2 * Copyright 2018-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2018-2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 #include <openssl/err.h>
12 #include <openssl/bn.h>
13 #include <openssl/core.h>
14 #include <openssl/evp.h>
15 #include <openssl/rand.h>
16 #include "crypto/bn.h"
17 #include "crypto/security_bits.h"
18 #include "rsa_local.h"
20 #define RSA_FIPS1864_MIN_KEYGEN_KEYSIZE 2048
21 #define RSA_FIPS1864_MIN_KEYGEN_STRENGTH 112
24 * Generate probable primes 'p' & 'q'. See FIPS 186-4 Section B.3.6
25 * "Generation of Probable Primes with Conditions Based on Auxiliary Probable
29 * rsa Object used to store primes p & q.
30 * test Object used for CAVS testing only.that contains..
31 * p1, p2 The returned auxiliary primes for p.
32 * If NULL they are not returned.
33 * Xpout An optionally returned random number used during generation of p.
34 * Xp An optional passed in value (that is random number used during
36 * Xp1, Xp2 Optionally passed in randomly generated numbers from which
37 * auxiliary primes p1 & p2 are calculated. If NULL these values
38 * are generated internally.
39 * q1, q2 The returned auxiliary primes for q.
40 * If NULL they are not returned.
41 * Xqout An optionally returned random number used during generation of q.
42 * Xq An optional passed in value (that is random number used during
44 * Xq1, Xq2 Optionally passed in randomly generated numbers from which
45 * auxiliary primes q1 & q2 are calculated. If NULL these values
46 * are generated internally.
47 * nbits The key size in bits (The size of the modulus n).
48 * e The public exponent.
49 * ctx A BN_CTX object.
50 * cb An optional BIGNUM callback.
51 * Returns: 1 if successful, or 0 otherwise.
53 * p1, p2, q1, q2, Xpout, Xqout are returned if they are not NULL.
54 * Xp, Xp1, Xp2, Xq, Xq1, Xq2 are optionally passed in.
55 * (Required for CAVS testing).
57 int ossl_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(RSA *rsa, RSA_ACVP_TEST *test,
58 int nbits, const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx,
62 /* Temp allocated BIGNUMS */
63 BIGNUM *Xpo = NULL, *Xqo = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
64 /* Intermediate BIGNUMS that can be returned for testing */
65 BIGNUM *p1 = NULL, *p2 = NULL;
66 BIGNUM *q1 = NULL, *q2 = NULL;
67 /* Intermediate BIGNUMS that can be input for testing */
68 BIGNUM *Xpout = NULL, *Xqout = NULL;
69 BIGNUM *Xp = NULL, *Xp1 = NULL, *Xp2 = NULL;
70 BIGNUM *Xq = NULL, *Xq1 = NULL, *Xq2 = NULL;
72 #if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
87 /* (Step 1) Check key length
88 * NOTE: SP800-131A Rev1 Disallows key lengths of < 2048 bits for RSA
89 * Signature Generation and Key Agree/Transport.
91 if (nbits < RSA_FIPS1864_MIN_KEYGEN_KEYSIZE) {
92 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
96 if (!ossl_rsa_check_public_exponent(e)) {
97 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_PUB_EXPONENT_OUT_OF_RANGE);
101 /* (Step 3) Determine strength and check rand generator strength is ok -
102 * this step is redundant because the generator always returns a higher
103 * strength than is required.
107 tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
108 Xpo = (Xpout != NULL) ? Xpout : BN_CTX_get(ctx);
109 Xqo = (Xqout != NULL) ? Xqout : BN_CTX_get(ctx);
110 if (tmp == NULL || Xpo == NULL || Xqo == NULL)
112 BN_set_flags(Xpo, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
113 BN_set_flags(Xqo, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
116 rsa->p = BN_secure_new();
118 rsa->q = BN_secure_new();
119 if (rsa->p == NULL || rsa->q == NULL)
121 BN_set_flags(rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
122 BN_set_flags(rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
124 /* (Step 4) Generate p, Xp */
125 if (!ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(rsa->p, Xpo, p1, p2, Xp, Xp1, Xp2,
129 /* (Step 5) Generate q, Xq*/
130 if (!ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(rsa->q, Xqo, q1, q2, Xq, Xq1,
131 Xq2, nbits, e, ctx, cb))
134 /* (Step 6) |Xp - Xq| > 2^(nbitlen/2 - 100) */
135 ok = ossl_rsa_check_pminusq_diff(tmp, Xpo, Xqo, nbits);
141 /* (Step 6) |p - q| > 2^(nbitlen/2 - 100) */
142 ok = ossl_rsa_check_pminusq_diff(tmp, rsa->p, rsa->q, nbits);
147 break; /* successfully finished */
152 /* Zeroize any internally generated values that are not returned */
164 * Validates the RSA key size based on the target strength.
165 * See SP800-56Br1 6.3.1.1 (Steps 1a-1b)
168 * nbits The key size in bits.
169 * strength The target strength in bits. -1 means the target
170 * strength is unknown.
171 * Returns: 1 if the key size matches the target strength, or 0 otherwise.
173 int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_validate_strength(int nbits, int strength)
175 int s = (int)ossl_ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(nbits);
178 if (s < RSA_FIPS1864_MIN_KEYGEN_STRENGTH) {
179 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MODULUS);
183 if (strength != -1 && s != strength) {
184 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_STRENGTH);
191 * Validate that the random bit generator is of sufficient strength to generate
192 * a key of the specified length.
194 static int rsa_validate_rng_strength(EVP_RAND_CTX *rng, int nbits)
200 * This should become mainstream once similar tests are added to the other
201 * key generations and once there is a way to disable these checks.
203 if (EVP_RAND_get_strength(rng) < ossl_ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(nbits)) {
204 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA,
205 RSA_R_RANDOMNESS_SOURCE_STRENGTH_INSUFFICIENT);
214 * Using p & q, calculate other required parameters such as n, d.
215 * as well as the CRT parameters dP, dQ, qInv.
218 * 6.3.1.1 rsakpg1 - basic (Steps 3-4)
219 * 6.3.1.3 rsakpg1 - crt (Step 5)
223 * nbits The key size.
224 * e The public exponent.
225 * ctx A BN_CTX object.
227 * There is a small chance that the generated d will be too small.
228 * Returns: -1 = error,
229 * 0 = d is too small,
232 int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_derive_params_from_pq(RSA *rsa, int nbits,
233 const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx)
236 BIGNUM *p1, *q1, *lcm, *p1q1, *gcd;
239 p1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
240 q1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
241 lcm = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
242 p1q1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
243 gcd = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
247 BN_set_flags(p1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
248 BN_set_flags(q1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
249 BN_set_flags(lcm, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
250 BN_set_flags(p1q1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
251 BN_set_flags(gcd, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
253 /* LCM((p-1, q-1)) */
254 if (ossl_rsa_get_lcm(ctx, rsa->p, rsa->q, lcm, gcd, p1, q1, p1q1) != 1)
263 BN_clear_free(rsa->d);
264 /* (Step 3) d = (e^-1) mod (LCM(p-1, q-1)) */
265 rsa->d = BN_secure_new();
268 BN_set_flags(rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
269 if (BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, e, lcm, ctx) == NULL)
272 /* (Step 3) return an error if d is too small */
273 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->d) <= (nbits >> 1)) {
278 /* (Step 4) n = pq */
281 if (rsa->n == NULL || !BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx))
284 /* (Step 5a) dP = d mod (p-1) */
285 if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL)
286 rsa->dmp1 = BN_secure_new();
287 if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL)
289 BN_set_flags(rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
290 if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, p1, ctx))
293 /* (Step 5b) dQ = d mod (q-1) */
294 if (rsa->dmq1 == NULL)
295 rsa->dmq1 = BN_secure_new();
296 if (rsa->dmq1 == NULL)
298 BN_set_flags(rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
299 if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, q1, ctx))
302 /* (Step 5c) qInv = (inverse of q) mod p */
304 rsa->iqmp = BN_secure_new();
305 if (rsa->iqmp == NULL)
307 BN_set_flags(rsa->iqmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
308 if (BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, rsa->p, ctx) == NULL)
339 * Generate a SP800-56B RSA key.
341 * See SP800-56Br1 6.3.1 "RSA Key-Pair Generation with a Fixed Public Exponent"
342 * 6.3.1.1 rsakpg1 - basic
343 * 6.3.1.3 rsakpg1 - crt
345 * See also FIPS 186-4 Section B.3.6
346 * "Generation of Probable Primes with Conditions Based on Auxiliary
350 * rsa The rsa object.
351 * nbits The intended key size in bits.
352 * efixed The public exponent. If NULL a default of 65537 is used.
353 * cb An optional BIGNUM callback.
354 * Returns: 1 if successfully generated otherwise it returns 0.
356 int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_generate_key(RSA *rsa, int nbits, const BIGNUM *efixed,
363 RSA_ACVP_TEST *info = NULL;
366 #if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
367 info = rsa->acvp_test;
370 /* (Steps 1a-1b) : Currently ignores the strength check */
371 if (!ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_validate_strength(nbits, -1))
374 /* Check that the RNG is capable of generating a key this large */
375 if (!rsa_validate_rng_strength(RAND_get0_private(rsa->libctx), nbits))
378 ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(rsa->libctx);
382 /* Set default if e is not passed in */
383 if (efixed == NULL) {
385 if (e == NULL || !BN_set_word(e, 65537))
388 e = (BIGNUM *)efixed;
390 /* (Step 1c) fixed exponent is checked later .*/
393 /* (Step 2) Generate prime factors */
394 if (!ossl_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(rsa, info, nbits, e, ctx, cb))
397 /* p>q check and skipping in case of acvp test */
398 if (info == NULL && BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
404 /* (Steps 3-5) Compute params d, n, dP, dQ, qInv */
405 ok = ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_derive_params_from_pq(rsa, nbits, e, ctx);
410 /* Gets here if computed d is too small - so try again */
413 /* (Step 6) Do pairwise test - optional validity test has been omitted */
414 ret = ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_pairwise_test(rsa, ctx);
423 * See SP800-56Br1 6.3.1.3 (Step 6) Perform a pair-wise consistency test by
424 * verifying that: k = (k^e)^d mod n for some integer k where 1 < k < n-1.
426 * Returns 1 if the RSA key passes the pairwise test or 0 it it fails.
428 int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_pairwise_test(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
434 tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
438 BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
440 ret = (BN_set_word(k, 2)
441 && BN_mod_exp(tmp, k, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx)
442 && BN_mod_exp(tmp, tmp, rsa->d, rsa->n, ctx)
443 && BN_cmp(k, tmp) == 0);
445 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_PAIRWISE_TEST_FAILURE);