2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
128 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
131 tls1_setup_key_block,
132 tls1_generate_master_secret,
133 tls1_change_cipher_state,
134 tls1_final_finish_mac,
135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
136 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
153 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
157 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
164 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
168 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
171 s->version = s->method->version;
174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
176 static int nid_list[] =
178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
205 static int pref_list[] =
207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
208 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
209 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
211 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
213 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
214 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
216 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
218 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
219 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
221 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
222 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
224 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
225 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
226 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
228 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
229 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
230 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
231 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
232 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
237 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
238 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
239 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
241 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
242 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
243 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
246 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
248 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */
249 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
250 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
252 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
255 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
257 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */
260 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
262 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
264 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
266 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
268 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
270 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
272 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
274 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
276 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
278 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
280 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
284 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
286 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
288 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
290 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
292 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
294 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
296 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
298 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
300 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
302 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
304 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
306 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
308 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
314 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
318 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
319 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
322 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
323 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
325 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
328 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
329 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
331 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
334 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
335 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
337 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
340 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
341 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
342 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
343 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
345 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
347 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
348 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
351 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
352 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
355 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
359 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
361 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
363 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
367 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
370 unsigned char *orig = buf;
371 unsigned char *ret = buf;
373 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
374 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
375 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
380 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
382 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
384 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
385 unsigned long size_str;
388 /* check for enough space.
389 4 for the servername type and entension length
390 2 for servernamelist length
391 1 for the hostname type
392 2 for hostname length
396 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
397 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
400 /* extension type and length */
401 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
404 /* length of servername list */
407 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
408 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
410 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
414 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
419 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
425 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
427 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
430 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
439 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
440 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
441 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
442 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
444 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
445 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
451 /* check for enough space.
452 4 for the srp type type and entension length
453 1 for the srp user identity
454 + srp user identity length
456 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
458 /* fill in the extension */
459 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
460 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
461 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
462 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
468 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
470 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
473 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
474 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
475 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
481 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
482 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
483 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
484 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
485 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
487 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
489 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
492 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
493 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
494 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
500 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
501 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
503 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
504 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
505 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
507 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
509 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
512 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
513 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
514 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
515 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
517 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
518 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
519 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
521 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
522 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
524 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
528 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
529 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
531 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
534 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
535 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
539 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
545 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
547 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
549 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
550 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
551 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
552 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
553 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
556 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
557 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
558 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
560 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
562 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
564 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
567 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
570 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
575 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
576 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
579 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
583 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
585 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
586 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
592 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
594 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
601 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
602 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
603 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
605 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
606 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
608 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
610 /* save position of id len */
611 unsigned char *q = ret;
612 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
613 /* skip over id len */
615 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
621 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
625 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
626 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
628 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
631 * 1: peer may send requests
632 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
634 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
635 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
637 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
641 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
643 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
644 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
645 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
647 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
652 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
653 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
657 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
659 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
661 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
664 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
672 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
673 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
675 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
676 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
678 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
680 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
681 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
682 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
683 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
685 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
687 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
695 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
697 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
702 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
705 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
709 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
712 unsigned char *orig = buf;
713 unsigned char *ret = buf;
714 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
715 int next_proto_neg_seen;
718 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
719 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
723 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
725 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
727 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
729 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
733 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
737 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
743 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
745 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
748 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
758 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
760 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
763 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
764 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
765 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
771 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
772 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
773 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
774 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
775 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
778 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
779 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
781 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
782 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
784 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
785 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
789 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
791 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
792 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
796 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
797 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
798 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
800 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
802 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
804 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
807 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
810 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
816 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
820 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
822 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
824 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
827 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
836 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
837 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
838 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
839 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
840 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
841 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
842 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
843 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
844 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
845 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
846 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
851 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
852 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
853 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
855 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
857 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
860 * 1: peer may send requests
861 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
863 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
864 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
866 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
872 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
873 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
874 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
876 const unsigned char *npa;
880 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
881 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
883 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
884 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
886 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
888 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
893 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
896 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
901 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
902 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
903 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
908 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
909 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
910 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
911 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
913 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
914 unsigned short type, size;
915 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
916 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
917 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
918 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
919 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
920 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
921 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
923 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
924 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
925 0x01, /* 1 point format */
926 0x00, /* uncompressed */
929 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
930 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
931 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
932 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
933 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
934 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
935 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
936 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
937 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
938 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
950 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
957 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
959 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
960 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
962 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
964 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
966 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
971 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
973 if (data + len != d+n)
975 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
979 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
981 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
983 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
988 unsigned char *data = *p;
989 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
992 s->servername_done = 0;
993 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
994 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
995 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
999 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1000 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1004 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1005 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1006 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1009 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1011 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1012 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1016 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1018 if (data >= (d + n - 2)) {
1026 if (data > (d+n-len))
1029 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1034 if (data+size > (d+n))
1037 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1039 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1040 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1041 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1042 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1044 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1045 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1046 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1047 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1048 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1049 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1050 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1051 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1052 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1053 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1054 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1055 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1056 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1057 the value of the Host: field.
1058 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1059 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1060 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1061 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1065 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1067 unsigned char *sdata;
1081 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1087 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1088 switch (servname_type)
1090 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1093 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1095 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1097 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1100 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1102 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1105 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1106 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1107 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1108 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1109 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1110 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1113 s->servername_done = 1;
1117 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1118 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1119 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1134 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1136 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1138 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1140 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1142 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1143 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1145 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1150 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1151 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1153 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1154 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1156 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1160 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1162 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1163 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1165 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1166 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1168 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1171 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1172 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1175 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1176 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1177 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1178 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1179 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1182 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
1184 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1185 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1186 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1188 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1189 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
1190 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
1191 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
1195 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1198 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1199 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1201 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1204 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1205 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1208 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1209 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1210 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1211 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1212 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1215 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1216 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1217 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1218 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1220 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1224 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1227 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1228 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1230 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1234 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1235 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1236 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1237 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1239 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1240 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1242 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1247 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1249 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1250 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1252 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1256 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1258 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1260 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1262 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1265 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1270 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1272 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1275 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1276 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1282 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1284 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1286 const unsigned char *sdata;
1288 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1300 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1306 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1312 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1315 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1316 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1317 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1319 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1320 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1323 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1324 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1326 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1327 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1332 /* Read in request_extensions */
1342 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1344 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1345 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1348 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1349 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1351 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1352 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1356 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1360 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1363 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1367 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1368 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1370 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1371 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1372 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1374 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1379 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1380 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1381 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1383 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1386 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1387 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1388 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1389 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1390 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1391 * anything like that, but this might change).
1393 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1394 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1395 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1396 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1397 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1398 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1402 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1404 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
1405 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1407 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1416 /* Spurious data on the end */
1424 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1426 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1427 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1429 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1430 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1431 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1437 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1442 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1443 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1444 * the length of the block. */
1445 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1447 unsigned int off = 0;
1461 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1463 unsigned short length;
1464 unsigned short type;
1465 unsigned short size;
1466 unsigned char *data = *p;
1467 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1468 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1471 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1473 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1476 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1477 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1480 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1484 if (data+length != d+n)
1486 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1490 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1495 if (data+size > (d+n))
1498 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1499 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1500 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1502 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1504 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1506 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1509 tlsext_servername = 1;
1512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1513 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1515 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1516 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1518 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1519 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1521 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1526 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1527 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1528 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1530 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1533 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1534 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1537 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1538 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1539 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1540 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1541 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1544 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1546 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1548 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1549 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1551 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1554 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1557 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1560 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1562 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1563 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1564 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1566 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1570 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1573 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1574 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1576 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1580 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1581 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1582 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1583 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1585 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1587 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1589 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1594 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1595 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1597 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1598 * a status request message.
1600 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1602 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1605 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1606 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1609 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1610 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1612 unsigned char *selected;
1613 unsigned char selected_len;
1615 /* We must have requested it. */
1616 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
1618 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1621 /* The data must be valid */
1622 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1624 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1627 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1629 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1632 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1633 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1635 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1638 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1639 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1640 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1643 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1645 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1647 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1650 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1654 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
1655 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1657 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
1658 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1659 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1661 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1666 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1667 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1669 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1680 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1684 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1686 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1688 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1690 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1691 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1693 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1699 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1709 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1710 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1711 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1712 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1713 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1714 * absence on initial connect only.
1716 if (!renegotiate_seen
1717 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1718 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1720 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1722 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1730 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1733 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1734 * and elliptic curves we support.
1739 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1740 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1742 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1744 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1746 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1747 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1748 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1754 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1757 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1758 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1763 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1764 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1765 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1766 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1768 /* we support all named elliptic curves in RFC 4492 */
1769 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1770 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
1771 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1773 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1777 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
1778 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
1780 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
1784 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1786 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1790 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1792 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1797 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1799 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1800 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1802 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1803 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1805 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1806 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1811 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1815 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1816 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1823 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1825 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1826 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1827 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1828 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1831 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1832 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1833 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1834 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1838 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1839 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1844 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1845 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1846 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1847 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1849 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1854 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
1856 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1857 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1860 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1861 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1863 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1864 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1868 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1869 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1870 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1871 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1873 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1875 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1876 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1877 * so this has to happen here in
1878 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
1882 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1884 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1887 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1888 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1893 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1894 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1895 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1897 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1899 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1900 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1902 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1903 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1905 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1906 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1908 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1909 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1911 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1912 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1915 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1919 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1921 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1922 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1923 * abort the handshake.
1925 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1926 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1934 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1935 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1938 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1939 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1942 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1943 s->servername_done=0;
1949 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
1951 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1954 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1955 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1956 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
1957 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
1959 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1962 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
1963 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
1964 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1965 if (certpkey == NULL)
1967 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1970 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
1971 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
1973 s->cert->key = certpkey;
1974 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1977 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1978 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1979 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1981 /* status request response should be sent */
1982 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1983 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1984 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1986 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1988 /* something bad happened */
1989 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1990 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1991 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1996 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2001 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2002 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2005 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2006 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2014 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2016 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2017 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2020 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2021 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2022 * it must contain uncompressed.
2024 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2025 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2026 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2027 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2028 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2030 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2032 unsigned char *list;
2033 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2034 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2035 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2037 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2039 found_uncompressed = 1;
2043 if (!found_uncompressed)
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2049 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2050 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2052 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2053 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2054 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2055 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2057 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2058 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2060 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2061 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2063 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2065 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2066 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2069 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2070 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2071 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2072 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2074 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2075 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2080 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2083 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2084 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2087 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2088 * there is no response.
2090 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2092 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2093 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2095 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2096 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2099 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2100 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2104 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2105 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2111 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2112 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2115 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2116 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2119 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2120 s->servername_done=0;
2126 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2127 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2128 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2130 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2131 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2132 * extension, if any.
2133 * len: the length of the session ID.
2134 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2135 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2136 * point to the resulting session.
2138 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2139 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2140 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2143 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2144 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2145 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2146 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2147 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2148 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2149 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2152 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2153 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2154 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2155 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2156 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2157 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2159 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2160 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2162 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2163 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2167 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2169 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2170 * to permit stateful resumption.
2172 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2174 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2178 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2179 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2186 /* Skip past cipher list */
2191 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2196 /* Now at start of extensions */
2197 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2200 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2202 unsigned short type, size;
2205 if (p + size > limit)
2207 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2212 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2213 * currently have one. */
2214 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2217 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2219 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2220 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2221 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2222 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2223 * calculate the master secret later. */
2226 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2229 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2230 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2232 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2234 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2235 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2237 default: /* fatal error */
2246 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2248 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2249 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2250 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2251 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2252 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2253 * point to the resulting session.
2256 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2257 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2258 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2259 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2261 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2262 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2263 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2266 unsigned char *sdec;
2267 const unsigned char *p;
2268 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2269 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2272 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2273 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2276 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2277 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2278 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2279 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2281 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2282 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2293 /* Check key name matches */
2294 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2296 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2297 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2298 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2299 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2301 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2302 * integrity checks on ticket.
2304 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2307 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2311 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2312 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2313 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2314 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2315 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2317 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2320 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2321 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2322 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2323 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2324 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2327 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2330 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2331 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2333 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2338 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2341 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2345 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2346 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2347 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2348 * as required by standard.
2351 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2352 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2360 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2365 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2373 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2374 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2375 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2377 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2378 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2380 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2381 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2382 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2385 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2386 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2390 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2392 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2395 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2398 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2402 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2405 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2407 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2413 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2416 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2418 if (table[i].id == id)
2419 return table[i].nid;
2425 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2430 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2431 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2434 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2437 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2438 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2442 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2444 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2445 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2448 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2453 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2457 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2458 return EVP_sha224();
2460 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2461 return EVP_sha256();
2463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2464 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2465 return EVP_sha384();
2467 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2468 return EVP_sha512();
2476 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2478 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2483 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2484 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2486 /* Should never happen */
2490 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2491 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2492 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2493 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2495 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
2497 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
2501 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2502 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2503 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2507 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2508 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2511 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2512 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2520 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2522 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2525 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2526 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2527 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2534 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2535 * supported it stays as NULL.
2537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2538 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2539 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2542 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2544 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2545 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2548 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2549 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2550 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2559 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2561 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
2562 unsigned short hbtype;
2563 unsigned int payload;
2564 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2566 if (s->msg_callback)
2567 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2568 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
2569 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2571 /* Read type and payload length first */
2572 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2573 return 0; /* silently discard */
2576 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2577 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
2580 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
2582 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
2585 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
2586 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
2587 * payload, plus padding
2589 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2592 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
2593 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
2595 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
2597 /* Random padding */
2598 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
2600 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
2602 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
2603 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2604 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
2605 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2607 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
2612 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
2616 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
2617 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
2618 * sequence number */
2621 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
2624 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
2632 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2634 unsigned char *buf, *p;
2636 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
2637 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2639 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
2640 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
2641 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
2643 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
2647 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
2648 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
2654 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
2655 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2661 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
2662 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
2664 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
2666 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
2667 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
2668 * some random stuff.
2669 * - Message Type, 1 byte
2670 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
2671 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
2672 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
2675 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2678 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
2679 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
2681 /* Sequence number */
2682 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
2683 /* 16 random bytes */
2684 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
2686 /* Random padding */
2687 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
2689 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
2692 if (s->msg_callback)
2693 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2694 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
2695 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2697 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;