1 /* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.229 2016/02/17 22:20:14 djm Exp $ */
3 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
4 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
6 * This file contains code implementing the packet protocol and communication
7 * with the other side. This same code is used both on client and server side.
9 * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
10 * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
11 * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
12 * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
13 * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
16 * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl.
17 * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
19 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
20 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
22 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
23 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
24 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
25 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
26 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
28 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
29 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
30 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
31 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
32 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
33 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
34 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
35 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
36 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
37 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
43 #include <sys/param.h> /* MIN roundup */
44 #include <sys/types.h>
45 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
46 #include <sys/socket.h>
47 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
48 # include <sys/time.h>
51 #include <netinet/in.h>
52 #include <netinet/ip.h>
53 #include <arpa/inet.h>
67 #include "buffer.h" /* typedefs XXX */
68 #include "key.h" /* typedefs XXX */
89 #include "blacklist_client.h"
97 #define PACKET_MAX_SIZE (256 * 1024)
107 TAILQ_ENTRY(packet) next;
109 struct sshbuf *payload;
112 struct session_state {
114 * This variable contains the file descriptors used for
115 * communicating with the other side. connection_in is used for
116 * reading; connection_out for writing. These can be the same
117 * descriptor, in which case it is assumed to be a socket.
122 /* Protocol flags for the remote side. */
123 u_int remote_protocol_flags;
125 /* Encryption context for receiving data. Only used for decryption. */
126 struct sshcipher_ctx receive_context;
128 /* Encryption context for sending data. Only used for encryption. */
129 struct sshcipher_ctx send_context;
131 /* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */
132 struct sshbuf *input;
134 /* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */
135 struct sshbuf *output;
137 /* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */
138 struct sshbuf *outgoing_packet;
140 /* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */
141 struct sshbuf *incoming_packet;
143 /* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */
144 struct sshbuf *compression_buffer;
146 /* Incoming/outgoing compression dictionaries */
147 z_stream compression_in_stream;
148 z_stream compression_out_stream;
149 int compression_in_started;
150 int compression_out_started;
151 int compression_in_failures;
152 int compression_out_failures;
155 * Flag indicating whether packet compression/decompression is
158 int packet_compression;
160 /* default maximum packet size */
161 u_int max_packet_size;
163 /* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */
166 /* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */
167 int interactive_mode;
169 /* Set to true if we are the server side. */
172 /* Set to true if we are authenticated. */
173 int after_authentication;
175 int keep_alive_timeouts;
177 /* The maximum time that we will wait to send or receive a packet */
178 int packet_timeout_ms;
180 /* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */
181 struct newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
182 struct packet_state p_read, p_send;
184 /* Volume-based rekeying */
185 u_int64_t max_blocks_in, max_blocks_out, rekey_limit;
187 /* Time-based rekeying */
188 u_int32_t rekey_interval; /* how often in seconds */
189 time_t rekey_time; /* time of last rekeying */
191 /* Session key for protocol v1 */
192 u_char ssh1_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
195 /* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */
198 /* XXX discard incoming data after MAC error */
199 u_int packet_discard;
200 struct sshmac *packet_discard_mac;
202 /* Used in packet_read_poll2() */
205 /* Used in packet_send2 */
208 /* Used in packet_set_interactive */
209 int set_interactive_called;
211 /* Used in packet_set_maxsize */
212 int set_maxsize_called;
214 /* One-off warning about weak ciphers */
215 int cipher_warning_done;
217 /* SSH1 CRC compensation attack detector */
218 struct deattack_ctx deattack;
220 TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
224 ssh_alloc_session_state(void)
226 struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
227 struct session_state *state = NULL;
229 if ((ssh = calloc(1, sizeof(*ssh))) == NULL ||
230 (state = calloc(1, sizeof(*state))) == NULL ||
231 (state->input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
232 (state->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
233 (state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
234 (state->incoming_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
236 TAILQ_INIT(&state->outgoing);
237 TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->private_keys);
238 TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->public_keys);
239 state->connection_in = -1;
240 state->connection_out = -1;
241 state->max_packet_size = 32768;
242 state->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
243 state->p_send.packets = state->p_read.packets = 0;
244 state->initialized = 1;
246 * ssh_packet_send2() needs to queue packets until
247 * we've done the initial key exchange.
254 sshbuf_free(state->input);
255 sshbuf_free(state->output);
256 sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet);
257 sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
264 /* Returns nonzero if rekeying is in progress */
266 ssh_packet_is_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh)
269 (ssh->state->rekeying || (ssh->kex != NULL && ssh->kex->done == 0));
273 * Sets the descriptors used for communication. Disables encryption until
274 * packet_set_encryption_key is called.
277 ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out)
279 struct session_state *state;
280 const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
284 error("%s: cannot load cipher 'none'", __func__);
288 ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state();
290 error("%s: cound not allocate state", __func__);
294 state->connection_in = fd_in;
295 state->connection_out = fd_out;
296 if ((r = cipher_init(&state->send_context, none,
297 (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 ||
298 (r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, none,
299 (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) {
300 error("%s: cipher_init failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
304 state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
305 deattack_init(&state->deattack);
307 * Cache the IP address of the remote connection for use in error
308 * messages that might be generated after the connection has closed.
310 (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
315 ssh_packet_set_timeout(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout, int count)
317 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
319 if (timeout <= 0 || count <= 0) {
320 state->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
323 if ((INT_MAX / 1000) / count < timeout)
324 state->packet_timeout_ms = INT_MAX;
326 state->packet_timeout_ms = timeout * count * 1000;
330 ssh_packet_stop_discard(struct ssh *ssh)
332 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
335 if (state->packet_discard_mac) {
338 memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf));
339 while (sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet) <
341 if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->incoming_packet, buf,
344 (void) mac_compute(state->packet_discard_mac,
346 sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet), PACKET_MAX_SIZE,
349 logit("Finished discarding for %.200s port %d",
350 ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
351 return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
355 ssh_packet_start_discard(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshenc *enc,
356 struct sshmac *mac, u_int packet_length, u_int discard)
358 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
361 if (enc == NULL || !cipher_is_cbc(enc->cipher) || (mac && mac->etm)) {
362 if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0)
364 return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
366 if (packet_length != PACKET_MAX_SIZE && mac && mac->enabled)
367 state->packet_discard_mac = mac;
368 if (sshbuf_len(state->input) >= discard &&
369 (r = ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh)) != 0)
371 state->packet_discard = discard - sshbuf_len(state->input);
375 /* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */
378 ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *ssh)
380 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
381 struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
382 socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
384 /* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
385 if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out)
387 fromlen = sizeof(from);
388 memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
389 if (getpeername(state->connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
393 memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
394 if (getpeername(state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to,
397 if (fromlen != tolen || memcmp(&from, &to, fromlen) != 0)
399 if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6)
405 ssh_packet_get_bytes(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *ibytes, u_int64_t *obytes)
408 *ibytes = ssh->state->p_read.bytes;
410 *obytes = ssh->state->p_send.bytes;
414 ssh_packet_connection_af(struct ssh *ssh)
416 struct sockaddr_storage to;
417 socklen_t tolen = sizeof(to);
419 memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
420 if (getsockname(ssh->state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to,
424 if (to.ss_family == AF_INET6 &&
425 IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&to)->sin6_addr))
431 /* Sets the connection into non-blocking mode. */
434 ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(struct ssh *ssh)
436 /* Set the socket into non-blocking mode. */
437 set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_in);
439 if (ssh->state->connection_out != ssh->state->connection_in)
440 set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_out);
443 /* Returns the socket used for reading. */
446 ssh_packet_get_connection_in(struct ssh *ssh)
448 return ssh->state->connection_in;
451 /* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */
454 ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *ssh)
456 return ssh->state->connection_out;
460 * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned
461 * string must not be freed.
465 ssh_remote_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh)
467 const int sock = ssh->state->connection_in;
469 /* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */
470 if (ssh->remote_ipaddr == NULL) {
471 if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
472 ssh->remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(sock);
473 ssh->remote_port = get_sock_port(sock, 0);
475 ssh->remote_ipaddr = strdup("UNKNOWN");
476 ssh->remote_port = 0;
479 return ssh->remote_ipaddr;
482 /* Returns the port number of the remote host. */
485 ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *ssh)
487 (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */
488 return ssh->remote_port;
491 /* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
494 ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh)
496 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
500 if (!state->initialized)
502 state->initialized = 0;
503 if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) {
504 shutdown(state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
505 close(state->connection_out);
507 close(state->connection_in);
508 close(state->connection_out);
510 sshbuf_free(state->input);
511 sshbuf_free(state->output);
512 sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
513 sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet);
514 for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++)
515 kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]);
516 if (state->compression_buffer) {
517 sshbuf_free(state->compression_buffer);
518 if (state->compression_out_started) {
519 z_streamp stream = &state->compression_out_stream;
520 debug("compress outgoing: "
521 "raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
522 (unsigned long long)stream->total_in,
523 (unsigned long long)stream->total_out,
524 stream->total_in == 0 ? 0.0 :
525 (double) stream->total_out / stream->total_in);
526 if (state->compression_out_failures == 0)
529 if (state->compression_in_started) {
530 z_streamp stream = &state->compression_out_stream;
531 debug("compress incoming: "
532 "raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
533 (unsigned long long)stream->total_out,
534 (unsigned long long)stream->total_in,
535 stream->total_out == 0 ? 0.0 :
536 (double) stream->total_in / stream->total_out);
537 if (state->compression_in_failures == 0)
541 if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context)) != 0)
542 error("%s: cipher_cleanup failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
543 if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context)) != 0)
544 error("%s: cipher_cleanup failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
545 free(ssh->remote_ipaddr);
546 ssh->remote_ipaddr = NULL;
551 /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
554 ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh, u_int protocol_flags)
556 ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags;
559 /* Returns the remote protocol flags set earlier by the above function. */
562 ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh)
564 return ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags;
568 * Starts packet compression from the next packet on in both directions.
569 * Level is compression level 1 (fastest) - 9 (slow, best) as in gzip.
573 ssh_packet_init_compression(struct ssh *ssh)
575 if (!ssh->state->compression_buffer &&
576 ((ssh->state->compression_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL))
577 return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
582 start_compression_out(struct ssh *ssh, int level)
584 if (level < 1 || level > 9)
585 return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
586 debug("Enabling compression at level %d.", level);
587 if (ssh->state->compression_out_started == 1)
588 deflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream);
589 switch (deflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream, level)) {
591 ssh->state->compression_out_started = 1;
594 return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
596 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
602 start_compression_in(struct ssh *ssh)
604 if (ssh->state->compression_in_started == 1)
605 inflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream);
606 switch (inflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream)) {
608 ssh->state->compression_in_started = 1;
611 return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
613 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
619 ssh_packet_start_compression(struct ssh *ssh, int level)
623 if (ssh->state->packet_compression && !compat20)
624 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
625 ssh->state->packet_compression = 1;
626 if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0 ||
627 (r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0 ||
628 (r = start_compression_out(ssh, level)) != 0)
633 /* XXX remove need for separate compression buffer */
635 compress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
640 if (ssh->state->compression_out_started != 1)
641 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
643 /* This case is not handled below. */
644 if (sshbuf_len(in) == 0)
647 /* Input is the contents of the input buffer. */
648 if ((ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_in =
649 sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL)
650 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
651 ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in);
653 /* Loop compressing until deflate() returns with avail_out != 0. */
655 /* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */
656 ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_out = buf;
657 ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf);
659 /* Compress as much data into the buffer as possible. */
660 status = deflate(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream,
664 return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
666 /* Append compressed data to output_buffer. */
667 if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) -
668 ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out)) != 0)
673 ssh->state->compression_out_failures++;
674 return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
676 } while (ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out == 0);
681 uncompress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
686 if (ssh->state->compression_in_started != 1)
687 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
689 if ((ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_in =
690 sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL)
691 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
692 ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in);
695 /* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */
696 ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_out = buf;
697 ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf);
699 status = inflate(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream,
703 if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) -
704 ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out)) != 0)
709 * Comments in zlib.h say that we should keep calling
710 * inflate() until we get an error. This appears to
711 * be the error that we get.
715 return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
717 return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
720 ssh->state->compression_in_failures++;
721 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
727 /* Serialise compression state into a blob for privsep */
729 ssh_packet_get_compress_state(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh)
731 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
735 if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
736 return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
737 if (state->compression_in_started) {
738 if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, &state->compression_in_stream,
739 sizeof(state->compression_in_stream))) != 0)
741 } else if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0)) != 0)
743 if (state->compression_out_started) {
744 if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, &state->compression_out_stream,
745 sizeof(state->compression_out_stream))) != 0)
747 } else if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0)) != 0)
749 r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b);
755 /* Deserialise compression state from a blob for privsep */
757 ssh_packet_set_compress_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
759 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
760 struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
762 const u_char *inblob, *outblob;
765 if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0)
767 if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &inblob, &inl)) != 0 ||
768 (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &outblob, &outl)) != 0)
771 state->compression_in_started = 0;
772 else if (inl != sizeof(state->compression_in_stream)) {
773 r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
776 state->compression_in_started = 1;
777 memcpy(&state->compression_in_stream, inblob, inl);
780 state->compression_out_started = 0;
781 else if (outl != sizeof(state->compression_out_stream)) {
782 r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
785 state->compression_out_started = 1;
786 memcpy(&state->compression_out_stream, outblob, outl);
795 ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(struct ssh *ssh, void *ctx,
796 void *(*allocfunc)(void *, u_int, u_int),
797 void (*freefunc)(void *, void *))
799 ssh->state->compression_out_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)allocfunc;
800 ssh->state->compression_out_stream.zfree = (free_func)freefunc;
801 ssh->state->compression_out_stream.opaque = ctx;
802 ssh->state->compression_in_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)allocfunc;
803 ssh->state->compression_in_stream.zfree = (free_func)freefunc;
804 ssh->state->compression_in_stream.opaque = ctx;
808 * Causes any further packets to be encrypted using the given key. The same
809 * key is used for both sending and reception. However, both directions are
810 * encrypted independently of each other.
814 ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *key, u_int keylen, int number)
817 fatal("no SSH protocol 1 support");
818 #else /* WITH_SSH1 */
819 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
820 const struct sshcipher *cipher = cipher_by_number(number);
825 fatal("%s: unknown cipher number %d", __func__, number);
827 fatal("%s: keylen too small: %d", __func__, keylen);
828 if (keylen > SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH)
829 fatal("%s: keylen too big: %d", __func__, keylen);
830 memcpy(state->ssh1_key, key, keylen);
831 state->ssh1_keylen = keylen;
832 if ((r = cipher_init(&state->send_context, cipher, key, keylen,
833 NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 ||
834 (r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, cipher, key, keylen,
835 NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT) != 0))
836 fatal("%s: cipher_init failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
837 if (!state->cipher_warning_done &&
838 ((wmsg = cipher_warning_message(&state->send_context)) != NULL ||
839 (wmsg = cipher_warning_message(&state->send_context)) != NULL)) {
840 error("Warning: %s", wmsg);
841 state->cipher_warning_done = 1;
843 #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
847 * Finalizes and sends the packet. If the encryption key has been set,
848 * encrypts the packet before sending.
852 ssh_packet_send1(struct ssh *ssh)
854 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
860 * If using packet compression, compress the payload of the outgoing
863 if (state->packet_compression) {
864 sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
866 if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 8)) != 0)
869 if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->compression_buffer,
870 "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8)) != 0)
872 if ((r = compress_buffer(ssh, state->outgoing_packet,
873 state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
875 sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
876 if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->outgoing_packet,
877 state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
880 /* Compute packet length without padding (add checksum, remove padding). */
881 len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) + 4 - 8;
883 /* Insert padding. Initialized to zero in packet_start1() */
884 padding = 8 - len % 8;
885 if (!state->send_context.plaintext) {
886 cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet);
888 r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
891 arc4random_buf(cp + 8 - padding, padding);
893 if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 8 - padding)) != 0)
896 /* Add check bytes. */
897 checksum = ssh_crc32(sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet),
898 sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet));
899 POKE_U32(buf, checksum);
900 if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->outgoing_packet, buf, 4)) != 0)
904 fprintf(stderr, "packet_send plain: ");
905 sshbuf_dump(state->outgoing_packet, stderr);
908 /* Append to output. */
910 if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->output, buf, 4)) != 0)
912 if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->output,
913 sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet), &cp)) != 0)
915 if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->send_context, 0, cp,
916 sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet),
917 sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet), 0, 0)) != 0)
921 fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
922 sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
924 state->p_send.packets++;
925 state->p_send.bytes += len +
926 sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
927 sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
930 * Note that the packet is now only buffered in output. It won't be
931 * actually sent until ssh_packet_write_wait or ssh_packet_write_poll
940 ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
942 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
945 struct sshcomp *comp;
946 struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
947 u_int64_t *max_blocks;
951 debug2("set_newkeys: mode %d", mode);
953 if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
954 cc = &state->send_context;
955 crypt_type = CIPHER_ENCRYPT;
956 state->p_send.packets = state->p_send.blocks = 0;
957 max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_out;
959 cc = &state->receive_context;
960 crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT;
961 state->p_read.packets = state->p_read.blocks = 0;
962 max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_in;
964 if (state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
965 debug("set_newkeys: rekeying, input %llu bytes %llu blocks, "
966 "output %llu bytes %llu blocks",
967 (unsigned long long)state->p_read.bytes,
968 (unsigned long long)state->p_read.blocks,
969 (unsigned long long)state->p_send.bytes,
970 (unsigned long long)state->p_send.blocks);
971 if ((r = cipher_cleanup(cc)) != 0)
973 enc = &state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
974 mac = &state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
975 comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
977 explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->iv_len);
978 explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len);
979 explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len);
986 free(state->newkeys[mode]);
988 /* move newkeys from kex to state */
989 if ((state->newkeys[mode] = ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]) == NULL)
990 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
991 ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
992 enc = &state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
993 mac = &state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
994 comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
995 if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
996 if ((r = mac_init(mac)) != 0)
1000 DBG(debug("cipher_init_context: %d", mode));
1001 if ((r = cipher_init(cc, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len,
1002 enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type)) != 0)
1004 if (!state->cipher_warning_done &&
1005 (wmsg = cipher_warning_message(cc)) != NULL) {
1006 error("Warning: %s", wmsg);
1007 state->cipher_warning_done = 1;
1009 /* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */
1010 /* explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->block_size);
1011 explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len);
1012 explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len); */
1013 if ((comp->type == COMP_ZLIB ||
1014 (comp->type == COMP_DELAYED &&
1015 state->after_authentication)) && comp->enabled == 0) {
1016 if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) < 0)
1018 if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
1019 if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0)
1022 if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0)
1028 * The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES,
1029 * blowfish, etc, so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes.
1031 if (enc->block_size >= 16)
1032 *max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2);
1034 *max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size;
1035 if (state->rekey_limit)
1036 *max_blocks = MIN(*max_blocks,
1037 state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size);
1038 debug("rekey after %llu blocks", (unsigned long long)*max_blocks);
1042 #define MAX_PACKETS (1U<<31)
1044 ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
1046 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
1047 u_int32_t out_blocks;
1049 /* XXX client can't cope with rekeying pre-auth */
1050 if (!state->after_authentication)
1053 /* Haven't keyed yet or KEX in progress. */
1054 if (ssh->kex == NULL || ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
1057 /* Peer can't rekey */
1058 if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
1062 * Permit one packet in or out per rekey - this allows us to
1063 * make progress when rekey limits are very small.
1065 if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0)
1068 /* Time-based rekeying */
1069 if (state->rekey_interval != 0 &&
1070 state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
1073 /* Always rekey when MAX_PACKETS sent in either direction */
1074 if (state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS ||
1075 state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS)
1078 /* Rekey after (cipher-specific) maxiumum blocks */
1079 out_blocks = roundup(outbound_packet_len,
1080 state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc.block_size);
1081 return (state->max_blocks_out &&
1082 (state->p_send.blocks + out_blocks > state->max_blocks_out)) ||
1083 (state->max_blocks_in &&
1084 (state->p_read.blocks > state->max_blocks_in));
1088 * Delayed compression for SSH2 is enabled after authentication:
1089 * This happens on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent,
1090 * and on the client side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is received.
1093 ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(struct ssh *ssh)
1095 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
1096 struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
1100 * Remember that we are past the authentication step, so rekeying
1101 * with COMP_DELAYED will turn on compression immediately.
1103 state->after_authentication = 1;
1104 for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
1105 /* protocol error: USERAUTH_SUCCESS received before NEWKEYS */
1106 if (state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
1108 comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
1109 if (comp && !comp->enabled && comp->type == COMP_DELAYED) {
1110 if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0)
1112 if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
1113 if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0)
1116 if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0)
1125 /* Used to mute debug logging for noisy packet types */
1127 ssh_packet_log_type(u_char type)
1130 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA:
1131 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA:
1132 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST:
1140 * Finalize packet in SSH2 format (compress, mac, encrypt, enqueue)
1143 ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
1145 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
1146 u_char type, *cp, macbuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
1147 u_char padlen, pad = 0;
1148 u_int authlen = 0, aadlen = 0;
1150 struct sshenc *enc = NULL;
1151 struct sshmac *mac = NULL;
1152 struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
1155 if (state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) {
1156 enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc;
1157 mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac;
1158 comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp;
1159 /* disable mac for authenticated encryption */
1160 if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0)
1163 block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
1164 aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0;
1166 type = (sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet))[5];
1167 if (ssh_packet_log_type(type))
1168 debug3("send packet: type %u", type);
1170 fprintf(stderr, "plain: ");
1171 sshbuf_dump(state->outgoing_packet, stderr);
1174 if (comp && comp->enabled) {
1175 len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
1176 /* skip header, compress only payload */
1177 if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 5)) != 0)
1179 sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
1180 if ((r = compress_buffer(ssh, state->outgoing_packet,
1181 state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
1183 sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
1184 if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->outgoing_packet,
1185 "\0\0\0\0\0", 5)) != 0 ||
1186 (r = sshbuf_putb(state->outgoing_packet,
1187 state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
1189 DBG(debug("compression: raw %d compressed %zd", len,
1190 sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet)));
1193 /* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload) */
1194 len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
1197 * calc size of padding, alloc space, get random data,
1198 * minimum padding is 4 bytes
1200 len -= aadlen; /* packet length is not encrypted for EtM modes */
1201 padlen = block_size - (len % block_size);
1203 padlen += block_size;
1204 if (state->extra_pad) {
1205 /* will wrap if extra_pad+padlen > 255 */
1207 roundup(state->extra_pad, block_size);
1208 pad = state->extra_pad -
1209 ((len + padlen) % state->extra_pad);
1210 DBG(debug3("%s: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)",
1211 __func__, pad, len, padlen, state->extra_pad));
1213 state->extra_pad = 0;
1215 if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->outgoing_packet, padlen, &cp)) != 0)
1217 if (enc && !state->send_context.plaintext) {
1218 /* random padding */
1219 arc4random_buf(cp, padlen);
1222 explicit_bzero(cp, padlen);
1224 /* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload + padding) */
1225 len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
1226 cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet);
1228 r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1231 /* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */
1232 POKE_U32(cp, len - 4);
1234 DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d, aadlen %d)",
1235 len, padlen, aadlen));
1237 /* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */
1238 if (mac && mac->enabled && !mac->etm) {
1239 if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr,
1240 sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), len,
1241 macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0)
1243 DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", state->p_send.seqnr));
1245 /* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */
1246 if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->output,
1247 sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) + authlen, &cp)) != 0)
1249 if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->send_context, state->p_send.seqnr, cp,
1250 sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet),
1251 len - aadlen, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
1253 /* append unencrypted MAC */
1254 if (mac && mac->enabled) {
1256 /* EtM: compute mac over aadlen + cipher text */
1257 if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr,
1258 cp, len, macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0)
1260 DBG(debug("done calc MAC(EtM) out #%d",
1261 state->p_send.seqnr));
1263 if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->output, macbuf, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
1267 fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
1268 sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
1270 /* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
1271 if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
1272 logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
1273 if (++state->p_send.packets == 0)
1274 if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
1275 return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
1276 state->p_send.blocks += len / block_size;
1277 state->p_send.bytes += len;
1278 sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
1280 if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
1281 r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
1282 else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side)
1283 r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh);
1290 /* returns non-zero if the specified packet type is usec by KEX */
1292 ssh_packet_type_is_kex(u_char type)
1295 type >= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN &&
1296 type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX &&
1297 type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST &&
1298 type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT &&
1299 type != SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO;
1303 ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *ssh)
1305 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
1310 if (sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) < 6)
1311 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1312 type = sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet)[5];
1313 need_rekey = !ssh_packet_type_is_kex(type) &&
1314 ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet));
1317 * During rekeying we can only send key exchange messages.
1318 * Queue everything else.
1320 if ((need_rekey || state->rekeying) && !ssh_packet_type_is_kex(type)) {
1322 debug3("%s: rekex triggered", __func__);
1323 debug("enqueue packet: %u", type);
1324 p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p));
1326 return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
1328 p->payload = state->outgoing_packet;
1329 TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&state->outgoing, p, next);
1330 state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new();
1331 if (state->outgoing_packet == NULL)
1332 return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
1335 * This packet triggered a rekey, so send the
1337 * NB. reenters this function via kex_start_rekex().
1339 return kex_start_rekex(ssh);
1344 /* rekeying starts with sending KEXINIT */
1345 if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)
1346 state->rekeying = 1;
1348 if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0)
1351 /* after a NEWKEYS message we can send the complete queue */
1352 if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
1353 state->rekeying = 0;
1354 state->rekey_time = monotime();
1355 while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&state->outgoing))) {
1358 * If this packet triggers a rekex, then skip the
1359 * remaining packets in the queue for now.
1360 * NB. re-enters this function via kex_start_rekex.
1362 if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh,
1363 sshbuf_len(p->payload))) {
1364 debug3("%s: queued packet triggered rekex",
1366 return kex_start_rekex(ssh);
1368 debug("dequeue packet: %u", type);
1369 sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
1370 state->outgoing_packet = p->payload;
1371 TAILQ_REMOVE(&state->outgoing, p, next);
1372 memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
1374 if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0)
1382 * Waits until a packet has been received, and returns its type. Note that
1383 * no other data is processed until this returns, so this function should not
1384 * be used during the interactive session.
1388 ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
1390 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
1391 int len, r, ms_remain;
1394 struct timeval timeout, start, *timeoutp = NULL;
1396 DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
1398 setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_in + 1,
1399 NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
1401 return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
1404 * Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have
1407 if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
1410 /* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
1412 /* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
1413 r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
1417 *typep == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS
1418 || *typep == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE
1419 || *typep == SSH_CMSG_EOF
1420 || *typep == SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION))
1421 if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
1423 /* If we got a packet, return it. */
1424 if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
1427 * Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the
1428 * buffer, and try again.
1430 memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_in + 1,
1431 NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
1432 FD_SET(state->connection_in, setp);
1434 if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
1435 ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms;
1436 timeoutp = &timeout;
1438 /* Wait for some data to arrive. */
1440 if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
1441 ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
1442 gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
1444 if ((r = select(state->connection_in + 1, setp,
1445 NULL, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
1447 if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
1448 errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
1450 if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
1452 ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
1453 if (ms_remain <= 0) {
1459 return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
1460 /* Read data from the socket. */
1461 len = read(state->connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
1463 r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
1467 r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
1471 /* Append it to the buffer. */
1472 if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len)) != 0)
1481 ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *ssh)
1486 if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0)
1487 fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1492 * Waits until a packet has been received, verifies that its type matches
1493 * that given, and gives a fatal error and exits if there is a mismatch.
1497 ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *ssh, u_int expected_type)
1502 if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0)
1504 if (type != expected_type) {
1505 if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
1506 "Protocol error: expected packet type %d, got %d",
1507 expected_type, type)) != 0)
1509 return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
1514 /* Checks if a full packet is available in the data received so far via
1515 * packet_process_incoming. If so, reads the packet; otherwise returns
1516 * SSH_MSG_NONE. This does not wait for data from the connection.
1518 * SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT is handled specially here. Also,
1519 * SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages are skipped by this function and are never returned
1524 ssh_packet_read_poll1(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep)
1526 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
1527 u_int len, padded_len;
1531 u_int checksum, stored_checksum;
1534 *typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
1536 /* Check if input size is less than minimum packet size. */
1537 if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + 8)
1539 /* Get length of incoming packet. */
1540 len = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->input));
1541 if (len < 1 + 2 + 2 || len > 256 * 1024) {
1542 if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Bad packet length %u",
1545 return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
1547 padded_len = (len + 8) & ~7;
1549 /* Check if the packet has been entirely received. */
1550 if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + padded_len)
1553 /* The entire packet is in buffer. */
1555 /* Consume packet length. */
1556 if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, 4)) != 0)
1560 * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh
1561 * (C)1998 CORE-SDI, Buenos Aires Argentina
1562 * Ariel Futoransky(futo@core-sdi.com)
1564 if (!state->receive_context.plaintext) {
1566 switch (detect_attack(&state->deattack,
1567 sshbuf_ptr(state->input), padded_len)) {
1570 case DEATTACK_DETECTED:
1571 emsg = "crc32 compensation attack detected";
1573 case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED:
1574 emsg = "deattack denial of service detected";
1577 emsg = "deattack error";
1582 if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "%s", emsg)) != 0 ||
1583 (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
1585 return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
1589 /* Decrypt data to incoming_packet. */
1590 sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
1591 if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, padded_len, &p)) != 0)
1593 if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->receive_context, 0, p,
1594 sshbuf_ptr(state->input), padded_len, 0, 0)) != 0)
1597 if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, padded_len)) != 0)
1601 fprintf(stderr, "read_poll plain: ");
1602 sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
1605 /* Compute packet checksum. */
1606 checksum = ssh_crc32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet),
1607 sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet) - 4);
1610 if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->incoming_packet, 8 - len % 8)) != 0)
1613 /* Test check bytes. */
1614 if (len != sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)) {
1615 error("%s: len %d != sshbuf_len %zd", __func__,
1616 len, sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet));
1617 if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid packet length")) != 0 ||
1618 (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
1620 return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
1623 cp = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet) + len - 4;
1624 stored_checksum = PEEK_U32(cp);
1625 if (checksum != stored_checksum) {
1626 error("Corrupted check bytes on input");
1627 if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "connection corrupted")) != 0 ||
1628 (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
1630 return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
1632 if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->incoming_packet, 4)) < 0)
1635 if (state->packet_compression) {
1636 sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
1637 if ((r = uncompress_buffer(ssh, state->incoming_packet,
1638 state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
1640 sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
1641 if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->incoming_packet,
1642 state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
1645 state->p_read.packets++;
1646 state->p_read.bytes += padded_len + 4;
1647 if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0)
1649 if (*typep < SSH_MSG_MIN || *typep > SSH_MSG_MAX) {
1650 error("Invalid ssh1 packet type: %d", *typep);
1651 if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid packet type")) != 0 ||
1652 (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
1654 return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
1662 ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
1664 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
1666 u_char *cp, macbuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
1667 u_int maclen, aadlen = 0, authlen = 0, block_size;
1668 struct sshenc *enc = NULL;
1669 struct sshmac *mac = NULL;
1670 struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
1673 *typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
1675 if (state->packet_discard)
1678 if (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) {
1679 enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc;
1680 mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac;
1681 comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp;
1682 /* disable mac for authenticated encryption */
1683 if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0)
1686 maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0;
1687 block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
1688 aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0;
1690 if (aadlen && state->packlen == 0) {
1691 if (cipher_get_length(&state->receive_context,
1692 &state->packlen, state->p_read.seqnr,
1693 sshbuf_ptr(state->input), sshbuf_len(state->input)) != 0)
1695 if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
1696 state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
1698 sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
1700 logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen);
1701 if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0)
1703 return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
1705 sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
1706 } else if (state->packlen == 0) {
1708 * check if input size is less than the cipher block size,
1709 * decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet
1711 if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < block_size)
1713 sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
1714 if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, block_size,
1717 if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->receive_context,
1718 state->p_send.seqnr, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->input),
1719 block_size, 0, 0)) != 0)
1721 state->packlen = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet));
1722 if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
1723 state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
1725 fprintf(stderr, "input: \n");
1726 sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
1727 fprintf(stderr, "incoming_packet: \n");
1728 sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
1730 logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen);
1731 return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac,
1732 state->packlen, PACKET_MAX_SIZE);
1734 if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, block_size)) != 0)
1737 DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", state->packlen+4));
1740 /* only the payload is encrypted */
1741 need = state->packlen;
1744 * the payload size and the payload are encrypted, but we
1745 * have a partial packet of block_size bytes
1747 need = 4 + state->packlen - block_size;
1749 DBG(debug("partial packet: block %d, need %d, maclen %d, authlen %d,"
1750 " aadlen %d", block_size, need, maclen, authlen, aadlen));
1751 if (need % block_size != 0) {
1752 logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d",
1753 need, block_size, need % block_size);
1754 return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac,
1755 state->packlen, PACKET_MAX_SIZE - block_size);
1758 * check if the entire packet has been received and
1759 * decrypt into incoming_packet:
1760 * 'aadlen' bytes are unencrypted, but authenticated.
1761 * 'need' bytes are encrypted, followed by either
1762 * 'authlen' bytes of authentication tag or
1763 * 'maclen' bytes of message authentication code.
1765 if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < aadlen + need + authlen + maclen)
1768 fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: ");
1769 sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
1771 /* EtM: compute mac over encrypted input */
1772 if (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) {
1773 if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_read.seqnr,
1774 sshbuf_ptr(state->input), aadlen + need,
1775 macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0)
1778 if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, aadlen + need,
1781 if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->receive_context, state->p_read.seqnr, cp,
1782 sshbuf_ptr(state->input), need, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
1784 if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, aadlen + need + authlen)) != 0)
1787 * compute MAC over seqnr and packet,
1788 * increment sequence number for incoming packet
1790 if (mac && mac->enabled) {
1792 if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_read.seqnr,
1793 sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet),
1794 sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
1795 macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0)
1797 if (timingsafe_bcmp(macbuf, sshbuf_ptr(state->input),
1798 mac->mac_len) != 0) {
1799 logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
1800 if (need > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
1801 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1802 return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac,
1803 state->packlen, PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need);
1806 DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr));
1807 if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
1810 if (seqnr_p != NULL)
1811 *seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr;
1812 if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
1813 logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
1814 if (++state->p_read.packets == 0)
1815 if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
1816 return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
1817 state->p_read.blocks += (state->packlen + 4) / block_size;
1818 state->p_read.bytes += state->packlen + 4;
1821 padlen = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet)[4];
1822 DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen));
1824 if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
1825 "Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen)) != 0 ||
1826 (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
1828 return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
1831 /* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */
1832 if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->incoming_packet, 4 + 1)) != 0 ||
1833 ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->incoming_packet, padlen)) != 0))
1836 DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %zd",
1837 sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)));
1838 if (comp && comp->enabled) {
1839 sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
1840 if ((r = uncompress_buffer(ssh, state->incoming_packet,
1841 state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
1843 sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
1844 if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->incoming_packet,
1845 state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
1847 DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %zd",
1848 sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)));
1851 * get packet type, implies consume.
1852 * return length of payload (without type field)
1854 if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0)
1856 if (ssh_packet_log_type(*typep))
1857 debug3("receive packet: type %u", *typep);
1858 if (*typep < SSH2_MSG_MIN || *typep >= SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN) {
1859 if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
1860 "Invalid ssh2 packet type: %d", *typep)) != 0 ||
1861 (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
1863 return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
1865 if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
1866 r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN);
1867 else if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && !state->server_side)
1868 r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh);
1872 fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", *typep);
1873 sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
1875 /* reset for next packet */
1878 /* do we need to rekey? */
1879 if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, 0)) {
1880 debug3("%s: rekex triggered", __func__);
1881 if ((r = kex_start_rekex(ssh)) != 0)
1889 ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
1891 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
1892 u_int reason, seqnr;
1899 r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
1903 state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
1904 DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
1907 case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
1908 debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
1910 case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG:
1911 if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 ||
1912 (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
1913 (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
1917 debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
1920 case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
1921 if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
1922 (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
1924 /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
1925 do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
1926 reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
1927 SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
1928 "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
1929 "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
1930 ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
1932 return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
1933 case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
1934 if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0)
1936 debug("Received SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for %u",
1943 r = ssh_packet_read_poll1(ssh, typep);
1946 return SSH_MSG_NONE;
1947 case SSH_MSG_IGNORE:
1950 if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
1952 debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
1955 case SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT:
1956 if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
1958 logit("Received disconnect from %s port %d: "
1959 "%.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
1960 ssh_remote_port(ssh), msg);
1962 return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
1964 DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
1972 * Buffers the given amount of input characters. This is intended to be used
1973 * together with packet_read_poll.
1977 ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *ssh, const char *buf, u_int len)
1979 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
1982 if (state->packet_discard) {
1983 state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; /* ?? */
1984 if (len >= state->packet_discard) {
1985 if ((r = ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh)) != 0)
1988 state->packet_discard -= len;
1991 if ((r = sshbuf_put(ssh->state->input, buf, len)) != 0)
1998 ssh_packet_remaining(struct ssh *ssh)
2000 return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet);
2004 * Sends a diagnostic message from the server to the client. This message
2005 * can be sent at any time (but not while constructing another message). The
2006 * message is printed immediately, but only if the client is being executed
2007 * in verbose mode. These messages are primarily intended to ease debugging
2008 * authentication problems. The length of the formatted message must not
2009 * exceed 1024 bytes. This will automatically call ssh_packet_write_wait.
2012 ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
2018 if (compat20 && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DEBUG))
2021 va_start(args, fmt);
2022 vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
2026 if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DEBUG)) != 0 ||
2027 (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* always display */
2028 (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
2029 (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
2030 (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
2031 fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
2033 if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH_MSG_DEBUG)) != 0 ||
2034 (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
2035 (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
2036 fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
2038 if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
2039 fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
2043 * Pretty-print connection-terminating errors and exit.
2046 sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r)
2049 case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED:
2050 logit("Connection closed by %.200s port %d",
2051 ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
2053 case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
2054 logit("Connection %s %.200s port %d timed out",
2055 ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to",
2056 ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
2058 case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
2059 logit("Disconnected from %.200s port %d",
2060 ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
2062 case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
2063 if (errno == ECONNRESET) {
2064 logit("Connection reset by %.200s port %d",
2065 ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
2069 case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH:
2070 case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH:
2071 case SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH:
2072 case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH:
2073 case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH:
2074 if (ssh && ssh->kex && ssh->kex->failed_choice) {
2075 BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL);
2076 fatal("Unable to negotiate with %.200s port %d: %s. "
2077 "Their offer: %s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
2078 ssh_remote_port(ssh), ssh_err(r),
2079 ssh->kex->failed_choice);
2083 fatal("%s%sConnection %s %.200s port %d: %s",
2084 tag != NULL ? tag : "", tag != NULL ? ": " : "",
2085 ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to",
2086 ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), ssh_err(r));
2091 * Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the
2092 * connection, and exits. This function never returns. The error message
2093 * should not contain a newline. The length of the formatted message must
2094 * not exceed 1024 bytes.
2097 ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
2101 static int disconnecting = 0;
2104 if (disconnecting) /* Guard against recursive invocations. */
2105 fatal("packet_disconnect called recursively.");
2109 * Format the message. Note that the caller must make sure the
2110 * message is of limited size.
2112 va_start(args, fmt);
2113 vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
2116 /* Display the error locally */
2117 logit("Disconnecting: %.100s", buf);
2120 * Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait
2121 * for it to get sent.
2123 if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "%s", buf)) != 0)
2124 sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r);
2126 if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
2127 sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r);
2129 /* Close the connection. */
2130 ssh_packet_close(ssh);
2135 * Checks if there is any buffered output, and tries to write some of
2139 ssh_packet_write_poll(struct ssh *ssh)
2141 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
2142 int len = sshbuf_len(state->output);
2146 len = write(state->connection_out,
2147 sshbuf_ptr(state->output), len);
2149 if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
2150 errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
2152 return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
2155 return SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
2156 if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->output, len)) != 0)
2163 * Calls packet_write_poll repeatedly until all pending output data has been
2167 ssh_packet_write_wait(struct ssh *ssh)
2170 int ret, r, ms_remain = 0;
2171 struct timeval start, timeout, *timeoutp = NULL;
2172 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
2174 setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_out + 1,
2175 NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
2177 return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
2178 if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
2182 while (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) {
2183 memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_out + 1,
2184 NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
2185 FD_SET(state->connection_out, setp);
2187 if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
2188 ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms;
2189 timeoutp = &timeout;
2192 if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
2193 ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
2194 gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
2196 if ((ret = select(state->connection_out + 1,
2197 NULL, setp, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
2199 if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
2200 errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
2202 if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
2204 ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
2205 if (ms_remain <= 0) {
2212 return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
2214 if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
2223 /* Returns true if there is buffered data to write to the connection. */
2226 ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh)
2228 return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) != 0;
2231 /* Returns true if there is not too much data to write to the connection. */
2234 ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh)
2236 if (ssh->state->interactive_mode)
2237 return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 16384;
2239 return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 128 * 1024;
2243 ssh_packet_set_tos(struct ssh *ssh, int tos)
2245 #ifndef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN
2246 if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh))
2248 switch (ssh_packet_connection_af(ssh)) {
2251 debug3("%s: set IP_TOS 0x%02x", __func__, tos);
2252 if (setsockopt(ssh->state->connection_in,
2253 IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) < 0)
2254 error("setsockopt IP_TOS %d: %.100s:",
2255 tos, strerror(errno));
2257 # endif /* IP_TOS */
2260 debug3("%s: set IPV6_TCLASS 0x%02x", __func__, tos);
2261 if (setsockopt(ssh->state->connection_in,
2262 IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_TCLASS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) < 0)
2263 error("setsockopt IPV6_TCLASS %d: %.100s:",
2264 tos, strerror(errno));
2266 # endif /* IPV6_TCLASS */
2268 #endif /* IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN */
2271 /* Informs that the current session is interactive. Sets IP flags for that. */
2274 ssh_packet_set_interactive(struct ssh *ssh, int interactive, int qos_interactive, int qos_bulk)
2276 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
2278 if (state->set_interactive_called)
2280 state->set_interactive_called = 1;
2282 /* Record that we are in interactive mode. */
2283 state->interactive_mode = interactive;
2285 /* Only set socket options if using a socket. */
2286 if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh))
2288 set_nodelay(state->connection_in);
2289 ssh_packet_set_tos(ssh, interactive ? qos_interactive :
2293 /* Returns true if the current connection is interactive. */
2296 ssh_packet_is_interactive(struct ssh *ssh)
2298 return ssh->state->interactive_mode;
2302 ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh, u_int s)
2304 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
2306 if (state->set_maxsize_called) {
2307 logit("packet_set_maxsize: called twice: old %d new %d",
2308 state->max_packet_size, s);
2311 if (s < 4 * 1024 || s > 1024 * 1024) {
2312 logit("packet_set_maxsize: bad size %d", s);
2315 state->set_maxsize_called = 1;
2316 debug("packet_set_maxsize: setting to %d", s);
2317 state->max_packet_size = s;
2322 ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh)
2324 return ++ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts;
2328 ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh, int ka)
2330 ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts = ka;
2334 ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh)
2336 return ssh->state->max_packet_size;
2340 * 9.2. Ignored Data Message
2342 * byte SSH_MSG_IGNORE
2345 * All implementations MUST understand (and ignore) this message at any
2346 * time (after receiving the protocol version). No implementation is
2347 * required to send them. This message can be used as an additional
2348 * protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques.
2351 ssh_packet_send_ignore(struct ssh *ssh, int nbytes)
2356 if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, compat20 ?
2357 SSH2_MSG_IGNORE : SSH_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
2358 (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbytes)) != 0)
2359 fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
2360 for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) {
2363 if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, (u_char)rnd & 0xff)) != 0)
2364 fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
2370 ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t bytes, time_t seconds)
2372 debug3("rekey after %llu bytes, %d seconds", (unsigned long long)bytes,
2374 ssh->state->rekey_limit = bytes;
2375 ssh->state->rekey_interval = seconds;
2379 ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *ssh)
2383 seconds = ssh->state->rekey_time + ssh->state->rekey_interval -
2385 return (seconds <= 0 ? 1 : seconds);
2389 ssh_packet_set_server(struct ssh *ssh)
2391 ssh->state->server_side = 1;
2395 ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh)
2397 ssh->state->after_authentication = 1;
2401 ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *ssh)
2403 return (void *)ssh->state->input;
2407 ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh)
2409 return (void *)ssh->state->output;
2412 /* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */
2414 ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh)
2416 struct sshcomp *comp;
2419 debug("%s: called", __func__);
2420 /* This was set in net child, but is not visible in user child */
2421 ssh->state->after_authentication = 1;
2422 ssh->state->rekeying = 0;
2423 for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
2424 if (ssh->state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
2426 comp = &ssh->state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
2427 if (comp && comp->enabled &&
2428 (r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0)
2434 /* Packet state (de-)serialization for privsep */
2436 /* turn kex into a blob for packet state serialization */
2438 kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex)
2442 if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, kex->session_id,
2443 kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
2444 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->we_need)) != 0 ||
2445 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
2446 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
2447 (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
2448 (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
2449 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->flags)) != 0 ||
2450 (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, kex->client_version_string)) != 0 ||
2451 (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, kex->server_version_string)) != 0)
2456 /* turn key exchange results into a blob for packet state serialization */
2458 newkeys_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
2461 struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
2462 struct sshcomp *comp;
2465 struct newkeys *newkey;
2468 if ((newkey = ssh->state->newkeys[mode]) == NULL)
2469 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2472 comp = &newkey->comp;
2473 cc = (mode == MODE_OUT) ? &ssh->state->send_context :
2474 &ssh->state->receive_context;
2475 if ((r = cipher_get_keyiv(cc, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0)
2477 if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
2478 return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
2479 /* The cipher struct is constant and shared, you export pointer */
2480 if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, enc->name)) != 0 ||
2481 (r = sshbuf_put(b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher))) != 0 ||
2482 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->enabled)) != 0 ||
2483 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->block_size)) != 0 ||
2484 (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->key, enc->key_len)) != 0 ||
2485 (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0)
2487 if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
2488 if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, mac->name)) != 0 ||
2489 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, mac->enabled)) != 0 ||
2490 (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, mac->key, mac->key_len)) != 0)
2493 if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, comp->type)) != 0 ||
2494 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, comp->enabled)) != 0 ||
2495 (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comp->name)) != 0)
2497 r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b);
2503 /* serialize packet state into a blob */
2505 ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
2507 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
2513 ssh1cipher = cipher_get_number(state->receive_context.cipher);
2514 slen = cipher_get_keyiv_len(&state->send_context);
2515 rlen = cipher_get_keyiv_len(&state->receive_context);
2516 if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->remote_protocol_flags)) != 0 ||
2517 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ssh1cipher)) != 0 ||
2518 (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, state->ssh1_key, state->ssh1_keylen)) != 0 ||
2519 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, slen)) != 0 ||
2520 (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, slen, &p)) != 0 ||
2521 (r = cipher_get_keyiv(&state->send_context, p, slen)) != 0 ||
2522 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, rlen)) != 0 ||
2523 (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, rlen, &p)) != 0 ||
2524 (r = cipher_get_keyiv(&state->receive_context, p, rlen)) != 0)
2527 if ((r = kex_to_blob(m, ssh->kex)) != 0 ||
2528 (r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 ||
2529 (r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
2530 (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->rekey_limit)) != 0 ||
2531 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->rekey_interval)) != 0 ||
2532 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 ||
2533 (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 ||
2534 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.packets)) != 0 ||
2535 (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 ||
2536 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 ||
2537 (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 ||
2538 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.packets)) != 0 ||
2539 (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.bytes)) != 0)
2543 slen = cipher_get_keycontext(&state->send_context, NULL);
2544 rlen = cipher_get_keycontext(&state->receive_context, NULL);
2545 if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, slen)) != 0 ||
2546 (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, slen, &p)) != 0)
2548 if (cipher_get_keycontext(&state->send_context, p) != (int)slen)
2549 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2550 if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, rlen)) != 0 ||
2551 (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, rlen, &p)) != 0)
2553 if (cipher_get_keycontext(&state->receive_context, p) != (int)rlen)
2554 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2556 if ((r = ssh_packet_get_compress_state(m, ssh)) != 0 ||
2557 (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->input)) != 0 ||
2558 (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->output)) != 0)
2564 /* restore key exchange results from blob for packet state de-serialization */
2566 newkeys_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
2568 struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
2569 struct sshcomp *comp;
2572 struct newkeys *newkey = NULL;
2573 size_t keylen, ivlen, maclen;
2576 if ((newkey = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkey))) == NULL) {
2577 r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
2580 if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0)
2583 sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
2587 comp = &newkey->comp;
2589 if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &enc->name, NULL)) != 0 ||
2590 (r = sshbuf_get(b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher))) != 0 ||
2591 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&enc->enabled)) != 0 ||
2592 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &enc->block_size)) != 0 ||
2593 (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->key, &keylen)) != 0 ||
2594 (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->iv, &ivlen)) != 0)
2596 if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
2597 if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &mac->name, NULL)) != 0)
2599 if ((r = mac_setup(mac, mac->name)) != 0)
2601 if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&mac->enabled)) != 0 ||
2602 (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &mac->key, &maclen)) != 0)
2604 if (maclen > mac->key_len) {
2605 r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
2608 mac->key_len = maclen;
2610 if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &comp->type)) != 0 ||
2611 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&comp->enabled)) != 0 ||
2612 (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &comp->name, NULL)) != 0)
2614 if (enc->name == NULL ||
2615 cipher_by_name(enc->name) != enc->cipher) {
2616 r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
2619 if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
2620 r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
2623 enc->key_len = keylen;
2624 enc->iv_len = ivlen;
2625 ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = newkey;
2634 /* restore kex from blob for packet state de-serialization */
2636 kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp)
2641 if ((kex = calloc(1, sizeof(struct kex))) == NULL ||
2642 (kex->my = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
2643 (kex->peer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
2644 r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
2647 if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &kex->session_id, &kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
2648 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->we_need)) != 0 ||
2649 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
2650 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
2651 (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
2652 (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
2653 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->flags)) != 0 ||
2654 (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &kex->client_version_string, NULL)) != 0 ||
2655 (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &kex->server_version_string, NULL)) != 0)
2661 if (r != 0 || kexp == NULL) {
2663 sshbuf_free(kex->my);
2664 sshbuf_free(kex->peer);
2676 * Restore packet state from content of blob 'm' (de-serialization).
2677 * Note that 'm' will be partially consumed on parsing or any other errors.
2680 ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
2682 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
2683 const u_char *ssh1key, *ivin, *ivout, *keyin, *keyout, *input, *output;
2684 size_t ssh1keylen, rlen, slen, ilen, olen;
2686 u_int ssh1cipher = 0;
2689 if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->remote_protocol_flags)) != 0 ||
2690 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ssh1cipher)) != 0 ||
2691 (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ssh1key, &ssh1keylen)) != 0 ||
2692 (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ivout, &slen)) != 0 ||
2693 (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ivin, &rlen)) != 0)
2695 if (ssh1cipher > INT_MAX)
2696 return SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
2697 ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(ssh, ssh1key, ssh1keylen,
2699 if (cipher_get_keyiv_len(&state->send_context) != (int)slen ||
2700 cipher_get_keyiv_len(&state->receive_context) != (int)rlen)
2701 return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
2702 if ((r = cipher_set_keyiv(&state->send_context, ivout)) != 0 ||
2703 (r = cipher_set_keyiv(&state->receive_context, ivin)) != 0)
2706 if ((r = kex_from_blob(m, &ssh->kex)) != 0 ||
2707 (r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 ||
2708 (r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
2709 (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->rekey_limit)) != 0 ||
2710 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->rekey_interval)) != 0 ||
2711 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 ||
2712 (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 ||
2713 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.packets)) != 0 ||
2714 (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 ||
2715 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 ||
2716 (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 ||
2717 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.packets)) != 0 ||
2718 (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.bytes)) != 0)
2721 * We set the time here so that in post-auth privsep slave we
2722 * count from the completion of the authentication.
2724 state->rekey_time = monotime();
2725 /* XXX ssh_set_newkeys overrides p_read.packets? XXX */
2726 if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
2727 (r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0)
2730 if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &keyout, &slen)) != 0 ||
2731 (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &keyin, &rlen)) != 0)
2733 if (cipher_get_keycontext(&state->send_context, NULL) != (int)slen ||
2734 cipher_get_keycontext(&state->receive_context, NULL) != (int)rlen)
2735 return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
2736 cipher_set_keycontext(&state->send_context, keyout);
2737 cipher_set_keycontext(&state->receive_context, keyin);
2739 if ((r = ssh_packet_set_compress_state(ssh, m)) != 0 ||
2740 (r = ssh_packet_set_postauth(ssh)) != 0)
2743 sshbuf_reset(state->input);
2744 sshbuf_reset(state->output);
2745 if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &input, &ilen)) != 0 ||
2746 (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &output, &olen)) != 0 ||
2747 (r = sshbuf_put(state->input, input, ilen)) != 0 ||
2748 (r = sshbuf_put(state->output, output, olen)) != 0)
2752 return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
2753 debug3("%s: done", __func__);
2759 /* put data to the outgoing packet */
2762 sshpkt_put(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len)
2764 return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len);
2768 sshpkt_putb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *b)
2770 return sshbuf_putb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, b);
2774 sshpkt_put_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char val)
2776 return sshbuf_put_u8(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val);
2780 sshpkt_put_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t val)
2782 return sshbuf_put_u32(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val);
2786 sshpkt_put_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t val)
2788 return sshbuf_put_u64(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val);
2792 sshpkt_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len)
2794 return sshbuf_put_string(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len);
2798 sshpkt_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v)
2800 return sshbuf_put_cstring(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
2804 sshpkt_put_stringb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *v)
2806 return sshbuf_put_stringb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
2810 #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
2812 sshpkt_put_ec(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
2814 return sshbuf_put_ec(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, g);
2816 #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
2820 sshpkt_put_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v)
2822 return sshbuf_put_bignum1(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
2824 #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
2827 sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v)
2829 return sshbuf_put_bignum2(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
2831 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
2833 /* fetch data from the incoming packet */
2836 sshpkt_get(struct ssh *ssh, void *valp, size_t len)
2838 return sshbuf_get(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, len);
2842 sshpkt_get_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *valp)
2844 return sshbuf_get_u8(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
2848 sshpkt_get_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t *valp)
2850 return sshbuf_get_u32(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
2854 sshpkt_get_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *valp)
2856 return sshbuf_get_u64(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
2860 sshpkt_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
2862 return sshbuf_get_string(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
2866 sshpkt_get_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
2868 return sshbuf_get_string_direct(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
2872 sshpkt_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, char **valp, size_t *lenp)
2874 return sshbuf_get_cstring(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
2878 #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
2880 sshpkt_get_ec(struct ssh *ssh, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
2882 return sshbuf_get_ec(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v, g);
2884 #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
2888 sshpkt_get_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v)
2890 return sshbuf_get_bignum1(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v);
2892 #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
2895 sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v)
2897 return sshbuf_get_bignum2(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v);
2899 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
2902 sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh)
2904 if (sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet) > 0)
2905 return SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
2910 sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp)
2913 *lenp = sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet);
2914 return sshbuf_ptr(ssh->state->incoming_packet);
2917 /* start a new packet */
2920 sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type)
2925 DBG(debug("packet_start[%d]", type));
2926 len = compat20 ? 6 : 9;
2927 memset(buf, 0, len - 1);
2928 buf[len - 1] = type;
2929 sshbuf_reset(ssh->state->outgoing_packet);
2930 return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, buf, len);
2936 sshpkt_send(struct ssh *ssh)
2939 return ssh_packet_send2(ssh);
2941 return ssh_packet_send1(ssh);
2945 sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
2951 va_start(args, fmt);
2952 vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
2956 if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
2957 (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 ||
2958 (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
2959 (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
2960 (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
2963 if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
2964 (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
2965 (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
2971 /* roundup current message to pad bytes */
2973 sshpkt_add_padding(struct ssh *ssh, u_char pad)
2975 ssh->state->extra_pad = pad;