2 * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 #include <openssl/dh.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/md5.h>
27 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
29 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
32 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
33 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
34 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
35 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
37 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
38 * (transition not allowed)
40 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
42 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
45 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
46 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
47 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
49 switch (st->hand_state) {
53 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
54 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
55 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
56 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
60 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
61 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
62 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
69 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
70 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
71 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
72 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
73 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
77 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
78 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
85 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
86 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
87 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
91 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
92 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
98 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
99 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
100 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
107 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
108 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
110 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
113 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
114 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
115 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
126 /* No valid transition found */
131 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
132 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
133 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
134 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
136 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
137 * (transition not allowed)
139 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
141 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
143 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
144 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
149 switch (st->hand_state) {
155 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
156 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
157 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
162 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
164 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
165 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
167 * 2) If we did request one then
168 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
170 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
171 * list if we requested a certificate)
173 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
174 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
175 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
176 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
177 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
179 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
180 * not going to accept it because we require a client
183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
184 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
185 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
188 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
192 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
195 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
196 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
197 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
204 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
205 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
210 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
212 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
213 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
214 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
215 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
216 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
219 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
220 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
222 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
223 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
224 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
225 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
227 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
231 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
232 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
238 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
239 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
240 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
245 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
247 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
248 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
249 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
264 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
265 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
266 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
272 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
273 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
281 /* No valid transition found */
282 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
286 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
287 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
290 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
291 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
292 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
293 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
296 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
297 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
298 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
303 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
305 * Valid return values are:
309 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
311 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
314 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
315 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
316 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
317 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
318 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
321 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
323 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
327 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
328 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
329 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
330 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
331 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
334 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
335 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
345 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
347 * Valid return values are:
351 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
354 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
355 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
357 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
358 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
360 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
361 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
363 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
366 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
367 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
369 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
370 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
373 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
375 * ... except when the application insists on
376 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
379 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
380 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
381 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
383 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
386 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
394 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
395 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
398 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
400 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
403 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
404 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
407 switch (st->hand_state) {
409 /* Shouldn't happen */
410 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
411 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
412 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
413 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
416 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
417 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
418 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
420 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
421 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
422 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
424 /* Try to read from the client instead */
425 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
427 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
428 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
431 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
432 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
433 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
435 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
436 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
441 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
442 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
448 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
451 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
458 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
459 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
460 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
461 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
463 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
465 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
468 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
469 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
471 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
472 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
473 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
475 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
479 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
480 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
482 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
484 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
485 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
488 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
489 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
490 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
492 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
493 * handshake at this point.
495 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
496 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
498 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
499 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
501 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
504 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
505 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
506 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
507 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
509 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
510 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
511 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
512 * been configured for.
514 if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
515 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
516 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
518 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
523 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
524 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
526 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
528 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
531 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
532 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
536 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
538 switch (st->hand_state) {
540 /* Shouldn't happen */
541 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
542 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
543 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
544 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
547 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
548 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
549 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
550 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
551 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
553 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
554 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
555 /* SSLfatal() already called */
556 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
561 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
562 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
564 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
565 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
566 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
568 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
569 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
570 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
571 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
572 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
573 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
577 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
579 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
581 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
582 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
584 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
586 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
587 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
589 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
591 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
592 /* normal PSK or SRP */
593 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
594 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
595 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
596 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
597 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
598 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
599 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
601 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
604 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
607 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
608 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
609 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
613 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
614 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
616 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
620 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
621 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
622 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
623 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
627 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
628 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
629 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
631 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
632 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
634 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
636 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
637 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
638 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
639 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
641 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
643 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
645 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
646 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
647 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
649 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
650 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
651 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
653 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
655 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
657 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
658 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
663 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
664 * the server to the client.
666 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
668 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
670 switch (st->hand_state) {
672 /* No pre work to be done */
675 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
678 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
681 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
683 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
684 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
685 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
690 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
691 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
693 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
694 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
700 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
702 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
703 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
704 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
707 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
709 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
710 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0) {
712 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
713 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
714 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
716 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
718 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
719 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
721 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
722 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
728 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
731 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
732 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
733 /* SSLfatal() already called */
736 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
738 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
739 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
740 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
741 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
745 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
747 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
748 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
749 && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
750 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
754 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
755 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
758 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
761 static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
763 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
768 #if defined(ECONNRESET)
772 #if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
782 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
783 * server to the client.
785 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
787 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
791 switch (st->hand_state) {
793 /* No post work to be done */
796 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
797 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
799 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
800 /* SSLfatal() already called */
805 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
806 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
808 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
809 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
810 /* SSLfatal() already called */
814 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
815 * treat like it was the first packet
820 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
821 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
822 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
823 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
827 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
828 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
829 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
830 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
834 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
837 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
838 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
840 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
841 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
842 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
845 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
846 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
849 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
850 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
851 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
855 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
856 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
860 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
861 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
865 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
866 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
867 if (!statem_flush(s))
872 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
873 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
874 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
875 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
876 /* SSLfatal() already called */
880 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
881 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
882 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
883 /* SSLfatal() already called */
887 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
888 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
889 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
891 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS;
895 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
896 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
898 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
901 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
905 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
906 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
908 /* SSLfatal() already called */
913 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
916 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
917 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
921 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
922 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
925 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
927 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
930 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
934 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
935 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
936 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
937 &s->session->master_key_length)
938 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
939 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
940 /* SSLfatal() already called */
945 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
946 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
947 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
952 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
953 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
955 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
956 /* SSLfatal() already called */
961 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
963 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
964 if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
965 && conn_is_closed()) {
967 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
968 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
969 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
970 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
971 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
973 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
982 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
986 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
989 * Valid return values are:
993 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
994 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
996 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
998 switch (st->hand_state) {
1000 /* Shouldn't happen */
1001 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1002 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
1003 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
1006 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
1008 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1010 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1011 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1014 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1015 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
1016 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
1019 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
1020 /* No construction function needed */
1022 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
1025 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
1026 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
1027 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1030 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
1031 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
1032 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
1035 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
1036 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
1037 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
1041 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
1042 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
1043 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1046 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1047 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
1048 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1051 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1052 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
1053 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1056 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1057 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
1058 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
1061 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
1062 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
1063 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1066 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1067 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1068 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1071 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1073 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1076 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1077 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1078 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1081 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1082 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1083 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1091 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1092 * calculated as follows:
1094 * 2 + # client_version
1095 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1096 * 1 + # length of session_id
1097 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1098 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1099 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1100 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1101 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1102 * 2 + # length of extensions
1103 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1105 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1107 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1108 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1111 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1112 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1114 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1116 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1118 switch (st->hand_state) {
1120 /* Shouldn't happen */
1123 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1124 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1126 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1127 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1129 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1130 return s->max_cert_list;
1132 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1133 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1135 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1136 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1139 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1140 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1143 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1144 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1146 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1147 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1149 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1150 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1155 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1157 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1159 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1161 switch (st->hand_state) {
1163 /* Shouldn't happen */
1164 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1165 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1166 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1167 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1169 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1170 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1172 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1173 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1175 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1176 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1178 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1179 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1181 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1182 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1184 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1185 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1186 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1189 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1190 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1192 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1193 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1195 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1196 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1202 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1205 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1207 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1209 switch (st->hand_state) {
1211 /* Shouldn't happen */
1212 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1213 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1214 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1217 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1218 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1220 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1221 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1226 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1227 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1230 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1232 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1233 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1234 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1236 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1239 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1240 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1241 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1244 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1247 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1248 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1249 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1250 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1251 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1260 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1263 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1264 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1265 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1271 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1273 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1274 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1275 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1276 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1277 cookie_leni > 255) {
1278 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1279 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1282 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1284 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1285 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1286 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1287 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1294 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1296 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1297 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1298 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1302 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1304 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1305 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1306 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1307 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1309 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1311 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1312 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1313 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1314 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1315 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1316 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1317 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1319 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1320 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1321 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1322 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1323 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1324 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1325 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1326 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1327 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1328 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1329 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1330 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1331 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1333 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1334 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1339 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1341 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1342 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1343 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1347 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1350 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1351 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1353 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1356 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1358 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1360 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1361 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1362 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1363 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1365 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1366 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1367 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1369 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1372 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
1373 || (!s->s3->send_connection_binding
1375 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1376 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1377 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1383 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1384 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1386 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1391 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1393 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1394 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1396 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1399 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1400 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1401 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1402 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1407 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1408 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1409 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1410 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1412 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1413 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1415 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1416 * 7-8 session_id_length
1417 * 9-10 challenge_length
1421 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1422 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1424 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1425 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1426 * in the first place
1428 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1429 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1434 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1435 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1436 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1440 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1441 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1443 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1444 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1445 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1447 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1450 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1451 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1452 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1453 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1454 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1458 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1459 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1460 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1464 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1466 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1467 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1468 /* No extensions. */
1469 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1470 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1471 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1474 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1476 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1477 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1478 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1479 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1481 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1482 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1483 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1484 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1485 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1486 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1487 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1488 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1489 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1490 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1494 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1496 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1497 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1498 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1499 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1500 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1501 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1502 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1503 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1507 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1508 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1509 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1510 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1513 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1514 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1515 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1516 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1517 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1521 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1522 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1523 * So check cookie length...
1525 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1526 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
1527 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1528 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1533 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1534 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1535 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1539 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1540 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1541 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1545 /* Could be empty. */
1546 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1547 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1549 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1550 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1551 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1552 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1558 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1559 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1560 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1561 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1562 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1566 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1567 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1568 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1569 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1570 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1571 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1574 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1576 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1579 if (clienthello != NULL)
1580 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1581 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1583 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1586 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1589 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1594 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1596 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1597 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1598 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1599 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1600 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1602 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1603 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1604 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1605 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1606 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1607 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1609 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1610 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1612 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1615 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1616 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1621 /* Set up the client_random */
1622 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1624 /* Choose the version */
1626 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1627 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1628 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1629 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1631 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1634 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1635 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1636 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1640 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1643 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1644 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1646 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1647 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1648 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1649 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1650 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1656 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1657 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1658 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1661 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1665 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1666 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1667 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1668 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1669 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1673 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1674 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1675 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1676 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1677 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1678 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1679 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1680 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1681 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1683 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1685 /* default verification */
1686 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1687 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1688 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1689 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1690 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1691 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1694 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1696 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1697 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1698 if (protverr != 0) {
1699 s->version = s->client_version;
1700 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1701 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1709 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1710 clienthello->isv2) ||
1711 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1712 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1713 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1717 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1718 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1719 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1720 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1721 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1722 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1723 if (s->renegotiate) {
1724 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1725 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1726 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1727 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1730 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1731 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1732 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1734 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1735 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1736 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1737 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1738 * an insecure downgrade.
1740 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1741 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1742 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1748 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1749 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1750 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1751 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1753 if (cipher == NULL) {
1754 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1755 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1756 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1759 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1760 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1761 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1763 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1764 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1766 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1767 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1771 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1774 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1775 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1776 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1777 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1778 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1783 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1784 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1786 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1787 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1788 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1789 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1790 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1791 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1792 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1793 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1794 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1795 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1798 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1800 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1801 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1802 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1806 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1808 /* previous session */
1810 } else if (i == -1) {
1811 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1815 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1816 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1822 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1823 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1824 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1825 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1829 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1830 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1832 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1834 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1837 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1839 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1840 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1842 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1843 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1852 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1855 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1856 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1857 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1862 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1863 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1867 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1869 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1870 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1871 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1876 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1877 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1878 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1880 /* TLS extensions */
1881 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1882 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1883 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1888 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1889 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1890 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1891 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1895 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1896 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1897 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1898 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1899 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1905 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1908 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1909 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1911 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1912 * backwards compat reasons
1914 int master_key_length;
1916 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1917 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1918 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1920 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1921 && master_key_length > 0) {
1922 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1924 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
1925 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1929 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1930 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1931 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
1932 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1933 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1934 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1935 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1936 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1940 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1941 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1942 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1943 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1944 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1949 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1950 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1951 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1953 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1954 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1956 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1957 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1958 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1960 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1961 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1962 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1963 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1968 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1969 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1970 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1972 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1973 /* Can't disable compression */
1974 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1975 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1976 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1977 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1980 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1981 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1982 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1983 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1984 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1988 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1989 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1990 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1991 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1994 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1995 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1996 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1999 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
2000 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2001 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2002 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
2005 } else if (s->hit) {
2007 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
2008 /* See if we have a match */
2009 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
2012 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
2013 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
2014 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
2016 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
2017 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
2026 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
2032 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2033 * using compression.
2035 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2036 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2037 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2038 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2044 * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2047 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2048 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
2049 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
2050 if (ciphers == NULL) {
2051 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2052 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2053 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2060 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2061 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2063 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
2065 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
2066 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2071 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2072 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2073 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2074 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2075 s->clienthello = NULL;
2078 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2079 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2080 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2081 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2082 s->clienthello = NULL;
2088 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2089 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2091 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
2093 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2096 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2097 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2098 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2099 * influence which certificate is sent
2101 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
2102 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2105 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2106 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
2108 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2109 * et al can pick it up.
2111 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2112 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2114 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2115 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2116 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2118 /* status request response should be sent */
2119 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2120 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2121 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2123 /* something bad happened */
2124 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2126 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2127 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
2128 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2138 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2139 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2141 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2143 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2144 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2146 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2147 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2148 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
2149 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
2150 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2152 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2153 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2154 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2155 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2156 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2157 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2160 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2162 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2163 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
2166 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2167 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2168 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2169 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2170 selected_len) != 0) {
2171 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2172 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2176 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2177 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2180 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2181 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2182 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2183 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2186 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2188 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2189 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2190 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2191 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2194 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2199 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2201 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2205 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2210 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2211 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2212 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2213 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2219 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2221 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2223 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2224 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2226 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2233 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2234 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2235 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2236 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2237 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2239 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2240 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2241 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2245 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2248 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2251 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2252 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2254 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2256 if (cipher == NULL) {
2257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2258 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2259 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2262 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2265 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2266 /* SSLfatal already called */
2269 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2270 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2271 s->session->not_resumable =
2272 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2273 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2274 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2275 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2276 /* do not send a session ticket */
2277 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2280 /* Session-id reuse */
2281 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2285 * we now have the following setup.
2287 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2288 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2289 * compression - basically ignored right now
2290 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2291 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2292 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2293 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2297 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2298 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2300 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2301 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2305 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2306 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2307 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2308 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2310 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2311 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2318 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2320 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2322 * callback indicates further work to be done
2324 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2328 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2334 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2339 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2344 unsigned char *session_id;
2345 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2347 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2348 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2350 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2351 * tls_process_client_hello()
2353 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2354 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2355 ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random,
2356 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2357 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2358 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2363 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2364 * back in the server hello:
2365 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2366 * we send back the old session ID.
2367 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2368 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2369 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2370 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2372 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2373 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2374 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2376 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2377 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2380 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2381 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2383 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2386 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2387 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2389 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2390 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2393 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2394 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2395 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2399 /* set up the compression method */
2400 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2403 if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2406 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2409 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2410 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2411 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
2412 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2413 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2417 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2418 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2419 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2421 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2422 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2424 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2428 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2429 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2430 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2435 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2436 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2438 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2439 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2442 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2443 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2444 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2451 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2453 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2454 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2455 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2462 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2464 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2465 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2468 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2469 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2472 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2476 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2477 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2478 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2480 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2481 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2482 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2486 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2487 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2488 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2492 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2494 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2496 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2497 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2499 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2500 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2501 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2502 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2504 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2507 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2508 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2509 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2510 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2513 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2514 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2517 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2520 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2522 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2523 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2524 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2526 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2527 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2528 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2533 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2534 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2535 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2536 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2539 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2540 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2541 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2542 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2543 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2546 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2547 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2548 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2549 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2553 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2554 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2555 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2559 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2561 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2562 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2563 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2567 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2570 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2571 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2574 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2575 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2577 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2578 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2579 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2580 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2584 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2585 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2586 if (curve_id == 0) {
2587 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2588 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2589 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2592 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2593 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2594 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2595 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2599 /* Encode the public key. */
2600 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2602 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2604 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2609 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2610 * can set these to NULLs
2617 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2619 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2620 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2621 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2622 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2623 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2624 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2625 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2628 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2629 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2630 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2631 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2635 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2636 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2637 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2641 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2642 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2644 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2645 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2646 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2650 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2651 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2652 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2653 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2656 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2657 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2659 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2660 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2663 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2664 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2670 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2671 unsigned char *binval;
2674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2675 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2676 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2679 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2682 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2683 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2684 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2690 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2691 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2694 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2695 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2698 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2699 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2700 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2701 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2704 memset(binval, 0, len);
2708 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2709 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2710 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2711 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2712 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2716 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2720 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2722 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2723 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2724 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2727 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2728 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2729 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2730 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2731 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2732 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2733 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2736 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2737 encodedPoint = NULL;
2743 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2745 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2746 size_t siglen, tbslen;
2749 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
2750 /* Should never happen */
2751 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2752 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2753 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2756 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2757 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2758 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2759 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2760 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2763 /* send signature algorithm */
2764 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2765 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2766 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2767 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2771 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2772 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2773 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2776 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2777 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2778 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2779 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2780 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2781 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2784 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2785 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2786 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2788 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2793 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2794 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2797 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2800 rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
2802 if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2803 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2805 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2806 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2811 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2815 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2818 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2820 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2824 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2826 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2827 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2828 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2829 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2830 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2831 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL
2832 || RAND_bytes(s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0
2833 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
2834 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2835 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2836 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2839 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2840 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2841 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2845 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2846 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2847 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2848 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2853 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2854 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2856 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2862 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2863 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2864 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2865 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2866 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2870 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2871 const uint16_t *psigs;
2872 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2874 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2875 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2876 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2877 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2878 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2879 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2880 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2885 if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
2886 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2892 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2896 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2899 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2901 PACKET psk_identity;
2903 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2904 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2905 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2908 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2909 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2910 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2913 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2914 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2915 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2919 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2920 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2921 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2925 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2928 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2929 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2930 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2932 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2934 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2936 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2937 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2938 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2942 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2943 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2944 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2946 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2947 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2948 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2952 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2956 /* Should never happen */
2957 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2958 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2963 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2965 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2966 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2968 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2969 size_t j, padding_len;
2970 PACKET enc_premaster;
2972 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2975 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2977 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2978 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2982 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2983 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2984 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2986 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2987 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2988 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2989 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2995 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2996 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2997 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2998 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
3000 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
3001 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3002 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
3006 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
3007 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
3008 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3009 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3014 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
3015 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
3016 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
3017 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
3018 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
3021 if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
3022 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
3023 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3024 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3029 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
3030 * the timing-sensitive code below.
3032 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3033 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
3034 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
3035 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
3036 if (decrypt_len < 0) {
3037 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3038 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3042 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
3045 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
3046 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
3047 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
3049 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
3050 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3051 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3055 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
3056 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
3057 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
3058 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
3059 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
3061 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
3064 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
3065 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
3066 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
3067 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
3068 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
3069 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
3072 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3073 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
3075 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3076 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
3079 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
3080 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
3081 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
3082 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
3083 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
3084 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
3087 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
3088 unsigned char workaround_good;
3089 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3090 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
3092 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3093 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
3094 version_good |= workaround_good;
3098 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
3099 * remain non-zero (0xff).
3101 decrypt_good &= version_good;
3104 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
3105 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
3106 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
3107 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
3109 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
3110 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
3111 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
3112 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
3113 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
3116 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
3117 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
3118 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3124 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
3127 /* Should never happen */
3128 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3129 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3134 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3137 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
3141 const unsigned char *data;
3142 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3145 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
3146 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3147 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
3150 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3153 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3157 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3158 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3159 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3162 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3163 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3164 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3165 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3168 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3169 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3170 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3175 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3176 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
3177 if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
3178 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3179 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3184 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3185 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3190 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3191 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3193 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3196 /* Should never happen */
3197 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3198 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3203 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3206 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3207 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3210 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3211 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3212 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3213 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3217 const unsigned char *data;
3220 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3221 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3224 /* Get encoded point length */
3225 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3226 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3227 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3228 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3232 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3233 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3237 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3238 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3239 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3243 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
3244 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3250 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3251 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3256 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3257 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3259 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3263 /* Should never happen */
3264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3265 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3270 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3274 const unsigned char *data;
3276 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3277 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3278 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3279 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3282 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3283 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3287 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3288 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3289 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3292 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3293 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3294 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3295 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3296 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3300 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3301 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3307 /* Should never happen */
3308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3309 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3314 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3317 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3318 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3319 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3320 const unsigned char *start;
3321 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3322 unsigned long alg_a;
3323 unsigned int asn1id, asn1len;
3327 /* Get our certificate private key */
3328 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3329 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3331 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3333 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3335 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3338 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3340 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3341 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3344 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
3345 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3347 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3350 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3351 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3352 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3356 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3357 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3358 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3359 * client certificate for authorization only.
3361 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3362 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3363 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3366 /* Decrypt session key */
3367 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &asn1id)
3368 || asn1id != (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3369 || !PACKET_peek_1(pkt, &asn1len)) {
3370 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3371 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3374 if (asn1len == 0x81) {
3376 * Long form length. Should only be one byte of length. Anything else
3378 * We did a successful peek before so this shouldn't fail
3380 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 1)) {
3381 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3382 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3385 } else if (asn1len >= 0x80) {
3387 * Indefinite length, or more than one long form length bytes. We don't
3390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3391 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3393 } /* else short form length */
3395 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encdata)) {
3396 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3397 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3400 inlen = PACKET_remaining(&encdata);
3401 start = PACKET_data(&encdata);
3403 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3406 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3409 /* Generate master secret */
3410 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3411 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3412 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3415 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3416 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3418 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3422 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3425 /* Should never happen */
3426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3427 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3432 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3434 unsigned long alg_k;
3436 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3438 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3439 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3440 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3444 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3445 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3446 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3447 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3448 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3449 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3452 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3453 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3454 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3457 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3458 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3459 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3462 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3463 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3464 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3467 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3468 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3469 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3472 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3473 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3474 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3477 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3478 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3479 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3483 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3484 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3485 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3489 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3492 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3493 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3495 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3498 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3500 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3501 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3502 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3503 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3504 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3507 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3510 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3511 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3513 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3514 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3515 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3518 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3519 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3522 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3523 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3524 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3528 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3529 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3534 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3536 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3537 * the handshake_buffer
3539 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3540 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3543 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3545 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3546 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3547 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3548 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3552 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3553 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3555 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3556 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3561 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3564 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3567 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3570 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3571 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3572 PACKET spkt, context;
3574 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3577 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3578 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
3581 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
3583 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3584 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3585 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3589 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3590 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3591 || (s->pha_context != NULL &&
3592 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
3593 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3594 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3598 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3599 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3600 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3601 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3605 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3606 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3607 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3608 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3609 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3610 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3614 certstart = certbytes;
3615 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3617 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3618 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3621 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3622 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3623 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3624 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3628 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3629 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3632 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3633 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3634 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3638 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3639 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3640 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3641 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3642 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3643 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3644 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3647 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3650 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3652 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3653 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3659 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3660 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3661 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3663 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3664 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3667 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3668 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3669 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3670 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3671 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3672 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3675 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3676 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3677 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3682 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3684 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3685 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3686 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3690 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3691 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3694 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3696 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3697 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3698 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3704 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3705 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3706 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3707 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3708 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3711 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3712 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3713 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3714 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3715 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3719 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3720 s->session = new_sess;
3723 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3724 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3725 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3727 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3728 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3731 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3734 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3735 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3740 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3741 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3745 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3746 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3747 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3748 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3749 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3750 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3754 /* Resend session tickets */
3755 s->sent_tickets = 0;
3758 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3762 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3766 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3768 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3771 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3772 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3777 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3778 * for the server Certificate message
3780 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3781 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3782 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3785 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3786 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3793 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3794 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3797 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3798 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3799 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3802 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3803 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3804 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) {
3805 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3806 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3810 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3811 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
3812 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
3813 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3814 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3819 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3820 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3821 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3822 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3829 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3830 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3832 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3833 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3834 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3835 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3836 const unsigned char *const_p;
3837 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3840 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3841 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3842 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3844 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3846 /* get session encoding length */
3847 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3849 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3852 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3853 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3854 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3857 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3859 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3860 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3864 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3865 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3866 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3867 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3868 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3873 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3874 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3875 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3880 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3883 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3885 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3886 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3890 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3891 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3892 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3893 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3894 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3895 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3899 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3900 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3901 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3902 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3905 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3908 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3909 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3911 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3912 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3913 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3918 /* Put timeout and length */
3919 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3920 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3921 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3922 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3923 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3927 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3928 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3932 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3933 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3936 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3938 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3940 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3941 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0
3942 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3943 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
3944 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
3945 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
3946 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
3947 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3948 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3951 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3952 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3955 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3956 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3960 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3961 /* Output key name */
3962 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3964 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3965 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3967 /* Encrypt session data */
3968 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3969 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3970 || encdata1 != encdata2
3971 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3972 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3973 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3974 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3975 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3976 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3977 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3978 macendoffset - macoffset)
3979 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3980 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3981 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3982 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3983 || macdata1 != macdata2) {
3984 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3985 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3989 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
3990 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3991 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3992 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3999 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
4000 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
4004 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
4005 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
4007 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4008 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4012 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
4013 s->session->session_id_length)
4014 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
4015 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET,
4016 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4023 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4025 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
4026 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
4028 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
4032 age_add_u.age_add = 0;
4034 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4037 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
4038 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
4039 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
4041 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
4042 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
4043 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4044 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4045 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4048 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
4051 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
4052 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
4053 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
4055 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
4056 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
4058 if (new_sess == NULL) {
4059 /* SSLfatal already called */
4063 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
4064 s->session = new_sess;
4067 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
4068 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4071 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
4072 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4073 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4074 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4077 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
4079 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
4080 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
4081 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
4085 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
4087 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
4090 s->session->master_key,
4092 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4095 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
4097 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
4098 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
4099 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
4100 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
4101 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
4102 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
4103 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4104 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4105 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4108 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
4110 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
4113 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
4114 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0)
4118 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
4119 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
4120 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
4123 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
4124 || (s->max_early_data > 0
4125 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
4126 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4127 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4130 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
4132 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4136 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4137 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
4138 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4140 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4144 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4145 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4146 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not.
4149 s->next_ticket_nonce++;
4150 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
4159 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4160 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4162 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4164 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
4165 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
4166 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
4167 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
4168 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4175 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4177 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
4178 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4187 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4188 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4190 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4192 PACKET next_proto, padding;
4193 size_t next_proto_len;
4196 * The payload looks like:
4198 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4199 * uint8 padding_len;
4200 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4202 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4203 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4204 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4205 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4206 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4207 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4210 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4212 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4213 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4214 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4217 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4219 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4223 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4225 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4227 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4234 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4236 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4237 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4238 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4239 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4242 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4243 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4244 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4245 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4246 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4250 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4251 * a record boundary.
4253 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4254 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
4255 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4256 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4257 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4260 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4261 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4262 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4263 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4264 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4267 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;