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MFC r341759, r341839, r346591:
[FreeBSD/FreeBSD.git] / contrib / wpa / src / eap_common / eap_eke_common.c
1 /*
2  * EAP server/peer: EAP-EKE shared routines
3  * Copyright (c) 2011-2013, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
4  *
5  * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6  * See README for more details.
7  */
8
9 #include "includes.h"
10
11 #include "common.h"
12 #include "crypto/aes.h"
13 #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
14 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
15 #include "crypto/dh_groups.h"
16 #include "crypto/random.h"
17 #include "crypto/sha1.h"
18 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
19 #include "eap_common/eap_defs.h"
20 #include "eap_eke_common.h"
21
22
23 static int eap_eke_dh_len(u8 group)
24 {
25         switch (group) {
26         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2:
27                 return 128;
28         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5:
29                 return 192;
30         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14:
31                 return 256;
32         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15:
33                 return 384;
34         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16:
35                 return 512;
36         }
37
38         return -1;
39 }
40
41
42 static int eap_eke_dhcomp_len(u8 dhgroup, u8 encr)
43 {
44         int dhlen;
45
46         dhlen = eap_eke_dh_len(dhgroup);
47         if (dhlen < 0 || encr != EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
48                 return -1;
49         return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + dhlen;
50 }
51
52
53 static const struct dh_group * eap_eke_dh_group(u8 group)
54 {
55         switch (group) {
56         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2:
57                 return dh_groups_get(2);
58         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5:
59                 return dh_groups_get(5);
60         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14:
61                 return dh_groups_get(14);
62         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15:
63                 return dh_groups_get(15);
64         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16:
65                 return dh_groups_get(16);
66         }
67
68         return NULL;
69 }
70
71
72 static int eap_eke_dh_generator(u8 group)
73 {
74         switch (group) {
75         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2:
76                 return 5;
77         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5:
78                 return 31;
79         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14:
80                 return 11;
81         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15:
82                 return 5;
83         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16:
84                 return 5;
85         }
86
87         return -1;
88 }
89
90
91 static int eap_eke_pnonce_len(u8 mac)
92 {
93         int mac_len;
94
95         if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1)
96                 mac_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
97         else if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256)
98                 mac_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
99         else
100                 return -1;
101
102         return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 16 + mac_len;
103 }
104
105
106 static int eap_eke_pnonce_ps_len(u8 mac)
107 {
108         int mac_len;
109
110         if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1)
111                 mac_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
112         else if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256)
113                 mac_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
114         else
115                 return -1;
116
117         return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 2 * 16 + mac_len;
118 }
119
120
121 static int eap_eke_prf_len(u8 prf)
122 {
123         if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
124                 return 20;
125         if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
126                 return 32;
127         return -1;
128 }
129
130
131 static int eap_eke_nonce_len(u8 prf)
132 {
133         int prf_len;
134
135         prf_len = eap_eke_prf_len(prf);
136         if (prf_len < 0)
137                 return -1;
138
139         if (prf_len > 2 * 16)
140                 return (prf_len + 1) / 2;
141
142         return 16;
143 }
144
145
146 static int eap_eke_auth_len(u8 prf)
147 {
148         switch (prf) {
149         case EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1:
150                 return SHA1_MAC_LEN;
151         case EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256:
152                 return SHA256_MAC_LEN;
153         }
154
155         return -1;
156 }
157
158
159 int eap_eke_dh_init(u8 group, u8 *ret_priv, u8 *ret_pub)
160 {
161         int generator;
162         u8 gen;
163         const struct dh_group *dh;
164
165         generator = eap_eke_dh_generator(group);
166         dh = eap_eke_dh_group(group);
167         if (generator < 0 || generator > 255 || !dh)
168                 return -1;
169         gen = generator;
170
171         if (crypto_dh_init(gen, dh->prime, dh->prime_len, ret_priv,
172                            ret_pub) < 0)
173                 return -1;
174         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DH private value",
175                         ret_priv, dh->prime_len);
176         wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DH public value",
177                     ret_pub, dh->prime_len);
178
179         return 0;
180 }
181
182
183 static int eap_eke_prf(u8 prf, const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const u8 *data,
184                        size_t data_len, const u8 *data2, size_t data2_len,
185                        u8 *res)
186 {
187         const u8 *addr[2];
188         size_t len[2];
189         size_t num_elem = 1;
190
191         addr[0] = data;
192         len[0] = data_len;
193         if (data2) {
194                 num_elem++;
195                 addr[1] = data2;
196                 len[1] = data2_len;
197         }
198
199         if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
200                 return hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, num_elem, addr, len, res);
201         if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
202                 return hmac_sha256_vector(key, key_len, num_elem, addr, len,
203                                           res);
204         return -1;
205 }
206
207
208 static int eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha1(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const u8 *data,
209                                  size_t data_len, u8 *res, size_t len)
210 {
211         u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
212         u8 idx;
213         const u8 *addr[3];
214         size_t vlen[3];
215         int ret;
216
217         idx = 0;
218         addr[0] = hash;
219         vlen[0] = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
220         addr[1] = data;
221         vlen[1] = data_len;
222         addr[2] = &idx;
223         vlen[2] = 1;
224
225         while (len > 0) {
226                 idx++;
227                 if (idx == 1)
228                         ret = hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, 2, &addr[1],
229                                                &vlen[1], hash);
230                 else
231                         ret = hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, 3, addr, vlen,
232                                                hash);
233                 if (ret < 0)
234                         return -1;
235                 if (len > SHA1_MAC_LEN) {
236                         os_memcpy(res, hash, SHA1_MAC_LEN);
237                         res += SHA1_MAC_LEN;
238                         len -= SHA1_MAC_LEN;
239                 } else {
240                         os_memcpy(res, hash, len);
241                         len = 0;
242                 }
243         }
244
245         return 0;
246 }
247
248
249 static int eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha256(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const u8 *data,
250                                    size_t data_len, u8 *res, size_t len)
251 {
252         u8 hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
253         u8 idx;
254         const u8 *addr[3];
255         size_t vlen[3];
256         int ret;
257
258         idx = 0;
259         addr[0] = hash;
260         vlen[0] = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
261         addr[1] = data;
262         vlen[1] = data_len;
263         addr[2] = &idx;
264         vlen[2] = 1;
265
266         while (len > 0) {
267                 idx++;
268                 if (idx == 1)
269                         ret = hmac_sha256_vector(key, key_len, 2, &addr[1],
270                                                  &vlen[1], hash);
271                 else
272                         ret = hmac_sha256_vector(key, key_len, 3, addr, vlen,
273                                                  hash);
274                 if (ret < 0)
275                         return -1;
276                 if (len > SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
277                         os_memcpy(res, hash, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
278                         res += SHA256_MAC_LEN;
279                         len -= SHA256_MAC_LEN;
280                 } else {
281                         os_memcpy(res, hash, len);
282                         len = 0;
283                 }
284         }
285
286         return 0;
287 }
288
289
290 static int eap_eke_prfplus(u8 prf, const u8 *key, size_t key_len,
291                            const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *res, size_t len)
292 {
293         if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
294                 return eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha1(key, key_len, data, data_len, res,
295                                              len);
296         if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
297                 return eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha256(key, key_len, data, data_len,
298                                                res, len);
299         return -1;
300 }
301
302
303 int eap_eke_derive_key(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
304                        const u8 *password, size_t password_len,
305                        const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len, const u8 *id_p,
306                        size_t id_p_len, u8 *key)
307 {
308         u8 zeros[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
309         u8 temp[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
310         size_t key_len = 16; /* Only AES-128-CBC is used here */
311         u8 *id;
312
313         /* temp = prf(0+, password) */
314         os_memset(zeros, 0, sess->prf_len);
315         if (eap_eke_prf(sess->prf, zeros, sess->prf_len,
316                         password, password_len, NULL, 0, temp) < 0)
317                 return -1;
318         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: temp = prf(0+, password)",
319                         temp, sess->prf_len);
320
321         /* key = prf+(temp, ID_S | ID_P) */
322         id = os_malloc(id_s_len + id_p_len);
323         if (id == NULL)
324                 return -1;
325         os_memcpy(id, id_s, id_s_len);
326         os_memcpy(id + id_s_len, id_p, id_p_len);
327         wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: ID_S | ID_P",
328                           id, id_s_len + id_p_len);
329         if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, temp, sess->prf_len,
330                             id, id_s_len + id_p_len, key, key_len) < 0) {
331                 os_free(id);
332                 return -1;
333         }
334         os_free(id);
335         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: key = prf+(temp, ID_S | ID_P)",
336                         key, key_len);
337
338         return 0;
339 }
340
341
342 int eap_eke_dhcomp(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const u8 *key, const u8 *dhpub,
343                    u8 *ret_dhcomp)
344 {
345         u8 pub[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN];
346         int dh_len;
347         u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
348
349         dh_len = eap_eke_dh_len(sess->dhgroup);
350         if (dh_len < 0)
351                 return -1;
352
353         /*
354          * DHComponent = Encr(key, y)
355          *
356          * All defined DH groups use primes that have length devisible by 16, so
357          * no need to do extra padding for y (= pub).
358          */
359         if (sess->encr != EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
360                 return -1;
361         if (random_get_bytes(iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
362                 return -1;
363         wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: IV for Encr(key, y)",
364                     iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
365         os_memcpy(pub, dhpub, dh_len);
366         if (aes_128_cbc_encrypt(key, iv, pub, dh_len) < 0)
367                 return -1;
368         os_memcpy(ret_dhcomp, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
369         os_memcpy(ret_dhcomp + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, pub, dh_len);
370         wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DHComponent = Encr(key, y)",
371                     ret_dhcomp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE + dh_len);
372
373         return 0;
374 }
375
376
377 int eap_eke_shared_secret(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const u8 *key,
378                           const u8 *dhpriv, const u8 *peer_dhcomp)
379 {
380         u8 zeros[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
381         u8 peer_pub[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN];
382         u8 modexp[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN];
383         size_t len;
384         const struct dh_group *dh;
385
386         dh = eap_eke_dh_group(sess->dhgroup);
387         if (sess->encr != EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC || !dh)
388                 return -1;
389
390         /* Decrypt peer DHComponent */
391         os_memcpy(peer_pub, peer_dhcomp + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, dh->prime_len);
392         if (aes_128_cbc_decrypt(key, peer_dhcomp, peer_pub, dh->prime_len) < 0) {
393                 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Failed to decrypt DHComponent");
394                 return -1;
395         }
396         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Decrypted peer DH pubkey",
397                         peer_pub, dh->prime_len);
398
399         /* SharedSecret = prf(0+, g ^ (x_s * x_p) (mod p)) */
400         len = dh->prime_len;
401         if (crypto_dh_derive_secret(*dh->generator, dh->prime, dh->prime_len,
402                                     NULL, 0, dhpriv, dh->prime_len, peer_pub,
403                                     dh->prime_len, modexp, &len) < 0)
404                 return -1;
405         if (len < dh->prime_len) {
406                 size_t pad = dh->prime_len - len;
407                 os_memmove(modexp + pad, modexp, len);
408                 os_memset(modexp, 0, pad);
409         }
410
411         os_memset(zeros, 0, sess->auth_len);
412         if (eap_eke_prf(sess->prf, zeros, sess->auth_len, modexp, dh->prime_len,
413                         NULL, 0, sess->shared_secret) < 0)
414                 return -1;
415         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: SharedSecret",
416                         sess->shared_secret, sess->auth_len);
417
418         return 0;
419 }
420
421
422 int eap_eke_derive_ke_ki(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
423                          const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len,
424                          const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len)
425 {
426         u8 buf[EAP_EKE_MAX_KE_LEN + EAP_EKE_MAX_KI_LEN];
427         size_t ke_len, ki_len;
428         u8 *data;
429         size_t data_len;
430         const char *label = "EAP-EKE Keys";
431         size_t label_len;
432
433         /*
434          * Ke | Ki = prf+(SharedSecret, "EAP-EKE Keys" | ID_S | ID_P)
435          * Ke = encryption key
436          * Ki = integrity protection key
437          * Length of each key depends on the selected algorithms.
438          */
439
440         if (sess->encr == EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
441                 ke_len = 16;
442         else
443                 return -1;
444
445         if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
446                 ki_len = 20;
447         else if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
448                 ki_len = 32;
449         else
450                 return -1;
451
452         label_len = os_strlen(label);
453         data_len = label_len + id_s_len + id_p_len;
454         data = os_malloc(data_len);
455         if (data == NULL)
456                 return -1;
457         os_memcpy(data, label, label_len);
458         os_memcpy(data + label_len, id_s, id_s_len);
459         os_memcpy(data + label_len + id_s_len, id_p, id_p_len);
460         if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, sess->shared_secret, sess->prf_len,
461                             data, data_len, buf, ke_len + ki_len) < 0) {
462                 os_free(data);
463                 return -1;
464         }
465
466         os_memcpy(sess->ke, buf, ke_len);
467         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ke", sess->ke, ke_len);
468         os_memcpy(sess->ki, buf + ke_len, ki_len);
469         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ki", sess->ki, ki_len);
470
471         os_free(data);
472         return 0;
473 }
474
475
476 int eap_eke_derive_ka(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
477                       const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len,
478                       const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len,
479                       const u8 *nonce_p, const u8 *nonce_s)
480 {
481         u8 *data, *pos;
482         size_t data_len;
483         const char *label = "EAP-EKE Ka";
484         size_t label_len;
485
486         /*
487          * Ka = prf+(SharedSecret, "EAP-EKE Ka" | ID_S | ID_P | Nonce_P |
488          *           Nonce_S)
489          * Ka = authentication key
490          * Length of the key depends on the selected algorithms.
491          */
492
493         label_len = os_strlen(label);
494         data_len = label_len + id_s_len + id_p_len + 2 * sess->nonce_len;
495         data = os_malloc(data_len);
496         if (data == NULL)
497                 return -1;
498         pos = data;
499         os_memcpy(pos, label, label_len);
500         pos += label_len;
501         os_memcpy(pos, id_s, id_s_len);
502         pos += id_s_len;
503         os_memcpy(pos, id_p, id_p_len);
504         pos += id_p_len;
505         os_memcpy(pos, nonce_p, sess->nonce_len);
506         pos += sess->nonce_len;
507         os_memcpy(pos, nonce_s, sess->nonce_len);
508         if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, sess->shared_secret, sess->prf_len,
509                             data, data_len, sess->ka, sess->prf_len) < 0) {
510                 os_free(data);
511                 return -1;
512         }
513         os_free(data);
514
515         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ka", sess->ka, sess->prf_len);
516
517         return 0;
518 }
519
520
521 int eap_eke_derive_msk(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
522                        const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len,
523                        const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len,
524                        const u8 *nonce_p, const u8 *nonce_s,
525                        u8 *msk, u8 *emsk)
526 {
527         u8 *data, *pos;
528         size_t data_len;
529         const char *label = "EAP-EKE Exported Keys";
530         size_t label_len;
531         u8 buf[EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN];
532
533         /*
534          * MSK | EMSK = prf+(SharedSecret, "EAP-EKE Exported Keys" | ID_S |
535          *                   ID_P | Nonce_P | Nonce_S)
536          */
537
538         label_len = os_strlen(label);
539         data_len = label_len + id_s_len + id_p_len + 2 * sess->nonce_len;
540         data = os_malloc(data_len);
541         if (data == NULL)
542                 return -1;
543         pos = data;
544         os_memcpy(pos, label, label_len);
545         pos += label_len;
546         os_memcpy(pos, id_s, id_s_len);
547         pos += id_s_len;
548         os_memcpy(pos, id_p, id_p_len);
549         pos += id_p_len;
550         os_memcpy(pos, nonce_p, sess->nonce_len);
551         pos += sess->nonce_len;
552         os_memcpy(pos, nonce_s, sess->nonce_len);
553         if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, sess->shared_secret, sess->prf_len,
554                             data, data_len, buf, EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN) <
555             0) {
556                 os_free(data);
557                 return -1;
558         }
559         os_free(data);
560
561         os_memcpy(msk, buf, EAP_MSK_LEN);
562         os_memcpy(emsk, buf + EAP_MSK_LEN, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
563         os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
564
565         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: MSK", msk, EAP_MSK_LEN);
566         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: EMSK", msk, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
567
568         return 0;
569 }
570
571
572 static int eap_eke_mac(u8 mac, const u8 *key, const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
573                        u8 *res)
574 {
575         if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1)
576                 return hmac_sha1(key, SHA1_MAC_LEN, data, data_len, res);
577         if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256)
578                 return hmac_sha256(key, SHA256_MAC_LEN, data, data_len, res);
579         return -1;
580 }
581
582
583 int eap_eke_prot(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
584                  const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
585                  u8 *prot, size_t *prot_len)
586 {
587         size_t block_size, icv_len, pad;
588         u8 *pos, *iv, *e;
589
590         if (sess->encr == EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
591                 block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
592         else
593                 return -1;
594
595         if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
596                 icv_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
597         else if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
598                 icv_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
599         else
600                 return -1;
601
602         pad = data_len % block_size;
603         if (pad)
604                 pad = block_size - pad;
605
606         if (*prot_len < block_size + data_len + pad + icv_len) {
607                 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Not enough room for Prot() data");
608                 return -1;
609         }
610         pos = prot;
611
612         if (random_get_bytes(pos, block_size))
613                 return -1;
614         iv = pos;
615         wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: IV for Prot()", iv, block_size);
616         pos += block_size;
617
618         e = pos;
619         os_memcpy(pos, data, data_len);
620         pos += data_len;
621         if (pad) {
622                 if (random_get_bytes(pos, pad))
623                         return -1;
624                 pos += pad;
625         }
626
627         if (aes_128_cbc_encrypt(sess->ke, iv, e, data_len + pad) < 0 ||
628             eap_eke_mac(sess->mac, sess->ki, e, data_len + pad, pos) < 0)
629                 return -1;
630         pos += icv_len;
631
632         *prot_len = pos - prot;
633         return 0;
634 }
635
636
637 int eap_eke_decrypt_prot(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
638                          const u8 *prot, size_t prot_len,
639                          u8 *data, size_t *data_len)
640 {
641         size_t block_size, icv_len;
642         u8 icv[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
643
644         if (sess->encr == EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
645                 block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
646         else
647                 return -1;
648
649         if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
650                 icv_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
651         else if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
652                 icv_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
653         else
654                 return -1;
655
656         if (prot_len < 2 * block_size + icv_len ||
657             (prot_len - icv_len) % block_size)
658                 return -1;
659
660         if (eap_eke_mac(sess->mac, sess->ki, prot + block_size,
661                         prot_len - block_size - icv_len, icv) < 0)
662                 return -1;
663         if (os_memcmp_const(icv, prot + prot_len - icv_len, icv_len) != 0) {
664                 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: ICV mismatch in Prot() data");
665                 return -1;
666         }
667
668         if (*data_len < prot_len - block_size - icv_len) {
669                 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Not enough room for decrypted Prot() data");
670                 return -1;
671         }
672
673         *data_len = prot_len - block_size - icv_len;
674         os_memcpy(data, prot + block_size, *data_len);
675         if (aes_128_cbc_decrypt(sess->ke, prot, data, *data_len) < 0) {
676                 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Failed to decrypt Prot() data");
677                 return -1;
678         }
679         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Decrypted Prot() data",
680                         data, *data_len);
681
682         return 0;
683 }
684
685
686 int eap_eke_auth(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const char *label,
687                  const struct wpabuf *msgs, u8 *auth)
688 {
689         wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Auth(%s)", label);
690         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ka for Auth",
691                         sess->ka, sess->auth_len);
692         wpa_hexdump_buf(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-EKE: Messages for Auth", msgs);
693         return eap_eke_prf(sess->prf, sess->ka, sess->auth_len,
694                            (const u8 *) label, os_strlen(label),
695                            wpabuf_head(msgs), wpabuf_len(msgs), auth);
696 }
697
698
699 int eap_eke_session_init(struct eap_eke_session *sess, u8 dhgroup, u8 encr,
700                          u8 prf, u8 mac)
701 {
702         sess->dhgroup = dhgroup;
703         sess->encr = encr;
704         sess->prf = prf;
705         sess->mac = mac;
706
707         sess->prf_len = eap_eke_prf_len(prf);
708         sess->nonce_len = eap_eke_nonce_len(prf);
709         sess->auth_len = eap_eke_auth_len(prf);
710         sess->dhcomp_len = eap_eke_dhcomp_len(sess->dhgroup, sess->encr);
711         sess->pnonce_len = eap_eke_pnonce_len(sess->mac);
712         sess->pnonce_ps_len = eap_eke_pnonce_ps_len(sess->mac);
713         if (sess->prf_len < 0 || sess->nonce_len < 0 || sess->auth_len < 0 ||
714             sess->dhcomp_len < 0 || sess->pnonce_len < 0 ||
715             sess->pnonce_ps_len < 0)
716                 return -1;
717
718         return 0;
719 }
720
721
722 void eap_eke_session_clean(struct eap_eke_session *sess)
723 {
724         os_memset(sess->shared_secret, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN);
725         os_memset(sess->ke, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_KE_LEN);
726         os_memset(sess->ki, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_KI_LEN);
727         os_memset(sess->ka, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_KA_LEN);
728 }