2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
117 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
118 # include <openssl/ec.h>
121 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
122 #include <openssl/rand.h>
123 #include "ssl_locl.h"
125 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
128 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
129 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
130 SSL_SESSION **psess);
131 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
132 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
135 #define CHECKLEN(curr, val, limit) \
136 (((curr) >= (limit)) || (size_t)((limit) - (curr)) < (size_t)(val))
138 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = {
141 tls1_setup_key_block,
142 tls1_generate_master_secret,
143 tls1_change_cipher_state,
144 tls1_final_finish_mac,
145 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
146 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
147 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
148 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
150 tls1_export_keying_material,
152 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
153 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
157 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
160 tls1_setup_key_block,
161 tls1_generate_master_secret,
162 tls1_change_cipher_state,
163 tls1_final_finish_mac,
164 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
165 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
166 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
167 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
169 tls1_export_keying_material,
170 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
171 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
172 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
176 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
179 tls1_setup_key_block,
180 tls1_generate_master_secret,
181 tls1_change_cipher_state,
182 tls1_final_finish_mac,
183 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
184 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
185 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
186 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
188 tls1_export_keying_material,
189 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
190 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
191 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
192 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
196 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
199 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
200 * http, the cache would over fill
202 return (60 * 60 * 2);
209 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
213 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
216 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
217 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
219 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
223 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
226 s->version = s->method->version;
229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
231 static int nid_list[] = {
232 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
233 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
234 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
235 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
236 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
237 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
238 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
239 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
240 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
241 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
242 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
243 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
244 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
245 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
246 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
247 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
248 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
249 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
250 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
251 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
252 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
253 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
254 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
255 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
256 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
257 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
258 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
259 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
262 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
263 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
264 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
265 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
268 /* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */
269 static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = {
270 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
271 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
272 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
273 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
274 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
275 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
276 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
277 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
278 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
279 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
280 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
281 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
282 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
283 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
284 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
285 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
290 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
291 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
292 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
293 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
294 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
295 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
296 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
297 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
298 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
299 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
300 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
301 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
302 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
303 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
304 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
305 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
306 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
307 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
310 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
311 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
313 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
314 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
315 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
316 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
317 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
318 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
319 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
320 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
321 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
322 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
323 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
324 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
325 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
326 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
327 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
328 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
332 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
333 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
334 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
338 /* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */
339 static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] = {
340 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
341 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
342 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
344 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
345 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
346 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
347 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
349 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
350 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
351 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
352 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
354 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
355 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
356 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
357 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
358 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
359 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
361 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
362 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
363 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
364 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
365 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
367 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
368 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
369 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
370 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
371 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
372 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
374 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
375 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
376 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
380 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
382 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
383 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
384 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
386 return nid_list[curve_id - 1];
389 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
391 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
393 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
395 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
397 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
399 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
401 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
403 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
405 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
407 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
409 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
411 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
413 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
415 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
417 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
419 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
421 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
423 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
425 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
427 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
429 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
431 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
433 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
435 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
437 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
439 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
441 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
443 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
445 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
447 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
455 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
457 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
458 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
459 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
460 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
461 * lists in the first place.
462 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
463 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
464 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
466 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
467 const unsigned char **pcurves,
470 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
472 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
473 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
475 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
476 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
477 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
478 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
479 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
482 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
483 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
487 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
488 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
492 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
493 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
498 *pcurves = fips_curves_default;
499 pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default);
503 if (!s->server || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
504 *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
505 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
507 *pcurves = eccurves_all;
508 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all);
513 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
514 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
515 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
519 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
524 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
525 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
527 const unsigned char *curves;
528 size_t num_curves, i;
529 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
530 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
532 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
534 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
537 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
538 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
540 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
541 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
543 } else /* Should never happen */
546 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
548 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
549 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
556 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
557 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
558 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
559 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
561 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
563 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
564 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
566 /* Can't do anything on client side */
570 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
572 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
573 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
575 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
576 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
577 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
578 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
579 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
580 /* Should never happen */
583 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
587 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
588 * but s->options is a long...
590 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
591 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
593 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
594 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
595 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
596 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
598 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
601 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
604 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
606 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
607 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
608 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
610 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
614 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
615 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
616 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
617 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
619 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
620 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
628 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
632 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
633 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
635 unsigned char *clist, *p;
638 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
641 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
642 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
646 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
649 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
650 unsigned long idmask;
652 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
654 /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */
655 if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25) {
660 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
661 curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]);
662 if (!curve || EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve))
663 == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
665 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
669 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
672 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
682 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
686 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
690 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
693 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
695 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
701 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
703 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
705 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
707 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
708 if (nid == NID_undef)
709 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
710 if (nid == NID_undef)
711 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
712 if (nid == NID_undef)
714 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
715 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
717 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
721 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
722 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
727 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
731 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
734 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
735 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
740 const EC_METHOD *meth;
743 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
744 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
747 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
750 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
754 /* Determine curve ID */
755 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
756 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
757 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
760 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
769 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
771 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
773 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
775 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
777 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
782 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
783 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
784 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
786 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
787 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
790 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
791 * supported (see RFC4492).
793 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
794 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
795 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
796 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
797 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
800 if (i == num_formats)
805 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
806 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
807 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
809 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
811 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
812 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
813 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
814 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
815 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
819 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
820 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
825 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
832 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
836 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
838 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
839 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
840 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
842 *pformats = ecformats_default;
843 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
845 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
847 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
852 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
853 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
855 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
857 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
860 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
863 /* If not EC nothing to do */
864 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
868 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
873 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
876 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
880 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
881 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
883 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
889 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
890 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
891 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
892 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
893 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
895 return 0; /* Should never happen */
896 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
897 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
899 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
901 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
902 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
903 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
905 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
911 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
912 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
913 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
915 unsigned char curve_id[2];
916 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
917 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
918 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
919 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
923 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
926 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
927 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
928 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
929 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
930 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
931 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
935 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
936 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
938 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
939 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
941 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
943 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
946 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
948 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
954 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
955 /* Need a shared curve */
956 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
962 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
967 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
969 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
973 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
976 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
980 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
985 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
990 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
991 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
994 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
995 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
997 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
1000 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1001 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
1003 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
1006 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1007 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
1010 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
1013 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
1014 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
1015 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
1016 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
1018 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
1019 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
1020 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
1021 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1023 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
1024 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1025 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
1027 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
1028 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
1032 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1033 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1034 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1035 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1038 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const unsigned char **psigs)
1041 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1044 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1045 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1046 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1047 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1048 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
1050 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1051 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1054 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1055 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
1059 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
1060 if (s->server == sent && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
1061 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1062 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1063 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1064 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1065 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1067 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1068 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1073 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1074 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
1076 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
1077 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1079 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1080 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1081 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1082 /* Should never happen */
1085 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1086 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1090 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1091 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1092 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1093 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1094 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1096 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1100 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1101 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1104 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1105 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1107 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1110 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1111 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1112 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1113 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1119 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1123 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1124 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1125 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1126 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1129 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1130 if (i == sent_sigslen
1131 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1132 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1136 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1142 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1144 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1145 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1150 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1151 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1152 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1155 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1158 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1159 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1160 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1163 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1164 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1165 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1169 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1170 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2.
1172 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1173 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
1174 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
1175 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1176 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1180 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1181 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1185 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1186 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1193 * Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1194 * signature algorithms.
1197 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1198 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1201 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1202 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1205 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1206 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1208 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1209 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
1210 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1211 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1214 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1215 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1216 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1217 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1218 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1220 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1221 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1222 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1223 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1224 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1230 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1231 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1234 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1235 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1236 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1237 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1239 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1241 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1242 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1244 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1245 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1247 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1248 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1249 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1250 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1258 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1259 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1265 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1267 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1268 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1272 * check for enough space.
1273 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1274 * 2 for servernamelist length
1275 * 1 for the hostname type
1276 * 2 for hostname length
1279 size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname);
1280 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + size_str, limit))
1283 /* extension type and length */
1284 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1285 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1287 /* length of servername list */
1288 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1290 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1291 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1293 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1297 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1298 if (s->renegotiate) {
1301 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1306 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1309 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1312 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1319 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1320 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1321 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1322 * Client Hello message */
1324 size_t login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1325 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1331 * check for enough space.
1332 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1333 * 1 for the srp user identity
1334 * + srp user identity length
1336 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + login_len, limit))
1339 /* fill in the extension */
1340 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1341 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1342 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1343 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1348 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1351 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1353 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1354 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1356 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1358 if (num_formats > 255) {
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1363 * check for enough space.
1364 * 4 bytes for the ec point formats type and extension length
1365 * 1 byte for the length of the formats
1368 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + num_formats, limit))
1371 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1372 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1373 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1374 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1375 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1379 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1381 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1382 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1385 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1389 curves_list_len = 2 * num_curves;
1391 * check for enough space.
1392 * 4 bytes for the ec curves type and extension length
1393 * 2 bytes for the curve list length
1394 * + curve list length
1396 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + curves_list_len, limit))
1399 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1400 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1401 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1402 memcpy(ret, pcurves, curves_list_len);
1403 ret += curves_list_len;
1405 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1407 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
1409 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1410 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1411 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1412 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1413 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1414 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1415 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1417 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1418 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1419 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1422 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1423 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1426 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1429 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + ticklen, limit))
1431 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1434 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1440 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1442 const unsigned char *salg;
1443 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
1446 * check for enough space.
1447 * 4 bytes for the sigalgs type and extension length
1448 * 2 bytes for the sigalg list length
1449 * + sigalg list length
1451 if (CHECKLEN(ret, salglen + 6, limit))
1453 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1454 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1456 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1459 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1460 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1461 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1463 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1465 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1468 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1471 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1476 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1478 size_t extlen, idlen;
1483 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1484 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1485 lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1488 idlen += (size_t)lentmp + 2;
1491 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1492 lentmp = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1495 extlen = (size_t)lentmp;
1499 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1502 * 2 bytes for status request type
1503 * 2 bytes for status request len
1504 * 1 byte for OCSP request type
1505 * 2 bytes for length of ids
1506 * 2 bytes for length of extensions
1508 * + length of extensions
1510 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + idlen + extlen, limit))
1513 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1514 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1515 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1517 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1518 /* save position of id len */
1519 unsigned char *q = ret;
1520 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1521 /* skip over id len */
1523 lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1529 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1531 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1532 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1535 * check for enough space.
1536 * 4 bytes for the heartbeat ext type and extension length
1537 * 1 byte for the mode
1539 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit))
1542 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1546 * 1: peer may send requests
1547 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1549 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1550 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1552 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1555 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1556 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1558 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1559 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1563 * check for enough space.
1564 * 4 bytes for the NPN ext type and extension length
1566 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1568 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1573 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1575 * check for enough space.
1576 * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length
1577 * 2 bytes for the ALPN protocol list length
1578 * + ALPN protocol list length
1580 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, limit))
1582 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1583 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1584 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1585 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1586 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1587 s->cert->alpn_sent = 1;
1589 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1590 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1593 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1596 * check for enough space.
1597 * 4 bytes for the SRTP type and extension length
1598 * + SRTP profiles length
1600 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
1603 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1606 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1613 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1614 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1615 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1619 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1620 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1621 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1624 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1625 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1627 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1628 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1631 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1633 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1634 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1641 * check for enough space. Strictly speaking we know we've already
1642 * got enough space because to get here the message size is < 0x200,
1643 * but we know that we've allocated far more than that in the buffer
1644 * - but for consistency and robustness we're going to check anyway.
1646 * 4 bytes for the padding type and extension length
1649 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + hlen, limit))
1651 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1653 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1658 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1661 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1665 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1666 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1669 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1670 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1671 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1672 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1674 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1675 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1676 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1677 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1678 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1679 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1682 * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation
1684 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1689 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1691 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1692 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1693 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1696 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1700 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1703 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1709 * check for enough space.
1710 * 4 bytes for the reneg type and extension length
1711 * + reneg data length
1713 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
1716 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1719 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1726 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1728 const unsigned char *plist;
1731 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1734 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1736 if (plistlen > 255) {
1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1742 * check for enough space.
1743 * 4 bytes for the ec points format type and extension length
1744 * 1 byte for the points format list length
1745 * + length of points format list
1747 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + plistlen, limit))
1750 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1751 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1752 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1753 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1758 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1761 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1763 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
1765 * check for enough space.
1766 * 4 bytes for the Ticket type and extension length
1768 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1770 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1773 /* if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket later */
1774 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1777 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1779 * check for enough space.
1780 * 4 bytes for the Status request type and extension length
1782 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1784 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1787 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1788 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1789 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1791 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1793 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1796 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1799 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1804 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1805 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1808 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1811 * check for enough space.
1812 * 4 bytes for the SRTP profiles type and extension length
1813 * + length of the SRTP profiles list
1815 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
1818 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1821 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1829 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1830 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1831 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1832 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1833 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1834 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1835 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1836 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1837 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1838 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1841 /* check for enough space. */
1842 if (CHECKLEN(ret, sizeof(cryptopro_ext), limit))
1844 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext));
1845 ret += sizeof(cryptopro_ext);
1848 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1849 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1850 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1852 * check for enough space.
1853 * 4 bytes for the Heartbeat type and extension length
1854 * 1 byte for the mode
1856 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit))
1858 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1862 * 1: peer may send requests
1863 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1865 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1866 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1868 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1873 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1874 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1875 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1876 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1877 const unsigned char *npa;
1878 unsigned int npalen;
1881 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1883 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1884 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1886 * check for enough space.
1887 * 4 bytes for the NPN type and extension length
1888 * + length of protocols list
1890 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + npalen, limit))
1892 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1894 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1896 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1900 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1903 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1904 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1905 size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1908 * check for enough space.
1909 * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length
1910 * 2 bytes for ALPN data length
1911 * 1 byte for selected protocol length
1912 * + length of the selected protocol
1914 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 7 + len, limit))
1916 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1919 *ret++ = (unsigned char)len;
1920 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1924 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1927 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1931 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1933 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1934 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1935 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1940 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1941 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1942 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1943 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1945 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1946 const unsigned char *limit)
1948 unsigned short type, size;
1949 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1950 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1951 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1952 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1953 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1954 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1955 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1957 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1958 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1959 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1960 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1963 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1964 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1965 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1966 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1967 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1968 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1969 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1970 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1971 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1972 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1975 if (limit - data <= 2)
1979 if (limit - data < 4)
1984 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1987 if (limit - data < size)
1991 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1992 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1993 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1995 if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
1997 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1999 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
2002 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
2004 if (limit - data != (int)(len))
2006 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
2010 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
2012 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2015 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to save the ALPN extension in a
2016 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
2017 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
2018 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
2021 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
2022 unsigned data_len, int *al)
2031 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
2032 * length-prefixed strings.
2034 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
2043 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
2044 proto_len = data[i];
2050 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
2056 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL)
2057 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed);
2058 s->cert->alpn_proposed = OPENSSL_malloc(data_len);
2059 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed == NULL) {
2060 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2063 memcpy(s->cert->alpn_proposed, data, data_len);
2064 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = data_len;
2068 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2073 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
2074 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
2075 * returns 1 on success, 0 on failure: al set only on failure
2077 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2079 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2080 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2082 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2083 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2084 s->cert->alpn_proposed,
2085 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len,
2086 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
2088 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2089 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2090 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2091 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2092 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2095 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
2096 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2097 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2098 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2099 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2107 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2108 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
2110 unsigned short type;
2111 unsigned short size;
2113 unsigned char *data = *p;
2114 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2116 s->servername_done = 0;
2117 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2118 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2119 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2122 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2123 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2124 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2126 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
2127 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed) {
2128 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed);
2129 s->cert->alpn_proposed = NULL;
2131 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
2132 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2133 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2134 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2137 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2138 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2139 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit);
2140 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2142 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2143 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2144 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
2145 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2147 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2148 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2149 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2150 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2154 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2159 if (limit - data < 2)
2164 if (limit - data != len)
2167 while (limit - data >= 4) {
2171 if (limit - data < size)
2174 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
2176 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2177 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2179 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2181 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2182 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2183 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2184 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2185 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2186 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2187 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2188 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2189 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2190 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2191 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2192 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2193 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2194 * the value of the Host: field.
2195 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2196 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2197 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2199 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2203 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2204 unsigned char *sdata;
2217 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2224 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2225 switch (servname_type) {
2226 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2228 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2231 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2232 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2235 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2236 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2237 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2240 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2241 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2242 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2243 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2244 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2245 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2248 s->servername_done = 1;
2251 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2252 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2253 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2254 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2268 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2269 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2270 if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1))
2272 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2274 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2276 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2277 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2279 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2284 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2285 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2286 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2287 int ecpointformatlist_length;
2292 ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2293 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2294 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2297 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
2298 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2299 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2301 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2302 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2303 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2304 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2307 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2308 ecpointformatlist_length;
2309 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2310 ecpointformatlist_length);
2314 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ",
2315 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2316 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2317 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2318 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2319 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2321 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2322 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2323 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2324 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2326 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2327 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2328 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2329 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
2333 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2336 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2337 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2338 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2339 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2342 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2343 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2344 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2345 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2349 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ",
2350 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2351 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2352 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2353 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2354 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2357 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2358 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2359 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2360 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2363 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2366 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2367 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2368 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2372 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2373 /* shouldn't really happen */
2374 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2377 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2378 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2379 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2381 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2382 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2383 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2384 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2389 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2390 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2391 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2392 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2394 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2397 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2398 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2400 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2401 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2403 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2407 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2409 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2411 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2416 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2418 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2419 const unsigned char *sdata;
2421 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2428 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2429 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2431 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2434 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2435 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2436 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2440 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2449 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2455 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2458 if (data != sdata) {
2459 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2462 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2463 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2464 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2469 /* Read in request_extensions */
2478 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
2479 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2480 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2483 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2484 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2485 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2490 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2493 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2495 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2496 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2498 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2499 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2501 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2502 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2503 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2506 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2511 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2512 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2513 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2515 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2518 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2519 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2520 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2521 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2522 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2523 * anything like that, but this might change).
2525 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2526 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2527 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2528 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2529 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2531 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2535 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2536 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2537 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2541 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2542 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2543 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2544 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2545 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2553 /* Spurious data on the end */
2561 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2563 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2564 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2565 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2567 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2573 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2578 * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data
2579 * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking.
2582 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
2583 const unsigned char *data,
2584 const unsigned char *limit,
2587 unsigned short type, size, len;
2588 /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */
2589 if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
2592 if (limit - data <= 2)
2596 if (limit - data < len)
2599 while (limit - data >= 4) {
2603 if (limit - data < size)
2605 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2614 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2615 unsigned char *limit)
2618 unsigned char *ptmp = *p;
2620 * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled
2621 * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically
2622 * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions
2623 * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure.
2625 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, limit, &al) <= 0) {
2626 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2630 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2635 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2636 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, limit, &al) <= 0) {
2637 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2644 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2646 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2647 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2648 * fill the length of the block.
2650 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2652 unsigned int off = 0;
2665 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2666 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2668 unsigned short length;
2669 unsigned short type;
2670 unsigned short size;
2671 unsigned char *data = *p;
2672 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2673 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2675 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2676 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2678 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2680 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2681 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2682 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2684 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2685 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2686 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2689 if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
2693 if ((d + n) - data != length) {
2694 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2698 while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
2702 if ((d + n) - data < size)
2705 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2706 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2708 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2709 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2710 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2713 tlsext_servername = 1;
2715 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2716 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2717 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2718 int ecpointformatlist_length;
2721 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2725 ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2726 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2727 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2731 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2732 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2733 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2734 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2735 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2736 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2739 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2740 ecpointformatlist_length;
2741 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2742 ecpointformatlist_length);
2746 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2747 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2748 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2749 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2750 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2753 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2755 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2756 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2757 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2758 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2760 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2763 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2765 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2768 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2770 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2771 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2772 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2775 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2778 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2779 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2780 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2784 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2785 /* shouldn't really happen */
2786 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2788 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2789 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2790 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2792 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
2793 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2796 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2797 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2802 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2804 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2807 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2808 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2811 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2812 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2814 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2815 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2816 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2817 unsigned char *selected;
2818 unsigned char selected_len;
2820 /* We must have requested it. */
2821 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2822 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2825 /* The data must be valid */
2826 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2827 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2831 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2833 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2834 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2835 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2839 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2840 * a single Serverhello
2842 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2843 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2844 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2845 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2848 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2849 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2850 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2854 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2857 /* We must have requested it. */
2858 if (!s->cert->alpn_sent) {
2859 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2863 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2867 * The extension data consists of:
2868 * uint16 list_length
2869 * uint8 proto_length;
2870 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2875 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2876 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2880 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2881 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2884 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2885 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2886 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2887 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2888 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2891 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2892 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2895 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2896 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2898 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2900 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2901 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2903 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2904 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2906 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2907 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2908 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2911 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2916 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2917 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2918 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2923 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2924 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2926 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2932 if (data != d + n) {
2933 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2937 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2938 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2939 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2940 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2941 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2942 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2946 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2957 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2958 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2959 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2960 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2961 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2962 * initial connect only.
2964 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2965 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2966 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2968 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2975 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2978 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2982 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
2983 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
2985 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2990 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2991 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2992 /* shouldn't really happen */
2993 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2996 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2997 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2998 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
3000 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
3001 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
3002 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3004 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
3005 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
3006 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3009 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len =
3010 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3015 * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate
3016 * server opaque PRF input
3018 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
3019 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3023 s->cert->alpn_sent = 0;
3027 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3032 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
3034 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3035 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3037 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3039 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
3040 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
3043 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
3044 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
3048 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3050 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3051 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3052 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3053 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3055 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3057 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3059 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3062 * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we
3063 * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this
3064 * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early().
3069 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
3070 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
3072 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
3074 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3075 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3080 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
3081 /* shouldn't really happen */
3082 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3084 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3086 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
3087 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3088 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len ==
3089 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) {
3091 * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF
3092 * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input!
3095 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
3096 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3097 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
3099 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
3100 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
3101 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3103 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
3104 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3105 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3108 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
3109 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3113 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
3115 * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we
3116 * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the
3119 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3120 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3127 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3128 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3131 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3132 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3135 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3136 s->servername_done = 0;
3142 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3146 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3147 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
3148 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3149 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3150 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3152 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3153 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
3154 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3155 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3158 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3159 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
3160 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
3161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3162 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3165 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3166 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
3167 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3168 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3169 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3173 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3176 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3181 * Upon success, returns 1.
3182 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
3184 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
3188 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
3189 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
3190 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
3191 * influence which certificate is sent
3193 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
3195 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3196 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3197 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3198 if (certpkey != NULL) {
3200 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
3201 * et al can pick it up.
3203 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3204 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3206 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3207 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3208 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3210 /* status request response should be sent */
3211 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3212 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3213 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3215 /* something bad happened */
3216 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3218 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3224 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
3231 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3233 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3234 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3236 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3238 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3239 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
3240 * must contain uncompressed.
3242 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3243 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3244 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3245 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3246 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3247 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3248 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
3249 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
3250 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3252 unsigned char *list;
3253 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3254 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3255 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
3256 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
3257 found_uncompressed = 1;
3261 if (!found_uncompressed) {
3262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3263 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3267 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3268 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3270 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3272 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3273 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3274 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3275 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3277 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3279 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3281 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3282 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) {
3284 * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on
3285 * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a
3286 * value from the server too.
3289 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
3290 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3291 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3295 * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to
3296 * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size.
3298 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3299 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len !=
3300 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
3301 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3302 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3307 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3308 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3309 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3311 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
3314 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3315 && !(s->hit) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
3318 * Call callback with resp == NULL and resplen == -1 so callback
3319 * knows there is no response
3321 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3323 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3324 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3327 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3328 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3333 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3334 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3337 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3338 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3341 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3342 s->servername_done = 0;
3348 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
3352 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3354 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
3355 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3359 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3367 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3368 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3369 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3371 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3372 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3373 * extension, if any.
3374 * len: the length of the session ID.
3375 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3376 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3377 * point to the resulting session.
3379 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3380 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3381 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3384 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3385 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3386 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3387 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3388 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3389 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3390 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3393 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3394 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3395 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3396 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3397 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3398 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3400 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3401 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3403 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3404 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3408 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3411 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3414 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3416 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3420 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3421 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3429 /* Skip past cipher list */
3435 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3441 /* Now at start of extensions */
3445 while (limit - p >= 4) {
3446 unsigned short type, size;
3449 if (limit - p < size)
3451 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
3455 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3458 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3461 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3463 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3464 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3465 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3466 * calculate the master secret later.
3470 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3472 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3473 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3475 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3477 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3478 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3480 default: /* fatal error */
3490 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3492 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3493 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3494 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3495 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3496 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3497 * point to the resulting session.
3500 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3501 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3502 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3503 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3505 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3506 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3507 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3510 unsigned char *sdec;
3511 const unsigned char *p;
3512 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3513 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3516 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3518 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
3519 if (eticklen < 16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH)
3522 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3523 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3524 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3525 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3526 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3527 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3532 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3533 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3539 /* Check key name matches */
3540 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3542 if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3543 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL) <= 0
3544 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3545 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3551 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3554 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3558 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3559 if (eticklen <= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) {
3560 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3561 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3566 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3567 if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3568 || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3571 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3572 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3573 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3576 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3577 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3578 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3579 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3580 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3582 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3583 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3587 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3588 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3593 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3596 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3600 /* Some additional consistency checks */
3601 if (slen != 0 || sess->session_id_length != 0) {
3602 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3606 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3607 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3608 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3612 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3613 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3622 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3626 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3627 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3631 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3638 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3639 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3640 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3641 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3642 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3643 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3644 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3647 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3648 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3649 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3650 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3653 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3656 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3657 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3663 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3666 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3667 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3668 return table[i].nid;
3673 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3679 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3680 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3683 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3686 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3687 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3691 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3693 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3694 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3697 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3700 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3701 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3702 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
3708 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3709 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3712 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3713 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3714 return EVP_sha224();
3716 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3717 return EVP_sha256();
3719 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3720 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3721 return EVP_sha384();
3723 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3724 return EVP_sha512();
3732 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3735 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3736 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3737 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3739 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3740 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3741 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3743 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3744 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3745 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3751 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3752 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3753 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3755 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3756 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3758 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3759 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3760 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3762 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3764 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3765 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3766 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3768 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3770 if (psignhash_nid) {
3771 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3772 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3774 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3778 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3779 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3780 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3781 const unsigned char *allow,
3784 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3785 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3786 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3787 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3788 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3790 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3792 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3793 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3796 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3797 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3798 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3800 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3810 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3811 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3813 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3814 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3816 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3818 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3819 if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
3820 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3821 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3822 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3824 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3825 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3826 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3827 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3828 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3829 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3830 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3832 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
3833 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3836 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3837 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3841 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3842 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3844 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3846 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3849 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3853 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3854 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3858 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3860 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3863 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3864 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3866 /* Should never happen */
3870 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3871 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3872 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3873 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3875 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3876 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3880 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3886 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3887 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3890 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3891 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3893 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3894 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3896 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3898 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3900 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3902 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3903 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3904 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3905 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3906 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3907 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3908 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3909 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3915 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3916 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3917 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3918 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3919 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3920 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3921 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3922 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3923 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3924 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3925 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3931 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3932 * the certificate for signing.
3934 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3936 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3937 * supported it stays as NULL.
3939 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3940 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3941 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3943 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3944 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3945 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3946 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3949 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3950 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3951 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3957 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3958 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3959 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3961 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3966 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3973 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3975 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3978 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3979 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3980 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3982 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3983 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3987 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3989 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3991 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3993 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3995 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3996 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3999 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
4000 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4002 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
4003 unsigned short hbtype;
4004 unsigned int payload;
4005 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4007 if (s->msg_callback)
4008 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4009 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
4010 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4012 /* Read type and payload length first */
4013 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
4014 return 0; /* silently discard */
4017 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
4018 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
4021 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
4022 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
4026 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
4027 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
4029 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4034 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
4035 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
4037 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
4039 /* Random padding */
4040 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
4041 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4045 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
4046 3 + payload + padding);
4048 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4049 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4050 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4051 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4053 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4057 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
4061 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
4062 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
4066 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
4068 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4075 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4077 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4079 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4080 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4082 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4083 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4084 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
4085 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4089 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4090 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
4091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4095 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4096 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
4097 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4102 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
4103 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4105 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4108 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4109 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4110 * some random stuff.
4111 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4112 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4113 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4114 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4117 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4122 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4123 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4125 /* Sequence number */
4126 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4127 /* 16 random bytes */
4128 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
4129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4133 /* Random padding */
4134 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
4135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4139 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4141 if (s->msg_callback)
4142 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4143 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4144 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4146 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4156 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4160 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4163 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4165 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4168 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4171 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4173 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4175 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4177 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4185 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4186 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4187 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4188 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4189 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4190 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4194 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4195 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4196 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4197 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4200 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
4201 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4204 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4205 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4210 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
4211 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
4213 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4217 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4221 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4224 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
4227 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4232 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4233 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4235 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
4236 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4237 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4238 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4239 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4241 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4248 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4249 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4250 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4251 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4253 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4254 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4255 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4256 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4262 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4266 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4270 if (default_nid == -1)
4272 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4274 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4275 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4276 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4281 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4282 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4286 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4287 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
4288 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4295 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
4296 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
4297 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
4298 * attempting to use them.
4301 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4303 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4304 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4305 /* Strict mode flags */
4306 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4307 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4308 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4310 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4315 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4316 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4318 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4319 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4321 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4324 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4326 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4328 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4330 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4331 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4334 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4335 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4336 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
4337 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
4338 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4339 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4346 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4349 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4350 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4351 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4353 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4360 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4361 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4362 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4363 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4364 else if (!check_flags)
4369 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4370 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4372 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4374 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4375 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4377 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4380 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4381 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4382 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4383 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4384 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4387 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4388 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4389 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4390 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4394 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4395 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4404 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4405 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4407 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4409 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4410 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4411 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4414 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4421 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4422 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4426 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4427 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4428 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4429 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4431 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4438 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4439 else if (check_flags)
4440 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4442 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4443 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4444 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4445 else if (!check_flags)
4448 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4449 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4450 else if (strict_mode) {
4451 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4452 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4453 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4454 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4456 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4463 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4464 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4468 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4471 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4474 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4479 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4480 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4481 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4482 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4483 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4487 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4491 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4493 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4494 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4496 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4497 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4498 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4502 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4505 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4507 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4509 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4510 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4512 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4513 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4514 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4516 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4517 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4518 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4519 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4520 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4525 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4528 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4530 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4531 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4535 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4536 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4537 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4538 else if (cpk->digest)
4539 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4541 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4544 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4548 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4549 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4551 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4552 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4559 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4560 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4562 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4563 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4564 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4565 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4566 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4567 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4570 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4571 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4573 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);