1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
65 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
66 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
67 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
68 #include <openssl/evp.h>
69 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509.h>
71 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
72 #include <openssl/objects.h>
75 /* CRL score values */
77 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
79 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
81 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
83 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
87 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
89 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
91 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
93 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
95 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
97 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
99 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
101 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
103 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
105 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
107 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
109 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
111 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
113 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
114 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
115 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
116 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
122 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
124 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
125 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
126 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
127 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
128 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
129 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
130 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
131 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
133 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
134 unsigned int *preasons);
135 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
136 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
137 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
138 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
140 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
141 const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
143 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
149 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
151 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b);
154 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
155 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
157 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
158 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
164 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
166 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
168 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
171 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
172 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
175 /* Look for exact match */
176 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
177 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
178 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
181 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
182 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
185 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
189 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
191 X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
193 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
194 int depth, i, ok = 0;
196 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
197 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
198 int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
201 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
202 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
203 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
206 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
208 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
209 * cannot do another one.
211 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
212 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
219 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
220 * the first entry is in place
222 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
223 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
224 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
225 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
229 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
230 ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
232 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
233 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
234 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
235 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
236 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
241 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
242 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
243 depth = param->depth;
246 /* If we have enough, we break */
248 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
249 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
250 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
253 /* If we are self signed, we break */
254 if (cert_self_signed(x))
257 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
259 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
260 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
262 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
266 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
275 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
276 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) {
277 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
279 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
280 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
281 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
285 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
286 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
287 ctx->last_untrusted++;
291 * reparse the full chain for the next one
299 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
302 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
303 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
309 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
311 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
312 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
313 if (cert_self_signed(x)) {
314 /* we have a self signed certificate */
315 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
317 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
318 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
319 * possible impersonation.
321 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
322 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
323 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
324 ctx->current_cert = x;
325 ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
334 * We have a match: replace certificate with store
335 * version so we get any trust settings.
339 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
340 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
344 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
346 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
347 ctx->last_untrusted--;
350 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
353 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
355 /* If we have enough, we break */
358 /* If we are self signed, we break */
359 if (cert_self_signed(x))
361 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
364 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
370 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
372 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
373 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
380 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
381 if ((trust = check_trust(ctx)) == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
382 /* Callback already issued */
388 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
389 * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
390 * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
394 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
395 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
396 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
398 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
399 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
401 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
404 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
407 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
412 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
416 xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
420 ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
429 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
430 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
431 * and set bad_chain == 1
433 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
434 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
435 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
436 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
438 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
439 ctx->current_cert = x;
442 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
444 ctx->last_untrusted = num;
445 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
446 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
450 ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
457 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
458 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
463 /* Check name constraints */
465 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
475 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
476 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
479 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
480 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
483 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
487 err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
489 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
491 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
497 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
498 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
499 ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
501 ok = internal_verify(ctx);
505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
506 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
507 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
510 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
515 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
516 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
517 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
522 /* Ensure we return an error */
525 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
529 if (chain_ss != NULL)
532 /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */
533 if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
534 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
539 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
542 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
546 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
547 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
548 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
554 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
556 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
559 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
560 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
562 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
563 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
567 ctx->current_cert = x;
568 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
569 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
572 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
574 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
576 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
578 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
585 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
589 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
591 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
594 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
596 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
597 int proxy_path_length = 0;
599 int allow_proxy_certs;
603 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
604 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
605 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
606 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
607 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
608 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
609 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
613 /* CRL path validation */
615 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
616 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
619 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
621 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
624 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
625 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
626 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
629 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
630 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
632 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
633 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
634 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
635 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
636 ctx->error_depth = i;
637 ctx->current_cert = x;
642 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
643 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
644 ctx->error_depth = i;
645 ctx->current_cert = x;
650 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
651 switch (must_be_ca) {
653 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
654 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
656 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
663 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
669 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
672 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
678 ctx->error_depth = i;
679 ctx->current_cert = x;
684 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
685 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
687 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
689 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
690 ctx->error_depth = i;
691 ctx->current_cert = x;
697 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
698 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
699 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
700 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
701 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
702 ctx->error_depth = i;
703 ctx->current_cert = x;
708 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
709 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
712 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
713 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
714 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
716 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
718 * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
719 * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
720 * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
721 * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
723 * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
724 * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
725 * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
726 * increment proxy_path_length.
728 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) {
729 if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
730 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
731 ctx->error_depth = i;
732 ctx->current_cert = x;
737 proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen;
750 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
754 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
755 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
756 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
757 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
758 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
762 * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
763 * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
765 * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
767 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
768 X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x);
769 X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
770 X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL;
771 int last_object_nid = 0;
773 int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
775 /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
776 if (last_object_loc < 1) {
777 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
778 goto proxy_name_done;
782 * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
783 * there is in issuer.
785 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject)
786 != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) {
787 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
788 goto proxy_name_done;
792 * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
795 if (X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc)->set
796 == X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc - 1)->set) {
797 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
798 goto proxy_name_done;
802 * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
803 * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
805 tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject);
806 if (tmpsubject == NULL) {
807 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
808 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
813 X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc);
815 OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
817 if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName
818 || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) {
819 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
822 X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
823 X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
826 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
828 ctx->error_depth = i;
829 ctx->current_cert = x;
830 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
836 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
837 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
838 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
841 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
842 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
844 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
848 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
853 ctx->error_depth = i;
854 ctx->current_cert = x;
855 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
865 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
867 ctx->error = errcode;
868 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
869 ctx->error_depth = 0;
870 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
873 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
876 int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
879 if (id->peername != NULL) {
880 OPENSSL_free(id->peername);
883 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
884 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
885 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags, &id->peername) > 0)
891 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
893 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
894 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
896 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) {
897 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
900 if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
901 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
904 if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
905 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
911 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
915 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
917 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
918 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
919 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
920 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
921 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
922 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
923 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
925 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
928 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
929 ctx->error_depth = i;
930 ctx->current_cert = x;
931 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
934 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
938 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
941 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
943 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
944 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
945 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
946 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
948 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
950 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
951 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
956 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
957 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
959 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
962 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
965 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
967 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
968 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
970 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
975 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
976 ctx->error_depth = i;
977 ok = check_cert(ctx);
984 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
986 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
989 unsigned int last_reasons;
990 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
991 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
992 ctx->current_cert = x;
993 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
994 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
995 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
996 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
998 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
999 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1000 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
1002 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
1004 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
1006 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
1009 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
1010 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1013 ctx->current_crl = crl;
1014 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
1019 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
1022 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
1028 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
1030 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
1036 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
1040 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
1043 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
1044 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
1045 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1051 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
1053 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1058 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
1060 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
1065 ctx->current_crl = crl;
1066 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1067 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1071 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
1075 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
1076 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1083 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
1084 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1088 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
1089 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
1094 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
1095 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1098 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
1099 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
1102 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
1103 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1109 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1114 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
1115 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
1116 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1118 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
1119 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
1120 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
1121 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
1122 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
1124 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1125 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1126 reasons = *preasons;
1127 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
1128 if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
1130 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
1131 if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
1133 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(best_crl),
1134 X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
1137 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
1140 if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
1144 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
1145 best_score = crl_score;
1146 best_reasons = reasons;
1151 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1153 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1154 *pscore = best_score;
1155 *preasons = best_reasons;
1156 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1158 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1161 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1164 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1171 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1172 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1175 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1177 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1179 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1181 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1182 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1184 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1188 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1192 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1194 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1204 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1210 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1212 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1214 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1215 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1217 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1218 if (!base->crl_number)
1220 /* Issuer names must match */
1221 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1223 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1224 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1226 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1228 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1229 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1231 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1232 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1238 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1239 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1242 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1243 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1247 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1249 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1251 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1252 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1253 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1254 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1255 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1256 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1265 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1266 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1267 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1268 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1269 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1272 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1273 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1277 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1279 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1281 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1282 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1284 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1285 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1286 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1288 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1289 /* If no new reasons reject */
1290 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1293 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1294 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1296 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1297 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1298 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1301 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1303 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1304 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1307 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1308 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1310 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1311 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1313 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1315 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1318 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1320 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1321 /* If no new reasons reject */
1322 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1324 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1325 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1328 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1334 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1335 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1337 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1338 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1339 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1342 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1345 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1347 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1348 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1349 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1350 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1355 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1356 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1357 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1359 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1360 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1361 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1366 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1368 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1372 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1373 * untrusted certificates.
1375 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1376 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1377 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1379 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1380 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1381 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1388 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1389 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1390 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1391 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1394 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1396 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1398 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1401 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1404 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1405 /* Copy verify params across */
1406 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1408 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1409 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1411 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1412 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1417 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1419 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1421 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1426 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1427 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1428 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1429 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1430 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1434 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1435 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1436 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1438 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1439 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1440 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1441 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1447 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1448 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1449 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1450 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1451 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1454 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1456 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1457 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1458 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1465 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1469 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1474 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1476 gens = b->name.fullname;
1477 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1480 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1481 gens = a->name.fullname;
1485 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1487 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1488 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1489 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1491 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1497 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1499 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1500 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1501 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1502 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1503 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1512 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1515 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1516 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1518 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1519 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1520 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1521 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1523 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1529 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1531 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1532 unsigned int *preasons)
1535 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1537 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1538 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1541 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1544 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1545 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1546 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1547 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1548 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1549 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1554 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1555 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1561 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1562 * to find a delta CRL too
1565 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1566 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1569 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1571 unsigned int reasons;
1572 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1573 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1574 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1575 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1576 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1577 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1582 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1584 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1586 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1590 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1592 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1596 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1598 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1599 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1600 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1609 /* Check CRL validity */
1610 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1612 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1613 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1614 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1615 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1616 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1617 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1618 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1619 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1622 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1623 * certificate in chain.
1625 else if (cnum < chnum)
1626 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1628 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1629 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1630 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
1631 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1632 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1640 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1642 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1643 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1644 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1645 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
1646 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1647 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1652 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
1653 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1654 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1659 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
1660 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
1661 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1662 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1668 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
1669 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1670 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1677 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
1678 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1683 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1684 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1687 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1688 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1693 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1694 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
1696 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1700 /* Verify CRL signature */
1701 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
1702 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1703 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1713 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1717 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1718 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1723 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1724 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1725 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1726 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1728 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1729 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
1730 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1731 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1736 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1737 * is not removeFromCRL.
1739 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1740 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1742 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1743 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1751 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1756 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1757 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1759 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1760 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1763 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1766 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1770 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1771 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1772 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1774 ctx->current_cert = x;
1775 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1776 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1782 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1783 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1784 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1787 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1788 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1790 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1791 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1792 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1793 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1795 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1802 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1807 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1808 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1812 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1814 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1815 ctx->current_cert = x;
1816 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1821 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1822 ctx->current_cert = x;
1823 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1827 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1829 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1830 ctx->current_cert = x;
1831 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1836 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1837 ctx->current_cert = x;
1838 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1845 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1849 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1850 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1852 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1854 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1855 ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
1857 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1859 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1862 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1867 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1868 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1873 ctx->error_depth = n;
1874 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1878 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1880 ctx->error_depth = n;
1883 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1884 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1889 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
1890 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1891 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1892 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1893 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1896 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1897 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1898 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1899 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1901 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1905 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1912 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1916 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1917 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1918 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1919 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
1926 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1934 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1936 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1939 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1941 static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1942 static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1943 ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL;
1944 int i, day, sec, ret = 0;
1947 * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
1948 * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1949 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1950 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1952 * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
1953 * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
1954 * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
1955 * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
1957 switch (ctm->type) {
1958 case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
1959 if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length))
1962 case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
1963 if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length))
1971 * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
1972 * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
1973 * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
1975 for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) {
1976 if (!isdigit(ctm->data[i]))
1979 if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != 'Z')
1983 * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
1984 * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
1985 * so we go through ASN.1
1987 asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time);
1988 if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL)
1990 if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time))
1994 * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
1995 * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
1997 ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1;
2000 ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time);
2004 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
2006 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
2009 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
2011 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
2014 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
2015 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
2024 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
2025 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
2026 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2027 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
2028 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2030 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2033 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2035 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
2038 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
2041 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2042 ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
2044 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
2045 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
2048 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
2051 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
2056 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
2057 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
2061 /* first, populate the other certs */
2062 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
2063 ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
2064 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
2065 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
2069 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
2070 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
2074 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
2076 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
2077 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
2079 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
2081 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
2082 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
2083 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
2084 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
2087 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2088 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
2089 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
2092 /* Issuer names must match */
2093 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
2094 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
2097 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2098 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
2099 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
2102 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
2103 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
2106 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2107 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
2108 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2111 /* CRLs must verify */
2112 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2113 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
2114 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2117 /* Create new CRL */
2118 crl = X509_CRL_new();
2119 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2121 /* Set issuer name */
2122 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2125 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
2127 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
2130 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2132 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2136 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2137 * number to correct value too.
2140 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
2141 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2142 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2143 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2147 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2149 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2151 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
2152 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2153 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2155 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2156 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2158 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
2159 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2162 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2163 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2168 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2170 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2176 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2182 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
2183 CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2184 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
2185 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2188 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2189 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2191 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2192 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2195 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2197 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2200 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2202 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2205 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2210 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2215 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2217 return ctx->error_depth;
2220 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2222 return ctx->current_cert;
2225 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2230 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2234 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2237 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2239 return ctx->current_issuer;
2242 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2244 return ctx->current_crl;
2247 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2252 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2257 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2259 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2262 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2267 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2269 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2272 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2274 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2278 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2279 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2280 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2281 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2282 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2283 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2284 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2288 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2289 int purpose, int trust)
2292 /* If purpose not set use default */
2294 purpose = def_purpose;
2295 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2298 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2300 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2301 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2304 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2305 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2306 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2308 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2309 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2312 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2314 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2316 trust = ptmp->trust;
2319 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2321 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2322 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2327 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2328 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2329 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2330 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2334 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2336 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2337 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2339 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2342 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2346 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2350 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2354 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2355 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2359 ctx->current_method = 0;
2361 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2363 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
2364 ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2368 ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2369 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2370 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2371 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2372 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2373 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2374 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2377 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2378 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2380 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2382 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2387 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2390 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2392 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2395 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2396 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, else must be idempotent */
2397 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2402 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2403 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2406 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2410 if (store && store->check_issued)
2411 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2413 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2415 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2416 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2418 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2420 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2421 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2423 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2425 if (store && store->verify)
2426 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2428 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2430 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2431 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2433 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2435 if (store && store->get_crl)
2436 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2438 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2440 if (store && store->check_crl)
2441 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2443 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2445 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2446 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2448 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2450 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2451 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2453 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2455 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2456 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2458 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2460 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2462 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2465 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2469 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2470 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2472 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2477 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2478 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2481 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2483 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2484 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2487 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2490 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2491 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2492 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2493 * pointers below after they're freed!
2495 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2496 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
2498 ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2500 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2501 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2502 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2505 if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
2506 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2509 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
2510 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2513 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2514 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2517 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2519 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2522 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2524 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2527 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2530 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2533 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2534 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2536 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2539 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2544 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2546 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2549 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2551 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2552 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2555 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2558 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2563 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2566 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2570 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2572 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2574 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2576 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2578 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)