2 * EAP server/peer: EAP-pwd shared routines
3 * Copyright (c) 2010, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
11 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
12 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
14 #include "eap_pwd_common.h"
16 /* The random function H(x) = HMAC-SHA256(0^32, x) */
17 struct crypto_hash * eap_pwd_h_init(void)
19 u8 allzero[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
20 os_memset(allzero, 0, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
21 return crypto_hash_init(CRYPTO_HASH_ALG_HMAC_SHA256, allzero,
26 void eap_pwd_h_update(struct crypto_hash *hash, const u8 *data, size_t len)
28 crypto_hash_update(hash, data, len);
32 void eap_pwd_h_final(struct crypto_hash *hash, u8 *digest)
34 size_t len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
35 crypto_hash_finish(hash, digest, &len);
39 /* a counter-based KDF based on NIST SP800-108 */
40 static int eap_pwd_kdf(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, const u8 *label,
41 size_t labellen, u8 *result, size_t resultbitlen)
43 struct crypto_hash *hash;
44 u8 digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
46 size_t resultbytelen, len = 0, mdlen;
48 resultbytelen = (resultbitlen + 7) / 8;
50 L = htons(resultbitlen);
51 while (len < resultbytelen) {
54 hash = crypto_hash_init(CRYPTO_HASH_ALG_HMAC_SHA256,
59 crypto_hash_update(hash, digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
60 crypto_hash_update(hash, (u8 *) &i, sizeof(u16));
61 crypto_hash_update(hash, label, labellen);
62 crypto_hash_update(hash, (u8 *) &L, sizeof(u16));
63 mdlen = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
64 if (crypto_hash_finish(hash, digest, &mdlen) < 0)
66 if ((len + mdlen) > resultbytelen)
67 os_memcpy(result + len, digest, resultbytelen - len);
69 os_memcpy(result + len, digest, mdlen);
73 /* since we're expanding to a bit length, mask off the excess */
74 if (resultbitlen % 8) {
76 mask <<= (8 - (resultbitlen % 8));
77 result[resultbytelen - 1] &= mask;
85 * compute a "random" secret point on an elliptic curve based
86 * on the password and identities.
88 int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
89 const u8 *password, size_t password_len,
90 const u8 *id_server, size_t id_server_len,
91 const u8 *id_peer, size_t id_peer_len,
94 BIGNUM *x_candidate = NULL, *rnd = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
95 struct crypto_hash *hash;
96 unsigned char pwe_digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *prfbuf = NULL, ctr;
97 int nid, is_odd, ret = 0;
98 size_t primebytelen, primebitlen;
100 switch (num) { /* from IANA registry for IKE D-H groups */
102 nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
110 #ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
112 nid = NID_X9_62_prime192v1;
114 #endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
119 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unsupported group %d", num);
127 if ((grp->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL) {
128 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to create EC_GROUP");
132 if (((rnd = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
133 ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
134 ((grp->pwe = EC_POINT_new(grp->group)) == NULL) ||
135 ((grp->order = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
136 ((grp->prime = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
137 ((x_candidate = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
138 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to create bignums");
142 if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(grp->group, grp->prime, NULL, NULL, NULL))
144 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to get prime for GFp "
148 if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(grp->group, grp->order, NULL)) {
149 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to get order for curve");
152 if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(grp->group, cofactor, NULL)) {
153 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to get cofactor for "
157 primebitlen = BN_num_bits(grp->prime);
158 primebytelen = BN_num_bytes(grp->prime);
159 if ((prfbuf = os_malloc(primebytelen)) == NULL) {
160 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to malloc space for prf "
164 os_memset(prfbuf, 0, primebytelen);
168 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to find random "
169 "point on curve for group %d, something's "
176 * compute counter-mode password value and stretch to prime
177 * pwd-seed = H(token | peer-id | server-id | password |
180 hash = eap_pwd_h_init();
183 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, token, sizeof(u32));
184 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, id_peer, id_peer_len);
185 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, id_server, id_server_len);
186 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, password, password_len);
187 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, &ctr, sizeof(ctr));
188 eap_pwd_h_final(hash, pwe_digest);
190 BN_bin2bn(pwe_digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN, rnd);
192 if (eap_pwd_kdf(pwe_digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN,
193 (u8 *) "EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking",
194 os_strlen("EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking"),
195 prfbuf, primebitlen) < 0)
198 BN_bin2bn(prfbuf, primebytelen, x_candidate);
201 * eap_pwd_kdf() returns a string of bits 0..primebitlen but
202 * BN_bin2bn will treat that string of bits as a big endian
203 * number. If the primebitlen is not an even multiple of 8
204 * then excessive bits-- those _after_ primebitlen-- so now
205 * we have to shift right the amount we masked off.
208 BN_rshift(x_candidate, x_candidate,
209 (8 - (primebitlen % 8)));
211 if (BN_ucmp(x_candidate, grp->prime) >= 0)
214 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: x_candidate",
215 prfbuf, primebytelen);
218 * need to unambiguously identify the solution, if there is
227 * solve the quadratic equation, if it's not solvable then we
230 if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(grp->group,
236 * If there's a solution to the equation then the point must be
237 * on the curve so why check again explicitly? OpenSSL code
238 * says this is required by X9.62. We're not X9.62 but it can't
239 * hurt just to be sure.
241 if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(grp->group, grp->pwe, NULL)) {
242 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is not on curve");
246 if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
247 /* make sure the point is not in a small sub-group */
248 if (!EC_POINT_mul(grp->group, grp->pwe, NULL, grp->pwe,
250 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: cannot "
251 "multiply generator by order");
254 if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(grp->group, grp->pwe)) {
255 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is at "
260 /* if we got here then we have a new generator. */
263 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: found a PWE in %d tries", ctr);
264 grp->group_num = num;
267 EC_GROUP_free(grp->group);
269 EC_POINT_clear_free(grp->pwe);
271 BN_clear_free(grp->order);
273 BN_clear_free(grp->prime);
277 /* cleanliness and order.... */
278 BN_clear_free(cofactor);
279 BN_clear_free(x_candidate);
287 int compute_keys(EAP_PWD_group *grp, BN_CTX *bnctx, const BIGNUM *k,
288 const BIGNUM *peer_scalar, const BIGNUM *server_scalar,
289 const u8 *confirm_peer, const u8 *confirm_server,
290 const u32 *ciphersuite, u8 *msk, u8 *emsk, u8 *session_id)
292 struct crypto_hash *hash;
293 u8 mk[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft;
294 u8 msk_emsk[EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN];
297 if ((cruft = os_malloc(BN_num_bytes(grp->prime))) == NULL)
301 * first compute the session-id = TypeCode | H(ciphersuite | scal_p |
304 session_id[0] = EAP_TYPE_PWD;
305 hash = eap_pwd_h_init();
310 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, (const u8 *) ciphersuite, sizeof(u32));
311 offset = BN_num_bytes(grp->order) - BN_num_bytes(peer_scalar);
312 os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(grp->prime));
313 BN_bn2bin(peer_scalar, cruft + offset);
314 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(grp->order));
315 offset = BN_num_bytes(grp->order) - BN_num_bytes(server_scalar);
316 os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(grp->prime));
317 BN_bn2bin(server_scalar, cruft + offset);
318 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(grp->order));
319 eap_pwd_h_final(hash, &session_id[1]);
321 /* then compute MK = H(k | confirm-peer | confirm-server) */
322 hash = eap_pwd_h_init();
327 offset = BN_num_bytes(grp->prime) - BN_num_bytes(k);
328 os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(grp->prime));
329 BN_bn2bin(k, cruft + offset);
330 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(grp->prime));
332 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, confirm_peer, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
333 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, confirm_server, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
334 eap_pwd_h_final(hash, mk);
336 /* stretch the mk with the session-id to get MSK | EMSK */
337 if (eap_pwd_kdf(mk, SHA256_MAC_LEN,
338 session_id, SHA256_MAC_LEN + 1,
339 msk_emsk, (EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN) * 8) < 0) {
343 os_memcpy(msk, msk_emsk, EAP_MSK_LEN);
344 os_memcpy(emsk, msk_emsk + EAP_MSK_LEN, EAP_EMSK_LEN);