2 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
3 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
5 * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients,
6 * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards
7 * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted
8 * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and
9 * authentication agent connections.
11 * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
12 * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
13 * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
14 * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
15 * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
17 * SSH2 implementation:
18 * Privilege Separation:
20 * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
21 * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
32 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
33 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
34 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
35 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
36 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
37 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
38 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
39 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
40 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
41 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
45 RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.312 2005/07/25 11:59:40 markus Exp $");
48 #include <openssl/dh.h>
49 #include <openssl/bn.h>
50 #include <openssl/md5.h>
51 #include <openssl/rand.h>
52 #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
53 #include <sys/security.h>
78 #include "myproposal.h"
80 #include "pathnames.h"
89 #include "monitor_mm.h"
91 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
92 #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
97 int allow_severity = LOG_INFO;
98 int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING;
106 #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
107 #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
108 #define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3)
109 #define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4)
111 extern char *__progname;
113 /* Server configuration options. */
114 ServerOptions options;
116 /* Name of the server configuration file. */
117 char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
120 * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug
121 * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
122 * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing
123 * the first connection.
127 /* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. */
130 /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
133 /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
134 int no_daemon_flag = 0;
136 /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
139 /* Saved arguments to main(). */
144 int rexeced_flag = 0;
150 * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP
153 #define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16
154 int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS];
155 int num_listen_socks = 0;
158 * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL,
159 * sshd will skip the version-number exchange
161 char *client_version_string = NULL;
162 char *server_version_string = NULL;
164 /* for rekeying XXX fixme */
168 * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
169 * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
170 * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some
171 * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle)
172 * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is
173 * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
176 Key *server_key; /* ephemeral server key */
177 Key *ssh1_host_key; /* ssh1 host key */
178 Key **host_keys; /* all private host keys */
181 u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
185 * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
186 * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
188 static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0;
190 /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
191 static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
192 static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
194 /* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */
195 u_char session_id[16];
198 u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
199 u_int session_id2_len = 0;
201 /* record remote hostname or ip */
202 u_int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN;
204 /* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */
205 int *startup_pipes = NULL;
206 int startup_pipe; /* in child */
208 /* variables used for privilege separation */
210 struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
212 /* global authentication context */
213 Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
215 /* message to be displayed after login */
218 /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
219 void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
220 void demote_sensitive_data(void);
222 static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
223 static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
226 * Close all listening sockets
229 close_listen_socks(void)
233 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
234 close(listen_socks[i]);
235 num_listen_socks = -1;
239 close_startup_pipes(void)
244 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
245 if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
246 close(startup_pipes[i]);
250 * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP;
251 * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
255 sighup_handler(int sig)
257 int save_errno = errno;
260 signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
265 * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP.
266 * Restarts the server.
271 logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
272 close_listen_socks();
273 close_startup_pipes();
274 execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
275 logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
281 * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon.
284 sigterm_handler(int sig)
286 received_sigterm = sig;
290 * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then
291 * reap any zombies left by exited children.
294 main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
296 int save_errno = errno;
300 while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
301 (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
304 signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
309 * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
312 grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
314 /* XXX no idea how fix this signal handler */
316 if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0)
317 kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM);
319 /* Log error and exit. */
320 fatal("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
324 * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm. Note that this
325 * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not
326 * do anything with the private key or random state before forking.
327 * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution
331 generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
336 verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.",
337 sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits);
338 if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
339 key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
340 sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1,
341 options.server_key_bits);
342 verbose("RSA key generation complete.");
344 for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) {
347 sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff;
354 key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
356 int save_errno = errno;
358 signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
364 sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
368 int remote_major, remote_minor;
371 char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */
372 char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
374 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
375 (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)) {
376 major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
378 } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
379 major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2;
380 minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2;
382 major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
383 minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
385 snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor, SSH_VERSION);
386 server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
388 /* Send our protocol version identification. */
389 if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,
390 strlen(server_version_string))
391 != strlen(server_version_string)) {
392 logit("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
396 /* Read other sides version identification. */
397 memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
398 for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
399 if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
400 logit("Did not receive identification string from %s",
401 get_remote_ipaddr());
404 if (buf[i] == '\r') {
406 /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */
408 strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0)
412 if (buf[i] == '\n') {
417 buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
418 client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
421 * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
422 * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
424 if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
425 &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
426 s = "Protocol mismatch.\n";
427 (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
430 logit("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' from %s",
431 client_version_string, get_remote_ipaddr());
434 debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s",
435 remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
437 compat_datafellows(remote_version);
439 if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PROBE) {
440 logit("probed from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
441 get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
445 if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) {
446 logit("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
447 get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
452 switch (remote_major) {
454 if (remote_minor == 99) {
455 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)
461 if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) {
465 if (remote_minor < 3) {
466 packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and "
467 "is no longer supported. Please install a newer version.");
468 } else if (remote_minor == 3) {
469 /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */
474 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
483 chop(server_version_string);
484 debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string);
487 s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n";
488 (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
491 logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s",
493 server_version_string, client_version_string);
498 /* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
500 destroy_sensitive_data(void)
504 if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
505 key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
506 sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
508 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
509 if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
510 key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
511 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
514 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
515 memset(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
518 /* Demote private to public keys for network child */
520 demote_sensitive_data(void)
525 if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
526 tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key);
527 key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
528 sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
531 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
532 if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
533 tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
534 key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
535 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
536 if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
537 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
541 /* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie. XXX - Okay Niels? */
545 privsep_preauth_child(void)
552 /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
553 privsep_challenge_enable();
555 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
556 rnd[i] = arc4random();
557 RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
559 /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
560 demote_sensitive_data();
562 if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
563 fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
565 memset(pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(pw->pw_passwd));
568 /* Change our root directory */
569 if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
570 fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
572 if (chdir("/") == -1)
573 fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
575 /* Drop our privileges */
576 debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
579 /* XXX not ready, too heavy after chroot */
580 do_setusercontext(pw);
582 gidset[0] = pw->pw_gid;
583 if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0)
584 fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
585 permanently_set_uid(pw);
590 privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
595 /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
596 pmonitor = monitor_init();
597 /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
598 pmonitor->m_pkex = &xxx_kex;
602 fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
603 } else if (pid != 0) {
604 debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
606 close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
607 pmonitor->m_pid = pid;
608 monitor_child_preauth(authctxt, pmonitor);
609 close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
612 monitor_sync(pmonitor);
614 /* Wait for the child's exit status */
615 while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
622 close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
624 /* Demote the child */
625 if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
626 privsep_preauth_child();
627 setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
633 privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
635 #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
638 if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) {
640 /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
641 monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
646 /* Authentication complete */
648 if (startup_pipe != -1) {
653 /* New socket pair */
654 monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
656 pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
657 if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
658 fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
659 else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
660 debug2("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
661 close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
662 buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
663 monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
669 close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
671 /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
672 demote_sensitive_data();
674 /* Drop privileges */
675 do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
677 /* It is safe now to apply the key state */
678 monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
681 * Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since
682 * this information is not part of the key state.
684 packet_set_authenticated();
688 list_hostkey_types(void)
696 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
697 Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
703 if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
704 buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
705 p = key_ssh_name(key);
706 buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p));
710 buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
711 ret = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
713 debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", ret);
718 get_hostkey_by_type(int type)
722 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
723 Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
724 if (key != NULL && key->type == type)
731 get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
733 if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
735 return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]);
739 get_hostkey_index(Key *key)
743 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
744 if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i])
751 * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise.
752 * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability
753 * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until
754 * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups
757 drop_connection(int startups)
761 if (startups < options.max_startups_begin)
763 if (startups >= options.max_startups)
765 if (options.max_startups_rate == 100)
768 p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate;
769 p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
770 p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin;
771 p += options.max_startups_rate;
772 r = arc4random() % 100;
774 debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r);
775 return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
781 fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
782 SSH_RELEASE, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
784 "usage: sshd [-46Ddeiqt] [-b bits] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
785 " [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n"
791 send_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
795 debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %d", __func__, fd,
799 * Protocol from reexec master to child:
800 * string configuration
801 * u_int ephemeral_key_follows
802 * bignum e (only if ephemeral_key_follows == 1)
810 buffer_put_cstring(&m, buffer_ptr(conf));
812 if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL &&
813 sensitive_data.server_key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
814 buffer_put_int(&m, 1);
815 buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
816 buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
817 buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d);
818 buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp);
819 buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p);
820 buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q);
822 buffer_put_int(&m, 0);
824 if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, &m) == -1)
825 fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__);
829 debug3("%s: done", __func__);
833 recv_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
839 debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd);
843 if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, &m) == -1)
844 fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__);
845 if (buffer_get_char(&m) != 0)
846 fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__);
848 cp = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
850 buffer_append(conf, cp, len + 1);
853 if (buffer_get_int(&m)) {
854 if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
855 key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
856 sensitive_data.server_key = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1);
857 buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
858 buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
859 buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d);
860 buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp);
861 buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p);
862 buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q);
863 rsa_generate_additional_parameters(
864 sensitive_data.server_key->rsa);
868 debug3("%s: done", __func__);
872 * Main program for the daemon.
875 main(int ac, char **av)
879 int opt, j, i, fdsetsz, on = 1;
880 int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1;
884 struct sockaddr_storage from;
885 const char *remote_ip;
889 char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
891 int listen_sock, maxfd;
892 int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 }, config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
896 int ret, key_used = 0;
899 #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
900 (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
902 __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
905 /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
908 saved_argv = xmalloc(sizeof(*saved_argv) * (ac + 1));
909 for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
910 saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
911 saved_argv[i] = NULL;
913 #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
914 /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
915 compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
919 if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
920 debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno));
922 /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
923 initialize_server_options(&options);
925 /* Parse command-line arguments. */
926 while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:u:o:dDeiqrtQR46")) != -1) {
929 options.address_family = AF_INET;
932 options.address_family = AF_INET6;
935 config_file_name = optarg;
938 if (debug_flag == 0) {
940 options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
941 } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
964 options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
967 options.server_key_bits = atoi(optarg);
970 options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
971 if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) {
972 fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n");
975 options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg);
976 if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] == 0) {
977 fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n");
982 if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
983 fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n");
988 if ((options.key_regeneration_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
989 fprintf(stderr, "Invalid key regeneration interval.\n");
994 if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) {
995 fprintf(stderr, "too many host keys.\n");
998 options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] = optarg;
1004 utmp_len = atoi(optarg);
1005 if (utmp_len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) {
1006 fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n");
1011 line = xstrdup(optarg);
1012 if (process_server_config_line(&options, line,
1013 "command-line", 0) != 0)
1023 if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag)
1025 if (rexec_flag && (av[0] == NULL || *av[0] != '/'))
1026 fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path");
1028 closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD);
1030 closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
1032 SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
1035 * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
1036 * key (unless started from inetd)
1038 log_init(__progname,
1039 options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
1040 SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
1041 options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
1042 SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
1043 log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
1046 * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
1047 * root's environment
1049 if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL)
1050 unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
1053 /* Cray can define user privs drop all privs now!
1054 * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems!
1061 sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
1062 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
1063 sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0;
1064 sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;
1066 /* Fetch our configuration */
1069 recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, &cfg);
1071 load_server_config(config_file_name, &cfg);
1073 parse_server_config(&options,
1074 rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name, &cfg);
1079 /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
1080 fill_default_server_options(&options);
1082 /* set default channel AF */
1083 channel_set_af(options.address_family);
1085 /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
1087 fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
1091 debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_RELEASE);
1093 /* load private host keys */
1094 sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files *
1096 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
1097 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
1099 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
1100 key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL);
1101 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
1103 error("Could not load host key: %s",
1104 options.host_key_files[i]);
1105 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
1108 switch (key->type) {
1110 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key;
1111 sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1;
1115 sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1;
1118 debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, key->type,
1121 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
1122 logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
1123 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
1125 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
1126 logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
1127 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
1129 if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
1130 logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
1134 /* Check certain values for sanity. */
1135 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
1136 if (options.server_key_bits < 512 ||
1137 options.server_key_bits > 32768) {
1138 fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n");
1142 * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This
1143 * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I
1144 * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels
1146 if (options.server_key_bits >
1147 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) -
1148 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && options.server_key_bits <
1149 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
1150 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
1151 options.server_key_bits =
1152 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
1153 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
1154 debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.",
1155 options.server_key_bits);
1163 if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
1164 fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
1166 if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) ||
1167 (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0))
1168 fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
1169 _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
1172 if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) &&
1173 (st.st_uid != getuid () ||
1174 (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0))
1176 if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
1178 fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or "
1179 "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
1182 /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
1187 * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This
1188 * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the
1189 * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM
1190 * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every
1191 * module which might be used).
1193 if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0)
1194 debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
1197 rexec_argv = xmalloc(sizeof(char *) * (rexec_argc + 2));
1198 for (i = 0; i < rexec_argc; i++) {
1199 debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]);
1200 rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i];
1202 rexec_argv[rexec_argc] = "-R";
1203 rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL;
1206 /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
1207 if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag))
1209 log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
1212 * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect
1213 * from the controlling terminal, and fork. The original process
1216 if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag)) {
1219 #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
1220 if (daemon(0, 0) < 0)
1221 fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
1223 /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */
1225 fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
1227 (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
1230 #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
1232 /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
1233 log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
1235 /* Initialize the random number generator. */
1238 /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
1239 unmounted if desired. */
1242 /* ignore SIGPIPE */
1243 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
1245 /* Start listening for a socket, unless started from inetd. */
1251 close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
1252 sock_in = sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
1254 startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
1255 close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
1258 sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
1259 sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
1262 * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
1263 * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if
1264 * ttyfd happens to be one of those.
1266 if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
1267 dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
1268 dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
1269 if (fd > STDOUT_FILENO)
1272 debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", sock_in, sock_out);
1273 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
1274 sensitive_data.server_key == NULL)
1275 generate_ephemeral_server_key();
1277 for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
1278 if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
1280 if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
1281 fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
1282 "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
1283 if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
1284 ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
1285 NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
1286 error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
1287 (ret != EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(ret) :
1291 /* Create socket for listening. */
1292 listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
1294 if (listen_sock < 0) {
1295 /* kernel may not support ipv6 */
1296 verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1299 if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) {
1304 * Set socket options.
1305 * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
1307 if (setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
1308 &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
1309 error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno));
1311 debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
1313 /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
1314 if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
1316 error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
1317 strport, ntop, strerror(errno));
1321 listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock;
1324 /* Start listening on the port. */
1325 logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
1326 if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0)
1327 fatal("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1330 freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs);
1332 if (!num_listen_socks)
1333 fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
1335 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
1336 generate_ephemeral_server_key();
1339 * Arrange to restart on SIGHUP. The handler needs
1342 signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
1344 signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
1345 signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
1347 /* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */
1348 signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
1350 /* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler is setup */
1353 * Record our pid in /var/run/sshd.pid to make it
1354 * easier to kill the correct sshd. We don't want to
1355 * do this before the bind above because the bind will
1356 * fail if there already is a daemon, and this will
1357 * overwrite any old pid in the file.
1359 f = fopen(options.pid_file, "wb");
1361 error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
1362 options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
1364 fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
1369 /* setup fd set for listen */
1372 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
1373 if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd)
1374 maxfd = listen_socks[i];
1375 /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */
1376 startup_pipes = xmalloc(options.max_startups * sizeof(int));
1377 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
1378 startup_pipes[i] = -1;
1381 * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
1382 * the daemon is killed with a signal.
1385 if (received_sighup)
1389 fdsetsz = howmany(maxfd+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
1390 fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz);
1391 memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz);
1393 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
1394 FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset);
1395 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
1396 if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
1397 FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset);
1399 /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
1400 ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
1401 if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
1402 error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1403 if (received_sigterm) {
1404 logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
1405 (int) received_sigterm);
1406 close_listen_socks();
1407 unlink(options.pid_file);
1410 if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
1411 generate_ephemeral_server_key();
1418 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
1419 if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 &&
1420 FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) {
1422 * the read end of the pipe is ready
1423 * if the child has closed the pipe
1424 * after successful authentication
1425 * or if the child has died
1427 close(startup_pipes[i]);
1428 startup_pipes[i] = -1;
1431 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) {
1432 if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset))
1434 fromlen = sizeof(from);
1435 newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct sockaddr *)&from,
1438 if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
1439 error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1442 if (unset_nonblock(newsock) == -1) {
1446 if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) {
1447 debug("drop connection #%d", startups);
1451 if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) {
1456 if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX,
1457 SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) {
1458 error("reexec socketpair: %s",
1461 close(startup_p[0]);
1462 close(startup_p[1]);
1466 for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
1467 if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
1468 startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
1469 if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
1470 maxfd = startup_p[0];
1476 * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless
1477 * we are in debugging mode.
1481 * In debugging mode. Close the listening
1482 * socket, and start processing the
1483 * connection without forking.
1485 debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
1486 close_listen_socks();
1489 close(startup_p[0]);
1490 close(startup_p[1]);
1494 send_rexec_state(config_s[0],
1501 * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have
1502 * the child process the connection. The
1503 * parent continues listening.
1505 if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
1507 * Child. Close the listening and max_startup
1508 * sockets. Start using the accepted socket.
1509 * Reinitialize logging (since our pid has
1510 * changed). We break out of the loop to handle
1513 startup_pipe = startup_p[1];
1514 close_startup_pipes();
1515 close_listen_socks();
1518 log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
1525 /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */
1527 error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1529 debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);
1531 close(startup_p[1]);
1534 send_rexec_state(config_s[0], &cfg);
1539 /* Mark that the key has been used (it was "given" to the child). */
1540 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
1542 /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
1543 signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
1544 alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
1550 /* Close the new socket (the child is now taking care of it). */
1553 /* child process check (or debug mode) */
1554 if (num_listen_socks < 0)
1559 /* This is the child processing a new connection. */
1560 setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]");
1563 * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
1564 * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't
1565 * want the child to be able to affect the parent.
1567 #if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
1569 * If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a
1570 * controlling terminal which will result in "could not set
1571 * controlling tty" errors.
1573 if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0)
1574 error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1580 debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
1581 sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
1582 dup2(newsock, STDIN_FILENO);
1583 dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
1584 if (startup_pipe == -1)
1585 close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
1587 dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
1589 dup2(config_s[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
1591 if (startup_pipe != -1)
1592 close(startup_pipe);
1594 execv(rexec_argv[0], rexec_argv);
1596 /* Reexec has failed, fall back and continue */
1597 error("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv[0], strerror(errno));
1598 recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, NULL);
1599 log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
1600 options.log_facility, log_stderr);
1603 startup_pipe = REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD;
1605 close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
1606 newsock = sock_out = sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
1607 if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
1608 dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
1609 dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
1610 if (fd > STDERR_FILENO)
1613 debug("rexec cleanup in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
1614 sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
1618 * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the
1619 * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We
1620 * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense.
1623 signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
1624 signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
1625 signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
1626 signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
1627 signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
1628 signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
1632 * Initialize the resolver. This may not happen automatically
1633 * before privsep chroot().
1635 if ((_res.options & RES_INIT) == 0) {
1636 debug("res_init()");
1642 * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
1645 packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out);
1646 packet_set_server();
1648 /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
1649 if (options.tcp_keep_alive && packet_connection_is_on_socket() &&
1650 setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
1651 error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1653 if ((remote_port = get_remote_port()) < 0) {
1654 debug("get_remote_port failed");
1657 remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
1659 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
1660 audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
1663 /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
1664 if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
1665 struct request_info req;
1667 request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
1670 if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
1671 debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
1674 fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
1677 #endif /* LIBWRAP */
1679 /* Log the connection. */
1680 verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
1683 * We don\'t want to listen forever unless the other side
1684 * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
1685 * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero
1686 * indicates no limit. Note that we don\'t set the alarm in debugging
1687 * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
1688 * are about to discover the bug.
1690 signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
1692 alarm(options.login_grace_time);
1694 sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out);
1696 packet_set_nonblocking();
1698 /* allocate authentication context */
1699 authctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(*authctxt));
1700 memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
1702 authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
1704 /* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
1705 the_authctxt = authctxt;
1707 /* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
1708 buffer_init(&loginmsg);
1711 if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1)
1714 /* perform the key exchange */
1715 /* authenticate user and start session */
1718 do_authentication2(authctxt);
1721 do_authentication(authctxt);
1724 * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
1725 * the current keystate and exits
1728 mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
1733 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
1734 audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
1738 * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
1739 * file descriptor passing.
1742 privsep_postauth(authctxt);
1743 /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
1745 destroy_sensitive_data();
1748 /* Start session. */
1749 do_authenticated(authctxt);
1751 /* The connection has been terminated. */
1752 verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip);
1755 if (options.use_pam)
1757 #endif /* USE_PAM */
1759 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
1760 PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE));
1772 * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key
1773 * (key with larger modulus first).
1776 ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
1780 if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
1781 /* Server key has bigger modulus. */
1782 if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) <
1783 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
1784 fatal("do_connection: %s: server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
1785 get_remote_ipaddr(),
1786 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
1787 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
1788 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
1790 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1791 sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) <= 0)
1793 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1794 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) <= 0)
1797 /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
1798 if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) <
1799 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
1800 fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
1801 get_remote_ipaddr(),
1802 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
1803 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
1804 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
1806 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1807 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) < 0)
1809 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1810 sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) < 0)
1823 BIGNUM *session_key_int;
1824 u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
1826 u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags;
1830 * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user
1831 * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip
1832 * spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody
1833 * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local
1834 * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random
1835 * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one
1836 * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure.
1838 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
1841 cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff;
1846 * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random
1847 * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP
1850 packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
1851 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
1852 packet_put_char(cookie[i]);
1854 /* Store our public server RSA key. */
1855 packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n));
1856 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
1857 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
1859 /* Store our public host RSA key. */
1860 packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
1861 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e);
1862 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n);
1864 /* Put protocol flags. */
1865 packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN);
1867 /* Declare which ciphers we support. */
1868 packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0));
1870 /* Declare supported authentication types. */
1872 if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication)
1873 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA;
1874 if (options.rsa_authentication)
1875 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA;
1876 if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1)
1877 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS;
1878 if (options.password_authentication)
1879 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD;
1880 packet_put_int(auth_mask);
1882 /* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */
1884 packet_write_wait();
1886 debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.",
1887 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
1888 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
1890 /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */
1891 packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
1893 /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */
1894 cipher_type = packet_get_char();
1896 if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type)))
1897 packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher.");
1899 /* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we
1900 sent earlier with the public key packet. */
1901 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
1902 if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
1903 packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
1905 debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
1907 /* Get the encrypted integer. */
1908 if ((session_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
1909 fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
1910 packet_get_bignum(session_key_int);
1912 protocol_flags = packet_get_int();
1913 packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags);
1916 /* Decrypt session_key_int using host/server keys */
1917 rsafail = PRIVSEP(ssh1_session_key(session_key_int));
1920 * Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the
1921 * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the
1922 * key is in the highest bits.
1925 BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
1926 len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
1927 if (len < 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(session_key)) {
1928 error("do_connection: bad session key len from %s: "
1929 "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu",
1930 get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
1933 memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
1934 BN_bn2bin(session_key_int,
1935 session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len);
1937 derive_ssh1_session_id(
1938 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n,
1939 sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n,
1940 cookie, session_id);
1942 * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the
1945 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1946 session_key[i] ^= session_id[i];
1950 int bytes = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
1951 u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes);
1954 logit("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key");
1955 BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, buf);
1957 MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
1958 MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
1959 MD5_Final(session_key, &md);
1961 MD5_Update(&md, session_key, 16);
1962 MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
1963 MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
1964 MD5_Final(session_key + 16, &md);
1965 memset(buf, 0, bytes);
1967 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1968 session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16];
1970 /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
1971 destroy_sensitive_data();
1974 mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
1976 /* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */
1977 BN_clear_free(session_key_int);
1979 /* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */
1980 packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type);
1982 /* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */
1983 memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
1985 debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
1987 /* Send an acknowledgment packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
1988 packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
1990 packet_write_wait();
1994 * SSH2 key exchange: diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
2001 if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
2002 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
2003 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
2005 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
2006 compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
2007 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
2008 compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]);
2010 if (options.macs != NULL) {
2011 myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
2012 myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
2014 if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
2015 myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
2016 myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
2017 } else if (options.compression == COMP_DELAYED) {
2018 myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
2019 myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com";
2022 myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
2024 /* start key exchange */
2025 kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
2026 kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
2027 kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
2028 kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
2030 kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
2031 kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
2032 kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type;
2033 kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
2037 dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
2039 session_id2 = kex->session_id;
2040 session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
2043 /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
2044 packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
2045 packet_put_cstring("markus");
2047 packet_write_wait();
2052 /* server specific fatal cleanup */
2057 do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
2058 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
2059 /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
2060 if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
2061 audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);