2 * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types.
25 typedef struct x509err2alert_st {
30 /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
31 const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = {
32 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
33 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
34 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
38 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
39 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
41 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
46 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
47 s->init_num, &written);
50 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
52 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
53 * ignore the result anyway
54 * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
56 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
57 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
58 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE))
59 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
60 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
63 if (written == s->init_num) {
65 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
66 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
70 s->init_off += written;
71 s->init_num -= written;
75 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
79 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
80 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
83 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
89 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s)
91 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
92 /* SSLfatal() already called */
96 /* Reset any extension flags */
97 memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags));
100 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
101 int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0;
104 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
105 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
108 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) {
109 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
110 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
113 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
114 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
116 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
117 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) &&
118 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls))
120 } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) {
127 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
128 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
129 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
133 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
134 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
135 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept);
137 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
138 tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
140 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
143 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
144 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect);
146 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
148 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
149 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
152 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
155 s->statem.use_timer = 1;
162 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
163 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
165 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
166 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
168 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
169 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
171 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
172 static const char *servercontext = { 0x54, 0x4c, 0x53, 0x20, 0x31, 0x2e,
173 0x33, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65,
174 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x56, 0x65, 0x72,
175 0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x00 };
176 static const char *clientcontext = { 0x54, 0x4c, 0x53, 0x20, 0x31, 0x2e,
177 0x33, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65,
178 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x56, 0x65, 0x72,
179 0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x00 };
181 static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
182 static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
184 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
187 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
188 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
189 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
190 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
191 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
192 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
194 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
197 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
198 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
199 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
201 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
202 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
203 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
204 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
205 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
206 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
207 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
208 /* SSLfatal() already called */
213 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
218 retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
220 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA,
221 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
230 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
232 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
233 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
234 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
235 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
236 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
238 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
239 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
240 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
242 if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) {
243 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
244 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
247 pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
249 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
250 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
251 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
255 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
258 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
262 /* Get the data to be signed */
263 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
264 /* SSLfatal() already called */
268 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
269 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
270 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
273 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
274 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
277 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
281 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
282 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
287 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
288 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
289 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
290 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
296 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
297 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
298 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
299 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
300 s->session->master_key)
301 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
307 } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
315 int pktype = lu->sig;
317 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
318 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
319 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
320 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
324 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
325 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
326 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
330 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
331 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
332 /* SSLfatal() already called */
337 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
341 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
345 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
347 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
348 const unsigned char *data;
349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
350 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
352 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
356 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
359 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
360 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
361 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
364 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
365 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
369 peer = s->session->peer;
370 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
372 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
373 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
377 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) {
378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
379 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
383 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
386 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
387 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
391 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) {
392 /* SSLfatal() already called */
395 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
396 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
397 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
401 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
402 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
403 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
408 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
409 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
410 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
413 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
415 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
416 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
419 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)
420 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
421 && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
422 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
423 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128
424 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) {
425 len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
428 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
429 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
430 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
434 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
435 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
436 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
438 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
441 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
442 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
443 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
447 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
448 /* SSLfatal() already called */
453 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n",
454 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
456 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
457 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
463 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
464 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
465 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
466 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
467 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
468 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
469 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
472 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
478 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
479 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
480 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
481 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
487 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
488 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
489 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
490 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
491 s->session->master_key)) {
492 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
496 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
498 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
502 j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
504 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
505 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
511 * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client
512 * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the
513 * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest
514 * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We
515 * want to make sure that SSL_get_peer_certificate() will return the actual
516 * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback.
518 if (!s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
519 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
521 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
523 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
524 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
525 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
526 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
527 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
532 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
534 size_t finish_md_len;
538 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
539 if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
540 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
543 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
548 && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0
549 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
550 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {;
551 /* SSLfatal() already called */
556 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
557 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
559 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
560 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
563 finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
565 s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
566 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
567 /* SSLfatal() already called */
571 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
573 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
574 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED,
575 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
580 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
581 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
583 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL,
584 s->session->master_key,
585 s->session->master_key_length)) {
586 /* SSLfatal() already called */
591 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
593 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
594 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED,
595 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
599 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
601 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
603 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
605 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
611 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
613 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) {
614 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE,
615 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
619 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
623 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
625 unsigned int updatetype;
628 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
629 * be on a record boundary.
631 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
632 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
633 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
634 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
637 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
638 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
639 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
640 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
641 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
645 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
648 if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
649 && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
650 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
651 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
652 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
656 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
657 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
658 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
660 if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)
661 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
663 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
664 /* SSLfatal() already called */
665 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
668 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
672 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
675 int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
681 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
682 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
684 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
685 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
688 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len =
689 s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen,
690 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
692 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) {
693 /* SSLfatal() already called */
700 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
704 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
706 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
707 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
708 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
710 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
711 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
712 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
713 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
714 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
715 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
716 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
717 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
718 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
722 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
723 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
724 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
725 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
729 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
730 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
731 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
732 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
733 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
736 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
737 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
738 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
739 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
740 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
743 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
744 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
746 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
747 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
751 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
752 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
755 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
759 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
762 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
767 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
770 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We
771 * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less
774 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
775 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
776 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
777 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
778 /* SSLfatal() already called */
779 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
784 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
785 * message must be on a record boundary.
787 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
788 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
789 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
790 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
793 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
794 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
795 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
796 SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
797 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
799 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
801 md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
803 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
805 SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
806 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
809 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
811 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
812 SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
813 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
817 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
819 if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
820 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
821 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
822 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
825 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
827 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
829 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
831 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
835 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
836 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
838 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
840 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED &&
841 !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
842 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
843 /* SSLfatal() already called */
844 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
847 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
848 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
849 &s->session->master_key_length)) {
850 /* SSLfatal() already called */
851 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
853 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
854 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
855 /* SSLfatal() already called */
856 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
858 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
859 /* SSLfatal() already called */
860 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
865 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
868 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
870 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
872 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
879 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
880 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain)
883 unsigned char *outbytes;
885 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
887 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET,
891 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
892 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
893 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET,
894 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
899 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
901 /* SSLfatal() already called */
908 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
909 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
913 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
914 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
915 X509_STORE *chain_store;
917 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
923 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
925 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
926 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
928 extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
930 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
932 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
933 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
935 chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
937 if (chain_store != NULL) {
938 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
940 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
941 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,
942 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
945 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
946 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
947 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,
952 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
953 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
954 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
955 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
957 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
958 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
960 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
961 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
964 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
969 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
970 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
973 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
974 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
975 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
977 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) {
978 /* SSLfatal() already called */
979 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
983 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
985 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
987 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
990 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) {
991 /* SSLfatal() already called */
994 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
995 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
996 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) {
997 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1005 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
1007 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) {
1008 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,
1009 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1013 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk))
1016 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1017 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,
1018 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1026 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
1027 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
1030 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop)
1032 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1033 int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand;
1036 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1038 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
1039 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1041 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
1044 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) {
1045 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE,
1046 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1052 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server
1053 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
1054 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1057 * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
1058 * post handshake exchange
1061 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1064 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
1065 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1067 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
1071 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the
1074 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1075 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
1077 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1078 tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
1079 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
1081 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1083 * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once,
1084 * so we remove this one from the cache.
1086 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode
1087 & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0)
1088 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1091 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1094 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
1097 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit);
1099 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
1100 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
1103 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1104 /* done with handshaking */
1105 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
1106 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
1107 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
1108 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
1112 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1113 cb = s->info_callback;
1114 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1115 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1117 /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
1118 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
1123 || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1124 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
1128 /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
1129 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1130 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1133 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1136 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
1138 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1139 int skip_message, i, recvd_type;
1141 size_t l, readbytes;
1143 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1146 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1147 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
1149 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
1152 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1155 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1157 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1158 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1160 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
1161 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1162 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1163 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1166 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE
1167 && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) {
1169 * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
1170 * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
1171 * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
1172 * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
1173 * with a valid cookie.
1177 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1178 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
1179 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1180 s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
1182 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1184 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1185 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1188 s->init_num += readbytes;
1193 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
1194 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
1196 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1197 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1198 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1201 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
1205 if (s->msg_callback)
1206 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1207 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1208 s->msg_callback_arg);
1210 } while (skip_message);
1211 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1214 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
1216 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1218 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1221 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1222 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1224 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
1225 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1226 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
1228 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1229 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1232 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1233 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1234 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1235 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
1238 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
1240 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1247 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
1249 size_t n, readbytes;
1253 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1254 /* We've already read everything in */
1255 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
1260 n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
1262 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
1263 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
1265 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1269 s->init_num += readbytes;
1274 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1275 * Finished verification.
1277 if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) {
1278 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1283 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1284 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1285 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1287 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1291 if (s->msg_callback)
1292 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
1293 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1296 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1297 * processing the message
1298 * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
1301 #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
1302 /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
1303 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
1304 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) {
1305 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
1306 || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1307 || memcmp(hrrrandom,
1308 s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET,
1309 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) {
1310 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1311 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1312 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1318 if (s->msg_callback)
1319 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1320 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1321 s->msg_callback_arg);
1328 static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = {
1329 {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE},
1330 {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1331 {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1332 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1333 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1334 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1335 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1336 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED},
1337 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1338 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1339 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1340 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1341 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1342 {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1343 {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1344 {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1345 {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1346 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1347 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1348 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1349 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1350 {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1351 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1352 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1353 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE},
1354 {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1355 {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1356 {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1357 {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1358 {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1359 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1360 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1361 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1362 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1363 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1364 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1365 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1366 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1367 {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1369 /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */
1370 {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN}
1373 int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err)
1375 const X509ERR2ALERT *tp;
1377 for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp)
1378 if (tp->x509err == x509err)
1383 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
1385 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1387 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1390 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
1392 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
1397 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1398 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1403 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1404 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1407 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1408 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1411 /* Must be in order high to low */
1412 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1414 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1416 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1419 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1421 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1424 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1426 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1429 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1431 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1434 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1436 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1441 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1442 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1445 /* Must be in order high to low */
1446 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1448 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1450 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1453 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1454 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1456 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1457 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1463 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1465 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1466 * @method: the intended method.
1468 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1470 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1472 int version = method->version;
1474 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1475 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1476 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1477 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1479 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1480 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1481 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1483 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1484 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1485 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1486 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1492 * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
1493 * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured. Otherwise
1496 static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s)
1499 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1505 if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL)
1509 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL)
1512 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1513 /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */
1515 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1516 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1517 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1518 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1523 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i))
1525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1526 if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC)
1529 * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is
1530 * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this
1531 * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446.
1533 eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
1536 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey));
1537 if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve))
1548 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1551 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1552 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1554 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1556 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version, const SSL_METHOD **meth)
1558 const version_info *vent;
1559 const version_info *table;
1561 switch (s->method->version) {
1563 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1564 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1565 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1566 table = tls_version_table;
1568 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1569 table = dtls_version_table;
1574 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1576 if (vent->cmeth != NULL
1577 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0
1578 && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0
1580 || version != TLS1_3_VERSION
1581 || is_tls13_capable(s))) {
1583 *meth = vent->cmeth();
1591 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1592 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1593 * supported protocol version.
1595 * @s server SSL handle.
1597 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1599 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
1601 const version_info *vent;
1602 const version_info *table;
1605 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1606 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1609 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
1613 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1614 * highest protocol version).
1616 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
1617 table = tls_version_table;
1618 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
1619 table = dtls_version_table;
1621 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1625 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1626 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
1627 return s->version == vent->version;
1633 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1634 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1635 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1636 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1638 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1639 * @version: the intended limit.
1640 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1642 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1644 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
1652 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1653 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1654 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1656 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1657 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1658 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1659 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1660 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1662 switch (method_version) {
1665 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1666 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1667 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1668 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1673 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1674 if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
1678 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1679 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
1680 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
1689 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1691 if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
1692 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) {
1693 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
1694 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1695 && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
1697 * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2
1698 * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still
1699 * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and
1700 * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is
1701 * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not.
1703 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) {
1704 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
1706 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1711 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1712 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1713 * the version specific method.
1715 * @s: server SSL handle.
1717 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1719 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1722 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1724 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1725 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1727 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1730 int server_version = s->method->version;
1731 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1732 const version_info *vent;
1733 const version_info *table;
1735 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1737 s->client_version = client_version;
1739 switch (server_version) {
1741 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1742 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1743 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1744 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1746 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1747 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1748 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1749 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1750 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1755 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1756 * a HelloRetryRequest
1759 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1760 table = tls_version_table;
1762 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1763 table = dtls_version_table;
1767 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
1769 /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
1770 if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE)
1771 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1773 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1774 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1775 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1776 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1777 PACKET versionslist;
1779 suppversions->parsed = 1;
1781 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1782 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1783 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1787 * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION.
1788 * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3:
1789 * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with
1790 * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to
1791 * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert."
1792 * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower.
1793 * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1.
1795 if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION)
1796 return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION;
1798 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1799 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1801 if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method))
1802 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1804 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1805 /* Trailing data? */
1806 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1809 if (best_vers > 0) {
1810 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1812 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
1813 * negotiated TLSv1.3
1815 if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
1816 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1819 check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
1820 s->version = best_vers;
1821 s->method = best_method;
1824 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1828 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1829 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1831 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1832 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1835 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1838 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1839 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1841 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1842 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1844 method = vent->smeth();
1845 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1846 check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd);
1847 s->version = vent->version;
1853 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1857 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1858 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1859 * the version specific method.
1861 * @s: client SSL handle.
1862 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1863 * @extensions: The extensions received
1865 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
1867 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
1869 const version_info *vent;
1870 const version_info *table;
1871 int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv;
1874 s->version = version;
1876 /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
1877 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions,
1878 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1879 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions,
1885 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE
1886 && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1888 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1889 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1893 switch (s->method->version) {
1895 if (s->version != s->method->version) {
1897 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1898 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1899 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1903 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1904 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1905 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1906 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1907 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1910 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1911 table = tls_version_table;
1913 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1914 table = dtls_version_table;
1918 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max);
1921 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1922 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, ret);
1925 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min)
1926 : s->version < ver_min) {
1928 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1929 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1931 } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max)
1932 : s->version > ver_max) {
1934 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1935 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1939 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0)
1942 /* Check for downgrades */
1943 if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) {
1944 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
1945 s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1946 - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
1947 sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
1949 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1950 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1951 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1954 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1955 && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION
1956 && real_max > s->version) {
1957 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
1958 s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1959 - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
1960 sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
1962 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1963 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1964 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1969 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1970 if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version)
1973 s->method = vent->cmeth();
1978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1979 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1984 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
1985 * @s: The SSL connection
1986 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1987 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1988 * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole
1989 * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled
1992 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1993 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1994 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1995 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1996 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1998 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1999 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
2000 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
2002 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
2003 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
2005 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version,
2008 int version, tmp_real_max;
2010 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
2011 const SSL_METHOD *method;
2012 const version_info *table;
2013 const version_info *vent;
2015 switch (s->method->version) {
2018 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2019 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2020 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2021 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2022 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2024 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
2026 * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version
2029 if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL))
2030 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2032 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
2033 table = tls_version_table;
2035 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
2036 table = dtls_version_table;
2041 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
2042 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
2043 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
2044 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
2046 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
2047 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
2048 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
2050 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
2051 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
2052 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
2054 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
2055 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
2056 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
2057 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
2058 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
2059 * selected, as we start from scratch.
2061 *min_version = version = 0;
2063 if (real_max != NULL)
2066 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2068 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
2069 * "version capability" vector.
2071 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
2076 method = vent->cmeth();
2078 if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0)
2079 tmp_real_max = vent->version;
2081 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
2085 *min_version = method->version;
2087 if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0)
2088 *real_max = tmp_real_max;
2089 version = (single = method)->version;
2090 *min_version = version;
2095 *max_version = version;
2097 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
2099 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
2105 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
2106 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
2108 * @s: client SSL handle.
2110 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2112 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
2114 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
2117 * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
2118 * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated.
2120 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
2123 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL);
2128 s->version = ver_max;
2130 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
2131 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION)
2132 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
2134 s->client_version = ver_max;
2139 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
2140 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
2141 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
2142 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
2144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2145 int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups,
2146 size_t num_groups, int checkallow)
2150 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
2153 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
2154 uint16_t group = groups[i];
2156 if (group_id == group
2158 || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
2167 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2168 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval,
2169 size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr,
2172 unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2173 unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
2175 memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
2177 if (hashval == NULL) {
2178 hashval = hashvaltmp;
2180 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2181 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
2182 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp),
2184 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2189 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2190 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
2191 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2195 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2196 msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
2197 msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen;
2198 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
2199 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
2200 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2205 * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
2206 * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
2207 * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
2210 && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen)
2211 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
2212 s->s3->tmp.message_size
2213 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) {
2214 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2221 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2223 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
2226 int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2228 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
2229 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2232 if (ca_sk == NULL) {
2233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2234 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2237 /* get the CA RDNs */
2238 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2239 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2240 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2244 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2245 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2246 unsigned int name_len;
2248 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2249 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2250 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2251 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2255 namestart = namebytes;
2256 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
2257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2261 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2263 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2267 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2268 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2269 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2275 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2276 s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
2281 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2286 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s)
2288 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;;
2291 ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2292 if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
2297 ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
2302 int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt)
2304 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2305 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2306 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2307 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2311 if (ca_sk != NULL) {
2314 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) {
2315 unsigned char *namebytes;
2316 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i);
2320 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2321 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2323 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2324 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2325 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2331 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2332 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2333 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2340 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2341 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
2342 const void *param, size_t paramlen)
2344 size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen;
2345 unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen);
2348 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS,
2349 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2352 memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2353 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2355 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen);
2362 * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
2363 * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
2365 int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s)
2367 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2368 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1))
2369 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2372 s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2373 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2374 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2375 SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2376 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2379 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst,
2380 s->s3->handshake_dgst)) {
2381 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2382 SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2383 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2391 * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
2392 * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
2394 int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s)
2396 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2397 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2398 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2399 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2402 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst,
2404 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2405 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2406 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);