2 * IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator
3 * Copyright (c) 2004-2015, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
9 #include "utils/includes.h"
11 #include "utils/common.h"
12 #include "utils/eloop.h"
13 #include "utils/state_machine.h"
14 #include "utils/bitfield.h"
15 #include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
16 #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
17 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
18 #include "crypto/sha1.h"
19 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
20 #include "crypto/random.h"
21 #include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h"
22 #include "ap_config.h"
23 #include "ieee802_11.h"
25 #include "pmksa_cache_auth.h"
26 #include "wpa_auth_i.h"
27 #include "wpa_auth_ie.h"
29 #define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine
30 #define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA"
31 #define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR sm->addr
34 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx);
35 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
36 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp, struct wpa_ptk *PTK, u8 *data,
38 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx);
39 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
40 struct wpa_group *group);
41 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
42 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
43 struct wpa_group *group);
44 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
45 struct wpa_group *group);
46 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *snonce,
47 const u8 *pmk, unsigned int pmk_len,
49 static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
50 struct wpa_group *group);
51 static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
52 struct wpa_group *group);
53 static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
54 struct wpa_group *group);
56 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount = 4;
57 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount = 4;
58 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first = 100; /* ms */
59 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq = 1000; /* ms */
60 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group = 500; /* ms */
62 /* TODO: make these configurable */
63 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime = 43200;
64 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold = 70;
65 static const int dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout = 60;
68 static inline int wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(
69 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr)
71 if (wpa_auth->cb.mic_failure_report)
72 return wpa_auth->cb.mic_failure_report(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr);
77 static inline void wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(
78 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr)
80 if (wpa_auth->cb.psk_failure_report)
81 wpa_auth->cb.psk_failure_report(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr);
85 static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
86 const u8 *addr, wpa_eapol_variable var,
89 if (wpa_auth->cb.set_eapol)
90 wpa_auth->cb.set_eapol(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, var, value);
94 static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
95 const u8 *addr, wpa_eapol_variable var)
97 if (wpa_auth->cb.get_eapol == NULL)
99 return wpa_auth->cb.get_eapol(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, var);
103 static inline const u8 * wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
105 const u8 *p2p_dev_addr,
108 if (wpa_auth->cb.get_psk == NULL)
110 return wpa_auth->cb.get_psk(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, p2p_dev_addr,
115 static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
116 const u8 *addr, u8 *msk, size_t *len)
118 if (wpa_auth->cb.get_msk == NULL)
120 return wpa_auth->cb.get_msk(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, msk, len);
124 static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
126 enum wpa_alg alg, const u8 *addr, int idx,
127 u8 *key, size_t key_len)
129 if (wpa_auth->cb.set_key == NULL)
131 return wpa_auth->cb.set_key(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, vlan_id, alg, addr, idx,
136 static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
137 const u8 *addr, int idx, u8 *seq)
139 if (wpa_auth->cb.get_seqnum == NULL)
141 return wpa_auth->cb.get_seqnum(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, idx, seq);
146 wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
147 const u8 *data, size_t data_len, int encrypt)
149 if (wpa_auth->cb.send_eapol == NULL)
151 return wpa_auth->cb.send_eapol(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, data, data_len,
157 static inline int wpa_auth_start_ampe(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
160 if (wpa_auth->cb.start_ampe == NULL)
162 return wpa_auth->cb.start_ampe(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr);
164 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
167 int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
168 int (*cb)(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx),
171 if (wpa_auth->cb.for_each_sta == NULL)
173 return wpa_auth->cb.for_each_sta(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, cb, cb_ctx);
177 int wpa_auth_for_each_auth(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
178 int (*cb)(struct wpa_authenticator *a, void *ctx),
181 if (wpa_auth->cb.for_each_auth == NULL)
183 return wpa_auth->cb.for_each_auth(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, cb, cb_ctx);
187 void wpa_auth_logger(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
188 logger_level level, const char *txt)
190 if (wpa_auth->cb.logger == NULL)
192 wpa_auth->cb.logger(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, level, txt);
196 void wpa_auth_vlogger(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
197 logger_level level, const char *fmt, ...)
203 if (wpa_auth->cb.logger == NULL)
206 maxlen = os_strlen(fmt) + 100;
207 format = os_malloc(maxlen);
212 vsnprintf(format, maxlen, fmt, ap);
215 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, addr, level, format);
221 static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
224 if (wpa_auth->cb.disconnect == NULL)
226 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR, MAC2STR(addr));
227 wpa_auth->cb.disconnect(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr,
228 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
232 static int wpa_use_aes_cmac(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
235 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
236 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
238 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
239 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
240 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
242 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
243 if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN)
249 static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
251 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
253 if (random_get_bytes(wpa_auth->group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN)) {
254 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
257 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, NULL, LOGGER_DEBUG, "GMK rekeyd");
258 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GMK",
259 wpa_auth->group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN);
262 if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey) {
263 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey, 0,
264 wpa_rekey_gmk, wpa_auth, NULL);
269 static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
271 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
272 struct wpa_group *group, *next;
274 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, NULL, LOGGER_DEBUG, "rekeying GTK");
275 group = wpa_auth->group;
277 wpa_group_get(wpa_auth, group);
279 group->GTKReKey = TRUE;
281 group->changed = FALSE;
282 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
283 } while (group->changed);
286 wpa_group_put(wpa_auth, group);
290 if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey) {
291 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey,
292 0, wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
297 static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
299 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
300 struct wpa_state_machine *sm = timeout_ctx;
302 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, "rekeying PTK");
303 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
308 static int wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx)
310 if (sm->pmksa == ctx)
316 static void wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry,
319 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = ctx;
320 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb, entry);
324 static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
325 struct wpa_group *group)
327 u8 buf[ETH_ALEN + 8 + sizeof(unsigned long)];
331 if (random_get_bytes(group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN) < 0)
333 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GMK", group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN);
336 * Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter",
337 * Local MAC Address || Time)
339 os_memcpy(buf, wpa_auth->addr, ETH_ALEN);
340 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf + ETH_ALEN);
341 ptr = (unsigned long) group;
342 os_memcpy(buf + ETH_ALEN + 8, &ptr, sizeof(ptr));
343 if (random_get_bytes(rkey, sizeof(rkey)) < 0)
346 if (sha1_prf(rkey, sizeof(rkey), "Init Counter", buf, sizeof(buf),
347 group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN) < 0)
349 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Key Counter",
350 group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
356 static struct wpa_group * wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
357 int vlan_id, int delay_init)
359 struct wpa_group *group;
361 group = os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group));
365 group->GTKAuthenticator = TRUE;
366 group->vlan_id = vlan_id;
367 group->GTK_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group);
369 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
370 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
371 "for secure operations - update keys later when "
372 "the first station connects");
376 * Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be
377 * used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to
378 * connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness
379 * on embedded devices.
381 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth, group) < 0) {
382 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
390 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Delay group state machine start "
391 "until Beacon frames have been configured");
392 /* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */
394 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
395 group->GInit = FALSE;
396 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
404 * wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator
405 * @addr: Authenticator address
406 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
407 * @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator
408 * Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure
410 struct wpa_authenticator * wpa_init(const u8 *addr,
411 struct wpa_auth_config *conf,
412 struct wpa_auth_callbacks *cb)
414 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth;
416 wpa_auth = os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator));
417 if (wpa_auth == NULL)
419 os_memcpy(wpa_auth->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
420 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth->conf, conf, sizeof(*conf));
421 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth->cb, cb, sizeof(*cb));
423 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth)) {
424 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
429 wpa_auth->group = wpa_group_init(wpa_auth, 0, 1);
430 if (wpa_auth->group == NULL) {
431 os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
436 wpa_auth->pmksa = pmksa_cache_auth_init(wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb,
438 if (wpa_auth->pmksa == NULL) {
439 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PMKSA cache initialization failed.");
440 os_free(wpa_auth->group);
441 os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
446 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
447 wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache = wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init();
448 if (wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache == NULL) {
449 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT PMK cache initialization failed.");
450 os_free(wpa_auth->group);
451 os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
452 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth->pmksa);
456 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
458 if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey) {
459 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey, 0,
460 wpa_rekey_gmk, wpa_auth, NULL);
463 if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey) {
464 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey, 0,
465 wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
469 if (WPA_GET_BE32(conf->ip_addr_start)) {
470 int count = WPA_GET_BE32(conf->ip_addr_end) -
471 WPA_GET_BE32(conf->ip_addr_start) + 1;
475 wpa_auth->ip_pool = bitfield_alloc(count);
477 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
483 int wpa_init_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
485 struct wpa_group *group = wpa_auth->group;
487 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Start group state machine to set initial "
489 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
490 group->GInit = FALSE;
491 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
492 if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE)
499 * wpa_deinit - Deinitialize WPA authenticator
500 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
502 void wpa_deinit(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
504 struct wpa_group *group, *prev;
506 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gmk, wpa_auth, NULL);
507 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
509 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
510 while (wpa_auth->stsl_negotiations)
511 wpa_stsl_remove(wpa_auth, wpa_auth->stsl_negotiations);
512 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
514 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth->pmksa);
516 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
517 wpa_ft_pmk_cache_deinit(wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache);
518 wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache = NULL;
519 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
522 bitfield_free(wpa_auth->ip_pool);
523 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
526 os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
528 group = wpa_auth->group;
540 * wpa_reconfig - Update WPA authenticator configuration
541 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
542 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
544 int wpa_reconfig(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
545 struct wpa_auth_config *conf)
547 struct wpa_group *group;
548 if (wpa_auth == NULL)
551 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth->conf, conf, sizeof(*conf));
552 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth)) {
553 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
558 * Reinitialize GTK to make sure it is suitable for the new
561 group = wpa_auth->group;
562 group->GTK_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group);
564 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
565 group->GInit = FALSE;
566 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
572 struct wpa_state_machine *
573 wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
574 const u8 *p2p_dev_addr)
576 struct wpa_state_machine *sm;
578 if (wpa_auth->group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE)
581 sm = os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine));
584 os_memcpy(sm->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
586 os_memcpy(sm->p2p_dev_addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN);
588 sm->wpa_auth = wpa_auth;
589 sm->group = wpa_auth->group;
590 wpa_group_get(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
596 int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
597 struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
599 if (wpa_auth == NULL || !wpa_auth->conf.wpa || sm == NULL)
602 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
603 if (sm->ft_completed) {
604 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
605 "FT authentication already completed - do not "
606 "start 4-way handshake");
607 /* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
608 sm->wpa_ptk_state = WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE;
611 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
614 os_memset(&sm->key_replay, 0, sizeof(sm->key_replay));
615 sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = TRUE;
616 return wpa_sm_step(sm);
619 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
620 "start authentication");
624 if (wpa_sm_step(sm) == 1)
625 return 1; /* should not really happen */
627 sm->AuthenticationRequest = TRUE;
628 return wpa_sm_step(sm);
632 void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
634 /* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA
635 * reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the
636 * STA has not yet been removed. */
640 sm->wpa_key_mgmt = 0;
644 static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
647 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr)) {
649 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "P2P: Free assigned IP "
650 "address %u.%u.%u.%u from " MACSTR,
651 sm->ip_addr[0], sm->ip_addr[1],
652 sm->ip_addr[2], sm->ip_addr[3],
654 start = WPA_GET_BE32(sm->wpa_auth->conf.ip_addr_start);
655 bitfield_clear(sm->wpa_auth->ip_pool,
656 WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr) - start);
658 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
659 if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) {
660 sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
661 sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
663 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
664 os_free(sm->assoc_resp_ftie);
665 wpabuf_free(sm->ft_pending_req_ies);
666 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
667 os_free(sm->last_rx_eapol_key);
669 wpa_group_put(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
674 void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
679 if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_strict_rekey && sm->has_GTK) {
680 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
681 "strict rekeying - force GTK rekey since STA "
683 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk, sm->wpa_auth, NULL);
684 eloop_register_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk, sm->wpa_auth,
688 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
689 sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
690 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_call_step, sm, NULL);
691 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
692 if (sm->in_step_loop) {
693 /* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running.
694 * Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */
695 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Registering pending STA state "
696 "machine deinit for " MACSTR, MAC2STR(sm->addr));
697 sm->pending_deinit = 1;
703 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
708 sm->PTKRequest = TRUE;
713 static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter *ctr,
714 const u8 *replay_counter)
717 for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) {
720 if (os_memcmp(replay_counter, ctr[i].counter,
721 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) == 0)
728 static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter *ctr,
729 const u8 *replay_counter)
732 for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) {
734 (replay_counter == NULL ||
735 os_memcmp(replay_counter, ctr[i].counter,
736 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) == 0))
737 ctr[i].valid = FALSE;
742 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
743 static int ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
744 struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
745 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *kde)
747 struct wpa_ie_data ie;
748 struct rsn_mdie *mdie;
750 if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde->rsn_ie, kde->rsn_ie_len, &ie) < 0 ||
751 ie.num_pmkid != 1 || ie.pmkid == NULL) {
752 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: No PMKR1Name in "
753 "FT 4-way handshake message 2/4");
757 os_memcpy(sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, ie.pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
758 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
759 sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, PMKID_LEN);
761 if (!kde->mdie || !kde->ftie) {
762 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake "
763 "message 2/4", kde->mdie ? "FTIE" : "MDIE");
767 mdie = (struct rsn_mdie *) (kde->mdie + 2);
768 if (kde->mdie[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) ||
769 os_memcmp(wpa_auth->conf.mobility_domain, mdie->mobility_domain,
770 MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN) != 0) {
771 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: MDIE mismatch");
775 if (sm->assoc_resp_ftie &&
776 (kde->ftie[1] != sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1] ||
777 os_memcmp(kde->ftie, sm->assoc_resp_ftie,
778 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]) != 0)) {
779 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE mismatch");
780 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
781 kde->ftie, kde->ftie_len);
782 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp",
783 sm->assoc_resp_ftie, 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]);
789 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
792 static int wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
793 struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int group)
795 /* Supplicant reported a Michael MIC error */
796 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
797 "received EAPOL-Key Error Request "
798 "(STA detected Michael MIC failure (group=%d))",
801 if (group && wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
802 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
803 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
804 "group cipher is not TKIP");
805 } else if (!group && sm->pairwise != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
806 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
807 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
808 "pairwise cipher is not TKIP");
810 if (wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth, sm->addr) > 0)
811 return 1; /* STA entry was removed */
812 sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures++;
813 wpa_auth->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures++;
817 * Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since
818 * Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway.
820 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
825 static int wpa_try_alt_snonce(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *data,
830 const u8 *pmk = NULL;
831 unsigned int pmk_len;
834 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
835 pmk = wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
836 sm->p2p_dev_addr, pmk);
842 pmk_len = sm->pmk_len;
845 wpa_derive_ptk(sm, sm->alt_SNonce, pmk, pmk_len, &PTK);
847 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, &PTK, data, data_len)
853 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
858 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
859 "WPA: Earlier SNonce did not result in matching MIC");
863 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
864 "WPA: Earlier SNonce resulted in matching MIC");
865 sm->alt_snonce_valid = 0;
866 os_memcpy(sm->SNonce, sm->alt_SNonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
867 os_memcpy(&sm->PTK, &PTK, sizeof(PTK));
868 sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
874 void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
875 struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
876 u8 *data, size_t data_len)
878 struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
879 struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
880 struct wpa_eapol_key_192 *key192;
881 u16 key_info, key_data_length;
882 enum { PAIRWISE_2, PAIRWISE_4, GROUP_2, REQUEST,
883 SMK_M1, SMK_M3, SMK_ERROR } msg;
885 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde;
887 const u8 *eapol_key_ie, *key_data;
888 size_t eapol_key_ie_len, keyhdrlen, mic_len;
890 if (wpa_auth == NULL || !wpa_auth->conf.wpa || sm == NULL)
893 mic_len = wpa_mic_len(sm->wpa_key_mgmt);
894 keyhdrlen = mic_len == 24 ? sizeof(*key192) : sizeof(*key);
896 if (data_len < sizeof(*hdr) + keyhdrlen)
899 hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) data;
900 key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
901 key192 = (struct wpa_eapol_key_192 *) (hdr + 1);
902 key_info = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_info);
904 key_data = (const u8 *) (key192 + 1);
905 key_data_length = WPA_GET_BE16(key192->key_data_length);
907 key_data = (const u8 *) (key + 1);
908 key_data_length = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_data_length);
910 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR
911 " key_info=0x%x type=%u key_data_length=%u",
912 MAC2STR(sm->addr), key_info, key->type, key_data_length);
913 if (key_data_length > data_len - sizeof(*hdr) - keyhdrlen) {
914 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - "
915 "key_data overflow (%d > %lu)",
917 (unsigned long) (data_len - sizeof(*hdr) -
922 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
923 if (key->type == EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA) {
925 * Some deployed station implementations seem to send
926 * msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode.
928 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key "
929 "with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode");
930 } else if (key->type != EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN) {
931 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
932 "unexpected type %d in RSN mode",
937 if (key->type != EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA) {
938 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
939 "unexpected type %d in WPA mode",
945 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key->key_nonce,
947 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received Replay Counter",
948 key->replay_counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
950 /* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys
953 if ((key_info & (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE | WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST)) ==
954 (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE | WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST)) {
955 if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR) {
957 msgtxt = "SMK Error";
962 } else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE) {
965 } else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
968 } else if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE)) {
970 msgtxt = "2/2 Group";
971 } else if (key_data_length == 0) {
973 msgtxt = "4/4 Pairwise";
976 msgtxt = "2/4 Pairwise";
979 /* TODO: key_info type validation for PeerKey */
980 if (msg == REQUEST || msg == PAIRWISE_2 || msg == PAIRWISE_4 ||
982 u16 ver = key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK;
983 if (sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP ||
984 sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP) {
985 if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm) &&
986 sm->wpa_key_mgmt != WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN &&
987 !wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
988 ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) {
989 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
991 "advertised support for "
992 "AES-128-CMAC, but did not "
997 if (!wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm) &&
998 ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES) {
999 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
1001 "did not use HMAC-SHA1-AES "
1007 if (wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
1008 ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED) {
1009 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_WARNING,
1010 "did not use EAPOL-Key descriptor version 0 as required for AKM-defined cases");
1015 if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
1016 if (sm->req_replay_counter_used &&
1017 os_memcmp(key->replay_counter, sm->req_replay_counter,
1018 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) <= 0) {
1019 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_WARNING,
1020 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1021 "replayed counter");
1026 if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) &&
1027 !wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->key_replay, key->replay_counter)) {
1030 if (msg == PAIRWISE_2 &&
1031 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->prev_key_replay,
1032 key->replay_counter) &&
1033 sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING &&
1034 os_memcmp(sm->SNonce, key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0)
1037 * Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP
1038 * WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This
1039 * breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
1040 * pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated
1041 * even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
1043 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
1044 "Process SNonce update from STA "
1045 "based on retransmitted EAPOL-Key "
1047 sm->update_snonce = 1;
1048 os_memcpy(sm->alt_SNonce, sm->SNonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
1049 sm->alt_snonce_valid = TRUE;
1050 os_memcpy(sm->alt_replay_counter,
1051 sm->key_replay[0].counter,
1052 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
1053 goto continue_processing;
1056 if (msg == PAIRWISE_4 && sm->alt_snonce_valid &&
1057 sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING &&
1058 os_memcmp(key->replay_counter, sm->alt_replay_counter,
1059 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) == 0) {
1061 * Supplicant may still be using the old SNonce since
1062 * there was two EAPOL-Key 2/4 messages and they had
1063 * different SNonce values.
1065 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
1066 "Try to process received EAPOL-Key 4/4 based on old Replay Counter and SNonce from an earlier EAPOL-Key 1/4");
1067 goto continue_processing;
1070 if (msg == PAIRWISE_2 &&
1071 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->prev_key_replay,
1072 key->replay_counter) &&
1073 sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING) {
1074 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
1075 "ignore retransmitted EAPOL-Key %s - "
1076 "SNonce did not change", msgtxt);
1078 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
1079 "received EAPOL-Key %s with "
1080 "unexpected replay counter", msgtxt);
1082 for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) {
1083 if (!sm->key_replay[i].valid)
1085 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "pending replay counter",
1086 sm->key_replay[i].counter,
1087 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
1089 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "received replay counter",
1090 key->replay_counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
1094 continue_processing:
1097 if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKSTART &&
1098 sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING &&
1099 (!sm->update_snonce ||
1100 sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING)) {
1101 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1102 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 in "
1103 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1107 random_add_randomness(key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
1108 if (sm->group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy) {
1110 * The system did not have enough entropy to generate
1111 * strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way
1112 * handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the
1113 * information from it. Once enough entropy is
1114 * available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key
1115 * Counter update and the station will be allowed to
1118 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to "
1119 "collect more entropy for random number "
1121 random_mark_pool_ready();
1122 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr);
1125 if (wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data, key_data_length, &kde) < 0) {
1126 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1127 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 with "
1128 "invalid Key Data contents");
1132 eapol_key_ie = kde.rsn_ie;
1133 eapol_key_ie_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
1134 } else if (kde.osen) {
1135 eapol_key_ie = kde.osen;
1136 eapol_key_ie_len = kde.osen_len;
1138 eapol_key_ie = kde.wpa_ie;
1139 eapol_key_ie_len = kde.wpa_ie_len;
1141 ft = sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 &&
1142 wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt);
1143 if (sm->wpa_ie == NULL ||
1144 wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft,
1145 sm->wpa_ie, sm->wpa_ie_len,
1146 eapol_key_ie, eapol_key_ie_len)) {
1147 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1148 "WPA IE from (Re)AssocReq did not "
1149 "match with msg 2/4");
1151 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA IE in AssocReq",
1152 sm->wpa_ie, sm->wpa_ie_len);
1154 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA IE in msg 2/4",
1155 eapol_key_ie, eapol_key_ie_len);
1156 /* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
1157 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr);
1160 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1161 if (ft && ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth, sm, &kde) < 0) {
1162 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr);
1165 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1167 if (kde.ip_addr_req && kde.ip_addr_req[0] &&
1168 wpa_auth->ip_pool && WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr) == 0) {
1170 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "P2P: IP address requested in "
1171 "EAPOL-Key exchange");
1172 idx = bitfield_get_first_zero(wpa_auth->ip_pool);
1174 u32 start = WPA_GET_BE32(wpa_auth->conf.
1176 bitfield_set(wpa_auth->ip_pool, idx);
1177 WPA_PUT_BE32(sm->ip_addr, start + idx);
1178 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "P2P: Assigned IP "
1179 "address %u.%u.%u.%u to " MACSTR,
1180 sm->ip_addr[0], sm->ip_addr[1],
1181 sm->ip_addr[2], sm->ip_addr[3],
1185 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
1188 if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING ||
1190 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1191 "received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 in "
1192 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1198 if (sm->wpa_ptk_group_state != WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
1199 || !sm->PTK_valid) {
1200 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1201 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/2 in "
1202 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1203 sm->wpa_ptk_group_state);
1207 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1211 if (!wpa_auth->conf.peerkey) {
1212 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: SMK M1/M3/Error, but "
1213 "PeerKey use disabled - ignoring message");
1216 if (!sm->PTK_valid) {
1217 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1218 "received EAPOL-Key msg SMK in "
1219 "invalid state - dropped");
1223 #else /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1227 return; /* STSL disabled - ignore SMK messages */
1228 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1233 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
1234 "received EAPOL-Key frame (%s)", msgtxt);
1236 if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK) {
1237 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1238 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key Ack set");
1242 if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
1243 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1244 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC not set");
1248 sm->MICVerified = FALSE;
1249 if (sm->PTK_valid && !sm->update_snonce) {
1250 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, &sm->PTK, data,
1252 (msg != PAIRWISE_4 || !sm->alt_snonce_valid ||
1253 wpa_try_alt_snonce(sm, data, data_len))) {
1254 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1255 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1258 sm->MICVerified = TRUE;
1259 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
1260 sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
1263 if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
1264 if (sm->MICVerified) {
1265 sm->req_replay_counter_used = 1;
1266 os_memcpy(sm->req_replay_counter, key->replay_counter,
1267 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
1269 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1270 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1276 * TODO: should decrypt key data field if encryption was used;
1277 * even though MAC address KDE is not normally encrypted,
1278 * supplicant is allowed to encrypt it.
1280 if (msg == SMK_ERROR) {
1281 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1282 wpa_smk_error(wpa_auth, sm, key_data, key_data_length);
1283 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1285 } else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR) {
1286 if (wpa_receive_error_report(
1288 !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE)) > 0)
1289 return; /* STA entry was removed */
1290 } else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE) {
1291 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1292 "received EAPOL-Key Request for new "
1294 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
1295 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1296 } else if (msg == SMK_M1) {
1297 wpa_smk_m1(wpa_auth, sm, key, key_data,
1299 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1300 } else if (key_data_length > 0 &&
1301 wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data, key_data_length,
1305 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1306 "received EAPOL-Key Request for GTK "
1308 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
1309 wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth, NULL);
1312 /* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */
1313 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm->key_replay,
1314 key->replay_counter);
1316 if (msg == PAIRWISE_2) {
1318 * Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in
1319 * case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is
1320 * needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another
1321 * pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around
1322 * unexpected supplicant behavior.
1324 os_memcpy(sm->prev_key_replay, sm->key_replay,
1325 sizeof(sm->key_replay));
1327 os_memset(sm->prev_key_replay, 0,
1328 sizeof(sm->prev_key_replay));
1332 * Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and
1333 * do not get copied again.
1335 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm->key_replay, NULL);
1338 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1339 if (msg == SMK_M3) {
1340 wpa_smk_m3(wpa_auth, sm, key, key_data, key_data_length);
1343 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1345 os_free(sm->last_rx_eapol_key);
1346 sm->last_rx_eapol_key = os_malloc(data_len);
1347 if (sm->last_rx_eapol_key == NULL)
1349 os_memcpy(sm->last_rx_eapol_key, data, data_len);
1350 sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len = data_len;
1352 sm->rx_eapol_key_secure = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE);
1353 sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = TRUE;
1354 sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE);
1355 sm->EAPOLKeyRequest = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST);
1356 os_memcpy(sm->SNonce, key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
1361 static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8 *gmk, const char *label, const u8 *addr,
1362 const u8 *gnonce, u8 *gtk, size_t gtk_len)
1364 u8 data[ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN + 8 + 16];
1368 /* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
1369 * AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
1370 * The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
1371 * GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
1372 * is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
1375 os_memcpy(data, addr, ETH_ALEN);
1376 os_memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, gnonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
1377 pos = data + ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN;
1378 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos);
1380 if (random_get_bytes(pos, 16) < 0)
1383 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1384 sha256_prf(gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN, label, data, sizeof(data), gtk, gtk_len);
1385 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1386 if (sha1_prf(gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN, label, data, sizeof(data), gtk, gtk_len)
1389 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1395 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
1397 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
1398 struct wpa_state_machine *sm = timeout_ctx;
1400 sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
1401 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, "EAPOL-Key timeout");
1402 sm->TimeoutEvt = TRUE;
1407 void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
1408 struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int key_info,
1409 const u8 *key_rsc, const u8 *nonce,
1410 const u8 *kde, size_t kde_len,
1411 int keyidx, int encr, int force_version)
1413 struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
1414 struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
1415 struct wpa_eapol_key_192 *key192;
1416 size_t len, mic_len, keyhdrlen;
1418 int key_data_len, pad_len = 0;
1420 int version, pairwise;
1424 mic_len = wpa_mic_len(sm->wpa_key_mgmt);
1425 keyhdrlen = mic_len == 24 ? sizeof(*key192) : sizeof(*key);
1427 len = sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr) + keyhdrlen;
1430 version = force_version;
1431 else if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN ||
1432 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
1433 version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED;
1434 else if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm))
1435 version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC;
1436 else if (sm->pairwise != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP)
1437 version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES;
1439 version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4;
1441 pairwise = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE);
1443 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d "
1444 "ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%lu keyidx=%d "
1447 (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE) ? 1 : 0,
1448 (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC) ? 1 : 0,
1449 (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK) ? 1 : 0,
1450 (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL) ? 1 : 0,
1451 pairwise, (unsigned long) kde_len, keyidx, encr);
1453 key_data_len = kde_len;
1455 if ((version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES ||
1456 sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN ||
1457 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) ||
1458 version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) && encr) {
1459 pad_len = key_data_len % 8;
1461 pad_len = 8 - pad_len;
1462 key_data_len += pad_len + 8;
1465 len += key_data_len;
1467 hdr = os_zalloc(len);
1470 hdr->version = wpa_auth->conf.eapol_version;
1471 hdr->type = IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY;
1472 hdr->length = host_to_be16(len - sizeof(*hdr));
1473 key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
1474 key192 = (struct wpa_eapol_key_192 *) (hdr + 1);
1475 key_data = ((u8 *) (hdr + 1)) + keyhdrlen;
1477 key->type = sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 ?
1478 EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN : EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA;
1479 key_info |= version;
1480 if (encr && sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2)
1481 key_info |= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA;
1482 if (sm->wpa != WPA_VERSION_WPA2)
1483 key_info |= keyidx << WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT;
1484 WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_info, key_info);
1486 alg = pairwise ? sm->pairwise : wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group;
1487 WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_length, wpa_cipher_key_len(alg));
1488 if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE)
1489 WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_length, 0);
1491 /* FIX: STSL: what to use as key_replay_counter? */
1492 for (i = RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES - 1; i > 0; i--) {
1493 sm->key_replay[i].valid = sm->key_replay[i - 1].valid;
1494 os_memcpy(sm->key_replay[i].counter,
1495 sm->key_replay[i - 1].counter,
1496 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
1498 inc_byte_array(sm->key_replay[0].counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
1499 os_memcpy(key->replay_counter, sm->key_replay[0].counter,
1500 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
1501 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Replay Counter",
1502 key->replay_counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
1503 sm->key_replay[0].valid = TRUE;
1506 os_memcpy(key->key_nonce, nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
1509 os_memcpy(key->key_rsc, key_rsc, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
1512 os_memcpy(key_data, kde, kde_len);
1514 WPA_PUT_BE16(key192->key_data_length, kde_len);
1516 WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_data_length, kde_len);
1517 } else if (encr && kde) {
1518 buf = os_zalloc(key_data_len);
1524 os_memcpy(pos, kde, kde_len);
1530 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1532 if (version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES ||
1533 sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN ||
1534 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) ||
1535 version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) {
1536 if (aes_wrap(sm->PTK.kek, sm->PTK.kek_len,
1537 (key_data_len - 8) / 8, buf, key_data)) {
1543 WPA_PUT_BE16(key192->key_data_length,
1546 WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_data_length,
1548 #ifndef CONFIG_NO_RC4
1549 } else if (sm->PTK.kek_len == 16) {
1551 os_memcpy(key->key_iv,
1552 sm->group->Counter + WPA_NONCE_LEN - 16, 16);
1553 inc_byte_array(sm->group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
1554 os_memcpy(ek, key->key_iv, 16);
1555 os_memcpy(ek + 16, sm->PTK.kek, sm->PTK.kek_len);
1556 os_memcpy(key_data, buf, key_data_len);
1557 rc4_skip(ek, 32, 256, key_data, key_data_len);
1559 WPA_PUT_BE16(key192->key_data_length,
1562 WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_data_length,
1564 #endif /* CONFIG_NO_RC4 */
1573 if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC) {
1576 if (!sm->PTK_valid) {
1577 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
1578 "PTK not valid when sending EAPOL-Key "
1584 key_mic = key192->key_mic; /* same offset for key and key192 */
1585 wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->PTK.kck, sm->PTK.kck_len,
1586 sm->wpa_key_mgmt, version,
1587 (u8 *) hdr, len, key_mic);
1588 #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
1590 wpa_auth->conf.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability > 0.0 &&
1592 wpa_auth->conf.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability) {
1593 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1594 "Corrupting group EAPOL-Key Key MIC");
1597 #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
1600 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx,
1602 wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth, sm->addr, (u8 *) hdr, len,
1608 static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
1609 struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int key_info,
1610 const u8 *key_rsc, const u8 *nonce,
1611 const u8 *kde, size_t kde_len,
1612 int keyidx, int encr)
1615 int pairwise = key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE;
1621 __wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth, sm, key_info, key_rsc, nonce, kde, kde_len,
1624 ctr = pairwise ? sm->TimeoutCtr : sm->GTimeoutCtr;
1625 if (ctr == 1 && wpa_auth->conf.tx_status)
1626 timeout_ms = pairwise ? eapol_key_timeout_first :
1627 eapol_key_timeout_first_group;
1629 timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_subseq;
1630 if (pairwise && ctr == 1 && !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC))
1631 sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 1;
1632 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
1633 "counter %d)", timeout_ms, ctr);
1634 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms / 1000, (timeout_ms % 1000) * 1000,
1635 wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
1639 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp, struct wpa_ptk *PTK, u8 *data,
1642 struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
1643 struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
1644 struct wpa_eapol_key_192 *key192;
1647 u8 mic[WPA_EAPOL_KEY_MIC_MAX_LEN];
1648 size_t mic_len = wpa_mic_len(akmp);
1650 if (data_len < sizeof(*hdr) + sizeof(*key))
1653 hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) data;
1654 key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
1655 key192 = (struct wpa_eapol_key_192 *) (hdr + 1);
1656 key_info = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_info);
1657 os_memcpy(mic, key192->key_mic, mic_len);
1658 os_memset(key192->key_mic, 0, mic_len);
1659 if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK->kck, PTK->kck_len, akmp,
1660 key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK,
1661 data, data_len, key192->key_mic) ||
1662 os_memcmp_const(mic, key192->key_mic, mic_len) != 0)
1664 os_memcpy(key192->key_mic, mic, mic_len);
1669 void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
1671 sm->PTK_valid = FALSE;
1672 os_memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK));
1673 wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE, sm->addr, 0, NULL, 0);
1674 sm->pairwise_set = FALSE;
1675 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
1679 int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event)
1686 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
1687 "event %d notification", event);
1692 /* PTKs are derived through AMPE */
1693 if (wpa_auth_start_ampe(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr)) {
1698 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
1703 sm->DeauthenticationRequest = TRUE;
1706 case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL:
1709 * When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA
1710 * manages to re-associate without the previous STA
1711 * entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make
1712 * sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized
1713 * properly at this point.
1715 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA state machine had not been "
1716 "started - initialize now");
1719 if (wpa_sm_step(sm) == 1)
1720 return 1; /* should not really happen */
1722 sm->AuthenticationRequest = TRUE;
1725 if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) {
1727 * Reauthentication cancels the pending group key
1728 * update for this STA.
1730 sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
1731 sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
1732 sm->PtkGroupInit = TRUE;
1734 sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = TRUE;
1737 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1738 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Retry PTK configuration "
1739 "after association");
1740 wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
1742 /* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */
1743 sm->ft_completed = 1;
1745 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1747 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1748 case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
1749 sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
1753 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1754 sm->ft_completed = 0;
1755 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1757 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1758 if (sm->mgmt_frame_prot && event == WPA_AUTH)
1760 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1763 sm->PTK_valid = FALSE;
1764 os_memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK));
1766 if (event != WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL)
1770 if (sm->in_step_loop) {
1772 * wpa_sm_step() is already running - avoid recursive call to
1773 * it by making the existing loop process the new update.
1778 return wpa_sm_step(sm);
1782 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE)
1784 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE, wpa_ptk);
1786 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
1787 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
1788 sm->changed = FALSE;
1792 if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys)
1793 sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
1794 sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
1795 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA)
1796 sm->PInitAKeys = FALSE;
1797 if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and
1798 * Local AA > Remote AA)) */) {
1801 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled, 0);
1803 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portValid, 0);
1805 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
1806 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
1807 WPA_EAPOL_authorized, 0);
1812 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT)
1814 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT, wpa_ptk);
1815 sm->Disconnect = FALSE;
1816 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr);
1820 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED)
1822 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED, wpa_ptk);
1823 sm->DeauthenticationRequest = FALSE;
1827 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION)
1829 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION, wpa_ptk);
1830 os_memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK));
1831 sm->PTK_valid = FALSE;
1832 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto,
1834 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled, 1);
1835 sm->AuthenticationRequest = FALSE;
1839 static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
1840 struct wpa_group *group)
1842 if (group->first_sta_seen)
1845 * System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started
1846 * potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances
1847 * of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the
1848 * GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not
1849 * enough entropy available immediately after system startup.
1851 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first "
1853 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
1854 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
1855 "to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake");
1856 group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = TRUE;
1858 group->first_sta_seen = TRUE;
1859 group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = FALSE;
1862 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth, group) < 0 ||
1863 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group) < 0 ||
1864 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group) < 0) {
1865 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPA: GMK/GTK setup failed");
1866 group->first_sta_seen = FALSE;
1867 group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = TRUE;
1872 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
1874 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2, wpa_ptk);
1876 wpa_group_ensure_init(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
1877 sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = FALSE;
1880 * Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat
1881 * ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is
1882 * incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security
1883 * analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces
1884 * help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state
1885 * machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide
1886 * stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks.
1888 if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
1889 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "WPA: Failed to get random data for "
1891 sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
1894 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm->ANonce,
1896 /* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more
1897 * logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be
1898 * re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through
1904 static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
1906 if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
1907 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
1908 "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
1909 sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
1912 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
1919 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
1921 u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN];
1922 size_t len = 2 * PMK_LEN;
1924 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITPMK, wpa_ptk);
1925 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1927 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1929 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PMK from PMKSA cache");
1930 os_memcpy(sm->PMK, sm->pmksa->pmk, sm->pmksa->pmk_len);
1931 sm->pmk_len = sm->pmksa->pmk_len;
1932 } else if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, msk, &len) == 0) {
1933 unsigned int pmk_len;
1935 if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt & WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192)
1936 pmk_len = PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192;
1939 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine "
1940 "(MSK len=%lu PMK len=%u)", (unsigned long) len,
1942 if (len < pmk_len) {
1943 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
1944 "WPA: MSK not long enough (%u) to create PMK (%u)",
1945 (unsigned int) len, (unsigned int) pmk_len);
1946 sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
1949 os_memcpy(sm->PMK, msk, pmk_len);
1950 sm->pmk_len = pmk_len;
1951 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1952 if (len >= 2 * PMK_LEN) {
1953 os_memcpy(sm->xxkey, msk + PMK_LEN, PMK_LEN);
1954 sm->xxkey_len = PMK_LEN;
1956 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1958 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Could not get PMK, get_msk: %p",
1959 sm->wpa_auth->cb.get_msk);
1960 sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
1963 os_memset(msk, 0, sizeof(msk));
1965 sm->req_replay_counter_used = 0;
1966 /* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to FALSE, but not doing this
1967 * will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be
1968 * get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state
1969 * machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK
1970 * state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will
1971 * eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK
1972 * derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = FALSE here seems to
1973 * be good workaround for this issue. */
1974 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun, 0);
1978 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPSK)
1981 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITPSK, wpa_ptk);
1982 psk = wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, sm->p2p_dev_addr, NULL);
1984 os_memcpy(sm->PMK, psk, PMK_LEN);
1985 sm->pmk_len = PMK_LEN;
1986 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1987 os_memcpy(sm->xxkey, psk, PMK_LEN);
1988 sm->xxkey_len = PMK_LEN;
1989 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1991 sm->req_replay_counter_used = 0;
1995 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART)
1997 u8 buf[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN], *pmkid = NULL;
1998 size_t pmkid_len = 0;
2000 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART, wpa_ptk);
2001 sm->PTKRequest = FALSE;
2002 sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE;
2003 sm->alt_snonce_valid = FALSE;
2006 if (sm->TimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
2007 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2008 * immediately following this. */
2012 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2013 "sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
2015 * TODO: Could add PMKID even with WPA2-PSK, but only if there is only
2016 * one possible PSK for this STA.
2018 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 &&
2019 wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
2020 sm->wpa_key_mgmt != WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
2022 pmkid_len = 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN;
2023 pmkid[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
2024 pmkid[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN;
2025 RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID);
2027 os_memcpy(&pmkid[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN],
2028 sm->pmksa->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
2029 } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
2030 /* No KCK available to derive PMKID */
2034 * Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
2035 * available with pre-calculated PMKID.
2037 rsn_pmkid(sm->PMK, sm->pmk_len, sm->wpa_auth->addr,
2038 sm->addr, &pmkid[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN],
2039 wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm->wpa_key_mgmt));
2042 wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
2043 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK | WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE, NULL,
2044 sm->ANonce, pmkid, pmkid_len, 0, 0);
2048 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *snonce,
2049 const u8 *pmk, unsigned int pmk_len,
2050 struct wpa_ptk *ptk)
2052 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2053 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
2054 return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm, pmk, ptk);
2055 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2057 return wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk, pmk_len, "Pairwise key expansion",
2058 sm->wpa_auth->addr, sm->addr, sm->ANonce, snonce,
2059 ptk, sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pairwise);
2063 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING)
2066 int ok = 0, psk_found = 0;
2067 const u8 *pmk = NULL;
2068 unsigned int pmk_len;
2070 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk);
2071 sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = FALSE;
2072 sm->update_snonce = FALSE;
2074 /* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP
2075 * WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching
2078 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
2079 pmk = wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
2080 sm->p2p_dev_addr, pmk);
2087 pmk_len = sm->pmk_len;
2090 wpa_derive_ptk(sm, sm->SNonce, pmk, pmk_len, &PTK);
2092 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm->wpa_key_mgmt, &PTK,
2093 sm->last_rx_eapol_key,
2094 sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len) == 0) {
2099 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
2104 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2105 "invalid MIC in msg 2/4 of 4-Way Handshake");
2107 wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr);
2111 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2112 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 && wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
2114 * Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches
2115 * with the value we derived.
2117 if (os_memcmp_const(sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, sm->pmk_r1_name,
2118 WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN) != 0) {
2119 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2120 "PMKR1Name mismatch in FT 4-way "
2122 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMKR1Name from "
2124 sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN);
2125 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name",
2126 sm->pmk_r1_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN);
2130 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2132 sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
2133 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
2135 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
2136 /* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update
2137 * state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here.
2139 os_memcpy(sm->PMK, pmk, PMK_LEN);
2140 sm->pmk_len = PMK_LEN;
2143 sm->MICVerified = TRUE;
2145 os_memcpy(&sm->PTK, &PTK, sizeof(PTK));
2146 sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
2150 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2)
2152 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2, wpa_ptk);
2157 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2159 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
2161 if (sm->mgmt_frame_prot) {
2163 len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->wpa_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
2164 return 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len;
2171 static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
2173 struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk;
2174 struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
2175 u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN];
2176 size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->wpa_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
2178 if (!sm->mgmt_frame_prot)
2181 igtk.keyid[0] = gsm->GN_igtk;
2183 if (gsm->wpa_group_state != WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE ||
2184 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN_igtk, rsc) < 0)
2185 os_memset(igtk.pn, 0, sizeof(igtk.pn));
2187 os_memcpy(igtk.pn, rsc, sizeof(igtk.pn));
2188 os_memcpy(igtk.igtk, gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], len);
2189 if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_gtk) {
2191 * Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
2194 if (random_get_bytes(igtk.igtk, len) < 0)
2197 pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK,
2198 (const u8 *) &igtk, WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len,
2204 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2206 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
2212 static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
2217 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2220 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING)
2222 u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN], *_rsc, *gtk, *kde, *pos, dummy_gtk[32];
2223 size_t gtk_len, kde_len;
2224 struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
2226 int wpa_ie_len, secure, keyidx, encr = 0;
2228 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk);
2229 sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE;
2232 if (sm->TimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
2233 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2234 * immediately following this. */
2238 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
2239 GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
2241 os_memset(rsc, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
2242 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, rsc);
2243 /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
2244 wpa_ie = sm->wpa_auth->wpa_ie;
2245 wpa_ie_len = sm->wpa_auth->wpa_ie_len;
2246 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA &&
2247 (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa & WPA_PROTO_RSN) &&
2248 wpa_ie_len > wpa_ie[1] + 2 && wpa_ie[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN) {
2249 /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE and possible MDIE */
2250 wpa_ie = wpa_ie + wpa_ie[1] + 2;
2251 if (wpa_ie[0] == WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN)
2252 wpa_ie = wpa_ie + wpa_ie[1] + 2;
2253 wpa_ie_len = wpa_ie[1] + 2;
2255 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2256 "sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
2257 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
2258 /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
2260 gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
2261 gtk_len = gsm->GTK_len;
2262 if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_gtk) {
2264 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2265 * of GTK in the BSS.
2267 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk, gtk_len) < 0)
2275 /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
2281 if (sm->rx_eapol_key_secure) {
2283 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
2284 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
2285 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
2286 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
2287 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
2288 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
2290 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2291 "STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - "
2292 "set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
2297 kde_len = wpa_ie_len + ieee80211w_kde_len(sm);
2299 kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + gtk_len;
2300 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2301 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
2302 kde_len += 2 + PMKID_LEN; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
2303 kde_len += 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
2305 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2307 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr) > 0)
2308 kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 3 * 4;
2309 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2310 kde = os_malloc(kde_len);
2315 os_memcpy(pos, wpa_ie, wpa_ie_len);
2317 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2318 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
2323 res = wpa_insert_pmkid(kde, &elen, sm->pmk_r1_name);
2325 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT: Failed to insert "
2326 "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
2333 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2336 hdr[0] = keyidx & 0x03;
2338 pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2,
2341 pos = ieee80211w_kde_add(sm, pos);
2343 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2344 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
2346 struct wpa_auth_config *conf;
2348 conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
2349 if (sm->assoc_resp_ftie &&
2350 kde + kde_len - pos >= 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]) {
2351 os_memcpy(pos, sm->assoc_resp_ftie,
2352 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]);
2353 res = 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1];
2355 res = wpa_write_ftie(conf, conf->r0_key_holder,
2356 conf->r0_key_holder_len,
2358 kde + kde_len - pos,
2362 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
2363 "into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
2369 /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
2370 *pos++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL;
2372 *pos++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE;
2373 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, conf->reassociation_deadline);
2376 /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
2377 *pos++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL;
2379 *pos++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME;
2380 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, conf->r0_key_lifetime * 60);
2383 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2385 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr) > 0) {
2387 os_memcpy(addr, sm->ip_addr, 4);
2388 os_memcpy(addr + 4, sm->wpa_auth->conf.ip_addr_mask, 4);
2389 os_memcpy(addr + 8, sm->wpa_auth->conf.ip_addr_go, 4);
2390 pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, WFA_KEY_DATA_IP_ADDR_ALLOC,
2391 addr, sizeof(addr), NULL, 0);
2393 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2395 wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
2396 (secure ? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE : 0) | WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC |
2397 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK | WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL |
2398 WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE,
2399 _rsc, sm->ANonce, kde, pos - kde, keyidx, encr);
2404 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE)
2406 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE, wpa_ptk);
2407 sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = FALSE;
2409 enum wpa_alg alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise);
2410 int klen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise);
2411 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, alg, sm->addr, 0,
2412 sm->PTK.tk, klen)) {
2413 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr);
2416 /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2417 sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
2419 if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_ptk_rekey) {
2420 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
2421 eloop_register_timeout(sm->wpa_auth->conf.
2422 wpa_ptk_rekey, 0, wpa_rekey_ptk,
2426 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
2427 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
2428 WPA_EAPOL_authorized, 1);
2432 if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) {
2434 if (sm->keycount == 2) {
2435 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
2436 WPA_EAPOL_portValid, 1);
2439 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portValid,
2442 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable, 0);
2443 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone, 1);
2444 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA)
2445 sm->PInitAKeys = TRUE;
2448 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
2449 "pairwise key handshake completed (%s)",
2450 sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA ? "WPA" : "RSN");
2452 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2453 wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr);
2454 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2460 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = sm->wpa_auth;
2463 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE);
2464 else if (sm->Disconnect
2465 /* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) {
2466 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2467 "WPA_PTK: sm->Disconnect");
2468 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
2470 else if (sm->DeauthenticationRequest)
2471 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
2472 else if (sm->AuthenticationRequest)
2473 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
2474 else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
2475 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
2476 else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
2477 if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
2478 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
2480 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
2481 } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
2482 case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
2484 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
2485 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
2487 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED:
2488 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE);
2490 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION:
2491 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
2493 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2:
2494 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
2495 wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
2496 WPA_EAPOL_keyRun) > 0)
2497 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITPMK);
2498 else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)
2499 /* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */)
2500 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITPSK);
2502 case WPA_PTK_INITPMK:
2503 if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
2504 WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable) > 0)
2505 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
2507 wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
2508 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
2509 "INITPMK - keyAvailable = false");
2510 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
2513 case WPA_PTK_INITPSK:
2514 if (wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, sm->p2p_dev_addr,
2516 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
2518 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
2519 "no PSK configured for the STA");
2520 wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
2521 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
2524 case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART:
2525 if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
2526 sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise)
2527 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING);
2528 else if (sm->TimeoutCtr >
2529 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
2530 wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
2531 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2532 "PTKSTART: Retry limit %d reached",
2533 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount);
2534 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
2535 } else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
2536 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
2538 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING:
2539 if (sm->MICVerified)
2540 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2);
2541 else if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
2542 sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise)
2543 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING);
2544 else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
2545 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
2547 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2:
2548 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING);
2550 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING:
2551 if (sm->update_snonce)
2552 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING);
2553 else if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
2554 sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
2555 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE);
2556 else if (sm->TimeoutCtr >
2557 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
2558 wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
2559 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2560 "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %d "
2562 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount);
2563 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
2564 } else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
2565 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING);
2567 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE:
2573 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE)
2575 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE, wpa_ptk_group);
2577 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
2578 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
2579 sm->changed = FALSE;
2581 sm->GTimeoutCtr = 0;
2585 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING)
2587 u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN];
2588 struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
2590 u8 *kde_buf = NULL, *pos, hdr[2];
2592 u8 *gtk, dummy_gtk[32];
2594 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk_group);
2597 if (sm->GTimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount) {
2598 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2599 * immediately following this. */
2603 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA)
2604 sm->PInitAKeys = FALSE;
2605 sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE;
2606 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
2607 os_memset(rsc, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
2608 if (gsm->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE)
2609 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, rsc);
2610 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2611 "sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake");
2613 gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
2614 if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_gtk) {
2616 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2617 * of GTK in the BSS.
2619 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk, gsm->GTK_len) < 0)
2623 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
2624 kde_len = 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + gsm->GTK_len +
2625 ieee80211w_kde_len(sm);
2626 kde_buf = os_malloc(kde_len);
2627 if (kde_buf == NULL)
2630 kde = pos = kde_buf;
2631 hdr[0] = gsm->GN & 0x03;
2633 pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2,
2635 pos = ieee80211w_kde_add(sm, pos);
2636 kde_len = pos - kde;
2639 kde_len = gsm->GTK_len;
2642 wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
2643 WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE | WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC |
2645 (!sm->Pair ? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL : 0),
2646 rsc, gsm->GNonce, kde, kde_len, gsm->GN, 1);
2652 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED)
2654 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED, wpa_ptk_group);
2655 sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = FALSE;
2656 if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys)
2657 sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
2658 sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
2659 sm->GTimeoutCtr = 0;
2660 /* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2661 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
2662 "group key handshake completed (%s)",
2663 sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA ? "WPA" : "RSN");
2668 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR)
2670 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR, wpa_ptk_group);
2671 if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys)
2672 sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
2673 sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
2674 sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
2678 SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP)
2680 if (sm->Init || sm->PtkGroupInit) {
2681 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE);
2682 sm->PtkGroupInit = FALSE;
2683 } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_group_state) {
2684 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE:
2685 if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys ||
2686 (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA && sm->PInitAKeys))
2687 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING);
2689 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING:
2690 if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
2691 !sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
2692 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED);
2693 else if (sm->GTimeoutCtr >
2694 (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount)
2695 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR);
2696 else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
2697 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING);
2699 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR:
2700 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE);
2702 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED:
2703 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE);
2709 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
2710 struct wpa_group *group)
2714 os_memcpy(group->GNonce, group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
2715 inc_byte_array(group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
2716 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group->GMK, "Group key expansion",
2717 wpa_auth->addr, group->GNonce,
2718 group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len) < 0)
2720 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GTK",
2721 group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len);
2723 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2724 if (wpa_auth->conf.ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION) {
2726 len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
2727 os_memcpy(group->GNonce, group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
2728 inc_byte_array(group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
2729 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group->GMK, "IGTK key expansion",
2730 wpa_auth->addr, group->GNonce,
2731 group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4], len) < 0)
2733 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "IGTK",
2734 group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4], len);
2736 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2742 static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
2743 struct wpa_group *group)
2745 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2746 "GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)", group->vlan_id);
2747 group->changed = FALSE; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */
2748 group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT;
2751 os_memset(group->GTK, 0, sizeof(group->GTK));
2754 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2757 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2758 /* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */
2759 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
2763 static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx)
2765 if (ctx != NULL && ctx != sm->group)
2768 if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE) {
2769 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2770 "Not in PTKINITDONE; skip Group Key update");
2771 sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
2774 if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) {
2776 * This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry.
2777 * Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the
2778 * station needs to be counted here anyway.
2780 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2781 "GUpdateStationKeys was already set when "
2782 "marking station for GTK rekeying");
2785 /* Do not rekey GTK/IGTK when STA is in WNM-Sleep Mode */
2786 if (sm->is_wnmsleep)
2789 sm->group->GKeyDoneStations++;
2790 sm->GUpdateStationKeys = TRUE;
2798 /* update GTK when exiting WNM-Sleep Mode */
2799 void wpa_wnmsleep_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
2801 if (sm == NULL || sm->is_wnmsleep)
2804 wpa_group_update_sta(sm, NULL);
2808 void wpa_set_wnmsleep(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int flag)
2811 sm->is_wnmsleep = !!flag;
2815 int wpa_wnmsleep_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
2817 struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
2822 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
2825 *pos++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_GTK;
2826 *pos++ = 11 + gsm->GTK_len;
2827 /* Key ID in B0-B1 of Key Info */
2828 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, gsm->GN & 0x03);
2830 *pos++ = gsm->GTK_len;
2831 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, pos) != 0)
2834 os_memcpy(pos, gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1], gsm->GTK_len);
2835 pos += gsm->GTK_len;
2837 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: GTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2839 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: GTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2840 gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1], gsm->GTK_len);
2846 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2847 int wpa_wnmsleep_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
2849 struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
2851 size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->wpa_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
2855 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] | Key[16]
2857 *pos++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK;
2858 *pos++ = 2 + 6 + len;
2859 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, gsm->GN_igtk);
2861 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN_igtk, pos) != 0)
2865 os_memcpy(pos, gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], len);
2868 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: IGTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2870 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: IGTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2871 gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], len);
2875 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2876 #endif /* CONFIG_WNM */
2879 static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
2880 struct wpa_group *group)
2884 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2885 "SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)", group->vlan_id);
2886 group->changed = TRUE;
2887 group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS;
2888 group->GTKReKey = FALSE;
2890 group->GM = group->GN;
2892 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2893 tmp = group->GM_igtk;
2894 group->GM_igtk = group->GN_igtk;
2895 group->GN_igtk = tmp;
2896 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2897 /* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by
2898 * counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of
2899 * including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */
2900 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
2902 if (group->GKeyDoneStations) {
2903 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected "
2904 "GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey",
2905 group->GKeyDoneStations);
2906 group->GKeyDoneStations = 0;
2908 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth, wpa_group_update_sta, group);
2909 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d",
2910 group->GKeyDoneStations);
2914 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
2915 struct wpa_group *group)
2919 if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth, group->vlan_id,
2920 wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group),
2921 broadcast_ether_addr, group->GN,
2922 group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len) < 0)
2925 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2926 if (wpa_auth->conf.ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION) {
2930 alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
2931 len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
2934 wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth, group->vlan_id, alg,
2935 broadcast_ether_addr, group->GN_igtk,
2936 group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4], len) < 0)
2939 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2945 static int wpa_group_disconnect_cb(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx)
2947 if (sm->group == ctx) {
2948 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Mark STA " MACSTR
2949 " for discconnection due to fatal failure",
2951 sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
2958 static void wpa_group_fatal_failure(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
2959 struct wpa_group *group)
2961 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: group state machine entering state FATAL_FAILURE");
2962 group->changed = TRUE;
2963 group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE;
2964 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth, wpa_group_disconnect_cb, group);
2968 static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
2969 struct wpa_group *group)
2971 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2972 "SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)", group->vlan_id);
2973 group->changed = TRUE;
2974 group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE;
2976 if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group) < 0) {
2977 wpa_group_fatal_failure(wpa_auth, group);
2985 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
2986 struct wpa_group *group)
2989 wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth, group);
2990 } else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE) {
2991 /* Do not allow group operations */
2992 } else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT &&
2993 group->GTKAuthenticator) {
2994 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth, group);
2995 } else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE &&
2997 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth, group);
2998 } else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS) {
2999 if (group->GKeyDoneStations == 0)
3000 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth, group);
3001 else if (group->GTKReKey)
3002 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth, group);
3007 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
3012 if (sm->in_step_loop) {
3013 /* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not
3014 * end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the
3015 * recursive call. */
3016 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively");
3020 sm->in_step_loop = 1;
3022 if (sm->pending_deinit)
3025 sm->changed = FALSE;
3026 sm->wpa_auth->group->changed = FALSE;
3028 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK);
3029 if (sm->pending_deinit)
3031 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP);
3032 if (sm->pending_deinit)
3034 wpa_group_sm_step(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
3035 } while (sm->changed || sm->wpa_auth->group->changed);
3036 sm->in_step_loop = 0;
3038 if (sm->pending_deinit) {
3039 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Completing pending STA state "
3040 "machine deinit for " MACSTR, MAC2STR(sm->addr));
3041 wpa_free_sta_sm(sm);
3048 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
3050 struct wpa_state_machine *sm = eloop_ctx;
3055 void wpa_auth_sm_notify(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
3059 eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step, sm, NULL);
3063 void wpa_gtk_rekey(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
3066 struct wpa_group *group;
3068 if (wpa_auth == NULL)
3071 group = wpa_auth->group;
3073 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
3075 group->GM = group->GN;
3077 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3078 tmp = group->GM_igtk;
3079 group->GM_igtk = group->GN_igtk;
3080 group->GN_igtk = tmp;
3081 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3082 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
3083 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group);
3088 static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int val)
3090 return val ? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
3094 #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
3095 #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
3096 ((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
3098 int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, char *buf, size_t buflen)
3101 char pmkid_txt[PMKID_LEN * 2 + 1];
3102 #ifdef CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH
3103 const int preauth = 1;
3104 #else /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
3105 const int preauth = 0;
3106 #endif /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
3108 if (wpa_auth == NULL)
3111 ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len,
3112 "dot11RSNAOptionImplemented=TRUE\n"
3113 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationImplemented=%s\n"
3114 "dot11RSNAEnabled=%s\n"
3115 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled=%s\n",
3116 wpa_bool_txt(preauth),
3117 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth->conf.wpa & WPA_PROTO_RSN),
3118 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth->conf.rsn_preauth));
3119 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
3123 wpa_snprintf_hex(pmkid_txt, sizeof(pmkid_txt),
3124 wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed, PMKID_LEN);
3127 buf + len, buflen - len,
3128 "dot11RSNAConfigVersion=%u\n"
3129 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseKeysSupported=9999\n"
3130 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipher */
3131 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyMethod */
3132 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime */
3133 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyPackets */
3134 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict=%u\n"
3135 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount=%u\n"
3136 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount=%u\n"
3137 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipherSize=%u\n"
3138 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=%u\n"
3139 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=%u\n"
3140 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfPTKSAReplayCounters=0\n"
3141 "dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=%u\n"
3142 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
3143 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
3144 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
3145 "dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed=%s\n"
3146 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
3147 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
3148 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
3149 "dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked=%u\n"
3150 "dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures=%u\n"
3151 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n",
3153 !!wpa_auth->conf.wpa_strict_rekey,
3154 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount,
3155 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount,
3156 wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group) * 8,
3157 dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime,
3158 dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold,
3159 dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout,
3160 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected),
3161 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected),
3162 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected),
3164 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested),
3165 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested),
3166 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested),
3167 wpa_auth->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked,
3168 wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures);
3169 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
3173 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable */
3174 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable */
3177 ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len, "hostapdWPAGroupState=%d\n",
3178 wpa_auth->group->wpa_group_state);
3179 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
3187 int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, char *buf, size_t buflen)
3195 /* TODO: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF entry for broadcast/multicast stats */
3197 /* dot11RSNAStatsEntry */
3199 pairwise = wpa_cipher_to_suite(sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 ?
3200 WPA_PROTO_RSN : WPA_PROTO_WPA,
3206 buf + len, buflen - len,
3207 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsIndex */
3208 "dot11RSNAStatsSTAAddress=" MACSTR "\n"
3209 "dot11RSNAStatsVersion=1\n"
3210 "dot11RSNAStatsSelectedPairwiseCipher=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
3211 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPICVErrors */
3212 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures=%u\n"
3213 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures=%u\n"
3214 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
3215 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors */
3216 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPReplays */,
3218 RSN_SUITE_ARG(pairwise),
3219 sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures,
3220 sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures);
3221 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
3226 ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len,
3227 "hostapdWPAPTKState=%d\n"
3228 "hostapdWPAPTKGroupState=%d\n",
3230 sm->wpa_ptk_group_state);
3231 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
3239 void wpa_auth_countermeasures_start(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
3242 wpa_auth->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked++;
3246 int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
3248 return sm && sm->pairwise_set;
3252 int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
3254 return sm->pairwise;
3258 int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
3262 return sm->wpa_key_mgmt;
3266 int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
3274 int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
3276 if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
3278 return sm->tk_already_set;
3282 int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
3283 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
3285 if (sm == NULL || sm->pmksa != entry)
3292 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
3293 wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
3295 return sm ? sm->pmksa : NULL;
3299 void wpa_auth_sta_local_mic_failure_report(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
3302 sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures++;
3306 const u8 * wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, size_t *len)
3308 if (wpa_auth == NULL)
3310 *len = wpa_auth->wpa_ie_len;
3311 return wpa_auth->wpa_ie;
3315 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *pmk,
3316 unsigned int pmk_len,
3317 int session_timeout, struct eapol_state_machine *eapol)
3319 if (sm == NULL || sm->wpa != WPA_VERSION_WPA2 ||
3320 sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_pmksa_caching)
3323 if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt & WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192) {
3324 if (pmk_len > PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192)
3325 pmk_len = PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192;
3326 } else if (pmk_len > PMK_LEN) {
3330 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(sm->wpa_auth->pmksa, pmk, pmk_len, NULL,
3331 sm->PTK.kck, sm->PTK.kck_len,
3332 sm->wpa_auth->addr, sm->addr, session_timeout,
3333 eapol, sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
3340 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_preauth(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
3341 const u8 *pmk, size_t len, const u8 *sta_addr,
3342 int session_timeout,
3343 struct eapol_state_machine *eapol)
3345 if (wpa_auth == NULL)
3348 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth->pmksa, pmk, len, NULL,
3351 sta_addr, session_timeout, eapol,
3352 WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X))
3359 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_sae(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
3360 const u8 *pmk, const u8 *pmkid)
3362 if (wpa_auth->conf.disable_pmksa_caching)
3365 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth->pmksa, pmk, PMK_LEN, pmkid,
3367 wpa_auth->addr, addr, 0, NULL,
3375 void wpa_auth_pmksa_remove(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
3378 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *pmksa;
3380 if (wpa_auth == NULL || wpa_auth->pmksa == NULL)
3382 pmksa = pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth->pmksa, sta_addr, NULL);
3384 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Remove PMKSA cache entry for "
3385 MACSTR " based on request", MAC2STR(sta_addr));
3386 pmksa_cache_free_entry(wpa_auth->pmksa, pmksa);
3391 int wpa_auth_pmksa_list(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, char *buf,
3394 if (!wpa_auth || !wpa_auth->pmksa)
3396 return pmksa_cache_auth_list(wpa_auth->pmksa, buf, len);
3400 void wpa_auth_pmksa_flush(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
3402 if (wpa_auth && wpa_auth->pmksa)
3403 pmksa_cache_auth_flush(wpa_auth->pmksa);
3407 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
3408 wpa_auth_pmksa_get(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *sta_addr)
3410 if (!wpa_auth || !wpa_auth->pmksa)
3412 return pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth->pmksa, sta_addr, NULL);
3416 void wpa_auth_pmksa_set_to_sm(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *pmksa,
3417 struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
3418 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
3425 os_memcpy(pmk, pmksa->pmk, PMK_LEN);
3426 os_memcpy(pmkid, pmksa->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
3427 os_memcpy(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed, pmksa->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
3432 * Remove and free the group from wpa_authenticator. This is triggered by a
3433 * callback to make sure nobody is currently iterating the group list while it
3436 static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
3437 struct wpa_group *group)
3439 struct wpa_group *prev = wpa_auth->group;
3441 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Remove group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
3445 if (prev->next == group) {
3446 /* This never frees the special first group as needed */
3447 prev->next = group->next;
3457 /* Increase the reference counter for group */
3458 static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
3459 struct wpa_group *group)
3461 /* Skip the special first group */
3462 if (wpa_auth->group == group)
3465 group->references++;
3469 /* Decrease the reference counter and maybe free the group */
3470 static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
3471 struct wpa_group *group)
3473 /* Skip the special first group */
3474 if (wpa_auth->group == group)
3477 group->references--;
3478 if (group->references)
3480 wpa_group_free(wpa_auth, group);
3485 * Add a group that has its references counter set to zero. Caller needs to
3486 * call wpa_group_get() on the return value to mark the entry in use.
3488 static struct wpa_group *
3489 wpa_auth_add_group(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, int vlan_id)
3491 struct wpa_group *group;
3493 if (wpa_auth == NULL || wpa_auth->group == NULL)
3496 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Add group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
3498 group = wpa_group_init(wpa_auth, vlan_id, 0);
3502 group->next = wpa_auth->group->next;
3503 wpa_auth->group->next = group;
3510 * Enforce that the group state machine for the VLAN is running, increase
3511 * reference counter as interface is up. References might have been increased
3512 * even if a negative value is returned.
3513 * Returns: -1 on error (group missing, group already failed); otherwise, 0
3515 int wpa_auth_ensure_group(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, int vlan_id)
3517 struct wpa_group *group;
3519 if (wpa_auth == NULL)
3522 group = wpa_auth->group;
3524 if (group->vlan_id == vlan_id)
3526 group = group->next;
3529 if (group == NULL) {
3530 group = wpa_auth_add_group(wpa_auth, vlan_id);
3535 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
3536 "WPA: Ensure group state machine running for VLAN ID %d",
3539 wpa_group_get(wpa_auth, group);
3540 group->num_setup_iface++;
3542 if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE)
3550 * Decrease reference counter, expected to be zero afterwards.
3551 * returns: -1 on error (group not found, group in fail state)
3552 * -2 if wpa_group is still referenced
3555 int wpa_auth_release_group(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, int vlan_id)
3557 struct wpa_group *group;
3560 if (wpa_auth == NULL)
3563 group = wpa_auth->group;
3565 if (group->vlan_id == vlan_id)
3567 group = group->next;
3573 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
3574 "WPA: Try stopping group state machine for VLAN ID %d",
3577 if (group->num_setup_iface <= 0) {
3578 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
3579 "WPA: wpa_auth_release_group called more often than wpa_auth_ensure_group for VLAN ID %d, skipping.",
3583 group->num_setup_iface--;
3585 if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE)
3588 if (group->references > 1) {
3589 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
3590 "WPA: Cannot stop group state machine for VLAN ID %d as references are still hold",
3595 wpa_group_put(wpa_auth, group);
3601 int wpa_auth_sta_set_vlan(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int vlan_id)
3603 struct wpa_group *group;
3605 if (sm == NULL || sm->wpa_auth == NULL)
3608 group = sm->wpa_auth->group;
3610 if (group->vlan_id == vlan_id)
3612 group = group->next;
3615 if (group == NULL) {
3616 group = wpa_auth_add_group(sm->wpa_auth, vlan_id);
3621 if (sm->group == group)
3624 if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE)
3627 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Moving STA " MACSTR " to use group state "
3628 "machine for VLAN ID %d", MAC2STR(sm->addr), vlan_id);
3630 wpa_group_get(sm->wpa_auth, group);
3631 wpa_group_put(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
3638 void wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
3639 struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int ack)
3641 if (wpa_auth == NULL || sm == NULL)
3643 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: EAPOL-Key TX status for STA " MACSTR
3644 " ack=%d", MAC2STR(sm->addr), ack);
3645 if (sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout && ack) {
3647 * Some deployed supplicant implementations update their SNonce
3648 * for each EAPOL-Key 2/4 message even within the same 4-way
3649 * handshake and then fail to use the first SNonce when
3650 * deriving the PTK. This results in unsuccessful 4-way
3651 * handshake whenever the relatively short initial timeout is
3652 * reached and EAPOL-Key 1/4 is retransmitted. Try to work
3653 * around this by increasing the timeout now that we know that
3654 * the station has received the frame.
3656 int timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_subseq;
3657 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Increase initial EAPOL-Key 1/4 "
3658 "timeout by %u ms because of acknowledged frame",
3660 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
3661 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms / 1000,
3662 (timeout_ms % 1000) * 1000,
3663 wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
3668 int wpa_auth_uses_sae(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
3672 return wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm->wpa_key_mgmt);
3676 int wpa_auth_uses_ft_sae(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
3680 return sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE;
3685 int wpa_auth_get_ip_addr(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *addr)
3687 if (sm == NULL || WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr) == 0)
3689 os_memcpy(addr, sm->ip_addr, 4);
3692 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
3695 int wpa_auth_radius_das_disconnect_pmksa(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
3696 struct radius_das_attrs *attr)
3698 return pmksa_cache_auth_radius_das_disconnect(wpa_auth->pmksa, attr);
3702 void wpa_auth_reconfig_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
3704 struct wpa_group *group;
3708 for (group = wpa_auth->group; group; group = group->next)
3709 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group);