algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs,
 532                                 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i));
 533                 }
 534         }
 535
 536         /* None of the DS's worked out. */
 537
 538         /* If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK. */
 539         if(!has_useful_ds) {
 540                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No usable DS records were found -- "
 541                         "treating as insecure.");
 542                 return sec_status_insecure;
 543         }
 544         /* If any were understandable, then it is bad. */
 545         verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Failed to match any usable DS to a DNSKEY.");
 546         if(sigalg && (alg=algo_needs_missing(&needs)) != 0) {
 547                 algo_needs_reason(env, alg, reason, "missing verification of "
 548                         "DNSKEY signature");
 549         }
 550         return sec_status_bogus;
 551 }
 552
 553 struct key_entry_key*
 554 val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(struct regional* region, struct module_env* env,
 555         struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
 556         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, int downprot, char** reason)
 557 {
 558         uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1];
 559         enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(env, ve,
 560                 dnskey_rrset, ds_rrset, downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason);
 561
 562         if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
 563                 return key_entry_create_rrset(region,
 564                         ds_rrset->rk.dname, ds_rrset->rk.dname_len,
 565                         ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class), dnskey_rrset,
 566                         downprot?sigalg:NULL, *env->now);
 567         } else if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
 568                 return key_entry_create_null(region, ds_rrset->rk.dname,
 569                         ds_rrset->rk.dname_len,
 570                         ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
 571                         rrset_get_ttl(ds_rrset), *env->now);
 572         }
 573         return key_entry_create_bad(region, ds_rrset->rk.dname,
 574                 ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
 575                 BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *env->now);
 576 }
 577
 578 enum sec_status
 579 val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 580         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
 581         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds,
 582         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason)
 583 {
 584         /* as long as this is false, we can consider this anchor to be
 585          * equivalent to no anchor. */
 586         int has_useful_ta = 0, digest_algo = 0, alg;
 587         struct algo_needs needs;
 588         size_t i, num;
 589         enum sec_status sec;
 590
 591         if(ta_ds && (dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ta_ds->rk.dname_len ||
 592                 query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ta_ds->rk.dname)
 593                 != 0)) {
 594                 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset "
 595                         "by name");
 596                 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name";
 597                 return sec_status_bogus;
 598         }
 599         if(ta_dnskey && (dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ta_dnskey->rk.dname_len
 600              || query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ta_dnskey->rk.dname)
 601                 != 0)) {
 602                 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match anchor RRset "
 603                         "by name");
 604                 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match anchor RRset by name";
 605                 return sec_status_bogus;
 606         }
 607
 608         if(ta_ds)
 609                 digest_algo = val_favorite_ds_algo(ta_ds);
 610         if(sigalg) {
 611                 if(ta_ds)
 612                         algo_needs_init_ds(&needs, ta_ds, digest_algo, sigalg);
 613                 else    memset(&needs, 0, sizeof(needs));
 614                 if(ta_dnskey)
 615                         algo_needs_init_dnskey_add(&needs, ta_dnskey, sigalg);
 616         }
 617         if(ta_ds) {
 618             num = rrset_get_count(ta_ds);
 619             for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
 620                 /* Check to see if we can understand this DS.
 621                  * And check it is the strongest digest */
 622                 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ta_ds, i) ||
 623                         !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ta_ds, i) ||
 624                         ds_get_digest_algo(ta_ds, i) != digest_algo)
 625                         continue;
 626
 627                 /* Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and
 628                  * algorithm, we cannot return INSECURE (with a
 629                  * "null" KeyEntry). */
 630                 has_useful_ta = 1;
 631
 632                 sec = verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(env, ve, dnskey_rrset,
 633                         ta_ds, i, reason);
 634                 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
 635                         if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
 636                                 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ta_ds, i))) {
 637                                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS matched DNSKEY.");
 638                                 return sec_status_secure;
 639                         }
 640                 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) {
 641                         algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs,
 642                                 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ta_ds, i));
 643                 }
 644             }
 645         }
 646
 647         /* None of the DS's worked out: check the DNSKEYs. */
 648         if(ta_dnskey) {
 649             num = rrset_get_count(ta_dnskey);
 650             for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
 651                 /* Check to see if we can understand this DNSKEY */
 652                 if(!dnskey_algo_is_supported(ta_dnskey, i))
 653                         continue;
 654
 655                 /* we saw a useful TA */
 656                 has_useful_ta = 1;
 657
 658                 sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset,
 659                         ta_dnskey, i, reason);
 660                 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
 661                         if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
 662                                 (uint8_t)dnskey_get_algo(ta_dnskey, i))) {
 663                                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "anchor matched DNSKEY.");
 664                                 return sec_status_secure;
 665                         }
 666                 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) {
 667                         algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs,
 668                                 (uint8_t)dnskey_get_algo(ta_dnskey, i));
 669                 }
 670             }
 671         }
 672
 673         /* If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK. */
 674         if(!has_useful_ta) {
 675                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No usable trust anchors were found -- "
 676                         "treating as insecure.");
 677                 return sec_status_insecure;
 678         }
 679         /* If any were understandable, then it is bad. */
 680         verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Failed to match any usable anchor to a DNSKEY.");
 681         if(sigalg && (alg=algo_needs_missing(&needs)) != 0) {
 682                 algo_needs_reason(env, alg, reason, "missing verification of "
 683                         "DNSKEY signature");
 684         }
 685         return sec_status_bogus;
 686 }
 687
 688 struct key_entry_key*
 689 val_verify_new_DNSKEYs_with_ta(struct regional* region, struct module_env* env,
 690         struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
 691         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds_rrset,
 692         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey_rrset, int downprot,
 693         char** reason)
 694 {
 695         uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1];
 696         enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(env, ve,
 697                 dnskey_rrset, ta_ds_rrset, ta_dnskey_rrset,
 698                 downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason);
 699
 700         if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
 701                 return key_entry_create_rrset(region,
 702                         dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len,
 703                         ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class), dnskey_rrset,
 704                         downprot?sigalg:NULL, *env->now);
 705         } else if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
 706                 return key_entry_create_null(region, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname,
 707                         dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len,
 708                         ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
 709                         rrset_get_ttl(dnskey_rrset), *env->now);
 710         }
 711         return key_entry_create_bad(region, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname,
 712                 dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len, ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
 713                 BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *env->now);
 714 }
 715
 716 int
 717 val_dsset_isusable(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset)
 718 {
 719         size_t i;
 720         for(i=0; i<rrset_get_count(ds_rrset); i++) {
 721                 if(ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) &&
 722                         ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i))
 723                         return 1;
 724         }
 725         if(verbosity < VERB_ALGO)
 726                 return 0;
 727         if(rrset_get_count(ds_rrset) == 0)
 728                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS is not usable");
 729         else {
 730                 /* report usability for the first DS RR */
 731                 sldns_lookup_table *lt;
 732                 char herr[64], aerr[64];
 733                 lt = sldns_lookup_by_id(sldns_hashes,
 734                         (int)ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i));
 735                 if(lt) snprintf(herr, sizeof(herr), "%s", lt->name);
 736                 else snprintf(herr, sizeof(herr), "%d",
 737                         (int)ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i));
 738                 lt = sldns_lookup_by_id(sldns_algorithms,
 739                         (int)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i));
 740                 if(lt) snprintf(aerr, sizeof(aerr), "%s", lt->name);
 741                 else snprintf(aerr, sizeof(aerr), "%d",
 742                         (int)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i));
 743                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS unsupported, hash %s %s, "
 744                         "key algorithm %s %s", herr,
 745                         (ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, 0)?
 746                         "(supported)":"(unsupported)"), aerr,
 747                         (ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, 0)?
 748                         "(supported)":"(unsupported)"));
 749         }
 750         return 0;
 751 }
 752
 753 /** get label count for a signature */
 754 static uint8_t
 755 rrsig_get_labcount(struct packed_rrset_data* d, size_t sig)
 756 {
 757         if(d->rr_len[sig] < 2+4)
 758                 return 0; /* bad sig length */
 759         return d->rr_data[sig][2+3];
 760 }
 761
 762 int
 763 val_rrset_wildcard(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t** wc)
 764 {
 765         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
 766                 entry.data;
 767         uint8_t labcount;
 768         int labdiff;
 769         uint8_t* wn;
 770         size_t i, wl;
 771         if(d->rrsig_count == 0) {
 772                 return 1;
 773         }
 774         labcount = rrsig_get_labcount(d, d->count + 0);
 775         /* check rest of signatures identical */
 776         for(i=1; i<d->rrsig_count; i++) {
 777                 if(labcount != rrsig_get_labcount(d, d->count + i)) {
 778                         return 0;
 779                 }
 780         }
 781         /* OK the rrsigs check out */
 782         /* if the RRSIG label count is shorter than the number of actual
 783          * labels, then this rrset was synthesized from a wildcard.
 784          * Note that the RRSIG label count doesn't count the root label. */
 785         wn = rrset->rk.dname;
 786         wl = rrset->rk.dname_len;
 787         /* skip a leading wildcard label in the dname (RFC4035 2.2) */
 788         if(dname_is_wild(wn)) {
 789                 wn += 2;
 790                 wl -= 2;
 791         }
 792         labdiff = (dname_count_labels(wn) - 1) - (int)labcount;
 793         if(labdiff > 0) {
 794                 *wc = wn;
 795                 dname_remove_labels(wc, &wl, labdiff);
 796                 return 1;
 797         }
 798         return 1;
 799 }
 800
 801 int
 802 val_chase_cname(struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* rep,
 803         size_t* cname_skip) {
 804         size_t i;
 805         /* skip any DNAMEs, go to the CNAME for next part */
 806         for(i = *cname_skip; i < rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
 807                 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME &&
 808                         query_dname_compare(qchase->qname, rep->rrsets[i]->
 809                                 rk.dname) == 0) {
 810                         qchase->qname = NULL;
 811                         get_cname_target(rep->rrsets[i], &qchase->qname,
 812                                 &qchase->qname_len);
 813                         if(!qchase->qname)
 814                                 return 0; /* bad CNAME rdata */
 815                         (*cname_skip) = i+1;
 816                         return 1;
 817                 }
 818         }
 819         return 0; /* CNAME classified but no matching CNAME ?! */
 820 }
 821
 822 /** see if rrset has signer name as one of the rrsig signers */
 823 static int
 824 rrset_has_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t* name, size_t len)
 825 {
 826         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
 827                 entry.data;
 828         size_t i;
 829         for(i = d->count; i< d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++) {
 830                 if(d->rr_len[i] > 2+18+len) {
 831                         /* at least rdatalen + signature + signame (+1 sig)*/
 832                         if(!dname_valid(d->rr_data[i]+2+18, d->rr_len[i]-2-18))
 833                                 continue;
 834                         if(query_dname_compare(name, d->rr_data[i]+2+18) == 0)
 835                         {
 836                                 return 1;
 837                         }
 838                 }
 839         }
 840         return 0;
 841 }
 842
 843 void
 844 val_fill_reply(struct reply_info* chase, struct reply_info* orig,
 845         size_t skip, uint8_t* name, size_t len, uint8_t* signer)
 846 {
 847         size_t i;
 848         int seen_dname = 0;
 849         chase->rrset_count = 0;
 850         chase->an_numrrsets = 0;
 851         chase->ns_numrrsets = 0;
 852         chase->ar_numrrsets = 0;
 853         /* ANSWER section */
 854         for(i=skip; i<orig->an_numrrsets; i++) {
 855                 if(!signer) {
 856                         if(query_dname_compare(name,
 857                                 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0)
 858                                 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] =
 859                                         orig->rrsets[i];
 860                 } else if(seen_dname && ntohs(orig->rrsets[i]->rk.type) ==
 861                         LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) {
 862                         chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
 863                         seen_dname = 0;
 864                 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) {
 865                         chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
 866                         if(ntohs(orig->rrsets[i]->rk.type) ==
 867                                 LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) {
 868                                         seen_dname = 1;
 869                         }
 870                 }
 871         }
 872         /* AUTHORITY section */
 873         for(i = (skip > orig->an_numrrsets)?skip:orig->an_numrrsets;
 874                 i<orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets;
 875                 i++) {
 876                 if(!signer) {
 877                         if(query_dname_compare(name,
 878                                 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0)
 879                                 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+
 880                                     chase->ns_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
 881                 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) {
 882                         chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+
 883                                 chase->ns_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
 884                 }
 885         }
 886         /* ADDITIONAL section */
 887         for(i= (skip>orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets)?
 888                 skip:orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets;
 889                 i<orig->rrset_count; i++) {
 890                 if(!signer) {
 891                         if(query_dname_compare(name,
 892                                 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0)
 893                             chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets
 894                                 +orig->ns_numrrsets+chase->ar_numrrsets++]
 895                                 = orig->rrsets[i];
 896                 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) {
 897                         chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets+
 898                                 chase->ar_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
 899                 }
 900         }
 901         chase->rrset_count = chase->an_numrrsets + chase->ns_numrrsets +
 902                 chase->ar_numrrsets;
 903 }
 904
 905 void val_reply_remove_auth(struct reply_info* rep, size_t index)
 906 {
 907         log_assert(index < rep->rrset_count);
 908         log_assert(index >= rep->an_numrrsets);
 909         log_assert(index < rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets);
 910         memmove(rep->rrsets+index, rep->rrsets+index+1,
 911                 sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*)*
 912                 (rep->rrset_count - index - 1));
 913         rep->ns_numrrsets--;
 914         rep->rrset_count--;
 915 }
 916
 917 void
 918 val_check_nonsecure(struct module_env* env, struct reply_info* rep)
 919 {
 920         size_t i;
 921         /* authority */
 922         for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
 923                 if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data)
 924                         ->security != sec_status_secure) {
 925                         /* because we want to return the authentic original
 926                          * message when presented with CD-flagged queries,
 927                          * we need to preserve AUTHORITY section data.
 928                          * However, this rrset is not signed or signed
 929                          * with the wrong keys. Validation has tried to
 930                          * verify this rrset with the keysets of import.
 931                          * But this rrset did not verify.
 932                          * Therefore the message is bogus.
 933                          */
 934
 935                         /* check if authority has an NS record
 936                          * which is bad, and there is an answer section with
 937                          * data.  In that case, delete NS and additional to
 938                          * be lenient and make a minimal response */
 939                         if(rep->an_numrrsets != 0 &&
 940                                 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type)
 941                                 == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) {
 942                                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "truncate to minimal");
 943                                 rep->ar_numrrsets = 0;
 944                                 rep->rrset_count = rep->an_numrrsets +
 945                                         rep->ns_numrrsets;
 946                                 /* remove this unneeded authority rrset */
 947                                 memmove(rep->rrsets+i, rep->rrsets+i+1,
 948                                         sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*)*
 949                                         (rep->rrset_count - i - 1));
 950                                 rep->ns_numrrsets--;
 951                                 rep->rrset_count--;
 952                                 i--;
 953                                 return;
 954                         }
 955
 956                         log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "message is bogus, "
 957                                 "non secure rrset",
 958                                 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname,
 959                                 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type),
 960                                 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.rrset_class));
 961                         rep->security = sec_status_bogus;
 962                         return;
 963                 }
 964         }
 965         /* additional */
 966         if(!env->cfg->val_clean_additional)
 967                 return;
 968         for(i=rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
 969                 if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data)
 970                         ->security != sec_status_secure) {
 971                         /* This does not cause message invalidation. It was
 972                          * simply unsigned data in the additional. The
 973                          * RRSIG must have been truncated off the message.
 974                          *
 975                          * However, we do not want to return possible bogus
 976                          * data to clients that rely on this service for
 977                          * their authentication.
 978                          */
 979                         /* remove this unneeded additional rrset */
 980                         memmove(rep->rrsets+i, rep->rrsets+i+1,
 981                                 sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*)*
 982                                 (rep->rrset_count - i - 1));
 983                         rep->ar_numrrsets--;
 984                         rep->rrset_count--;
 985                         i--;
 986                 }
 987         }
 988 }
 989
 990 /** check no anchor and unlock */
 991 static int
 992 check_no_anchor(struct val_anchors* anchors, uint8_t* nm, size_t l, uint16_t c)
 993 {
 994         struct trust_anchor* ta;
 995         if((ta=anchors_lookup(anchors, nm, l, c))) {
 996                 lock_basic_unlock(&ta->lock);
 997         }
 998         return !ta;
 999 }
1000
1001 void
1002 val_mark_indeterminate(struct reply_info* rep, struct val_anchors* anchors,
1003         struct rrset_cache* r, struct module_env* env)
1004 {
1005         size_t i;
1006         struct packed_rrset_data* d;
1007         for(i=0; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
1008                 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
1009                 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked &&
1010                    check_no_anchor(anchors, rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname,
1011                         rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname_len,
1012                         ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.rrset_class)))
1013                 {
1014                         /* mark as indeterminate */
1015                         d->security = sec_status_indeterminate;
1016                         rrset_update_sec_status(r, rep->rrsets[i], *env->now);
1017                 }
1018         }
1019 }
1020
1021 void
1022 val_mark_insecure(struct reply_info* rep, uint8_t* kname,
1023         struct rrset_cache* r, struct module_env* env)
1024 {
1025         size_t i;
1026         struct packed_rrset_data* d;
1027         for(i=0; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
1028                 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
1029                 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked &&
1030                    dname_subdomain_c(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, kname)) {
1031                         /* mark as insecure */
1032                         d->security = sec_status_insecure;
1033                         rrset_update_sec_status(r, rep->rrsets[i], *env->now);
1034                 }
1035         }
1036 }
1037
1038 size_t
1039 val_next_unchecked(struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip)
1040 {
1041         size_t i;
1042         struct packed_rrset_data* d;
1043         for(i=skip+1; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
1044                 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
1045                 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked) {
1046                         return i;
1047                 }
1048         }
1049         return rep->rrset_count;
1050 }
1051
1052 const char*
1053 val_classification_to_string(enum val_classification subtype)
1054 {
1055         switch(subtype) {
1056                 case VAL_CLASS_UNTYPED:         return "untyped";
1057                 case VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN:         return "unknown";
1058                 case VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE:        return "positive";
1059                 case VAL_CLASS_CNAME:           return "cname";
1060                 case VAL_CLASS_NODATA:          return "nodata";
1061                 case VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR:       return "nameerror";
1062                 case VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER:   return "cnamenoanswer";
1063                 case VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL:        return "referral";
1064                 case VAL_CLASS_ANY:             return "qtype_any";
1065                 default:
1066                         return "bad_val_classification";
1067         }
1068 }
1069
1070 /** log a sock_list entry */
1071 static void
1072 sock_list_logentry(enum verbosity_value v, const char* s, struct sock_list* p)
1073 {
1074         if(p->len)
1075                 log_addr(v, s, &p->addr, p->len);
1076         else    verbose(v, "%s cache", s);
1077 }
1078
1079 void val_blacklist(struct sock_list** blacklist, struct regional* region,
1080         struct sock_list* origin, int cross)
1081 {
1082         /* debug printout */
1083         if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) {
1084                 struct sock_list* p;
1085                 for(p=*blacklist; p; p=p->next)
1086                         sock_list_logentry(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist", p);
1087                 if(!origin)
1088                         verbose(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist add: cache");
1089                 for(p=origin; p; p=p->next)
1090                         sock_list_logentry(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist add", p);
1091         }
1092         /* blacklist the IPs or the cache */
1093         if(!origin) {
1094                 /* only add if nothing there. anything else also stops cache*/
1095                 if(!*blacklist)
1096                         sock_list_insert(blacklist, NULL, 0, region);
1097         } else if(!cross)
1098                 sock_list_prepend(blacklist, origin);
1099         else    sock_list_merge(blacklist, region, origin);
1100 }
1101
1102 int val_has_signed_nsecs(struct reply_info* rep, char** reason)
1103 {
1104         size_t i, num_nsec = 0, num_nsec3 = 0;
1105         struct packed_rrset_data* d;
1106         for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
1107                 if(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type == htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC))
1108                         num_nsec++;
1109                 else if(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type == htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3))
1110                         num_nsec3++;
1111                 else continue;
1112                 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
1113                 if(d && d->rrsig_count != 0) {
1114                         return 1;
1115                 }
1116         }
1117         if(num_nsec == 0 && num_nsec3 == 0)
1118                 *reason = "no DNSSEC records";
1119         else if(num_nsec != 0)
1120                 *reason = "no signatures over NSECs";
1121         else    *reason = "no signatures over NSEC3s";
1122         return 0;
1123 }
1124
1125 struct dns_msg*
1126 val_find_DS(struct module_env* env, uint8_t* nm, size_t nmlen, uint16_t c,
1127         struct regional* region, uint8_t* topname)
1128 {
1129         struct dns_msg* msg;
1130         struct query_info qinfo;
1131         struct ub_packed_rrset_key *rrset = rrset_cache_lookup(
1132                 env->rrset_cache, nm, nmlen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, c, 0,
1133                 *env->now, 0);
1134         if(rrset) {
1135                 /* DS rrset exists. Return it to the validator immediately*/
1136                 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* copy = packed_rrset_copy_region(
1137                         rrset, region, *env->now);
1138                 lock_rw_unlock(&rrset->entry.lock);
1139                 if(!copy)
1140                         return NULL;
1141                 msg = dns_msg_create(nm, nmlen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, c, region, 1);
1142                 if(!msg)
1143                         return NULL;
1144                 msg->rep->rrsets[0] = copy;
1145                 msg->rep->rrset_count++;
1146                 msg->rep->an_numrrsets++;
1147                 return msg;
1148         }
1149         /* lookup in rrset and negative cache for NSEC/NSEC3 */
1150         qinfo.qname = nm;
1151         qinfo.qname_len = nmlen;
1152         qinfo.qtype = LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS;
1153         qinfo.qclass = c;
1154         qinfo.local_alias = NULL;
1155         /* do not add SOA to reply message, it is going to be used internal */
1156         msg = val_neg_getmsg(env->neg_cache, &qinfo, region, env->rrset_cache,
1157                 env->scratch_buffer, *env->now, 0, topname);
1158         return msg;
1159 }