1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
65 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
66 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
67 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
68 #include <openssl/evp.h>
69 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509.h>
71 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
72 #include <openssl/objects.h>
75 /* CRL score values */
77 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
79 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
81 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
83 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
87 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
89 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
91 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
93 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
95 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
97 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
99 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
101 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
103 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
105 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
107 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
109 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
111 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
113 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
114 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
115 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
116 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
122 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
124 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
125 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
126 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
127 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
128 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
129 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
130 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
131 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
133 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
134 unsigned int *preasons);
135 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
136 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
137 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
138 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
140 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
141 const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
143 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
149 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
151 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b);
154 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
155 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
157 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
158 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
164 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
166 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
168 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
171 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
172 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
175 /* Look for exact match */
176 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
177 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
178 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
181 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
182 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
185 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
189 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
191 X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
193 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
194 int depth, i, ok = 0;
196 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
197 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
198 int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
201 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
202 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
203 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
206 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
208 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
209 * cannot do another one.
211 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
212 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
219 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
220 * the first entry is in place
222 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
223 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
224 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
225 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
229 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
230 ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
232 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
233 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
234 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
235 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
236 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
241 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
242 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
243 depth = param->depth;
246 /* If we have enough, we break */
248 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
249 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
250 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
253 /* If we are self signed, we break */
254 if (cert_self_signed(x))
257 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
259 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
260 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
262 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
266 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
275 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
276 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) {
277 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
279 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
280 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
281 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
285 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
286 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
287 ctx->last_untrusted++;
291 * reparse the full chain for the next one
299 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
302 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
303 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
309 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
311 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
312 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
313 if (cert_self_signed(x)) {
314 /* we have a self signed certificate */
315 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
317 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
318 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
319 * possible impersonation.
321 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
322 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
323 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
324 ctx->current_cert = x;
325 ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
334 * We have a match: replace certificate with store
335 * version so we get any trust settings.
339 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
340 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
344 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
346 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
347 ctx->last_untrusted--;
350 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
353 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
355 /* If we have enough, we break */
358 /* If we are self signed, we break */
359 if (cert_self_signed(x))
361 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
364 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
370 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
372 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
373 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
380 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
381 if ((trust = check_trust(ctx)) == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
382 /* Callback already issued */
388 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
389 * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
390 * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
394 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
395 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
396 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
398 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
399 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
401 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
404 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
407 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
412 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
416 xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
420 ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
429 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
430 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
431 * and set bad_chain == 1
433 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
434 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
435 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
436 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
438 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
439 ctx->current_cert = x;
442 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
444 ctx->last_untrusted = num;
445 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
446 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
450 ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
457 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
458 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
463 /* Check name constraints */
465 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
475 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
476 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
479 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
480 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
483 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
487 err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
489 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
491 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
497 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
498 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
499 ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
501 ok = internal_verify(ctx);
505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
506 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
507 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
510 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
515 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
516 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
517 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
522 /* Ensure we return an error */
525 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
529 if (chain_ss != NULL)
532 /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */
533 if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
534 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
539 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
542 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
546 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
547 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
548 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
554 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
556 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
559 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
560 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
562 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
563 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
567 ctx->current_cert = x;
568 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
569 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
572 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
574 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
576 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
578 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
585 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
589 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
591 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
594 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
596 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
597 int proxy_path_length = 0;
599 int allow_proxy_certs;
603 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
604 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
605 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
606 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
607 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
608 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
609 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
613 /* CRL path validation */
615 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
616 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
619 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
621 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
624 if (ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
625 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
626 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
629 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
630 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
632 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
633 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
634 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
635 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
636 ctx->error_depth = i;
637 ctx->current_cert = x;
642 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
643 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
644 ctx->error_depth = i;
645 ctx->current_cert = x;
650 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
651 switch (must_be_ca) {
653 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
654 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
656 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
663 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
669 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
672 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
678 ctx->error_depth = i;
679 ctx->current_cert = x;
684 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
685 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
687 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
689 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
690 ctx->error_depth = i;
691 ctx->current_cert = x;
698 if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
699 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length))) {
700 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
701 ctx->error_depth = i;
702 ctx->current_cert = x;
707 /* Increment path length if not a self issued intermediate CA */
708 if (i > 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0)
711 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
712 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
713 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
715 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
717 * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
718 * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
719 * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
720 * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
722 * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
723 * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
724 * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
725 * increment proxy_path_length.
727 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) {
728 if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
729 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
730 ctx->error_depth = i;
731 ctx->current_cert = x;
736 proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen;
749 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
753 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
754 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
755 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
756 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
757 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
761 * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
762 * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
764 * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
766 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
767 X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x);
768 X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
769 X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL;
770 int last_object_nid = 0;
772 int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
774 /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
775 if (last_object_loc < 1) {
776 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
777 goto proxy_name_done;
781 * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
782 * there is in issuer.
784 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject)
785 != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) {
786 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
787 goto proxy_name_done;
791 * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
794 if (X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc)->set
795 == X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc - 1)->set) {
796 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
797 goto proxy_name_done;
801 * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
802 * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
804 tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject);
805 if (tmpsubject == NULL) {
806 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
807 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
812 X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc);
814 OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
816 if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName
817 || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) {
818 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
821 X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
822 X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
825 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
827 ctx->error_depth = i;
828 ctx->current_cert = x;
829 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
835 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
836 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
837 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
840 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
841 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
843 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
847 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
852 ctx->error_depth = i;
853 ctx->current_cert = x;
854 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
864 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
866 ctx->error = errcode;
867 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
868 ctx->error_depth = 0;
869 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
872 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
875 int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
878 if (id->peername != NULL) {
879 OPENSSL_free(id->peername);
882 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
883 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
884 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags, &id->peername) > 0)
890 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
892 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
893 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
895 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) {
896 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
899 if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
900 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
903 if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
904 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
910 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
914 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
916 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
917 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
918 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
919 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
920 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
921 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
922 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
924 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
927 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
928 ctx->error_depth = i;
929 ctx->current_cert = x;
930 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
933 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
937 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
940 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
942 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
943 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
944 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
945 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
947 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
949 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
950 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
955 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
956 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
958 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
961 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
964 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
966 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
967 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
969 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
974 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
975 ctx->error_depth = i;
976 ok = check_cert(ctx);
983 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
985 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
988 unsigned int last_reasons;
989 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
990 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
991 ctx->current_cert = x;
992 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
993 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
994 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
995 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
997 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
998 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
999 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
1001 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
1003 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
1005 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
1008 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
1009 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1012 ctx->current_crl = crl;
1013 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
1018 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
1021 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
1027 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
1029 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
1035 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
1039 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
1042 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
1043 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
1044 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1050 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
1052 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1057 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
1059 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
1064 ctx->current_crl = crl;
1065 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1066 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1070 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
1074 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
1075 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1082 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
1083 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1087 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
1088 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
1093 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
1094 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1097 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
1098 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
1101 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
1102 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1108 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1113 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
1114 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
1115 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1117 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
1118 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
1119 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
1120 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
1121 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
1123 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1124 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1125 reasons = *preasons;
1126 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
1127 if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
1129 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
1130 if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
1132 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(best_crl),
1133 X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
1136 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
1139 if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
1143 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
1144 best_score = crl_score;
1145 best_reasons = reasons;
1150 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1152 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1153 *pscore = best_score;
1154 *preasons = best_reasons;
1155 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1157 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1160 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1163 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1170 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1171 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1174 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1176 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1178 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1180 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1181 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1183 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1187 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1191 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1193 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1203 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1209 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1211 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1213 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1214 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1216 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1217 if (!base->crl_number)
1219 /* Issuer names must match */
1220 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1222 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1223 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1225 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1227 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1228 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1230 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1231 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1237 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1238 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1241 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1242 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1246 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1248 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1250 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1251 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1252 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1253 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1254 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1255 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1264 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1265 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1266 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1267 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1268 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1271 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1272 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1276 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1278 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1280 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1281 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1283 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1284 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1285 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1287 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1288 /* If no new reasons reject */
1289 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1292 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1293 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1295 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1296 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1297 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1300 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1302 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1303 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1306 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1307 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1309 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1310 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1312 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1314 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1317 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1319 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1320 /* If no new reasons reject */
1321 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1323 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1324 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1327 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1333 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1334 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1336 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1337 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1338 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1341 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1344 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1346 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1347 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1348 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1349 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1354 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1355 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1356 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1358 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1359 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1360 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1365 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1367 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1371 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1372 * untrusted certificates.
1374 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1375 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1376 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1378 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1379 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1380 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1387 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1388 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1389 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1390 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1393 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1395 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1397 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1400 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1403 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1404 /* Copy verify params across */
1405 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1407 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1408 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1410 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1411 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1416 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1418 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1420 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1425 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1426 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1427 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1428 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1429 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1433 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1434 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1435 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1437 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1438 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1439 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1440 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1446 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1447 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1448 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1449 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1450 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1453 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1455 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1456 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1457 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1464 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1468 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1473 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1475 gens = b->name.fullname;
1476 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1479 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1480 gens = a->name.fullname;
1484 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1486 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1487 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1488 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1490 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1496 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1498 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1499 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1500 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1501 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1502 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1511 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1514 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1515 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1517 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1518 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1519 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1520 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1522 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1528 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1530 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1531 unsigned int *preasons)
1534 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1536 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1537 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1540 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1543 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1544 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1545 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1546 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1547 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1548 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1553 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1554 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1560 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1561 * to find a delta CRL too
1564 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1565 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1568 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1570 unsigned int reasons;
1571 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1572 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1573 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1574 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1575 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1576 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1581 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1583 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1585 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1589 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1591 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1595 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1597 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1598 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1599 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1608 /* Check CRL validity */
1609 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1611 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1612 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1613 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1614 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1615 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1616 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1617 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1618 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1621 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1622 * certificate in chain.
1624 else if (cnum < chnum)
1625 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1627 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1628 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1629 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
1630 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1631 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1639 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1641 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1642 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1643 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1644 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
1645 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1646 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1651 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
1652 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1653 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1658 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
1659 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
1660 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1661 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1667 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
1668 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1669 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1676 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
1677 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1682 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1683 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1686 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1687 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1692 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1693 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
1695 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1699 /* Verify CRL signature */
1700 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
1701 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1702 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1712 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1716 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1717 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1722 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1723 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1724 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1725 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1727 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1728 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
1729 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1730 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1735 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1736 * is not removeFromCRL.
1738 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1739 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1741 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1742 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1750 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1755 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1756 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1758 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1759 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1762 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1765 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1769 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1770 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1771 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1773 ctx->current_cert = x;
1774 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1775 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1781 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1782 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1783 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1786 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1787 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1789 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1790 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1791 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1792 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1794 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1801 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1806 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1807 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1811 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1813 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1814 ctx->current_cert = x;
1815 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1820 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1821 ctx->current_cert = x;
1822 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1826 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1828 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1829 ctx->current_cert = x;
1830 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1835 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1836 ctx->current_cert = x;
1837 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1844 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1848 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1849 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1851 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1853 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1854 ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
1856 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1858 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1861 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1866 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1867 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1872 ctx->error_depth = n;
1873 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1877 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1879 ctx->error_depth = n;
1882 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1883 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1888 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
1889 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1890 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1891 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1892 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1895 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1896 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1897 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1898 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1900 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1904 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1911 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1915 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1916 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1917 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1918 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
1925 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1933 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1935 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1938 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1940 static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1941 static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1942 ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL;
1943 int i, day, sec, ret = 0;
1946 * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
1947 * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1948 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1949 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1951 * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
1952 * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
1953 * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
1954 * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
1956 switch (ctm->type) {
1957 case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
1958 if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length))
1961 case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
1962 if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length))
1970 * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
1971 * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
1972 * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
1974 for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) {
1975 if (!isdigit(ctm->data[i]))
1978 if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != 'Z')
1982 * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
1983 * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
1984 * so we go through ASN.1
1986 asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time);
1987 if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL)
1989 if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time))
1993 * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
1994 * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
1996 ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1;
1999 ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time);
2003 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
2005 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
2008 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
2010 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
2013 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
2014 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
2023 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
2024 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
2025 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2026 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
2027 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2029 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2032 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2034 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
2037 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
2040 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2041 ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
2043 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
2044 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
2047 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
2050 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
2055 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
2056 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
2060 /* first, populate the other certs */
2061 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
2062 ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
2063 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
2064 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
2068 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
2069 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
2073 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
2075 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
2076 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
2078 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
2080 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
2081 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
2082 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
2083 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
2086 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2087 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
2088 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
2091 /* Issuer names must match */
2092 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
2093 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
2096 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2097 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
2098 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
2101 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
2102 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
2105 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2106 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
2107 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2110 /* CRLs must verify */
2111 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2112 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
2113 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2116 /* Create new CRL */
2117 crl = X509_CRL_new();
2118 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2120 /* Set issuer name */
2121 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2124 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
2126 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
2129 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2131 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2135 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2136 * number to correct value too.
2139 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
2140 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2141 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2142 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2146 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2148 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2150 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
2151 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2152 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2154 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2155 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2157 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
2158 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2161 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2162 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2167 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2169 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2175 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2181 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
2182 CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2183 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
2184 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2187 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2188 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2190 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2191 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2194 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2196 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2199 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2201 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2204 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2209 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2214 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2216 return ctx->error_depth;
2219 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2221 return ctx->current_cert;
2224 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2229 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2233 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2236 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2238 return ctx->current_issuer;
2241 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2243 return ctx->current_crl;
2246 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2251 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2256 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2258 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2261 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2266 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2268 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2271 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2273 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2277 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2278 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2279 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2280 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2281 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2282 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2283 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2287 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2288 int purpose, int trust)
2291 /* If purpose not set use default */
2293 purpose = def_purpose;
2294 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2297 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2299 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2300 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2303 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2304 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2305 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2307 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2308 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2311 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2313 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2315 trust = ptmp->trust;
2318 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2320 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2321 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2326 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2327 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2328 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2329 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2333 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2335 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2336 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2338 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2341 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2345 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2349 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2353 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2354 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2358 ctx->current_method = 0;
2360 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2362 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
2363 ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2367 ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2368 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2369 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2370 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2371 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2372 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2373 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2376 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2377 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2379 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2381 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2386 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2389 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2391 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2394 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2395 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, else must be idempotent */
2396 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2401 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2402 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2405 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2409 if (store && store->check_issued)
2410 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2412 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2414 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2415 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2417 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2419 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2420 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2422 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2424 if (store && store->verify)
2425 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2427 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2429 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2430 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2432 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2434 if (store && store->get_crl)
2435 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2437 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2439 if (store && store->check_crl)
2440 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2442 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2444 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2445 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2447 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2449 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2450 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2452 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2454 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2455 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2457 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2459 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2461 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2464 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2468 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2469 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2471 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2476 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2477 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2480 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2482 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2483 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2486 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2489 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2490 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2491 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2492 * pointers below after they're freed!
2494 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2495 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
2497 ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2499 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2500 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2501 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2504 if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
2505 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2508 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
2509 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2512 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2513 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2516 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2518 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2521 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2523 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2526 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2529 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2532 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2533 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2535 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2538 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2543 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2545 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2548 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2550 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2551 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2554 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2557 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2562 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2565 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2569 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2571 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2573 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2575 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2577 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)