1 /* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.243 2016/10/11 21:47:45 djm Exp $ */
3 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
4 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
6 * This file contains code implementing the packet protocol and communication
7 * with the other side. This same code is used both on client and server side.
9 * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
10 * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
11 * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
12 * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
13 * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
16 * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl.
17 * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
19 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
20 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
22 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
23 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
24 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
25 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
26 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
28 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
29 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
30 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
31 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
32 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
33 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
34 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
35 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
36 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
37 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
43 #include <sys/types.h>
44 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
45 #include <sys/socket.h>
46 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
47 # include <sys/time.h>
50 #include <netinet/in.h>
51 #include <netinet/ip.h>
52 #include <arpa/inet.h>
67 #include "buffer.h" /* typedefs XXX */
68 #include "key.h" /* typedefs XXX */
89 #include "blacklist_client.h"
97 #define PACKET_MAX_SIZE (256 * 1024)
107 TAILQ_ENTRY(packet) next;
109 struct sshbuf *payload;
112 struct session_state {
114 * This variable contains the file descriptors used for
115 * communicating with the other side. connection_in is used for
116 * reading; connection_out for writing. These can be the same
117 * descriptor, in which case it is assumed to be a socket.
122 /* Protocol flags for the remote side. */
123 u_int remote_protocol_flags;
125 /* Encryption context for receiving data. Only used for decryption. */
126 struct sshcipher_ctx *receive_context;
128 /* Encryption context for sending data. Only used for encryption. */
129 struct sshcipher_ctx *send_context;
131 /* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */
132 struct sshbuf *input;
134 /* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */
135 struct sshbuf *output;
137 /* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */
138 struct sshbuf *outgoing_packet;
140 /* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */
141 struct sshbuf *incoming_packet;
143 /* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */
144 struct sshbuf *compression_buffer;
146 /* Incoming/outgoing compression dictionaries */
147 z_stream compression_in_stream;
148 z_stream compression_out_stream;
149 int compression_in_started;
150 int compression_out_started;
151 int compression_in_failures;
152 int compression_out_failures;
155 * Flag indicating whether packet compression/decompression is
158 int packet_compression;
160 /* default maximum packet size */
161 u_int max_packet_size;
163 /* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */
166 /* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */
167 int interactive_mode;
169 /* Set to true if we are the server side. */
172 /* Set to true if we are authenticated. */
173 int after_authentication;
175 int keep_alive_timeouts;
177 /* The maximum time that we will wait to send or receive a packet */
178 int packet_timeout_ms;
180 /* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */
181 struct newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
182 struct packet_state p_read, p_send;
184 /* Volume-based rekeying */
185 u_int64_t max_blocks_in, max_blocks_out, rekey_limit;
187 /* Time-based rekeying */
188 u_int32_t rekey_interval; /* how often in seconds */
189 time_t rekey_time; /* time of last rekeying */
191 /* Session key for protocol v1 */
192 u_char ssh1_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
195 /* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */
198 /* XXX discard incoming data after MAC error */
199 u_int packet_discard;
200 size_t packet_discard_mac_already;
201 struct sshmac *packet_discard_mac;
203 /* Used in packet_read_poll2() */
206 /* Used in packet_send2 */
209 /* Used in ssh_packet_send_mux() */
212 /* Used in packet_set_interactive */
213 int set_interactive_called;
215 /* Used in packet_set_maxsize */
216 int set_maxsize_called;
218 /* One-off warning about weak ciphers */
219 int cipher_warning_done;
221 /* SSH1 CRC compensation attack detector */
222 struct deattack_ctx deattack;
224 /* Hook for fuzzing inbound packets */
225 ssh_packet_hook_fn *hook_in;
228 TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
232 ssh_alloc_session_state(void)
234 struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
235 struct session_state *state = NULL;
237 if ((ssh = calloc(1, sizeof(*ssh))) == NULL ||
238 (state = calloc(1, sizeof(*state))) == NULL ||
239 (state->input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
240 (state->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
241 (state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
242 (state->incoming_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
244 TAILQ_INIT(&state->outgoing);
245 TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->private_keys);
246 TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->public_keys);
247 state->connection_in = -1;
248 state->connection_out = -1;
249 state->max_packet_size = 32768;
250 state->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
251 state->p_send.packets = state->p_read.packets = 0;
252 state->initialized = 1;
254 * ssh_packet_send2() needs to queue packets until
255 * we've done the initial key exchange.
262 sshbuf_free(state->input);
263 sshbuf_free(state->output);
264 sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet);
265 sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
273 ssh_packet_set_input_hook(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_packet_hook_fn *hook, void *ctx)
275 ssh->state->hook_in = hook;
276 ssh->state->hook_in_ctx = ctx;
279 /* Returns nonzero if rekeying is in progress */
281 ssh_packet_is_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh)
284 (ssh->state->rekeying || (ssh->kex != NULL && ssh->kex->done == 0));
288 * Sets the descriptors used for communication. Disables encryption until
289 * packet_set_encryption_key is called.
292 ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out)
294 struct session_state *state;
295 const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
299 error("%s: cannot load cipher 'none'", __func__);
303 ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state();
305 error("%s: cound not allocate state", __func__);
309 state->connection_in = fd_in;
310 state->connection_out = fd_out;
311 if ((r = cipher_init(&state->send_context, none,
312 (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 ||
313 (r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, none,
314 (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) {
315 error("%s: cipher_init failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
316 free(ssh); /* XXX need ssh_free_session_state? */
319 state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
320 deattack_init(&state->deattack);
322 * Cache the IP address of the remote connection for use in error
323 * messages that might be generated after the connection has closed.
325 (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
330 ssh_packet_set_timeout(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout, int count)
332 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
334 if (timeout <= 0 || count <= 0) {
335 state->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
338 if ((INT_MAX / 1000) / count < timeout)
339 state->packet_timeout_ms = INT_MAX;
341 state->packet_timeout_ms = timeout * count * 1000;
345 ssh_packet_set_mux(struct ssh *ssh)
348 ssh->state->rekeying = 0;
352 ssh_packet_get_mux(struct ssh *ssh)
354 return ssh->state->mux;
358 ssh_packet_stop_discard(struct ssh *ssh)
360 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
363 if (state->packet_discard_mac) {
365 size_t dlen = PACKET_MAX_SIZE;
367 if (dlen > state->packet_discard_mac_already)
368 dlen -= state->packet_discard_mac_already;
369 memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf));
370 while (sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet) < dlen)
371 if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->incoming_packet, buf,
374 (void) mac_compute(state->packet_discard_mac,
376 sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet), dlen,
379 logit("Finished discarding for %.200s port %d",
380 ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
381 return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
385 ssh_packet_start_discard(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshenc *enc,
386 struct sshmac *mac, size_t mac_already, u_int discard)
388 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
391 if (enc == NULL || !cipher_is_cbc(enc->cipher) || (mac && mac->etm)) {
392 if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0)
394 return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
397 * Record number of bytes over which the mac has already
398 * been computed in order to minimize timing attacks.
400 if (mac && mac->enabled) {
401 state->packet_discard_mac = mac;
402 state->packet_discard_mac_already = mac_already;
404 if (sshbuf_len(state->input) >= discard)
405 return ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh);
406 state->packet_discard = discard - sshbuf_len(state->input);
410 /* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */
413 ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *ssh)
415 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
416 struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
417 socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
419 if (state->connection_in == -1 || state->connection_out == -1)
422 /* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
423 if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out)
425 fromlen = sizeof(from);
426 memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
427 if (getpeername(state->connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
431 memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
432 if (getpeername(state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to,
435 if (fromlen != tolen || memcmp(&from, &to, fromlen) != 0)
437 if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6)
443 ssh_packet_get_bytes(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *ibytes, u_int64_t *obytes)
446 *ibytes = ssh->state->p_read.bytes;
448 *obytes = ssh->state->p_send.bytes;
452 ssh_packet_connection_af(struct ssh *ssh)
454 struct sockaddr_storage to;
455 socklen_t tolen = sizeof(to);
457 memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
458 if (getsockname(ssh->state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to,
462 if (to.ss_family == AF_INET6 &&
463 IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&to)->sin6_addr))
469 /* Sets the connection into non-blocking mode. */
472 ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(struct ssh *ssh)
474 /* Set the socket into non-blocking mode. */
475 set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_in);
477 if (ssh->state->connection_out != ssh->state->connection_in)
478 set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_out);
481 /* Returns the socket used for reading. */
484 ssh_packet_get_connection_in(struct ssh *ssh)
486 return ssh->state->connection_in;
489 /* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */
492 ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *ssh)
494 return ssh->state->connection_out;
498 * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned
499 * string must not be freed.
503 ssh_remote_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh)
505 const int sock = ssh->state->connection_in;
507 /* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */
508 if (ssh->remote_ipaddr == NULL) {
509 if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
510 ssh->remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(sock);
511 ssh->remote_port = get_peer_port(sock);
512 ssh->local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock);
513 ssh->local_port = get_local_port(sock);
515 ssh->remote_ipaddr = strdup("UNKNOWN");
516 ssh->remote_port = 65535;
517 ssh->local_ipaddr = strdup("UNKNOWN");
518 ssh->local_port = 65535;
521 return ssh->remote_ipaddr;
524 /* Returns the port number of the remote host. */
527 ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *ssh)
529 (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */
530 return ssh->remote_port;
534 * Returns the IP-address of the local host as a string. The returned
535 * string must not be freed.
539 ssh_local_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh)
541 (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */
542 return ssh->local_ipaddr;
545 /* Returns the port number of the local host. */
548 ssh_local_port(struct ssh *ssh)
550 (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */
551 return ssh->local_port;
554 /* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
557 ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh)
559 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
562 if (!state->initialized)
564 state->initialized = 0;
565 if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) {
566 shutdown(state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
567 close(state->connection_out);
569 close(state->connection_in);
570 close(state->connection_out);
572 sshbuf_free(state->input);
573 sshbuf_free(state->output);
574 sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
575 sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet);
576 for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++)
577 kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]);
578 if (state->compression_buffer) {
579 sshbuf_free(state->compression_buffer);
580 if (state->compression_out_started) {
581 z_streamp stream = &state->compression_out_stream;
582 debug("compress outgoing: "
583 "raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
584 (unsigned long long)stream->total_in,
585 (unsigned long long)stream->total_out,
586 stream->total_in == 0 ? 0.0 :
587 (double) stream->total_out / stream->total_in);
588 if (state->compression_out_failures == 0)
591 if (state->compression_in_started) {
592 z_streamp stream = &state->compression_out_stream;
593 debug("compress incoming: "
594 "raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
595 (unsigned long long)stream->total_out,
596 (unsigned long long)stream->total_in,
597 stream->total_out == 0 ? 0.0 :
598 (double) stream->total_in / stream->total_out);
599 if (state->compression_in_failures == 0)
603 cipher_free(state->send_context);
604 cipher_free(state->receive_context);
605 state->send_context = state->receive_context = NULL;
606 free(ssh->remote_ipaddr);
607 ssh->remote_ipaddr = NULL;
612 /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
615 ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh, u_int protocol_flags)
617 ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags;
620 /* Returns the remote protocol flags set earlier by the above function. */
623 ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh)
625 return ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags;
629 * Starts packet compression from the next packet on in both directions.
630 * Level is compression level 1 (fastest) - 9 (slow, best) as in gzip.
634 ssh_packet_init_compression(struct ssh *ssh)
636 if (!ssh->state->compression_buffer &&
637 ((ssh->state->compression_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL))
638 return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
643 start_compression_out(struct ssh *ssh, int level)
645 if (level < 1 || level > 9)
646 return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
647 debug("Enabling compression at level %d.", level);
648 if (ssh->state->compression_out_started == 1)
649 deflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream);
650 switch (deflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream, level)) {
652 ssh->state->compression_out_started = 1;
655 return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
657 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
663 start_compression_in(struct ssh *ssh)
665 if (ssh->state->compression_in_started == 1)
666 inflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream);
667 switch (inflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream)) {
669 ssh->state->compression_in_started = 1;
672 return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
674 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
680 ssh_packet_start_compression(struct ssh *ssh, int level)
684 if (ssh->state->packet_compression && !compat20)
685 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
686 ssh->state->packet_compression = 1;
687 if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0 ||
688 (r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0 ||
689 (r = start_compression_out(ssh, level)) != 0)
694 /* XXX remove need for separate compression buffer */
696 compress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
701 if (ssh->state->compression_out_started != 1)
702 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
704 /* This case is not handled below. */
705 if (sshbuf_len(in) == 0)
708 /* Input is the contents of the input buffer. */
709 if ((ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_in =
710 sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL)
711 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
712 ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in);
714 /* Loop compressing until deflate() returns with avail_out != 0. */
716 /* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */
717 ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_out = buf;
718 ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf);
720 /* Compress as much data into the buffer as possible. */
721 status = deflate(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream,
725 return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
727 /* Append compressed data to output_buffer. */
728 if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) -
729 ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out)) != 0)
734 ssh->state->compression_out_failures++;
735 return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
737 } while (ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out == 0);
742 uncompress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
747 if (ssh->state->compression_in_started != 1)
748 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
750 if ((ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_in =
751 sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL)
752 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
753 ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in);
756 /* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */
757 ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_out = buf;
758 ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf);
760 status = inflate(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream,
764 if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) -
765 ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out)) != 0)
770 * Comments in zlib.h say that we should keep calling
771 * inflate() until we get an error. This appears to
772 * be the error that we get.
776 return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
778 return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
781 ssh->state->compression_in_failures++;
782 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
789 * Causes any further packets to be encrypted using the given key. The same
790 * key is used for both sending and reception. However, both directions are
791 * encrypted independently of each other.
795 ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *key, u_int keylen, int number)
798 fatal("no SSH protocol 1 support");
799 #else /* WITH_SSH1 */
800 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
801 const struct sshcipher *cipher = cipher_by_number(number);
806 fatal("%s: unknown cipher number %d", __func__, number);
808 fatal("%s: keylen too small: %d", __func__, keylen);
809 if (keylen > SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH)
810 fatal("%s: keylen too big: %d", __func__, keylen);
811 memcpy(state->ssh1_key, key, keylen);
812 state->ssh1_keylen = keylen;
813 if ((r = cipher_init(&state->send_context, cipher, key, keylen,
814 NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 ||
815 (r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, cipher, key, keylen,
816 NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT) != 0))
817 fatal("%s: cipher_init failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
818 if (!state->cipher_warning_done &&
819 ((wmsg = cipher_warning_message(state->send_context)) != NULL ||
820 (wmsg = cipher_warning_message(state->send_context)) != NULL)) {
821 error("Warning: %s", wmsg);
822 state->cipher_warning_done = 1;
824 #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
828 * Finalizes and sends the packet. If the encryption key has been set,
829 * encrypts the packet before sending.
833 ssh_packet_send1(struct ssh *ssh)
835 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
841 * If using packet compression, compress the payload of the outgoing
844 if (state->packet_compression) {
845 sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
847 if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 8)) != 0)
850 if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->compression_buffer,
851 "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8)) != 0)
853 if ((r = compress_buffer(ssh, state->outgoing_packet,
854 state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
856 sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
857 if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->outgoing_packet,
858 state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
861 /* Compute packet length without padding (add checksum, remove padding). */
862 len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) + 4 - 8;
864 /* Insert padding. Initialized to zero in packet_start1() */
865 padding = 8 - len % 8;
866 if (!cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(state->send_context)) {
867 cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet);
869 r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
872 arc4random_buf(cp + 8 - padding, padding);
874 if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 8 - padding)) != 0)
877 /* Add check bytes. */
878 checksum = ssh_crc32(sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet),
879 sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet));
880 POKE_U32(buf, checksum);
881 if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->outgoing_packet, buf, 4)) != 0)
885 fprintf(stderr, "packet_send plain: ");
886 sshbuf_dump(state->outgoing_packet, stderr);
889 /* Append to output. */
891 if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->output, buf, 4)) != 0)
893 if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->output,
894 sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet), &cp)) != 0)
896 if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->send_context, 0, cp,
897 sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet),
898 sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet), 0, 0)) != 0)
902 fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
903 sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
905 state->p_send.packets++;
906 state->p_send.bytes += len +
907 sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
908 sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
911 * Note that the packet is now only buffered in output. It won't be
912 * actually sent until ssh_packet_write_wait or ssh_packet_write_poll
921 ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
923 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
926 struct sshcomp *comp;
927 struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp;
928 struct packet_state *ps;
929 u_int64_t *max_blocks;
930 const char *wmsg, *dir;
933 debug2("set_newkeys: mode %d", mode);
935 if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
937 ccp = &state->send_context;
938 crypt_type = CIPHER_ENCRYPT;
940 max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_out;
943 ccp = &state->receive_context;
944 crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT;
946 max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_in;
948 if (state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
949 debug("%s: rekeying after %llu %s blocks"
950 " (%llu bytes total)", __func__,
951 (unsigned long long)ps->blocks, dir,
952 (unsigned long long)ps->bytes);
955 enc = &state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
956 mac = &state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
957 comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
959 explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->iv_len);
960 explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len);
961 explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len);
968 free(state->newkeys[mode]);
970 /* note that both bytes and the seqnr are not reset */
971 ps->packets = ps->blocks = 0;
972 /* move newkeys from kex to state */
973 if ((state->newkeys[mode] = ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]) == NULL)
974 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
975 ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
976 enc = &state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
977 mac = &state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
978 comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
979 if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
980 if ((r = mac_init(mac)) != 0)
984 DBG(debug("cipher_init_context: %d", mode));
985 if ((r = cipher_init(ccp, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len,
986 enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type)) != 0)
988 if (!state->cipher_warning_done &&
989 (wmsg = cipher_warning_message(*ccp)) != NULL) {
990 error("Warning: %s", wmsg);
991 state->cipher_warning_done = 1;
993 /* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */
994 /* explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->block_size);
995 explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len);
996 explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len); */
997 if ((comp->type == COMP_ZLIB ||
998 (comp->type == COMP_DELAYED &&
999 state->after_authentication)) && comp->enabled == 0) {
1000 if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) < 0)
1002 if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
1003 if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0)
1006 if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0)
1012 * The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES,
1013 * blowfish, etc, so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes.
1015 if (enc->block_size >= 16)
1016 *max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2);
1018 *max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size;
1019 if (state->rekey_limit)
1020 *max_blocks = MINIMUM(*max_blocks,
1021 state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size);
1022 debug("rekey after %llu blocks", (unsigned long long)*max_blocks);
1026 #define MAX_PACKETS (1U<<31)
1028 ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
1030 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
1031 u_int32_t out_blocks;
1033 /* XXX client can't cope with rekeying pre-auth */
1034 if (!state->after_authentication)
1037 /* Haven't keyed yet or KEX in progress. */
1038 if (ssh->kex == NULL || ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
1041 /* Peer can't rekey */
1042 if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
1046 * Permit one packet in or out per rekey - this allows us to
1047 * make progress when rekey limits are very small.
1049 if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0)
1052 /* Time-based rekeying */
1053 if (state->rekey_interval != 0 &&
1054 state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
1057 /* Always rekey when MAX_PACKETS sent in either direction */
1058 if (state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS ||
1059 state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS)
1062 /* Rekey after (cipher-specific) maxiumum blocks */
1063 out_blocks = ROUNDUP(outbound_packet_len,
1064 state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc.block_size);
1065 return (state->max_blocks_out &&
1066 (state->p_send.blocks + out_blocks > state->max_blocks_out)) ||
1067 (state->max_blocks_in &&
1068 (state->p_read.blocks > state->max_blocks_in));
1072 * Delayed compression for SSH2 is enabled after authentication:
1073 * This happens on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent,
1074 * and on the client side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is received.
1077 ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(struct ssh *ssh)
1079 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
1080 struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
1084 * Remember that we are past the authentication step, so rekeying
1085 * with COMP_DELAYED will turn on compression immediately.
1087 state->after_authentication = 1;
1088 for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
1089 /* protocol error: USERAUTH_SUCCESS received before NEWKEYS */
1090 if (state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
1092 comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
1093 if (comp && !comp->enabled && comp->type == COMP_DELAYED) {
1094 if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0)
1096 if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
1097 if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0)
1100 if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0)
1109 /* Used to mute debug logging for noisy packet types */
1111 ssh_packet_log_type(u_char type)
1114 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA:
1115 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA:
1116 case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST:
1124 * Finalize packet in SSH2 format (compress, mac, encrypt, enqueue)
1127 ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
1129 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
1130 u_char type, *cp, macbuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
1131 u_char tmp, padlen, pad = 0;
1132 u_int authlen = 0, aadlen = 0;
1134 struct sshenc *enc = NULL;
1135 struct sshmac *mac = NULL;
1136 struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
1139 if (state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) {
1140 enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc;
1141 mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac;
1142 comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp;
1143 /* disable mac for authenticated encryption */
1144 if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0)
1147 block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
1148 aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0;
1150 type = (sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet))[5];
1151 if (ssh_packet_log_type(type))
1152 debug3("send packet: type %u", type);
1154 fprintf(stderr, "plain: ");
1155 sshbuf_dump(state->outgoing_packet, stderr);
1158 if (comp && comp->enabled) {
1159 len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
1160 /* skip header, compress only payload */
1161 if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 5)) != 0)
1163 sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
1164 if ((r = compress_buffer(ssh, state->outgoing_packet,
1165 state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
1167 sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
1168 if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->outgoing_packet,
1169 "\0\0\0\0\0", 5)) != 0 ||
1170 (r = sshbuf_putb(state->outgoing_packet,
1171 state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
1173 DBG(debug("compression: raw %d compressed %zd", len,
1174 sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet)));
1177 /* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload) */
1178 len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
1181 * calc size of padding, alloc space, get random data,
1182 * minimum padding is 4 bytes
1184 len -= aadlen; /* packet length is not encrypted for EtM modes */
1185 padlen = block_size - (len % block_size);
1187 padlen += block_size;
1188 if (state->extra_pad) {
1189 tmp = state->extra_pad;
1191 ROUNDUP(state->extra_pad, block_size);
1192 /* check if roundup overflowed */
1193 if (state->extra_pad < tmp)
1194 return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
1195 tmp = (len + padlen) % state->extra_pad;
1196 /* Check whether pad calculation below will underflow */
1197 if (tmp > state->extra_pad)
1198 return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
1199 pad = state->extra_pad - tmp;
1200 DBG(debug3("%s: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)",
1201 __func__, pad, len, padlen, state->extra_pad));
1204 /* Check whether padlen calculation overflowed */
1206 return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* overflow */
1207 state->extra_pad = 0;
1209 if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->outgoing_packet, padlen, &cp)) != 0)
1211 if (enc && !cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(state->send_context)) {
1212 /* random padding */
1213 arc4random_buf(cp, padlen);
1216 explicit_bzero(cp, padlen);
1218 /* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload + padding) */
1219 len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
1220 cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet);
1222 r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1225 /* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */
1226 POKE_U32(cp, len - 4);
1228 DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d, aadlen %d)",
1229 len, padlen, aadlen));
1231 /* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */
1232 if (mac && mac->enabled && !mac->etm) {
1233 if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr,
1234 sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), len,
1235 macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0)
1237 DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", state->p_send.seqnr));
1239 /* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */
1240 if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->output,
1241 sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) + authlen, &cp)) != 0)
1243 if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->send_context, state->p_send.seqnr, cp,
1244 sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet),
1245 len - aadlen, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
1247 /* append unencrypted MAC */
1248 if (mac && mac->enabled) {
1250 /* EtM: compute mac over aadlen + cipher text */
1251 if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr,
1252 cp, len, macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0)
1254 DBG(debug("done calc MAC(EtM) out #%d",
1255 state->p_send.seqnr));
1257 if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->output, macbuf, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
1261 fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
1262 sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
1264 /* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
1265 if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
1266 logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
1267 if (++state->p_send.packets == 0)
1268 if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
1269 return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
1270 state->p_send.blocks += len / block_size;
1271 state->p_send.bytes += len;
1272 sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
1274 if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
1275 r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
1276 else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side)
1277 r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh);
1284 /* returns non-zero if the specified packet type is usec by KEX */
1286 ssh_packet_type_is_kex(u_char type)
1289 type >= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN &&
1290 type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX &&
1291 type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST &&
1292 type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT &&
1293 type != SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO;
1297 ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *ssh)
1299 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
1304 if (sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) < 6)
1305 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1306 type = sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet)[5];
1307 need_rekey = !ssh_packet_type_is_kex(type) &&
1308 ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet));
1311 * During rekeying we can only send key exchange messages.
1312 * Queue everything else.
1314 if ((need_rekey || state->rekeying) && !ssh_packet_type_is_kex(type)) {
1316 debug3("%s: rekex triggered", __func__);
1317 debug("enqueue packet: %u", type);
1318 p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p));
1320 return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
1322 p->payload = state->outgoing_packet;
1323 TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&state->outgoing, p, next);
1324 state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new();
1325 if (state->outgoing_packet == NULL)
1326 return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
1329 * This packet triggered a rekey, so send the
1331 * NB. reenters this function via kex_start_rekex().
1333 return kex_start_rekex(ssh);
1338 /* rekeying starts with sending KEXINIT */
1339 if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)
1340 state->rekeying = 1;
1342 if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0)
1345 /* after a NEWKEYS message we can send the complete queue */
1346 if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
1347 state->rekeying = 0;
1348 state->rekey_time = monotime();
1349 while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&state->outgoing))) {
1352 * If this packet triggers a rekex, then skip the
1353 * remaining packets in the queue for now.
1354 * NB. re-enters this function via kex_start_rekex.
1356 if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh,
1357 sshbuf_len(p->payload))) {
1358 debug3("%s: queued packet triggered rekex",
1360 return kex_start_rekex(ssh);
1362 debug("dequeue packet: %u", type);
1363 sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
1364 state->outgoing_packet = p->payload;
1365 TAILQ_REMOVE(&state->outgoing, p, next);
1366 memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
1368 if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0)
1376 * Waits until a packet has been received, and returns its type. Note that
1377 * no other data is processed until this returns, so this function should not
1378 * be used during the interactive session.
1382 ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
1384 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
1385 int len, r, ms_remain;
1388 struct timeval timeout, start, *timeoutp = NULL;
1390 DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
1392 setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_in + 1,
1393 NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
1395 return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
1398 * Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have
1401 if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
1404 /* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
1406 /* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
1407 r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
1411 *typep == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS
1412 || *typep == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE
1413 || *typep == SSH_CMSG_EOF
1414 || *typep == SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION))
1415 if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
1417 /* If we got a packet, return it. */
1418 if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
1421 * Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the
1422 * buffer, and try again.
1424 memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_in + 1,
1425 NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
1426 FD_SET(state->connection_in, setp);
1428 if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
1429 ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms;
1430 timeoutp = &timeout;
1432 /* Wait for some data to arrive. */
1434 if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
1435 ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
1436 gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
1438 if ((r = select(state->connection_in + 1, setp,
1439 NULL, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
1441 if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
1442 errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
1444 if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
1446 ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
1447 if (ms_remain <= 0) {
1453 return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
1454 /* Read data from the socket. */
1455 len = read(state->connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
1457 r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
1461 r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
1465 /* Append it to the buffer. */
1466 if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len)) != 0)
1475 ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *ssh)
1480 if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0)
1481 fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1486 * Waits until a packet has been received, verifies that its type matches
1487 * that given, and gives a fatal error and exits if there is a mismatch.
1491 ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *ssh, u_int expected_type)
1496 if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0)
1498 if (type != expected_type) {
1499 if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
1500 "Protocol error: expected packet type %d, got %d",
1501 expected_type, type)) != 0)
1503 return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
1508 /* Checks if a full packet is available in the data received so far via
1509 * packet_process_incoming. If so, reads the packet; otherwise returns
1510 * SSH_MSG_NONE. This does not wait for data from the connection.
1512 * SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT is handled specially here. Also,
1513 * SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages are skipped by this function and are never returned
1518 ssh_packet_read_poll1(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep)
1520 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
1521 u_int len, padded_len;
1525 u_int checksum, stored_checksum;
1528 *typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
1530 /* Check if input size is less than minimum packet size. */
1531 if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + 8)
1533 /* Get length of incoming packet. */
1534 len = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->input));
1535 if (len < 1 + 2 + 2 || len > 256 * 1024) {
1536 if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Bad packet length %u",
1539 return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
1541 padded_len = (len + 8) & ~7;
1543 /* Check if the packet has been entirely received. */
1544 if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + padded_len)
1547 /* The entire packet is in buffer. */
1549 /* Consume packet length. */
1550 if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, 4)) != 0)
1554 * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh
1555 * (C)1998 CORE-SDI, Buenos Aires Argentina
1556 * Ariel Futoransky(futo@core-sdi.com)
1558 if (!cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(state->receive_context)) {
1560 switch (detect_attack(&state->deattack,
1561 sshbuf_ptr(state->input), padded_len)) {
1564 case DEATTACK_DETECTED:
1565 emsg = "crc32 compensation attack detected";
1567 case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED:
1568 emsg = "deattack denial of service detected";
1571 emsg = "deattack error";
1576 if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "%s", emsg)) != 0 ||
1577 (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
1579 return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
1583 /* Decrypt data to incoming_packet. */
1584 sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
1585 if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, padded_len, &p)) != 0)
1587 if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->receive_context, 0, p,
1588 sshbuf_ptr(state->input), padded_len, 0, 0)) != 0)
1591 if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, padded_len)) != 0)
1595 fprintf(stderr, "read_poll plain: ");
1596 sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
1599 /* Compute packet checksum. */
1600 checksum = ssh_crc32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet),
1601 sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet) - 4);
1604 if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->incoming_packet, 8 - len % 8)) != 0)
1607 /* Test check bytes. */
1608 if (len != sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)) {
1609 error("%s: len %d != sshbuf_len %zd", __func__,
1610 len, sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet));
1611 if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid packet length")) != 0 ||
1612 (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
1614 return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
1617 cp = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet) + len - 4;
1618 stored_checksum = PEEK_U32(cp);
1619 if (checksum != stored_checksum) {
1620 error("Corrupted check bytes on input");
1621 if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "connection corrupted")) != 0 ||
1622 (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
1624 return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
1626 if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->incoming_packet, 4)) < 0)
1629 if (state->packet_compression) {
1630 sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
1631 if ((r = uncompress_buffer(ssh, state->incoming_packet,
1632 state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
1634 sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
1635 if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->incoming_packet,
1636 state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
1639 state->p_read.packets++;
1640 state->p_read.bytes += padded_len + 4;
1641 if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0)
1643 if (*typep < SSH_MSG_MIN || *typep > SSH_MSG_MAX) {
1644 error("Invalid ssh1 packet type: %d", *typep);
1645 if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid packet type")) != 0 ||
1646 (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
1648 return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
1656 ssh_packet_read_poll2_mux(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
1658 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
1664 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1665 *typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
1666 cp = sshbuf_ptr(state->input);
1667 if (state->packlen == 0) {
1668 if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + 1)
1669 return 0; /* packet is incomplete */
1670 state->packlen = PEEK_U32(cp);
1671 if (state->packlen < 4 + 1 ||
1672 state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
1673 return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
1675 need = state->packlen + 4;
1676 if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < need)
1677 return 0; /* packet is incomplete */
1678 sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
1679 if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->incoming_packet, cp + 4,
1680 state->packlen)) != 0 ||
1681 (r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, need)) != 0 ||
1682 (r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, NULL)) != 0 ||
1683 (r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0)
1685 if (ssh_packet_log_type(*typep))
1686 debug3("%s: type %u", __func__, *typep);
1687 /* sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr); */
1688 /* reset for next packet */
1694 ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
1696 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
1699 u_int maclen, aadlen = 0, authlen = 0, block_size;
1700 struct sshenc *enc = NULL;
1701 struct sshmac *mac = NULL;
1702 struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
1706 return ssh_packet_read_poll2_mux(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
1708 *typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
1710 if (state->packet_discard)
1713 if (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) {
1714 enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc;
1715 mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac;
1716 comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp;
1717 /* disable mac for authenticated encryption */
1718 if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0)
1721 maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0;
1722 block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
1723 aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0;
1725 if (aadlen && state->packlen == 0) {
1726 if (cipher_get_length(state->receive_context,
1727 &state->packlen, state->p_read.seqnr,
1728 sshbuf_ptr(state->input), sshbuf_len(state->input)) != 0)
1730 if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
1731 state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
1733 sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
1735 logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen);
1736 if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0)
1738 return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
1740 sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
1741 } else if (state->packlen == 0) {
1743 * check if input size is less than the cipher block size,
1744 * decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet
1746 if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < block_size)
1748 sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
1749 if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, block_size,
1752 if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->receive_context,
1753 state->p_send.seqnr, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->input),
1754 block_size, 0, 0)) != 0)
1756 state->packlen = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet));
1757 if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
1758 state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
1760 fprintf(stderr, "input: \n");
1761 sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
1762 fprintf(stderr, "incoming_packet: \n");
1763 sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
1765 logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen);
1766 return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0,
1769 if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, block_size)) != 0)
1772 DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", state->packlen+4));
1775 /* only the payload is encrypted */
1776 need = state->packlen;
1779 * the payload size and the payload are encrypted, but we
1780 * have a partial packet of block_size bytes
1782 need = 4 + state->packlen - block_size;
1784 DBG(debug("partial packet: block %d, need %d, maclen %d, authlen %d,"
1785 " aadlen %d", block_size, need, maclen, authlen, aadlen));
1786 if (need % block_size != 0) {
1787 logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d",
1788 need, block_size, need % block_size);
1789 return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0,
1790 PACKET_MAX_SIZE - block_size);
1793 * check if the entire packet has been received and
1794 * decrypt into incoming_packet:
1795 * 'aadlen' bytes are unencrypted, but authenticated.
1796 * 'need' bytes are encrypted, followed by either
1797 * 'authlen' bytes of authentication tag or
1798 * 'maclen' bytes of message authentication code.
1800 if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < aadlen + need + authlen + maclen)
1801 return 0; /* packet is incomplete */
1803 fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: ");
1804 sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
1806 /* EtM: check mac over encrypted input */
1807 if (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) {
1808 if ((r = mac_check(mac, state->p_read.seqnr,
1809 sshbuf_ptr(state->input), aadlen + need,
1810 sshbuf_ptr(state->input) + aadlen + need + authlen,
1812 if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
1813 logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
1817 if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, aadlen + need,
1820 if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->receive_context, state->p_read.seqnr, cp,
1821 sshbuf_ptr(state->input), need, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
1823 if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, aadlen + need + authlen)) != 0)
1825 if (mac && mac->enabled) {
1826 /* Not EtM: check MAC over cleartext */
1827 if (!mac->etm && (r = mac_check(mac, state->p_read.seqnr,
1828 sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet),
1829 sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
1830 sshbuf_ptr(state->input), maclen)) != 0) {
1831 if (r != SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
1833 logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
1834 if (need > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
1835 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1836 return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac,
1837 sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
1838 PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need);
1840 /* Remove MAC from input buffer */
1841 DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr));
1842 if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
1845 if (seqnr_p != NULL)
1846 *seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr;
1847 if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
1848 logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
1849 if (++state->p_read.packets == 0)
1850 if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
1851 return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
1852 state->p_read.blocks += (state->packlen + 4) / block_size;
1853 state->p_read.bytes += state->packlen + 4;
1856 padlen = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet)[4];
1857 DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen));
1859 if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
1860 "Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen)) != 0 ||
1861 (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
1863 return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
1866 /* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */
1867 if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->incoming_packet, 4 + 1)) != 0 ||
1868 ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->incoming_packet, padlen)) != 0))
1871 DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %zd",
1872 sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)));
1873 if (comp && comp->enabled) {
1874 sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
1875 if ((r = uncompress_buffer(ssh, state->incoming_packet,
1876 state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
1878 sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
1879 if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->incoming_packet,
1880 state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
1882 DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %zd",
1883 sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)));
1886 * get packet type, implies consume.
1887 * return length of payload (without type field)
1889 if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0)
1891 if (ssh_packet_log_type(*typep))
1892 debug3("receive packet: type %u", *typep);
1893 if (*typep < SSH2_MSG_MIN || *typep >= SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN) {
1894 if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
1895 "Invalid ssh2 packet type: %d", *typep)) != 0 ||
1896 (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
1898 return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
1900 if (state->hook_in != NULL &&
1901 (r = state->hook_in(ssh, state->incoming_packet, typep,
1902 state->hook_in_ctx)) != 0)
1904 if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && !state->server_side)
1905 r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh);
1909 fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", *typep);
1910 sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
1912 /* reset for next packet */
1915 /* do we need to rekey? */
1916 if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, 0)) {
1917 debug3("%s: rekex triggered", __func__);
1918 if ((r = kex_start_rekex(ssh)) != 0)
1926 ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
1928 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
1929 u_int reason, seqnr;
1936 r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
1940 state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
1941 DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
1944 case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
1945 debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
1947 case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG:
1948 if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 ||
1949 (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
1950 (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
1954 debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
1957 case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
1958 if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
1959 (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
1961 /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
1962 do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
1963 reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
1964 SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
1965 "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
1966 "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
1967 ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
1969 return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
1970 case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
1971 if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0)
1973 debug("Received SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for %u",
1980 r = ssh_packet_read_poll1(ssh, typep);
1983 return SSH_MSG_NONE;
1984 case SSH_MSG_IGNORE:
1987 if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
1989 debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
1992 case SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT:
1993 if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
1995 logit("Received disconnect from %s port %d: "
1996 "%.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
1997 ssh_remote_port(ssh), msg);
1999 return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
2001 DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
2009 * Buffers the given amount of input characters. This is intended to be used
2010 * together with packet_read_poll.
2014 ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *ssh, const char *buf, u_int len)
2016 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
2019 if (state->packet_discard) {
2020 state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; /* ?? */
2021 if (len >= state->packet_discard) {
2022 if ((r = ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh)) != 0)
2025 state->packet_discard -= len;
2028 if ((r = sshbuf_put(ssh->state->input, buf, len)) != 0)
2035 ssh_packet_remaining(struct ssh *ssh)
2037 return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet);
2041 * Sends a diagnostic message from the server to the client. This message
2042 * can be sent at any time (but not while constructing another message). The
2043 * message is printed immediately, but only if the client is being executed
2044 * in verbose mode. These messages are primarily intended to ease debugging
2045 * authentication problems. The length of the formatted message must not
2046 * exceed 1024 bytes. This will automatically call ssh_packet_write_wait.
2049 ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
2055 if (compat20 && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DEBUG))
2058 va_start(args, fmt);
2059 vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
2063 if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DEBUG)) != 0 ||
2064 (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* always display */
2065 (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
2066 (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
2067 (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
2068 fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
2070 if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH_MSG_DEBUG)) != 0 ||
2071 (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
2072 (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
2073 fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
2075 if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
2076 fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
2080 * Pretty-print connection-terminating errors and exit.
2083 sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r)
2086 case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED:
2087 logdie("Connection closed by %.200s port %d",
2088 ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
2089 case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
2090 logdie("Connection %s %.200s port %d timed out",
2091 ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to",
2092 ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
2093 case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
2094 logdie("Disconnected from %.200s port %d",
2095 ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
2096 case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
2097 if (errno == ECONNRESET)
2098 logdie("Connection reset by %.200s port %d",
2099 ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
2101 case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH:
2102 case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH:
2103 case SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH:
2104 case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH:
2105 case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH:
2106 if (ssh && ssh->kex && ssh->kex->failed_choice) {
2107 BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "ssh");
2108 logdie("Unable to negotiate with %.200s port %d: %s. "
2109 "Their offer: %s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
2110 ssh_remote_port(ssh), ssh_err(r),
2111 ssh->kex->failed_choice);
2115 logdie("%s%sConnection %s %.200s port %d: %s",
2116 tag != NULL ? tag : "", tag != NULL ? ": " : "",
2117 ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to",
2118 ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), ssh_err(r));
2123 * Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the
2124 * connection, and exits. This function never returns. The error message
2125 * should not contain a newline. The length of the formatted message must
2126 * not exceed 1024 bytes.
2129 ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
2133 static int disconnecting = 0;
2136 if (disconnecting) /* Guard against recursive invocations. */
2137 fatal("packet_disconnect called recursively.");
2141 * Format the message. Note that the caller must make sure the
2142 * message is of limited size.
2144 va_start(args, fmt);
2145 vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
2148 /* Display the error locally */
2149 logit("Disconnecting: %.100s", buf);
2152 * Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait
2153 * for it to get sent.
2155 if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "%s", buf)) != 0)
2156 sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r);
2158 if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
2159 sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r);
2161 /* Close the connection. */
2162 ssh_packet_close(ssh);
2167 * Checks if there is any buffered output, and tries to write some of
2171 ssh_packet_write_poll(struct ssh *ssh)
2173 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
2174 int len = sshbuf_len(state->output);
2178 len = write(state->connection_out,
2179 sshbuf_ptr(state->output), len);
2181 if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
2182 errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
2184 return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
2187 return SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
2188 if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->output, len)) != 0)
2195 * Calls packet_write_poll repeatedly until all pending output data has been
2199 ssh_packet_write_wait(struct ssh *ssh)
2202 int ret, r, ms_remain = 0;
2203 struct timeval start, timeout, *timeoutp = NULL;
2204 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
2206 setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_out + 1,
2207 NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
2209 return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
2210 if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
2214 while (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) {
2215 memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_out + 1,
2216 NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
2217 FD_SET(state->connection_out, setp);
2219 if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
2220 ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms;
2221 timeoutp = &timeout;
2224 if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
2225 ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
2226 gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
2228 if ((ret = select(state->connection_out + 1,
2229 NULL, setp, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
2231 if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
2232 errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
2234 if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
2236 ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
2237 if (ms_remain <= 0) {
2244 return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
2246 if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
2255 /* Returns true if there is buffered data to write to the connection. */
2258 ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh)
2260 return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) != 0;
2263 /* Returns true if there is not too much data to write to the connection. */
2266 ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh)
2268 if (ssh->state->interactive_mode)
2269 return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 16384;
2271 return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 128 * 1024;
2275 ssh_packet_set_tos(struct ssh *ssh, int tos)
2277 #ifndef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN
2278 if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh))
2280 switch (ssh_packet_connection_af(ssh)) {
2283 debug3("%s: set IP_TOS 0x%02x", __func__, tos);
2284 if (setsockopt(ssh->state->connection_in,
2285 IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) < 0)
2286 error("setsockopt IP_TOS %d: %.100s:",
2287 tos, strerror(errno));
2289 # endif /* IP_TOS */
2292 debug3("%s: set IPV6_TCLASS 0x%02x", __func__, tos);
2293 if (setsockopt(ssh->state->connection_in,
2294 IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_TCLASS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) < 0)
2295 error("setsockopt IPV6_TCLASS %d: %.100s:",
2296 tos, strerror(errno));
2298 # endif /* IPV6_TCLASS */
2300 #endif /* IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN */
2303 /* Informs that the current session is interactive. Sets IP flags for that. */
2306 ssh_packet_set_interactive(struct ssh *ssh, int interactive, int qos_interactive, int qos_bulk)
2308 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
2310 if (state->set_interactive_called)
2312 state->set_interactive_called = 1;
2314 /* Record that we are in interactive mode. */
2315 state->interactive_mode = interactive;
2317 /* Only set socket options if using a socket. */
2318 if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh))
2320 set_nodelay(state->connection_in);
2321 ssh_packet_set_tos(ssh, interactive ? qos_interactive :
2325 /* Returns true if the current connection is interactive. */
2328 ssh_packet_is_interactive(struct ssh *ssh)
2330 return ssh->state->interactive_mode;
2334 ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh, u_int s)
2336 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
2338 if (state->set_maxsize_called) {
2339 logit("packet_set_maxsize: called twice: old %d new %d",
2340 state->max_packet_size, s);
2343 if (s < 4 * 1024 || s > 1024 * 1024) {
2344 logit("packet_set_maxsize: bad size %d", s);
2347 state->set_maxsize_called = 1;
2348 debug("packet_set_maxsize: setting to %d", s);
2349 state->max_packet_size = s;
2354 ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh)
2356 return ++ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts;
2360 ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh, int ka)
2362 ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts = ka;
2366 ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh)
2368 return ssh->state->max_packet_size;
2372 * 9.2. Ignored Data Message
2374 * byte SSH_MSG_IGNORE
2377 * All implementations MUST understand (and ignore) this message at any
2378 * time (after receiving the protocol version). No implementation is
2379 * required to send them. This message can be used as an additional
2380 * protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques.
2383 ssh_packet_send_ignore(struct ssh *ssh, int nbytes)
2388 if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, compat20 ?
2389 SSH2_MSG_IGNORE : SSH_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
2390 (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbytes)) != 0)
2391 fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
2392 for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) {
2395 if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, (u_char)rnd & 0xff)) != 0)
2396 fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
2402 ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t bytes, time_t seconds)
2404 debug3("rekey after %llu bytes, %d seconds", (unsigned long long)bytes,
2406 ssh->state->rekey_limit = bytes;
2407 ssh->state->rekey_interval = seconds;
2411 ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *ssh)
2415 seconds = ssh->state->rekey_time + ssh->state->rekey_interval -
2417 return (seconds <= 0 ? 1 : seconds);
2421 ssh_packet_set_server(struct ssh *ssh)
2423 ssh->state->server_side = 1;
2427 ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh)
2429 ssh->state->after_authentication = 1;
2433 ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *ssh)
2435 return (void *)ssh->state->input;
2439 ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh)
2441 return (void *)ssh->state->output;
2444 /* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */
2446 ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh)
2450 debug("%s: called", __func__);
2451 /* This was set in net child, but is not visible in user child */
2452 ssh->state->after_authentication = 1;
2453 ssh->state->rekeying = 0;
2454 if ((r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh)) != 0)
2459 /* Packet state (de-)serialization for privsep */
2461 /* turn kex into a blob for packet state serialization */
2463 kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex)
2467 if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, kex->session_id,
2468 kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
2469 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->we_need)) != 0 ||
2470 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
2471 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
2472 (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
2473 (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
2474 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->flags)) != 0 ||
2475 (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, kex->client_version_string)) != 0 ||
2476 (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, kex->server_version_string)) != 0)
2481 /* turn key exchange results into a blob for packet state serialization */
2483 newkeys_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
2486 struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
2487 struct sshcomp *comp;
2490 struct newkeys *newkey;
2493 if ((newkey = ssh->state->newkeys[mode]) == NULL)
2494 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2497 comp = &newkey->comp;
2498 cc = (mode == MODE_OUT) ? ssh->state->send_context :
2499 ssh->state->receive_context;
2500 if ((r = cipher_get_keyiv(cc, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0)
2502 if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
2503 return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
2504 /* The cipher struct is constant and shared, you export pointer */
2505 if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, enc->name)) != 0 ||
2506 (r = sshbuf_put(b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher))) != 0 ||
2507 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->enabled)) != 0 ||
2508 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->block_size)) != 0 ||
2509 (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->key, enc->key_len)) != 0 ||
2510 (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0)
2512 if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
2513 if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, mac->name)) != 0 ||
2514 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, mac->enabled)) != 0 ||
2515 (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, mac->key, mac->key_len)) != 0)
2518 if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, comp->type)) != 0 ||
2519 (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comp->name)) != 0)
2521 r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b);
2527 /* serialize packet state into a blob */
2529 ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
2531 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
2537 ssh1cipher = cipher_ctx_get_number(state->receive_context);
2538 slen = cipher_get_keyiv_len(state->send_context);
2539 rlen = cipher_get_keyiv_len(state->receive_context);
2540 if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->remote_protocol_flags)) != 0 ||
2541 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ssh1cipher)) != 0 ||
2542 (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, state->ssh1_key, state->ssh1_keylen)) != 0 ||
2543 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, slen)) != 0 ||
2544 (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, slen, &p)) != 0 ||
2545 (r = cipher_get_keyiv(state->send_context, p, slen)) != 0 ||
2546 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, rlen)) != 0 ||
2547 (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, rlen, &p)) != 0 ||
2548 (r = cipher_get_keyiv(state->receive_context, p, rlen)) != 0)
2551 if ((r = kex_to_blob(m, ssh->kex)) != 0 ||
2552 (r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 ||
2553 (r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
2554 (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->rekey_limit)) != 0 ||
2555 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->rekey_interval)) != 0 ||
2556 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 ||
2557 (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 ||
2558 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.packets)) != 0 ||
2559 (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 ||
2560 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 ||
2561 (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 ||
2562 (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.packets)) != 0 ||
2563 (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.bytes)) != 0)
2567 slen = cipher_get_keycontext(state->send_context, NULL);
2568 rlen = cipher_get_keycontext(state->receive_context, NULL);
2569 if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, slen)) != 0 ||
2570 (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, slen, &p)) != 0)
2572 if (cipher_get_keycontext(state->send_context, p) != (int)slen)
2573 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2574 if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, rlen)) != 0 ||
2575 (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, rlen, &p)) != 0)
2577 if (cipher_get_keycontext(state->receive_context, p) != (int)rlen)
2578 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2579 if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->input)) != 0 ||
2580 (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->output)) != 0)
2586 /* restore key exchange results from blob for packet state de-serialization */
2588 newkeys_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
2590 struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
2591 struct sshcomp *comp;
2594 struct newkeys *newkey = NULL;
2595 size_t keylen, ivlen, maclen;
2598 if ((newkey = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkey))) == NULL) {
2599 r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
2602 if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0)
2605 sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
2609 comp = &newkey->comp;
2611 if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &enc->name, NULL)) != 0 ||
2612 (r = sshbuf_get(b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher))) != 0 ||
2613 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&enc->enabled)) != 0 ||
2614 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &enc->block_size)) != 0 ||
2615 (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->key, &keylen)) != 0 ||
2616 (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->iv, &ivlen)) != 0)
2618 if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
2619 if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &mac->name, NULL)) != 0)
2621 if ((r = mac_setup(mac, mac->name)) != 0)
2623 if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&mac->enabled)) != 0 ||
2624 (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &mac->key, &maclen)) != 0)
2626 if (maclen > mac->key_len) {
2627 r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
2630 mac->key_len = maclen;
2632 if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &comp->type)) != 0 ||
2633 (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &comp->name, NULL)) != 0)
2635 if (enc->name == NULL ||
2636 cipher_by_name(enc->name) != enc->cipher) {
2637 r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
2640 if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
2641 r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
2644 enc->key_len = keylen;
2645 enc->iv_len = ivlen;
2646 ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = newkey;
2655 /* restore kex from blob for packet state de-serialization */
2657 kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp)
2662 if ((kex = calloc(1, sizeof(struct kex))) == NULL ||
2663 (kex->my = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
2664 (kex->peer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
2665 r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
2668 if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &kex->session_id, &kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
2669 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->we_need)) != 0 ||
2670 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
2671 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
2672 (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
2673 (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
2674 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->flags)) != 0 ||
2675 (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &kex->client_version_string, NULL)) != 0 ||
2676 (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &kex->server_version_string, NULL)) != 0)
2682 if (r != 0 || kexp == NULL) {
2684 sshbuf_free(kex->my);
2685 sshbuf_free(kex->peer);
2697 * Restore packet state from content of blob 'm' (de-serialization).
2698 * Note that 'm' will be partially consumed on parsing or any other errors.
2701 ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
2703 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
2704 const u_char *ssh1key, *ivin, *ivout, *keyin, *keyout, *input, *output;
2705 size_t ssh1keylen, rlen, slen, ilen, olen;
2707 u_int ssh1cipher = 0;
2710 if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->remote_protocol_flags)) != 0 ||
2711 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ssh1cipher)) != 0 ||
2712 (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ssh1key, &ssh1keylen)) != 0 ||
2713 (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ivout, &slen)) != 0 ||
2714 (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ivin, &rlen)) != 0)
2716 if (ssh1cipher > INT_MAX)
2717 return SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
2718 ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(ssh, ssh1key, ssh1keylen,
2720 if (cipher_get_keyiv_len(state->send_context) != (int)slen ||
2721 cipher_get_keyiv_len(state->receive_context) != (int)rlen)
2722 return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
2723 if ((r = cipher_set_keyiv(state->send_context, ivout)) != 0 ||
2724 (r = cipher_set_keyiv(state->receive_context, ivin)) != 0)
2727 if ((r = kex_from_blob(m, &ssh->kex)) != 0 ||
2728 (r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 ||
2729 (r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
2730 (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->rekey_limit)) != 0 ||
2731 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->rekey_interval)) != 0 ||
2732 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 ||
2733 (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 ||
2734 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.packets)) != 0 ||
2735 (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 ||
2736 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 ||
2737 (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 ||
2738 (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.packets)) != 0 ||
2739 (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.bytes)) != 0)
2742 * We set the time here so that in post-auth privsep slave we
2743 * count from the completion of the authentication.
2745 state->rekey_time = monotime();
2746 /* XXX ssh_set_newkeys overrides p_read.packets? XXX */
2747 if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
2748 (r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0)
2751 if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &keyout, &slen)) != 0 ||
2752 (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &keyin, &rlen)) != 0)
2754 if (cipher_get_keycontext(state->send_context, NULL) != (int)slen ||
2755 cipher_get_keycontext(state->receive_context, NULL) != (int)rlen)
2756 return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
2757 cipher_set_keycontext(state->send_context, keyout);
2758 cipher_set_keycontext(state->receive_context, keyin);
2760 if ((r = ssh_packet_set_postauth(ssh)) != 0)
2763 sshbuf_reset(state->input);
2764 sshbuf_reset(state->output);
2765 if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &input, &ilen)) != 0 ||
2766 (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &output, &olen)) != 0 ||
2767 (r = sshbuf_put(state->input, input, ilen)) != 0 ||
2768 (r = sshbuf_put(state->output, output, olen)) != 0)
2772 return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
2773 debug3("%s: done", __func__);
2779 /* put data to the outgoing packet */
2782 sshpkt_put(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len)
2784 return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len);
2788 sshpkt_putb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *b)
2790 return sshbuf_putb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, b);
2794 sshpkt_put_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char val)
2796 return sshbuf_put_u8(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val);
2800 sshpkt_put_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t val)
2802 return sshbuf_put_u32(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val);
2806 sshpkt_put_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t val)
2808 return sshbuf_put_u64(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val);
2812 sshpkt_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len)
2814 return sshbuf_put_string(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len);
2818 sshpkt_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v)
2820 return sshbuf_put_cstring(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
2824 sshpkt_put_stringb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *v)
2826 return sshbuf_put_stringb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
2830 #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
2832 sshpkt_put_ec(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
2834 return sshbuf_put_ec(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, g);
2836 #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
2840 sshpkt_put_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v)
2842 return sshbuf_put_bignum1(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
2844 #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
2847 sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v)
2849 return sshbuf_put_bignum2(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
2851 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
2853 /* fetch data from the incoming packet */
2856 sshpkt_get(struct ssh *ssh, void *valp, size_t len)
2858 return sshbuf_get(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, len);
2862 sshpkt_get_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *valp)
2864 return sshbuf_get_u8(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
2868 sshpkt_get_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t *valp)
2870 return sshbuf_get_u32(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
2874 sshpkt_get_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *valp)
2876 return sshbuf_get_u64(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
2880 sshpkt_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
2882 return sshbuf_get_string(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
2886 sshpkt_get_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
2888 return sshbuf_get_string_direct(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
2892 sshpkt_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, char **valp, size_t *lenp)
2894 return sshbuf_get_cstring(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
2898 #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
2900 sshpkt_get_ec(struct ssh *ssh, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
2902 return sshbuf_get_ec(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v, g);
2904 #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
2908 sshpkt_get_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v)
2910 return sshbuf_get_bignum1(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v);
2912 #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
2915 sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v)
2917 return sshbuf_get_bignum2(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v);
2919 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
2922 sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh)
2924 if (sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet) > 0)
2925 return SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
2930 sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp)
2933 *lenp = sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet);
2934 return sshbuf_ptr(ssh->state->incoming_packet);
2937 /* start a new packet */
2940 sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type)
2945 DBG(debug("packet_start[%d]", type));
2946 len = compat20 ? 6 : 9;
2947 memset(buf, 0, len - 1);
2948 buf[len - 1] = type;
2949 sshbuf_reset(ssh->state->outgoing_packet);
2950 return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, buf, len);
2954 ssh_packet_send_mux(struct ssh *ssh)
2956 struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
2962 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2963 len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
2965 return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2966 cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet);
2968 if (ssh_packet_log_type(type))
2969 debug3("%s: type %u", __func__, type);
2970 /* drop everything, but the connection protocol */
2971 if (type >= SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MIN &&
2972 type <= SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MAX) {
2973 POKE_U32(cp, len - 4);
2974 if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->output,
2975 state->outgoing_packet)) != 0)
2977 /* sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr); */
2979 sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
2986 sshpkt_send(struct ssh *ssh)
2988 if (ssh->state && ssh->state->mux)
2989 return ssh_packet_send_mux(ssh);
2991 return ssh_packet_send2(ssh);
2993 return ssh_packet_send1(ssh);
2997 sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
3003 va_start(args, fmt);
3004 vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
3008 if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
3009 (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 ||
3010 (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
3011 (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
3012 (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
3015 if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
3016 (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
3017 (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
3023 /* roundup current message to pad bytes */
3025 sshpkt_add_padding(struct ssh *ssh, u_char pad)
3027 ssh->state->extra_pad = pad;