2 * WPA Supplicant - Mesh RSN routines
3 * Copyright (c) 2013-2014, cozybit, Inc. All rights reserved.
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
9 #include "utils/includes.h"
11 #include "utils/common.h"
12 #include "utils/eloop.h"
13 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
14 #include "crypto/random.h"
15 #include "crypto/aes.h"
16 #include "crypto/aes_siv.h"
17 #include "rsn_supp/wpa.h"
18 #include "ap/hostapd.h"
19 #include "ap/wpa_auth.h"
20 #include "ap/sta_info.h"
21 #include "ap/ieee802_11.h"
22 #include "wpa_supplicant_i.h"
24 #include "wpas_glue.h"
28 #define MESH_AUTH_TIMEOUT 10
29 #define MESH_AUTH_RETRY 3
31 void mesh_auth_timer(void *eloop_ctx, void *user_data)
33 struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = eloop_ctx;
34 struct sta_info *sta = user_data;
35 struct hostapd_data *hapd;
37 if (sta->sae->state != SAE_ACCEPTED) {
38 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "AUTH: Re-authenticate with " MACSTR
40 MAC2STR(sta->addr), sta->sae_auth_retry);
41 wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, MESH_SAE_AUTH_FAILURE "addr=" MACSTR,
43 if (sta->sae_auth_retry < MESH_AUTH_RETRY) {
44 mesh_rsn_auth_sae_sta(wpa_s, sta);
46 hapd = wpa_s->ifmsh->bss[0];
48 if (sta->sae_auth_retry > MESH_AUTH_RETRY) {
49 ap_free_sta(hapd, sta);
53 /* block the STA if exceeded the number of attempts */
54 wpa_mesh_set_plink_state(wpa_s, sta, PLINK_BLOCKED);
55 sta->sae->state = SAE_NOTHING;
56 wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, MESH_SAE_AUTH_BLOCKED "addr="
57 MACSTR " duration=%d",
59 hapd->conf->ap_max_inactivity);
61 sta->sae_auth_retry++;
66 static void auth_logger(void *ctx, const u8 *addr, logger_level level,
70 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "AUTH: " MACSTR " - %s",
73 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "AUTH: %s", txt);
77 static const u8 *auth_get_psk(void *ctx, const u8 *addr,
78 const u8 *p2p_dev_addr, const u8 *prev_psk)
80 struct mesh_rsn *mesh_rsn = ctx;
81 struct hostapd_data *hapd = mesh_rsn->wpa_s->ifmsh->bss[0];
82 struct sta_info *sta = ap_get_sta(hapd, addr);
84 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "AUTH: %s (addr=" MACSTR " prev_psk=%p)",
85 __func__, MAC2STR(addr), prev_psk);
87 if (sta && sta->auth_alg == WLAN_AUTH_SAE) {
88 if (!sta->sae || prev_psk)
97 static int auth_set_key(void *ctx, int vlan_id, enum wpa_alg alg,
98 const u8 *addr, int idx, u8 *key, size_t key_len)
100 struct mesh_rsn *mesh_rsn = ctx;
103 os_memset(seq, 0, sizeof(seq));
106 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "AUTH: %s(alg=%d addr=" MACSTR
108 __func__, alg, MAC2STR(addr), idx);
110 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "AUTH: %s(alg=%d key_idx=%d)",
113 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "AUTH: set_key - key", key, key_len);
115 return wpa_drv_set_key(mesh_rsn->wpa_s, alg, addr, idx,
116 1, seq, 6, key, key_len);
120 static int auth_start_ampe(void *ctx, const u8 *addr)
122 struct mesh_rsn *mesh_rsn = ctx;
123 struct hostapd_data *hapd;
124 struct sta_info *sta;
126 if (mesh_rsn->wpa_s->current_ssid->mode != WPAS_MODE_MESH)
129 hapd = mesh_rsn->wpa_s->ifmsh->bss[0];
130 sta = ap_get_sta(hapd, addr);
132 eloop_cancel_timeout(mesh_auth_timer, mesh_rsn->wpa_s, sta);
134 mesh_mpm_auth_peer(mesh_rsn->wpa_s, addr);
139 static int __mesh_rsn_auth_init(struct mesh_rsn *rsn, const u8 *addr,
140 enum mfp_options ieee80211w)
142 struct wpa_auth_config conf;
143 struct wpa_auth_callbacks cb;
146 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "AUTH: Initializing group state machine");
148 os_memset(&conf, 0, sizeof(conf));
149 conf.wpa = WPA_PROTO_RSN;
150 conf.wpa_key_mgmt = WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE;
151 conf.wpa_pairwise = rsn->pairwise_cipher;
152 conf.rsn_pairwise = rsn->pairwise_cipher;
153 conf.wpa_group = rsn->group_cipher;
154 conf.eapol_version = 0;
155 conf.wpa_group_rekey = -1;
156 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
157 conf.ieee80211w = ieee80211w;
158 if (ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION)
159 conf.group_mgmt_cipher = rsn->mgmt_group_cipher;
160 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
162 os_memset(&cb, 0, sizeof(cb));
164 cb.logger = auth_logger;
165 cb.get_psk = auth_get_psk;
166 cb.set_key = auth_set_key;
167 cb.start_ampe = auth_start_ampe;
169 rsn->auth = wpa_init(addr, &conf, &cb);
170 if (rsn->auth == NULL) {
171 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "AUTH: wpa_init() failed");
175 /* TODO: support rekeying */
176 rsn->mgtk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(conf.wpa_group);
177 if (random_get_bytes(rsn->mgtk, rsn->mgtk_len) < 0)
179 rsn->mgtk_key_id = 1;
181 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
182 if (ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION) {
183 rsn->igtk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
184 if (random_get_bytes(rsn->igtk, rsn->igtk_len) < 0)
186 rsn->igtk_key_id = 4;
189 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: Own TX IGTK",
190 rsn->igtk, rsn->igtk_len);
191 wpa_drv_set_key(rsn->wpa_s,
192 wpa_cipher_to_alg(rsn->mgmt_group_cipher), NULL,
194 seq, sizeof(seq), rsn->igtk, rsn->igtk_len);
196 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
198 /* group privacy / data frames */
199 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: Own TX MGTK",
200 rsn->mgtk, rsn->mgtk_len);
201 wpa_drv_set_key(rsn->wpa_s, wpa_cipher_to_alg(rsn->group_cipher), NULL,
202 rsn->mgtk_key_id, 1, seq, sizeof(seq),
203 rsn->mgtk, rsn->mgtk_len);
209 static void mesh_rsn_deinit(struct mesh_rsn *rsn)
211 os_memset(rsn->mgtk, 0, sizeof(rsn->mgtk));
213 os_memset(rsn->igtk, 0, sizeof(rsn->igtk));
216 wpa_deinit(rsn->auth);
220 struct mesh_rsn *mesh_rsn_auth_init(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
221 struct mesh_conf *conf)
223 struct mesh_rsn *mesh_rsn;
224 struct hostapd_data *bss = wpa_s->ifmsh->bss[0];
228 mesh_rsn = os_zalloc(sizeof(*mesh_rsn));
229 if (mesh_rsn == NULL)
231 mesh_rsn->wpa_s = wpa_s;
232 mesh_rsn->pairwise_cipher = conf->pairwise_cipher;
233 mesh_rsn->group_cipher = conf->group_cipher;
234 mesh_rsn->mgmt_group_cipher = conf->mgmt_group_cipher;
236 if (__mesh_rsn_auth_init(mesh_rsn, wpa_s->own_addr,
237 conf->ieee80211w) < 0) {
238 mesh_rsn_deinit(mesh_rsn);
243 bss->wpa_auth = mesh_rsn->auth;
245 ie = wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(mesh_rsn->auth, &ie_len);
246 conf->rsn_ie = (u8 *) ie;
247 conf->rsn_ie_len = ie_len;
249 wpa_supplicant_rsn_supp_set_config(wpa_s, wpa_s->current_ssid);
255 static int index_within_array(const int *array, int idx)
259 for (i = 0; i < idx; i++) {
268 static int mesh_rsn_sae_group(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
269 struct sae_data *sae)
271 int *groups = wpa_s->ifmsh->bss[0]->conf->sae_groups;
273 /* Configuration may have changed, so validate current index */
274 if (!index_within_array(groups, wpa_s->mesh_rsn->sae_group_index))
278 int group = groups[wpa_s->mesh_rsn->sae_group_index];
282 if (sae_set_group(sae, group) == 0) {
283 wpa_dbg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "SME: Selected SAE group %d",
287 wpa_s->mesh_rsn->sae_group_index++;
294 static int mesh_rsn_build_sae_commit(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
295 struct wpa_ssid *ssid,
296 struct sta_info *sta)
298 if (ssid->passphrase == NULL) {
299 wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: No password available");
303 if (mesh_rsn_sae_group(wpa_s, sta->sae) < 0) {
304 wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Failed to select group");
308 return sae_prepare_commit(wpa_s->own_addr, sta->addr,
309 (u8 *) ssid->passphrase,
310 os_strlen(ssid->passphrase), sta->sae);
314 /* initiate new SAE authentication with sta */
315 int mesh_rsn_auth_sae_sta(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
316 struct sta_info *sta)
318 struct hostapd_data *hapd = wpa_s->ifmsh->bss[0];
319 struct wpa_ssid *ssid = wpa_s->current_ssid;
320 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *pmksa;
325 wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG,
326 "AUTH: No current_ssid known to initiate new SAE");
331 sta->sae = os_zalloc(sizeof(*sta->sae));
332 if (sta->sae == NULL)
336 pmksa = wpa_auth_pmksa_get(hapd->wpa_auth, sta->addr);
339 sta->wpa_sm = wpa_auth_sta_init(hapd->wpa_auth,
342 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
343 "mesh: Failed to initialize RSN state machine");
347 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
348 "AUTH: Mesh PMKSA cache entry found for " MACSTR
349 " - try to use PMKSA caching instead of new SAE authentication",
351 wpa_auth_pmksa_set_to_sm(pmksa, sta->wpa_sm, hapd->wpa_auth,
352 sta->sae->pmkid, sta->sae->pmk);
353 sae_accept_sta(hapd, sta);
354 sta->mesh_sae_pmksa_caching = 1;
357 sta->mesh_sae_pmksa_caching = 0;
359 if (mesh_rsn_build_sae_commit(wpa_s, ssid, sta))
362 wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG,
363 "AUTH: started authentication with SAE peer: " MACSTR,
366 ret = auth_sae_init_committed(hapd, sta);
370 eloop_cancel_timeout(mesh_auth_timer, wpa_s, sta);
371 rnd = rand() % MESH_AUTH_TIMEOUT;
372 eloop_register_timeout(MESH_AUTH_TIMEOUT + rnd, 0, mesh_auth_timer,
378 void mesh_rsn_get_pmkid(struct mesh_rsn *rsn, struct sta_info *sta, u8 *pmkid)
380 os_memcpy(pmkid, sta->sae->pmkid, SAE_PMKID_LEN);
385 mesh_rsn_derive_aek(struct mesh_rsn *rsn, struct sta_info *sta)
387 u8 *myaddr = rsn->wpa_s->own_addr;
388 u8 *peer = sta->addr;
390 u8 context[RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 * ETH_ALEN], *ptr = context;
393 * AEK = KDF-Hash-256(PMK, "AEK Derivation", Selected AKM Suite ||
394 * min(localMAC, peerMAC) || max(localMAC, peerMAC))
396 /* Selected AKM Suite: SAE */
397 RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(ptr, RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_SAE);
398 ptr += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
400 if (os_memcmp(myaddr, peer, ETH_ALEN) < 0) {
407 os_memcpy(ptr, addr1, ETH_ALEN);
409 os_memcpy(ptr, addr2, ETH_ALEN);
411 sha256_prf(sta->sae->pmk, sizeof(sta->sae->pmk), "AEK Derivation",
412 context, sizeof(context), sta->aek, sizeof(sta->aek));
416 /* derive mesh temporal key from pmk */
417 int mesh_rsn_derive_mtk(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, struct sta_info *sta)
421 u8 *myaddr = wpa_s->own_addr;
422 u8 *peer = sta->addr;
423 u8 context[2 * WPA_NONCE_LEN + 2 * 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 * ETH_ALEN];
426 * MTK = KDF-Hash-Length(PMK, "Temporal Key Derivation", min(localNonce,
427 * peerNonce) || max(localNonce, peerNonce) || min(localLinkID,
428 * peerLinkID) || max(localLinkID, peerLinkID) || Selected AKM Suite ||
429 * min(localMAC, peerMAC) || max(localMAC, peerMAC))
432 if (os_memcmp(sta->my_nonce, sta->peer_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) < 0) {
434 max = sta->peer_nonce;
436 min = sta->peer_nonce;
439 os_memcpy(ptr, min, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
440 ptr += WPA_NONCE_LEN;
441 os_memcpy(ptr, max, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
442 ptr += WPA_NONCE_LEN;
444 if (sta->my_lid < sta->peer_lid) {
445 WPA_PUT_LE16(ptr, sta->my_lid);
447 WPA_PUT_LE16(ptr, sta->peer_lid);
450 WPA_PUT_LE16(ptr, sta->peer_lid);
452 WPA_PUT_LE16(ptr, sta->my_lid);
456 /* Selected AKM Suite: SAE */
457 RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(ptr, RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_SAE);
458 ptr += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
460 if (os_memcmp(myaddr, peer, ETH_ALEN) < 0) {
467 os_memcpy(ptr, min, ETH_ALEN);
469 os_memcpy(ptr, max, ETH_ALEN);
471 sta->mtk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_s->mesh_rsn->pairwise_cipher);
472 sha256_prf(sta->sae->pmk, SAE_PMK_LEN,
473 "Temporal Key Derivation", context, sizeof(context),
474 sta->mtk, sta->mtk_len);
479 void mesh_rsn_init_ampe_sta(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, struct sta_info *sta)
481 if (random_get_bytes(sta->my_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) < 0) {
482 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "mesh: Failed to derive random nonce");
483 /* TODO: How to handle this more cleanly? */
485 os_memset(sta->peer_nonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
486 mesh_rsn_derive_aek(wpa_s->mesh_rsn, sta);
490 /* insert AMPE and encrypted MIC at @ie.
491 * @mesh_rsn: mesh RSN context
492 * @sta: STA we're sending to
493 * @cat: pointer to category code in frame header.
494 * @buf: wpabuf to add encrypted AMPE and MIC to.
496 int mesh_rsn_protect_frame(struct mesh_rsn *rsn, struct sta_info *sta,
497 const u8 *cat, struct wpabuf *buf)
499 struct ieee80211_ampe_ie *ampe;
500 u8 const *ie = wpabuf_head_u8(buf) + wpabuf_len(buf);
501 u8 *ampe_ie, *pos, *mic_payload;
502 const u8 *aad[] = { rsn->wpa_s->own_addr, sta->addr, cat };
503 const size_t aad_len[] = { ETH_ALEN, ETH_ALEN, ie - cat };
508 if (cat[1] == PLINK_OPEN)
509 len += rsn->mgtk_len + WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN + 4;
510 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
511 if (cat[1] == PLINK_OPEN && rsn->igtk_len)
512 len += 2 + 6 + rsn->igtk_len;
513 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
515 if (2 + AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 2 + len > wpabuf_tailroom(buf)) {
516 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "protect frame: buffer too small");
520 ampe_ie = os_zalloc(2 + len);
522 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "protect frame: out of memory");
527 ampe_ie[0] = WLAN_EID_AMPE;
529 ampe = (struct ieee80211_ampe_ie *) (ampe_ie + 2);
531 RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(ampe->selected_pairwise_suite,
532 RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP);
533 os_memcpy(ampe->local_nonce, sta->my_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
534 os_memcpy(ampe->peer_nonce, sta->peer_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
536 pos = (u8 *) (ampe + 1);
537 if (cat[1] != PLINK_OPEN)
540 /* TODO: Key Replay Counter[8] optionally for
541 * Mesh Group Key Inform/Acknowledge frames */
543 /* TODO: static mgtk for now since we don't support rekeying! */
546 * MGTK[variable] || Key RSC[8] || GTKExpirationTime[4]
548 os_memcpy(pos, rsn->mgtk, rsn->mgtk_len);
549 pos += rsn->mgtk_len;
550 wpa_drv_get_seqnum(rsn->wpa_s, NULL, rsn->mgtk_key_id, pos);
551 pos += WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN;
552 /* Use fixed GTKExpirationTime for now */
553 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, 0xffffffff);
556 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
558 * IGTKdata[variable]:
559 * Key ID[2], IPN[6], IGTK[variable]
562 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, rsn->igtk_key_id);
564 wpa_drv_get_seqnum(rsn->wpa_s, NULL, rsn->igtk_key_id, pos);
566 os_memcpy(pos, rsn->igtk, rsn->igtk_len);
568 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
571 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: Plaintext AMPE element",
575 wpabuf_put_u8(buf, WLAN_EID_MIC);
576 wpabuf_put_u8(buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
577 /* MIC field is output ciphertext */
579 /* encrypt after MIC */
580 mic_payload = wpabuf_put(buf, 2 + len + AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
582 if (aes_siv_encrypt(sta->aek, ampe_ie, 2 + len, 3,
583 aad, aad_len, mic_payload)) {
584 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "protect frame: failed to encrypt");
594 int mesh_rsn_process_ampe(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, struct sta_info *sta,
595 struct ieee802_11_elems *elems, const u8 *cat,
596 const u8 *chosen_pmk,
597 const u8 *start, size_t elems_len)
600 struct ieee80211_ampe_ie *ampe;
601 u8 null_nonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN] = {};
604 u8 *ampe_buf, *crypt = NULL, *pos, *end;
606 const u8 *aad[] = { sta->addr, wpa_s->own_addr, cat };
607 const size_t aad_len[] = { ETH_ALEN, ETH_ALEN,
608 (elems->mic - 2) - cat };
612 struct hostapd_data *hapd = wpa_s->ifmsh->bss[0];
614 if (!wpa_auth_pmksa_get(hapd->wpa_auth, sta->addr)) {
616 "Mesh RSN: SAE is not prepared yet");
619 mesh_rsn_auth_sae_sta(wpa_s, sta);
622 if (chosen_pmk && os_memcmp(chosen_pmk, sta->sae->pmkid, PMKID_LEN)) {
623 wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG,
624 "Mesh RSN: Invalid PMKID (Chosen PMK did not match calculated PMKID)");
628 if (!elems->mic || elems->mic_len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
629 wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "Mesh RSN: missing mic ie");
633 ampe_buf = (u8 *) elems->mic + elems->mic_len;
634 if ((int) elems_len < ampe_buf - start)
637 crypt_len = elems_len - (elems->mic - start);
638 if (crypt_len < 2 + AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
639 wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "Mesh RSN: missing ampe ie");
643 /* crypt is modified by siv_decrypt */
644 crypt = os_zalloc(crypt_len);
646 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Mesh RSN: out of memory");
651 os_memcpy(crypt, elems->mic, crypt_len);
653 if (aes_siv_decrypt(sta->aek, crypt, crypt_len, 3,
654 aad, aad_len, ampe_buf)) {
655 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Mesh RSN: frame verification failed!");
660 crypt_len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
661 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: Decrypted AMPE element",
662 ampe_buf, crypt_len);
664 ampe_eid = *ampe_buf++;
665 ampe_ie_len = *ampe_buf++;
667 if (ampe_eid != WLAN_EID_AMPE ||
668 (size_t) 2 + ampe_ie_len > crypt_len ||
669 ampe_ie_len < sizeof(struct ieee80211_ampe_ie)) {
670 wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "Mesh RSN: invalid ampe ie");
675 ampe = (struct ieee80211_ampe_ie *) ampe_buf;
676 pos = (u8 *) (ampe + 1);
677 end = ampe_buf + ampe_ie_len;
678 if (os_memcmp(ampe->peer_nonce, null_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 &&
679 os_memcmp(ampe->peer_nonce, sta->my_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
680 wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "Mesh RSN: invalid peer nonce");
684 os_memcpy(sta->peer_nonce, ampe->local_nonce,
685 sizeof(ampe->local_nonce));
687 /* TODO: Key Replay Counter[8] in Mesh Group Key Inform/Acknowledge
691 * GTKdata shall not be included in Mesh Peering Confirm. While the
692 * standard does not state the same about IGTKdata, that same constraint
693 * needs to apply for it. It makes no sense to include the keys in Mesh
694 * Peering Close frames either, so while the standard does not seem to
695 * have a shall statement for these, they are described without
696 * mentioning GTKdata.
698 * An earlier implementation used to add GTKdata to both Mesh Peering
699 * Open and Mesh Peering Confirm frames, so ignore the possibly present
700 * GTKdata frame without rejecting the frame as a backwards
701 * compatibility mechanism.
703 if (cat[1] != PLINK_OPEN) {
705 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG,
706 "mesh: Ignore unexpected GTKdata(etc.) fields in the end of AMPE element in Mesh Peering Confirm/Close",
714 * MGTK[variable] || Key RSC[8] || GTKExpirationTime[4]
716 sta->mgtk_key_id = 1; /* FIX: Where to get Key ID? */
717 key_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_s->mesh_rsn->group_cipher);
718 if ((int) key_len + WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN + 4 > end - pos) {
719 wpa_dbg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: Truncated AMPE element");
723 sta->mgtk_len = key_len;
724 os_memcpy(sta->mgtk, pos, sta->mgtk_len);
725 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: GTKdata - MGTK",
726 sta->mgtk, sta->mgtk_len);
727 pos += sta->mgtk_len;
728 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: GTKdata - MGTK - Key RSC",
729 pos, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
730 os_memcpy(sta->mgtk_rsc, pos, sizeof(sta->mgtk_rsc));
731 pos += WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN;
732 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
733 "mesh: GTKdata - MGTK - GTKExpirationTime: %u seconds",
737 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
739 * IGTKdata[variable]:
740 * Key ID[2], IPN[6], IGTK[variable]
742 key_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_s->mesh_rsn->mgmt_group_cipher);
743 if (end - pos >= (int) (2 + 6 + key_len)) {
744 sta->igtk_key_id = WPA_GET_LE16(pos);
745 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: IGTKdata - Key ID %u",
748 os_memcpy(sta->igtk_rsc, pos, sizeof(sta->igtk_rsc));
749 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: IGTKdata - IPN",
750 sta->igtk_rsc, sizeof(sta->igtk_rsc));
752 os_memcpy(sta->igtk, pos, key_len);
753 sta->igtk_len = key_len;
754 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: IGTKdata - IGTK",
755 sta->igtk, sta->igtk_len);
757 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */