2 * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_local.h"
16 #include "statem_local.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 #include <internal/cryptlib.h>
27 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
28 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
30 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
31 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
32 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
36 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
42 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
44 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
45 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
46 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
47 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
54 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
60 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
62 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
65 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
66 * ciphersuite or for SRP
68 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
77 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
78 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
79 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
80 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
82 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
83 * (transition not allowed)
85 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
87 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
90 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
91 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
92 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
95 switch (st->hand_state) {
99 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
101 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
102 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
104 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
105 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
110 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
111 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
112 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
117 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
124 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
125 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
128 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
129 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
135 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
136 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
137 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
143 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
144 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
149 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
150 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
151 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
157 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
158 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
166 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
167 # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
169 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
170 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
172 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
173 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
174 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
175 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
177 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
178 /* SSLfatal() already called */
181 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
188 /* No valid transition found */
193 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
194 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
195 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
196 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
198 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
199 * (transition not allowed)
201 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
203 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
207 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
208 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
210 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
211 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
216 switch (st->hand_state) {
220 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
221 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
222 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
226 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
227 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
228 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
234 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
236 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
237 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
240 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
241 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
246 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
248 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
249 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
253 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
254 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
258 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
259 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
261 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
262 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
263 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
264 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
266 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
267 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
268 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
269 * the server is resuming.
272 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
274 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
275 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
276 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
277 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
281 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
282 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
284 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
285 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
286 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
287 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
290 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
291 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
292 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
294 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
295 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
304 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
305 * |ext.status_expected| is set
307 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
308 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
313 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
314 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
315 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
316 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
317 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
318 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
319 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
326 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
327 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
328 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
329 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
336 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
337 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
338 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
343 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
344 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
345 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
346 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
349 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
350 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
355 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
356 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
357 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
362 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
363 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
364 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
370 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
371 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
378 /* No valid transition found */
379 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
383 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
384 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
387 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
388 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
389 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
390 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
393 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
394 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
395 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
400 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
401 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
404 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
406 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
409 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
410 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
411 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
413 switch (st->hand_state) {
415 /* Shouldn't happen */
416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
417 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
418 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
419 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
421 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
422 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
423 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
424 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
427 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
428 * we already sent close_notify
430 if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
431 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
432 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
433 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
434 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
435 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
438 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
440 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
441 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
442 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
444 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
445 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
446 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
448 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
449 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
450 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
452 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
453 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
455 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
459 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
460 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
461 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
462 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
466 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
467 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
468 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
469 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
471 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
472 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
473 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
475 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
476 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
477 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
478 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
479 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
480 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
483 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
484 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
485 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
488 /* Try to read from the server instead */
489 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
494 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
495 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
497 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
499 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
502 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
503 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
507 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
509 switch (st->hand_state) {
511 /* Shouldn't happen */
512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
513 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
514 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
515 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
518 if (!s->renegotiate) {
520 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
521 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
523 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
528 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
529 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
531 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
532 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
534 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
535 * actually selected a version yet.
537 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
538 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
540 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
541 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
544 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
547 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
549 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
551 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
552 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
553 * because we did early data.
555 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
556 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
557 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
559 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
560 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
562 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
563 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
565 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
567 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
569 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
570 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
573 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
574 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
577 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
578 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
580 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
582 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
583 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
586 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
587 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
588 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
589 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
591 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
592 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
596 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
597 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
599 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
601 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
602 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
603 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
605 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
606 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
607 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
608 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
609 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
611 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
612 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
614 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
617 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
620 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
622 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
623 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
624 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
625 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
628 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
630 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
631 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
633 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
636 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
638 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
639 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
641 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
642 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
645 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
647 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
650 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
651 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
652 /* SSLfatal() already called */
653 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
655 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
656 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
658 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
659 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
664 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
665 * the client to the server.
667 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
669 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
671 switch (st->hand_state) {
673 /* No pre work to be done */
676 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
678 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
679 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
680 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
681 /* SSLfatal() already called */
687 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
688 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
691 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
692 * messages unless we need to.
696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
697 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
698 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
699 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
705 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
707 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
708 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
709 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
711 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
712 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
713 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
716 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
717 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
720 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
721 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
724 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
728 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
729 * client to the server.
731 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
733 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
737 switch (st->hand_state) {
739 /* No post work to be done */
742 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
743 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
744 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
746 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
747 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
748 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
750 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
751 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
752 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
753 /* SSLfatal() already called */
757 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
758 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
762 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
763 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
768 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
770 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
771 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
773 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
774 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
777 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
778 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
779 /* SSLfatal() already called */
784 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
785 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
787 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
788 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
790 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
791 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
792 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
794 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
795 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
799 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
800 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
801 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
803 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
804 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
806 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
808 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
809 /* SSLfatal() already called */
813 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
814 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
815 /* SSLfatal() already called */
819 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
820 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
823 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
826 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
831 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
835 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
837 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
839 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
842 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
846 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
849 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
850 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
851 /* SSLfatal() already called */
854 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
855 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
856 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
857 /* SSLfatal() already called */
864 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
865 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
867 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
868 /* SSLfatal() already called */
874 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
878 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
881 * Valid return values are:
885 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
886 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
888 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
890 switch (st->hand_state) {
892 /* Shouldn't happen */
893 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
894 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
895 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
898 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
900 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
902 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
903 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
906 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
907 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
908 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
911 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
912 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
913 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
916 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
922 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
923 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
926 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
927 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
928 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
931 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
932 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
933 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
936 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
937 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
938 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
939 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
942 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
943 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
944 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
947 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
948 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
949 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
957 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
958 * reading. Excludes the message header.
960 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
962 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
964 switch (st->hand_state) {
966 /* Shouldn't happen */
969 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
970 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
972 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
973 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
976 return s->max_cert_list;
978 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
979 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
981 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
982 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
984 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
985 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
987 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
989 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
990 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
991 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
993 return s->max_cert_list;
995 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
996 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
998 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
999 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1001 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1003 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1004 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1006 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1007 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1009 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1010 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1012 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1013 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1018 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
1020 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1022 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1024 switch (st->hand_state) {
1026 /* Shouldn't happen */
1027 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1028 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1029 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1030 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1032 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1033 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1035 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1036 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1038 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1039 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1041 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1042 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1044 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1045 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1047 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1048 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1050 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1051 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1053 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1054 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1056 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1057 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1059 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1060 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1062 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1063 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1065 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1066 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1068 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1069 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1071 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1072 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1077 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1080 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1082 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1084 switch (st->hand_state) {
1086 /* Shouldn't happen */
1087 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1088 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1089 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1092 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1093 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1094 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1098 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1103 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1106 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1107 unsigned char *session_id;
1109 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1110 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1111 if (protverr != 0) {
1112 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1118 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
1119 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1120 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1121 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1122 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1126 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1128 p = s->s3->client_random;
1131 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1132 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1134 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1137 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1144 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1147 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1148 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1149 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1150 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1155 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1156 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1157 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1158 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1159 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1160 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1161 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1162 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1165 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1166 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1167 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1168 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1169 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1170 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1171 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1172 * know that is maximum server supports.
1173 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1174 * containing version 1.0.
1176 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1177 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1178 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1179 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1180 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1181 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1182 * the negotiated version.
1184 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1185 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1187 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1188 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1189 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1190 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1195 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1196 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1197 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1198 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1199 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1200 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1201 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1202 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1203 && RAND_bytes(s->tmp_session_id, sess_id_len) <= 0) {
1204 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1205 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1206 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1213 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1214 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1215 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1216 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1217 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1220 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1221 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1223 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1225 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1229 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1230 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1231 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1232 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1233 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1234 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1235 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1240 /* Ciphers supported */
1241 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1242 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1243 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1247 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1248 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1251 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1253 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1258 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1260 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1264 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1265 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1266 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1267 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1268 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1269 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1270 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1272 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1273 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1279 /* Add the NULL method */
1280 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1281 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1282 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1286 /* TLS extensions */
1287 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1288 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1295 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1300 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1301 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1302 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1303 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1304 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1307 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1308 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1309 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1310 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1311 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1314 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1315 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1316 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1317 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1319 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1321 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1324 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1326 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1327 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1330 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1332 /* unknown cipher */
1333 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1334 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1338 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1339 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1341 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1342 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1343 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1347 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1348 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1350 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1351 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1352 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1356 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1357 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1358 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1360 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1365 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1366 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1367 * set and use it for comparison.
1369 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1370 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1371 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1372 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1374 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1375 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1377 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1378 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1379 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1380 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1381 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1386 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1390 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1394 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1399 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1401 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1402 size_t session_id_len;
1403 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1405 unsigned int compression;
1406 unsigned int sversion;
1407 unsigned int context;
1408 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1413 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1414 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1415 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1419 /* load the server random */
1420 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1421 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1422 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1423 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1424 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1426 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1427 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1428 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1432 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1433 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1434 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1439 /* Get the session-id. */
1440 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1441 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1442 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1445 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1446 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1447 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1448 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1449 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1453 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1454 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1455 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1459 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1461 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1465 /* TLS extensions */
1466 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1467 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1468 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1469 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1470 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1476 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1477 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1478 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1479 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1480 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1484 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1485 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1490 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1491 if (compression != 0) {
1492 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1493 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1494 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1498 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1499 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1500 session_id_len) != 0) {
1501 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1502 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1508 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1509 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1513 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1517 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1518 * are appropriate for this version.
1520 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1521 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1522 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1523 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1524 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1530 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1532 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1533 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1535 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1536 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1537 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1538 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1542 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1543 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1544 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1545 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1546 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1551 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1552 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1553 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1554 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1555 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1556 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1557 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1558 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1559 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1560 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1562 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1563 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1564 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1566 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1567 * backwards compat reasons
1569 int master_key_length;
1570 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1571 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1574 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1575 && master_key_length > 0) {
1576 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1577 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1578 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1580 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1581 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1586 if (session_id_len != 0
1587 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1588 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1589 session_id_len) == 0)
1594 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1595 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1596 /* actually a client application bug */
1597 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1598 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1599 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1604 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1605 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1606 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1607 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1608 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1610 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1611 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
1612 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1613 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1618 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1620 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1621 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1622 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1623 * used for resumption.
1625 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1626 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1627 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1628 if (session_id_len > 0)
1629 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1634 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1635 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1636 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1637 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1641 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1644 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1645 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1647 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1648 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1652 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1653 if (compression != 0) {
1654 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1655 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1659 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1660 * using compression.
1662 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1663 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1664 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1668 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1669 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1670 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1673 if (compression == 0)
1675 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1676 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1677 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1680 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1683 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1684 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1685 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1688 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1692 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1693 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1698 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1699 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1700 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1704 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1707 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1708 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1710 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1711 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
1712 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
1715 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1716 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1718 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1720 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1724 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1725 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1726 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1731 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1732 * we're done with this message
1735 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1736 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1737 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1738 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1742 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1743 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1745 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1746 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1749 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1752 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1755 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1756 * should not be used.
1758 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1759 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1761 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1762 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1763 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1764 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1765 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1769 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1772 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1773 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1774 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL
1778 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1779 * ClientHello will not change
1781 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1782 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1783 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1788 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1789 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1791 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1792 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1797 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1798 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1799 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1802 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1803 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1804 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1808 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1810 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1811 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1814 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1817 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1818 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1820 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1821 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1822 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1823 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1824 unsigned int context = 0;
1825 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1827 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1828 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1829 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1833 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1835 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1836 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1837 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1838 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1839 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1842 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1843 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1844 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1845 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1846 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1847 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1851 certstart = certbytes;
1852 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1854 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
1855 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1858 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1859 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1860 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1861 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1865 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1866 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1869 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1870 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1871 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1875 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1876 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1877 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1878 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1879 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1880 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1881 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1882 /* SSLfatal already called */
1885 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1888 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1889 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1890 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1891 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1897 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1899 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1900 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1901 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1902 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1903 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1904 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1905 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1906 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1907 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1908 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1909 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1910 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1912 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1913 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
1914 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1915 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1918 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1920 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1921 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1925 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1927 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1928 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1930 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1933 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1935 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1938 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1942 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1944 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1945 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1946 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1950 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1951 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1954 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1955 if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1957 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1958 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1959 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1964 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1966 s->session->peer = x;
1967 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1970 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1972 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1973 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1974 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1975 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1979 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1983 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1987 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1989 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1990 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1992 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1994 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1995 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1996 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2001 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2002 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2003 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2006 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2007 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2008 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2009 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2013 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
2014 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2015 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
2016 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
2017 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
2018 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2019 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2025 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2026 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2031 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2033 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2034 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
2036 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2037 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2038 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
2039 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
2040 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2041 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2045 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
2047 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2048 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2050 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2051 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2053 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2054 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2056 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2057 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2058 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2063 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2064 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2068 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2069 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2070 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2074 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2075 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2080 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2082 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2083 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2084 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2087 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2091 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2092 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2093 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2094 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2095 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2099 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
2102 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
2103 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2104 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2108 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2109 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2110 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2112 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2113 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2114 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2115 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2120 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2121 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
2122 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2123 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2127 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
2128 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2134 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2135 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2136 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2140 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2141 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2147 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2148 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2154 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, EVP_PKEY_security_bits(peer_tmp),
2156 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2157 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2161 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2164 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2165 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2167 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2168 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2169 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2178 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2182 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2183 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2188 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2192 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2195 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2196 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2197 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2199 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2201 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2205 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2206 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2208 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2209 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2210 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2215 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) {
2216 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2217 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2221 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2222 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2223 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2227 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2228 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2229 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2236 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2237 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2240 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2241 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2242 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2243 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2244 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2249 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2254 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2257 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2258 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2259 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2260 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2262 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2264 save_param_start = *pkt;
2266 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2267 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2268 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2271 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2272 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2273 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2278 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2279 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2280 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2281 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2282 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2285 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2286 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2287 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2290 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2291 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2292 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2296 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2297 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2301 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2305 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2311 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2312 * equals the length of the parameters.
2314 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2315 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2316 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2318 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2322 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2323 unsigned int sigalg;
2325 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2326 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2327 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2330 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2331 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2334 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2335 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2336 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2340 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2342 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2346 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2347 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2348 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
2351 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2352 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2354 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2357 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2360 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2365 * Check signature length
2367 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2368 /* wrong packet length */
2369 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2370 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2374 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2375 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2376 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2377 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2381 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2382 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2386 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2387 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2388 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2389 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2391 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2395 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2396 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2398 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2402 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2403 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2406 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2407 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2410 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2413 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2414 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2415 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2416 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2417 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2421 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2424 /* still data left over */
2425 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2427 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2432 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2434 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2435 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2438 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2442 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2443 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2444 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2446 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2447 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2448 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2450 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
2452 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2453 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2456 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2459 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2460 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2461 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2462 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2463 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2464 s->pha_context = NULL;
2465 s->pha_context_len = 0;
2467 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2468 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2469 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2470 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2471 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2472 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2475 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2476 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2477 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2479 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2481 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2482 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2484 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2485 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2486 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2487 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2488 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2490 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2491 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2492 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2493 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2495 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2500 /* get the certificate types */
2501 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2502 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2503 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2504 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2505 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2508 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2509 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2510 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2511 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2512 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2515 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2518 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2519 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2520 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2521 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2522 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2526 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2527 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2529 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2530 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2531 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2532 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2533 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2535 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2536 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2537 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2538 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2539 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2543 /* get the CA RDNs */
2544 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2545 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2546 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2550 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2551 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2552 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2553 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2554 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2557 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2558 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2561 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2562 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2563 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2564 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2565 * SSL_get_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2568 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
2569 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2571 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2574 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2576 unsigned int ticklen;
2577 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2578 unsigned int sess_len;
2579 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2582 PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
2584 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2586 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2587 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
2588 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2589 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
2590 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
2591 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2592 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2597 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2598 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2599 * be 0 here in that instance
2602 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2605 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2606 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2607 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2608 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2609 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2612 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2613 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2616 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2619 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2620 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2621 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2622 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2626 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
2627 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2629 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2630 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2631 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2633 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2636 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2637 s->session = new_sess;
2641 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2642 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2644 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2646 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2647 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2648 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2650 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2651 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2652 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2653 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2656 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2657 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2658 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2662 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2663 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2664 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2666 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2669 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2670 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2671 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2672 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2673 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2677 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2678 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
2680 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2681 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2682 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2683 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2689 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2690 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2691 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2692 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2693 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2694 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2695 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2696 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2697 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2700 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2701 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2703 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2704 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2705 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2706 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2710 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2711 s->session->not_resumable = 0;
2713 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2714 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2715 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
2716 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
2718 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
2720 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2721 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
2722 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2723 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2724 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2727 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
2729 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
2731 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
2732 PACKET_data(&nonce),
2733 PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
2734 s->session->master_key,
2736 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2739 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
2742 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2743 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2746 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2749 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2753 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2754 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2756 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2761 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2762 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2764 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2767 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2768 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2769 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2770 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2773 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2774 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2775 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
2776 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2777 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2780 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2781 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2782 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2783 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2791 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2793 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2794 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2795 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2798 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2802 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2803 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2804 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2807 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2810 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2813 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2814 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2819 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2820 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2821 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2823 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2824 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2825 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2828 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2829 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2830 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2834 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2835 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2836 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2841 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2842 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2843 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2844 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2853 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2855 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2856 /* should contain no data */
2857 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2858 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2859 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2861 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2862 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2863 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2864 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2866 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2871 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2872 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2873 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2876 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2879 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2881 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2884 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2885 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2888 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2889 size_t identitylen = 0;
2890 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2891 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2892 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2895 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2896 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2897 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2901 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2903 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2904 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2907 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2908 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2909 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2910 psklen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN; /* Avoid overrunning the array on cleanse */
2912 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2913 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2914 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2915 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2919 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2920 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2921 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2922 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2926 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2927 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2928 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2929 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2930 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2934 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2935 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2936 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2938 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2939 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2942 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2943 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2944 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2951 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2952 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2953 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2954 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2958 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2959 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2964 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2967 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2968 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2969 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2971 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2974 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2976 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2979 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2983 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2984 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2986 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2990 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2991 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2993 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2994 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2998 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2999 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
3000 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3001 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
3002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3003 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3007 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3008 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3009 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3010 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3013 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3014 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
3015 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3016 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3020 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
3021 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3022 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3023 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
3026 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3029 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3030 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3031 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3032 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3036 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
3037 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
3038 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3042 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3043 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3047 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3048 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3052 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3053 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3058 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3060 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3062 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
3063 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3064 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
3066 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
3068 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3069 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3073 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3075 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3076 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3080 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3082 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
3083 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3084 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3088 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3089 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3093 /* send off the data */
3094 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
3095 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key),
3097 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3098 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3102 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
3103 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3107 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3110 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3111 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3116 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3119 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3120 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3121 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3124 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
3126 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3127 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3131 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3133 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3134 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3138 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3139 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3143 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3144 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3146 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3147 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3152 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3153 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3154 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3160 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3161 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3164 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3165 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3170 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3173 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3174 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3177 unsigned int md_len;
3178 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3179 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3180 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3181 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3184 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3185 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3188 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3190 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3192 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3193 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3197 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
3198 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3200 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3204 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3205 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3206 * certificate key for key exchange
3209 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3211 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3213 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3214 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3218 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3219 /* Generate session key
3220 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3222 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3223 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3224 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3228 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3231 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3232 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3233 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3234 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3235 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3236 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3237 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3238 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3239 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3240 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3243 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3245 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3246 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3251 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3253 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3256 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3262 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3263 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3264 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3265 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3266 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3270 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3271 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3272 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3276 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3277 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3278 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3281 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3282 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3287 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3289 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3290 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3292 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3293 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3295 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3296 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3299 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3301 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3302 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3303 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3304 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3305 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3311 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3312 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3317 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3319 unsigned long alg_k;
3321 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3324 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3325 * no need to do so here.
3327 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3328 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3331 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3332 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3334 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3335 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3337 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3338 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3340 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3341 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3343 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3344 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3346 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3347 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3348 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3354 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3355 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3356 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = 0;
3357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3358 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3359 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3360 s->s3->tmp.psklen = 0;
3365 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3367 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3370 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3371 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3373 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3375 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3376 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3377 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3384 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3386 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3389 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3390 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3391 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3400 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3401 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3402 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3406 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3409 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3410 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3412 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3413 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3414 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3417 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3418 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3419 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3420 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3421 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3422 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3426 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3427 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3433 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3434 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3435 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = 0;
3440 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3441 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3442 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3444 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3446 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3447 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3450 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3451 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3453 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3454 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3459 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3462 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3465 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3466 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3467 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3468 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3470 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3475 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3476 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3479 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3481 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3482 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3483 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3485 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3488 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3492 /* We need to get a client cert */
3493 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3495 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3496 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3498 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3500 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3503 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3504 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3505 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3507 } else if (i == 1) {
3509 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3510 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3514 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3515 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3518 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3519 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3520 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3521 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3523 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3524 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3525 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3531 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3532 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3533 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3536 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3537 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3538 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3542 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3544 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3545 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3546 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3547 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3548 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3549 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3552 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3553 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3554 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3558 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3559 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3561 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3566 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3567 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3568 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3570 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3571 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3573 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3574 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3581 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3583 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3587 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3588 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3590 /* we don't have a certificate */
3591 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3594 /* This is the passed certificate */
3595 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3597 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3598 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3599 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3600 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3601 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3606 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3607 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3609 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3610 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3614 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3615 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3616 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3617 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3618 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3623 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3624 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3625 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3634 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3636 size_t len, padding_len;
3637 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3639 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3640 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3642 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3643 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3644 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
3645 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3649 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3655 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3657 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3658 /* should contain no data */
3659 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
3660 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3661 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3664 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3665 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3666 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3670 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3671 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3672 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3673 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3674 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3679 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3681 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3684 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3687 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3689 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3690 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3691 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3692 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3696 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3697 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3699 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3700 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3701 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3705 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3706 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3709 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3710 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3713 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3716 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3717 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3718 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3719 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3720 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3725 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3726 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3730 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3733 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3734 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3736 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3737 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
3738 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3739 SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
3744 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3745 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3749 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3750 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3751 # error Max cipher length too short
3754 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3755 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3758 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3759 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3762 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3765 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3767 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3770 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3771 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3773 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3774 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3775 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3778 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3779 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3780 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3784 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3786 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3787 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3788 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3791 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3792 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3800 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3801 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3802 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3805 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3812 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3813 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3814 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3816 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3817 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3818 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3822 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3823 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3824 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3826 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3827 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3828 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3837 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3839 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3840 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3841 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3842 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3843 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3847 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;