1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return(SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function,
187 ssl3_get_server_method)
190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
191 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
193 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
195 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
197 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
198 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
200 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
202 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
203 we do so if There is no srp login name */
205 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
209 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
216 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
219 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
220 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
222 int new_state,state,skip=0;
224 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
228 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
230 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
231 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
233 /* init things to blank */
235 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
244 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
245 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
246 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
248 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
250 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
261 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
263 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
267 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
271 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
273 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
278 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
280 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
282 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
287 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
296 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
303 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
304 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
305 /* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
306 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
308 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
310 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
311 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
313 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
315 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
316 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
317 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
319 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
320 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
322 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
323 * client that doesn't support secure
326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
327 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
333 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
334 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
336 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
344 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
345 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
346 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
347 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
350 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
353 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
357 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
362 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
364 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
365 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
370 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
372 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
373 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
376 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
378 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
379 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
380 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
381 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
383 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
391 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
395 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
396 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
397 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
398 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
402 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
403 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
405 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
409 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
412 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
416 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
417 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
418 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
419 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
420 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
421 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
423 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
424 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
426 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
427 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
429 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
434 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
441 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
446 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
447 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
448 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
451 * clear this, it may get reset by
452 * send_server_key_exchange
454 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
457 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
458 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
460 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
462 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
463 * message only if the cipher suite is either
464 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
465 * server certificate contains the server's
466 * public key for key exchange.
469 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
470 * hint if provided */
471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
472 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
475 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
476 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
478 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
479 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
480 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
481 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
482 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
483 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
489 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
490 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
495 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
499 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
500 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
501 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
502 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
503 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
504 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
505 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
506 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
507 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
508 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
509 * and in RFC 2246): */
510 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
511 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
512 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
513 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
514 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
515 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
516 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
517 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
518 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
519 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
520 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
522 /* no cert request */
524 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
525 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
526 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
527 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
532 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
533 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
534 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
535 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
536 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
538 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
539 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
545 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
546 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
547 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
548 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
549 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
550 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
554 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
556 /* This code originally checked to see if
557 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
558 * and then flushed. This caused problems
559 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
560 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
561 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
562 * still exist. So instead we just flush
566 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
567 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
572 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
574 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
577 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
578 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
579 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
580 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
584 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
586 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
588 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
589 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
592 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
596 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
597 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
598 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
603 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
604 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
605 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
606 * message is not sent.
607 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
608 * the client uses its key from the certificate
611 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
612 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
614 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
615 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
617 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
621 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
623 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
625 if (!s->session->peer)
627 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
628 * at this point and digest cached records.
630 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
635 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
636 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
644 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
647 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
648 * a client cert, it can be verified
649 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
650 * should be generalized. But it is next step
652 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
653 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
655 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
656 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
660 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
661 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
672 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
673 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
675 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
676 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
677 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
678 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
680 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
681 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
682 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
683 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
684 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
686 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
687 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
689 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
690 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
692 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
697 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
698 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
699 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
701 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
702 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
703 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
704 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
705 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
706 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
707 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
708 * the client's Finished message is read.
710 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
711 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
713 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
714 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
716 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
720 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
721 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
723 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
724 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
725 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
726 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
727 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
728 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
729 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
730 * the client's Finished message is read.
732 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
733 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
734 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
735 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
736 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
740 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
741 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
744 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
749 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
750 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
751 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
752 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
753 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
759 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
760 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
761 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
767 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
768 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
770 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
771 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
772 { ret= -1; goto end; }
774 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
775 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
777 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
778 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
781 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
782 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
790 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
791 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
792 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
793 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
794 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
795 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
796 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
797 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
800 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
801 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
803 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
805 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
808 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
812 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
817 /* clean a few things up */
818 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
820 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
823 /* remove buffering on output */
824 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
828 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
833 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
835 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
837 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
839 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
853 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
857 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
862 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
866 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
873 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
877 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
881 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
885 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
887 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
888 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
893 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
894 /* number of bytes to write */
899 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
900 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
903 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
908 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
909 * so permit appropriate message length */
910 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
916 if (!ok) return((int)n);
917 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
918 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
920 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
922 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
924 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
927 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
928 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
930 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
932 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
933 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
937 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
939 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
940 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
943 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
949 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
951 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
952 unsigned int cookie_len;
955 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
957 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
960 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
962 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
963 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
964 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
965 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
968 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
971 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
974 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
975 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
976 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
977 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
978 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
981 if (!ok) return((int)n);
983 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
985 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
986 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
987 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
990 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
991 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
994 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
995 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
997 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
998 s->version = s->client_version;
1000 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1004 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
1005 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
1006 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
1008 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
1010 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1012 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1013 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1015 if (cookie_length == 0)
1019 /* load the client random */
1020 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1021 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1023 /* get the session-id */
1027 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1028 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1029 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1030 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1031 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1033 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1034 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1035 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1036 * setting will be ignored.
1038 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1040 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1045 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1047 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1049 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1050 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1051 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1052 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1053 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1055 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version)
1056 { /* previous session */
1063 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1070 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1073 cookie_len = *(p++);
1076 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1077 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1078 * does not cause an overflow.
1080 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1083 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1088 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1089 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1092 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1094 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1096 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1099 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1101 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1104 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1106 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1107 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1109 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1111 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1122 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1124 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1125 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1131 /* not enough data */
1132 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1136 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1143 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1144 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1147 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1150 fprintf(stderr,"client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1152 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1154 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1156 fprintf(stderr,"client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1157 i,sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers),
1158 SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1166 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1167 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1170 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1172 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1173 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1174 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1175 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1176 * enabled, though. */
1177 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1178 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1180 s->session->cipher = c;
1187 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1188 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1189 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1199 /* not enough data */
1200 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1207 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1214 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1221 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1223 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1225 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1230 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1235 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1236 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1237 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1238 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1241 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1242 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1244 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1249 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1251 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1253 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1254 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1255 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1258 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1259 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1263 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1264 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1265 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1267 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1272 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1275 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1277 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1278 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1280 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1281 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1286 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1287 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1288 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1289 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1291 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1292 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1294 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1295 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1296 /* Can't disable compression */
1297 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1299 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1303 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1304 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1306 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1307 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1309 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1313 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1315 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1319 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1320 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1322 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1327 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1334 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1335 { /* See if we have a match */
1336 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1338 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1339 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1341 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1354 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1359 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1360 * using compression.
1362 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1364 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1370 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1375 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1376 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1378 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1380 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1381 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1382 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1383 if (ciphers == NULL)
1385 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1390 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1391 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1395 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1399 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1403 /* Session-id reuse */
1404 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1405 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1406 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1407 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1409 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1411 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1412 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1414 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1415 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1417 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1421 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1422 else if (ec != NULL)
1423 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1425 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1429 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1432 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1434 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1436 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1441 /* we now have the following setup.
1443 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1444 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1445 * compression - basically ignored right now
1446 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1447 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1448 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1449 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1452 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1453 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1455 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1466 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1469 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1473 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1476 unsigned char *p,*d;
1480 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1482 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1483 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1484 p=s->s3->server_random;
1485 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1488 /* Do the message type and length last */
1491 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1492 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1495 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1496 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1498 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1499 * back in the server hello:
1500 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1501 * we send back the old session ID.
1502 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1503 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1504 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1505 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1507 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1508 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1509 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1510 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1513 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1515 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1517 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1518 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1524 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1527 /* put the cipher */
1528 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1531 /* put the compression method */
1532 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1535 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1538 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1541 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1546 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1555 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1558 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1559 /* number of bytes to write */
1564 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1565 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1568 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1572 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1574 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1577 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1582 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1583 /* number of bytes to write */
1588 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1589 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1592 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1598 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1604 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1605 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1606 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1609 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1612 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1613 unsigned char *p,*d;
1623 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1624 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1626 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1631 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1634 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1637 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1639 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1640 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1641 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1644 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1653 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1659 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1664 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1667 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1668 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1669 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1670 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1673 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1678 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1684 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1691 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1692 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1693 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1695 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1704 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1705 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1706 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1707 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1720 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1722 const EC_GROUP *group;
1724 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1725 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1727 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1728 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1729 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1733 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1738 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1744 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1750 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1756 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1757 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1758 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1759 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1761 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1768 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1769 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1770 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1776 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1777 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1783 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1784 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1785 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1788 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1795 /* Encode the public key.
1796 * First check the size of encoding and
1797 * allocate memory accordingly.
1799 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1800 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1801 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1804 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1805 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1806 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1807 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1814 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1815 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1816 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1817 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1819 if (encodedlen == 0)
1821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1825 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1827 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1828 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1829 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1830 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1835 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1836 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1844 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1846 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1848 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1849 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1852 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1853 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1854 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1856 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1857 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1858 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1859 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1872 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1876 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1878 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1879 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1880 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1887 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1888 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1890 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1893 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1896 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1904 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1909 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1912 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1914 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1915 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1928 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1930 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1931 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1932 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1933 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1934 * the actual encoded point itself
1936 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1944 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1945 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1947 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1948 encodedPoint = NULL;
1953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1954 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1956 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1957 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1958 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1959 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1966 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1967 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1969 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1970 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1974 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1976 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1977 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1978 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1979 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1980 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1981 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1982 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1983 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1984 (unsigned int *)&i);
1988 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1989 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2001 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
2003 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2005 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2007 /* Should never happen */
2008 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2015 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2018 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2019 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2020 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2021 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
2022 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2023 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2030 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2035 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2036 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2042 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
2045 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2051 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2052 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2053 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2055 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2057 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2058 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2059 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2061 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2065 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2067 unsigned char *p,*d;
2069 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2073 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2077 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2079 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2081 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2086 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2088 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2098 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2102 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2104 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2105 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2106 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2111 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2112 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2115 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2122 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2123 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2129 /* else no CA names */
2130 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2133 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2134 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2137 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2142 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2143 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2148 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2151 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2158 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2161 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2162 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2167 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2171 unsigned long alg_k;
2173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2175 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2177 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2183 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2186 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2187 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2188 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2189 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2192 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2193 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2194 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2195 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2199 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2200 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2202 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2205 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2207 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2209 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2212 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2213 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2215 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2216 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2217 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2218 * be sent already */
2221 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2229 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2230 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2231 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2232 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2234 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2241 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2242 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2247 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2249 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2261 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2262 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2263 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2264 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2265 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2267 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2269 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2274 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2275 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2276 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2277 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2278 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2279 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2281 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2282 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2283 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2285 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2288 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2289 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
2290 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2292 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2293 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
2294 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2295 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2296 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2297 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2298 * decryption error. */
2299 version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
2300 version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
2302 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2303 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2304 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2305 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2306 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2307 * support the requested protocol version. If
2308 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2309 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2311 unsigned char workaround_good;
2312 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
2313 workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
2314 version_good |= workaround_good;
2317 /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
2318 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
2319 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2322 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2323 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2324 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2325 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2327 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++)
2329 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2330 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2333 s->session->master_key_length=
2334 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2335 s->session->master_key,
2336 p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2337 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2342 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2347 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2359 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2361 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2367 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2369 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2374 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2377 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2384 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2393 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2398 s->session->master_key_length=
2399 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2400 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2401 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2406 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2408 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2409 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2410 krb5_data authenticator;
2412 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2413 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2414 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2415 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2416 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2417 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2419 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2420 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2422 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2424 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2427 enc_ticket.length = i;
2429 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2432 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2436 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2437 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2440 authenticator.length = i;
2442 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2445 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2449 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2450 p+=authenticator.length;
2454 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2457 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2460 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2463 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2467 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2468 enc_pms.length + 6))
2470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2471 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2475 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2479 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2480 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2482 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2483 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2489 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2490 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2492 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2493 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2496 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2497 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2499 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2500 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2506 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2513 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2514 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2516 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2520 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2522 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2525 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2528 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2529 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2532 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2535 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2538 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2541 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2544 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2548 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2550 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2551 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2554 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2556 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2557 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2558 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2559 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2560 * the protocol version.
2561 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2562 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2564 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2567 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2572 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2574 s->session->master_key_length=
2575 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2576 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2578 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2580 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2581 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2583 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2584 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2589 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2590 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2591 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2592 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2596 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2599 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2604 const EC_GROUP *group;
2605 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2607 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2608 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2611 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2615 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2616 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2618 /* use the certificate */
2619 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2623 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2624 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2626 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2629 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2630 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2632 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2633 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2640 /* Let's get client's public key */
2641 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2644 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2650 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2652 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2654 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2658 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2660 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2662 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2663 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2664 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2665 * never executed. When that support is
2666 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2667 * received in the certificate is
2668 * authorized for key agreement.
2669 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2670 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2673 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2675 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2679 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2680 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2686 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2690 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2691 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2693 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2696 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2700 /* Get encoded point length */
2705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2709 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2710 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2716 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2717 * currently, so set it to the start
2719 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2722 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2723 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2724 if (field_size <= 0)
2726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2730 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2738 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2739 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2740 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2741 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2742 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2743 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2745 /* Compute the master secret */
2746 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2747 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2749 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2755 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2757 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2758 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2759 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2761 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2763 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2769 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2772 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2775 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2778 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2781 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2785 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2786 * string for the callback */
2787 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2788 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2789 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2790 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2791 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2793 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2796 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2799 else if (psk_len == 0)
2801 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2803 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2804 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2808 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2809 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2811 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2813 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2817 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2818 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2819 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2820 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2823 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2827 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2828 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2829 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2830 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2831 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2834 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2838 s->session->master_key_length=
2839 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2840 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2843 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2849 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2850 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2858 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2862 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2867 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2868 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
2870 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2871 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2874 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2875 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2876 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2877 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2880 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2884 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2893 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2894 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2897 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2898 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2899 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2900 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2901 unsigned long alg_a;
2905 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2906 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2907 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2908 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2909 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2910 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2912 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2913 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2914 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2915 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2916 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2917 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2918 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2919 if (client_pub_pkey)
2921 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2924 /* Decrypt session key */
2925 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
2926 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
2927 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
2929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2934 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2940 /* Generate master secret */
2941 s->session->master_key_length=
2942 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2943 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2944 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2945 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2950 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2951 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2959 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2961 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2967 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2968 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2971 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2972 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2973 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2974 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2975 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2976 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2981 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2983 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2989 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2991 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2993 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2994 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2995 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2997 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
3000 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3002 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3004 peer=s->session->peer;
3005 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3006 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3014 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3016 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3019 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3030 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3034 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3037 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3041 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3043 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3044 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3048 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3049 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3050 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3051 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3052 * signature without length field */
3053 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3054 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3060 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3062 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
3063 /* Should never happen */
3066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3067 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3070 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3071 if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3074 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3077 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
3080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
3081 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3085 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3095 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3099 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3100 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3103 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3107 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3111 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3115 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3119 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3122 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3123 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3126 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3130 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3132 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3139 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3141 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3142 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3146 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3152 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3160 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3162 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3163 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3164 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3168 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3176 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3178 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3179 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3180 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3184 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3186 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3192 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3193 { unsigned char signature[64];
3195 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3196 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3198 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3200 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3201 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3203 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3204 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3207 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3209 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3216 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3225 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3228 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3230 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3231 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3232 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3234 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3235 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3239 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3241 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3243 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3244 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3246 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3248 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3255 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3257 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3259 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3260 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3263 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3266 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3267 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3270 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3273 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3277 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3279 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3283 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3285 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3294 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3298 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3301 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3303 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3309 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3317 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3321 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3330 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3332 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3333 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3335 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3339 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3340 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3341 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3344 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3347 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3348 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3350 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3356 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3359 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3365 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3366 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3367 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3368 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3370 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3371 * when we arrive here. */
3372 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3374 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3375 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3381 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3382 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3383 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3384 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3385 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3393 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3396 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3397 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3401 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3406 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3408 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3411 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3412 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3413 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3420 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3426 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3431 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3432 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3436 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3437 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3439 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3441 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3442 const unsigned char *const_p;
3443 int len, slen_full, slen;
3448 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3449 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3450 unsigned char key_name[16];
3452 /* get session encoding length */
3453 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3454 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3457 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3459 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3463 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3465 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3467 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3473 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3475 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3476 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3482 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3483 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3485 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3486 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3487 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3488 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3489 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3490 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3492 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3493 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3494 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3497 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3499 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3500 /* Skip message length for now */
3502 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3503 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3504 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3505 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3508 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3510 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3519 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3520 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3521 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3522 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3523 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3524 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3527 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3528 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3529 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3530 * as their sessions. */
3531 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3533 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3535 /* Output key name */
3537 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3540 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3541 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3542 /* Encrypt session data */
3543 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3545 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3547 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3549 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3550 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3551 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3554 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3556 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3557 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3558 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3560 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3562 /* number of bytes to write */
3564 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3569 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3570 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3573 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3575 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3578 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3579 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3580 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3583 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3586 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3589 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3590 /* message length */
3591 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3593 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3594 /* length of OCSP response */
3595 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3596 /* actual response */
3597 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3598 /* number of bytes to write */
3599 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3600 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3604 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3605 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3608 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3609 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3610 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3611 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3614 int proto_len, padding_len;
3616 const unsigned char *p;
3618 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3619 * extension in their ClientHello */
3620 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3626 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3627 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3628 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3630 514, /* See the payload format below */
3636 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3637 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3638 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3639 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3646 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3648 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3650 /* The payload looks like:
3652 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3653 * uint8 padding_len;
3654 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3657 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3659 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3660 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3663 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3664 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3669 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3670 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;