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1 /*
2  * Copyright (c) 1983, 1988, 1993
3  *      The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
6  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
7  * are met:
8  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
9  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
10  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
11  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
12  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
13  * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
14  *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
15  *    without specific prior written permission.
16  *
17  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
18  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
19  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
20  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
21  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
22  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
23  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
24  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
25  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
26  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
27  * SUCH DAMAGE.
28  *
29  * $FreeBSD$
30  */
31
32 #include "defs.h"
33
34 #ifdef __NetBSD__
35 __RCSID("$NetBSD$");
36 #elif defined(__FreeBSD__)
37 __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
38 #else
39 __RCSID("$Revision: 2.26 $");
40 #ident "$Revision: 2.26 $"
41 #endif
42
43 static void input(struct sockaddr_in *, struct interface *, struct interface *,
44                   struct rip *, int);
45 static void input_route(naddr, naddr, struct rt_spare *, struct netinfo *);
46 static int ck_passwd(struct interface *, struct rip *, void *,
47                      naddr, struct msg_limit *);
48
49
50 /* process RIP input
51  */
52 void
53 read_rip(int sock,
54          struct interface *sifp)
55 {
56         struct sockaddr_in from;
57         struct interface *aifp;
58         socklen_t fromlen;
59         int cc;
60 #ifdef USE_PASSIFNAME
61         static struct msg_limit  bad_name;
62         struct {
63                 char    ifname[IFNAMSIZ];
64                 union pkt_buf pbuf;
65         } inbuf;
66 #else
67         struct {
68                 union pkt_buf pbuf;
69         } inbuf;
70 #endif
71
72
73         for (;;) {
74                 fromlen = sizeof(from);
75                 cc = recvfrom(sock, &inbuf, sizeof(inbuf), 0,
76                               (struct sockaddr*)&from, &fromlen);
77                 if (cc <= 0) {
78                         if (cc < 0 && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
79                                 LOGERR("recvfrom(rip)");
80                         break;
81                 }
82                 if (fromlen != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
83                         logbad(1,"impossible recvfrom(rip) fromlen=%d",
84                                (int)fromlen);
85
86                 /* aifp is the "authenticated" interface via which the packet
87                  *      arrived.  In fact, it is only the interface on which
88                  *      the packet should have arrived based on is source
89                  *      address.
90                  * sifp is interface associated with the socket through which
91                  *      the packet was received.
92                  */
93 #ifdef USE_PASSIFNAME
94                 if ((cc -= sizeof(inbuf.ifname)) < 0)
95                         logbad(0,"missing USE_PASSIFNAME; only %d bytes",
96                                cc+sizeof(inbuf.ifname));
97
98                 /* check the remote interfaces first */
99                 LIST_FOREACH(aifp, &remote_if, remote_list) {
100                         if (aifp->int_addr == from.sin_addr.s_addr)
101                                 break;
102                 }
103                 if (aifp == 0) {
104                         aifp = ifwithname(inbuf.ifname, 0);
105                         if (aifp == 0) {
106                                 msglim(&bad_name, from.sin_addr.s_addr,
107                                        "impossible interface name %.*s",
108                                        IFNAMSIZ, inbuf.ifname);
109                         } else if (((aifp->int_if_flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT)
110                                     && aifp->int_dstaddr!=from.sin_addr.s_addr)
111                                    || (!(aifp->int_if_flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT)
112                                        && !on_net(from.sin_addr.s_addr,
113                                                   aifp->int_net,
114                                                   aifp->int_mask))) {
115                                 /* If it came via the wrong interface, do not
116                                  * trust it.
117                                  */
118                                 aifp = 0;
119                         }
120                 }
121 #else
122                 aifp = iflookup(from.sin_addr.s_addr);
123 #endif
124                 if (sifp == 0)
125                         sifp = aifp;
126
127                 input(&from, sifp, aifp, &inbuf.pbuf.rip, cc);
128         }
129 }
130
131
132 /* Process a RIP packet
133  */
134 static void
135 input(struct sockaddr_in *from,         /* received from this IP address */
136       struct interface *sifp,           /* interface of incoming socket */
137       struct interface *aifp,           /* "authenticated" interface */
138       struct rip *rip,
139       int cc)
140 {
141 #       define FROM_NADDR from->sin_addr.s_addr
142         static struct msg_limit use_auth, bad_len, bad_mask;
143         static struct msg_limit unk_router, bad_router, bad_nhop;
144
145         struct rt_entry *rt;
146         struct rt_spare new;
147         struct netinfo *n, *lim;
148         struct interface *ifp1;
149         naddr gate, mask, v1_mask, dst, ddst_h = 0;
150         struct auth *ap;
151         struct tgate *tg = 0;
152         struct tgate_net *tn;
153         int i, j;
154
155         /* Notice when we hear from a remote gateway
156          */
157         if (aifp != 0
158             && (aifp->int_state & IS_REMOTE))
159                 aifp->int_act_time = now.tv_sec;
160
161         trace_rip("Recv", "from", from, sifp, rip, cc);
162
163         if (sifp == 0) {
164                 trace_pkt("    discard a request from an indirect router"
165                     " (possibly an attack)");
166                 return;
167         }
168
169         if (rip->rip_vers == 0) {
170                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
171                        "RIP version 0, cmd %d, packet received from %s",
172                        rip->rip_cmd, naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
173                 return;
174         } else if (rip->rip_vers > RIPv2) {
175                 rip->rip_vers = RIPv2;
176         }
177         if (cc > (int)OVER_MAXPACKETSIZE) {
178                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
179                        "packet at least %d bytes too long received from %s",
180                        cc-MAXPACKETSIZE, naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
181                 return;
182         }
183
184         n = rip->rip_nets;
185         lim = (struct netinfo *)((char*)rip + cc);
186
187         /* Notice authentication.
188          * As required by section 4.2 in RFC 1723, discard authenticated
189          * RIPv2 messages, but only if configured for that silliness.
190          *
191          * RIPv2 authentication is lame.  Why authenticate queries?
192          * Why should a RIPv2 implementation with authentication disabled
193          * not be able to listen to RIPv2 packets with authentication, while
194          * RIPv1 systems will listen?  Crazy!
195          */
196         if (!auth_ok
197             && rip->rip_vers == RIPv2
198             && n < lim && n->n_family == RIP_AF_AUTH) {
199                 msglim(&use_auth, FROM_NADDR,
200                        "RIPv2 message with authentication from %s discarded",
201                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
202                 return;
203         }
204
205         switch (rip->rip_cmd) {
206         case RIPCMD_REQUEST:
207                 /* For mere requests, be a little sloppy about the source
208                  */
209                 if (aifp == 0)
210                         aifp = sifp;
211
212                 /* Are we talking to ourself or a remote gateway?
213                  */
214                 ifp1 = ifwithaddr(FROM_NADDR, 0, 1);
215                 if (ifp1) {
216                         if (ifp1->int_state & IS_REMOTE) {
217                                 /* remote gateway */
218                                 aifp = ifp1;
219                                 if (check_remote(aifp)) {
220                                         aifp->int_act_time = now.tv_sec;
221                                         (void)if_ok(aifp, "remote ");
222                                 }
223                         } else if (from->sin_port == htons(RIP_PORT)) {
224                                 trace_pkt("    discard our own RIP request");
225                                 return;
226                         }
227                 }
228
229                 /* did the request come from a router?
230                  */
231                 if (from->sin_port == htons(RIP_PORT)) {
232                         /* yes, ignore the request if RIP is off so that
233                          * the router does not depend on us.
234                          */
235                         if (rip_sock < 0
236                             || (aifp != 0
237                                 && IS_RIP_OUT_OFF(aifp->int_state))) {
238                                 trace_pkt("    discard request while RIP off");
239                                 return;
240                         }
241                 }
242
243                 /* According to RFC 1723, we should ignore unauthenticated
244                  * queries.  That is too silly to bother with.  Sheesh!
245                  * Are forwarding tables supposed to be secret, when
246                  * a bad guy can infer them with test traffic?  When RIP
247                  * is still the most common router-discovery protocol
248                  * and so hosts need to send queries that will be answered?
249                  * What about `rtquery`?
250                  * Maybe on firewalls you'd care, but not enough to
251                  * give up the diagnostic facilities of remote probing.
252                  */
253
254                 if (n >= lim) {
255                         msglim(&bad_len, FROM_NADDR, "empty request from %s",
256                                naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
257                         return;
258                 }
259                 if (cc%sizeof(*n) != sizeof(struct rip)%sizeof(*n)) {
260                         msglim(&bad_len, FROM_NADDR,
261                                "request of bad length (%d) from %s",
262                                cc, naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
263                 }
264
265                 if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv2
266                     && (aifp == 0 || (aifp->int_state & IS_NO_RIPV1_OUT))) {
267                         v12buf.buf->rip_vers = RIPv2;
268                         /* If we have a secret but it is a cleartext secret,
269                          * do not disclose our secret unless the other guy
270                          * already knows it.
271                          */
272                         ap = find_auth(aifp);
273                         if (ap != 0 && ap->type == RIP_AUTH_PW
274                             && n->n_family == RIP_AF_AUTH
275                             && !ck_passwd(aifp,rip,lim,FROM_NADDR,&use_auth))
276                                 ap = 0;
277                 } else {
278                         v12buf.buf->rip_vers = RIPv1;
279                         ap = 0;
280                 }
281                 clr_ws_buf(&v12buf, ap);
282
283                 do {
284                         n->n_metric = ntohl(n->n_metric);
285
286                         /* A single entry with family RIP_AF_UNSPEC and
287                          * metric HOPCNT_INFINITY means "all routes".
288                          * We respond to routers only if we are acting
289                          * as a supplier, or to anyone other than a router
290                          * (i.e. a query).
291                          */
292                         if (n->n_family == RIP_AF_UNSPEC
293                             && n->n_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY) {
294                                 /* Answer a query from a utility program
295                                  * with all we know.
296                                  */
297                                 if (aifp == NULL) {
298                                         trace_pkt("ignore remote query");
299                                         return;
300                                 }
301                                 if (from->sin_port != htons(RIP_PORT)) {
302                                         /*
303                                          * insecure: query from non-router node
304                                          *   > 1: allow from distant node
305                                          *   > 0: allow from neighbor node
306                                          *  == 0: deny
307                                          */
308                                         if ((aifp != NULL && insecure > 0) ||
309                                             (aifp == NULL && insecure > 1))
310                                                 supply(from, aifp, OUT_QUERY, 0,
311                                                        rip->rip_vers, ap != 0);
312                                         else
313                                                 trace_pkt("Warning: "
314                                                     "possible attack detected");
315                                         return;
316                                 }
317
318                                 /* A router trying to prime its tables.
319                                  * Filter the answer in the about same way
320                                  * broadcasts are filtered.
321                                  *
322                                  * Only answer a router if we are a supplier
323                                  * to keep an unwary host that is just starting
324                                  * from picking us as a router.
325                                  */
326                                 if (aifp == 0) {
327                                         trace_pkt("ignore distant router");
328                                         return;
329                                 }
330                                 if (!supplier
331                                     || IS_RIP_OFF(aifp->int_state)) {
332                                         trace_pkt("ignore; not supplying");
333                                         return;
334                                 }
335
336                                 /* Do not answer a RIPv1 router if
337                                  * we are sending RIPv2.  But do offer
338                                  * poor man's router discovery.
339                                  */
340                                 if ((aifp->int_state & IS_NO_RIPV1_OUT)
341                                     && rip->rip_vers == RIPv1) {
342                                         if (!(aifp->int_state & IS_PM_RDISC)) {
343                                             trace_pkt("ignore; sending RIPv2");
344                                             return;
345                                         }
346
347                                         v12buf.n->n_family = RIP_AF_INET;
348                                         v12buf.n->n_dst = RIP_DEFAULT;
349                                         i = aifp->int_d_metric;
350                                         if (0 != (rt = rtget(RIP_DEFAULT, 0))) {
351                                             j = (rt->rt_metric
352                                                  +aifp->int_metric
353                                                  +aifp->int_adj_outmetric
354                                                  +1);
355                                             if (i > j)
356                                                 i = j;
357                                         }
358                                         v12buf.n->n_metric = htonl(i);
359                                         v12buf.n++;
360                                         break;
361                                 }
362
363                                 /* Respond with RIPv1 instead of RIPv2 if
364                                  * that is what we are broadcasting on the
365                                  * interface to keep the remote router from
366                                  * getting the wrong initial idea of the
367                                  * routes we send.
368                                  */
369                                 supply(from, aifp, OUT_UNICAST, 0,
370                                        (aifp->int_state & IS_NO_RIPV1_OUT)
371                                        ? RIPv2 : RIPv1,
372                                        ap != 0);
373                                 return;
374                         }
375
376                         /* Ignore authentication */
377                         if (n->n_family == RIP_AF_AUTH)
378                                 continue;
379
380                         if (n->n_family != RIP_AF_INET) {
381                                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
382                                        "request from %s for unsupported"
383                                        " (af %d) %s",
384                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
385                                        ntohs(n->n_family),
386                                        naddr_ntoa(n->n_dst));
387                                 return;
388                         }
389
390                         /* We are being asked about a specific destination.
391                          */
392                         dst = n->n_dst;
393                         if (!check_dst(dst)) {
394                                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
395                                        "bad queried destination %s from %s",
396                                        naddr_ntoa(dst),
397                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
398                                 return;
399                         }
400
401                         /* decide what mask was intended */
402                         if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv1
403                             || 0 == (mask = ntohl(n->n_mask))
404                             || 0 != (ntohl(dst) & ~mask))
405                                 mask = ripv1_mask_host(dst, aifp);
406
407                         /* try to find the answer */
408                         rt = rtget(dst, mask);
409                         if (!rt && dst != RIP_DEFAULT)
410                                 rt = rtfind(n->n_dst);
411
412                         if (v12buf.buf->rip_vers != RIPv1)
413                                 v12buf.n->n_mask = mask;
414                         if (rt == 0) {
415                                 /* we do not have the answer */
416                                 v12buf.n->n_metric = HOPCNT_INFINITY;
417                         } else {
418                                 /* we have the answer, so compute the
419                                  * right metric and next hop.
420                                  */
421                                 v12buf.n->n_family = RIP_AF_INET;
422                                 v12buf.n->n_dst = dst;
423                                 j = rt->rt_metric+1;
424                                 if (!aifp)
425                                         ++j;
426                                 else
427                                         j += (aifp->int_metric
428                                               + aifp->int_adj_outmetric);
429                                 if (j < HOPCNT_INFINITY)
430                                         v12buf.n->n_metric = j;
431                                 else
432                                         v12buf.n->n_metric = HOPCNT_INFINITY;
433                                 if (v12buf.buf->rip_vers != RIPv1) {
434                                         v12buf.n->n_tag = rt->rt_tag;
435                                         v12buf.n->n_mask = mask;
436                                         if (aifp != 0
437                                             && on_net(rt->rt_gate,
438                                                       aifp->int_net,
439                                                       aifp->int_mask)
440                                             && rt->rt_gate != aifp->int_addr)
441                                             v12buf.n->n_nhop = rt->rt_gate;
442                                 }
443                         }
444                         v12buf.n->n_metric = htonl(v12buf.n->n_metric);
445
446                         /* Stop paying attention if we fill the output buffer.
447                          */
448                         if (++v12buf.n >= v12buf.lim)
449                                 break;
450                 } while (++n < lim);
451
452                 /* Send the answer about specific routes.
453                  */
454                 if (ap != 0 && ap->type == RIP_AUTH_MD5)
455                         end_md5_auth(&v12buf, ap);
456
457                 if (from->sin_port != htons(RIP_PORT)) {
458                         /* query */
459                         (void)output(OUT_QUERY, from, aifp,
460                                      v12buf.buf,
461                                      ((char *)v12buf.n - (char*)v12buf.buf));
462                 } else if (supplier) {
463                         (void)output(OUT_UNICAST, from, aifp,
464                                      v12buf.buf,
465                                      ((char *)v12buf.n - (char*)v12buf.buf));
466                 } else {
467                         /* Only answer a router if we are a supplier
468                          * to keep an unwary host that is just starting
469                          * from picking us an a router.
470                          */
471                         ;
472                 }
473                 return;
474
475         case RIPCMD_TRACEON:
476         case RIPCMD_TRACEOFF:
477                 /* Notice that trace messages are turned off for all possible
478                  * abuse if _PATH_TRACE is undefined in pathnames.h.
479                  * Notice also that because of the way the trace file is
480                  * handled in trace.c, no abuse is plausible even if
481                  * _PATH_TRACE_ is defined.
482                  *
483                  * First verify message came from a privileged port. */
484                 if (ntohs(from->sin_port) > IPPORT_RESERVED) {
485                         msglog("trace command from untrusted port on %s",
486                                naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
487                         return;
488                 }
489                 if (aifp == 0) {
490                         msglog("trace command from unknown router %s",
491                                naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
492                         return;
493                 }
494                 if (rip->rip_cmd == RIPCMD_TRACEON) {
495                         rip->rip_tracefile[cc-4] = '\0';
496                         set_tracefile((char*)rip->rip_tracefile,
497                                       "trace command: %s\n", 0);
498                 } else {
499                         trace_off("tracing turned off by %s",
500                                   naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
501                 }
502                 return;
503
504         case RIPCMD_RESPONSE:
505                 if (cc%sizeof(*n) != sizeof(struct rip)%sizeof(*n)) {
506                         msglim(&bad_len, FROM_NADDR,
507                                "response of bad length (%d) from %s",
508                                cc, naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
509                 }
510
511                 /* verify message came from a router */
512                 if (from->sin_port != ntohs(RIP_PORT)) {
513                         msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
514                                "    discard RIP response from unknown port"
515                                " %d on %s",
516                                ntohs(from->sin_port), naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
517                         return;
518                 }
519
520                 if (rip_sock < 0) {
521                         trace_pkt("    discard response while RIP off");
522                         return;
523                 }
524
525                 /* Are we talking to ourself or a remote gateway?
526                  */
527                 ifp1 = ifwithaddr(FROM_NADDR, 0, 1);
528                 if (ifp1) {
529                         if (ifp1->int_state & IS_REMOTE) {
530                                 /* remote gateway */
531                                 aifp = ifp1;
532                                 if (check_remote(aifp)) {
533                                         aifp->int_act_time = now.tv_sec;
534                                         (void)if_ok(aifp, "remote ");
535                                 }
536                         } else {
537                                 trace_pkt("    discard our own RIP response");
538                                 return;
539                         }
540                 }
541
542                 /* Accept routing packets from routers directly connected
543                  * via broadcast or point-to-point networks, and from
544                  * those listed in /etc/gateways.
545                  */
546                 if (aifp == 0) {
547                         msglim(&unk_router, FROM_NADDR,
548                                "   discard response from %s"
549                                " via unexpected interface",
550                                naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
551                         return;
552                 }
553                 if (IS_RIP_IN_OFF(aifp->int_state)) {
554                         trace_pkt("    discard RIPv%d response"
555                                   " via disabled interface %s",
556                                   rip->rip_vers, aifp->int_name);
557                         return;
558                 }
559
560                 if (n >= lim) {
561                         msglim(&bad_len, FROM_NADDR, "empty response from %s",
562                                naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
563                         return;
564                 }
565
566                 if (((aifp->int_state & IS_NO_RIPV1_IN)
567                      && rip->rip_vers == RIPv1)
568                     || ((aifp->int_state & IS_NO_RIPV2_IN)
569                         && rip->rip_vers != RIPv1)) {
570                         trace_pkt("    discard RIPv%d response",
571                                   rip->rip_vers);
572                         return;
573                 }
574
575                 /* Ignore routes via dead interface.
576                  */
577                 if (aifp->int_state & IS_BROKE) {
578                         trace_pkt("discard response via broken interface %s",
579                                   aifp->int_name);
580                         return;
581                 }
582
583                 /* If the interface cares, ignore bad routers.
584                  * Trace but do not log this problem, because where it
585                  * happens, it happens frequently.
586                  */
587                 if (aifp->int_state & IS_DISTRUST) {
588                         tg = tgates;
589                         while (tg->tgate_addr != FROM_NADDR) {
590                                 tg = tg->tgate_next;
591                                 if (tg == 0) {
592                                         trace_pkt("    discard RIP response"
593                                                   " from untrusted router %s",
594                                                   naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
595                                         return;
596                                 }
597                         }
598                 }
599
600                 /* Authenticate the packet if we have a secret.
601                  * If we do not have any secrets, ignore the error in
602                  * RFC 1723 and accept it regardless.
603                  */
604                 if (aifp->int_auth[0].type != RIP_AUTH_NONE
605                     && rip->rip_vers != RIPv1
606                     && !ck_passwd(aifp,rip,lim,FROM_NADDR,&use_auth))
607                         return;
608
609                 do {
610                         if (n->n_family == RIP_AF_AUTH)
611                                 continue;
612
613                         n->n_metric = ntohl(n->n_metric);
614                         dst = n->n_dst;
615                         if (n->n_family != RIP_AF_INET
616                             && (n->n_family != RIP_AF_UNSPEC
617                                 || dst != RIP_DEFAULT)) {
618                                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
619                                        "route from %s to unsupported"
620                                        " address family=%d destination=%s",
621                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
622                                        n->n_family,
623                                        naddr_ntoa(dst));
624                                 continue;
625                         }
626                         if (!check_dst(dst)) {
627                                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
628                                        "bad destination %s from %s",
629                                        naddr_ntoa(dst),
630                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
631                                 return;
632                         }
633                         if (n->n_metric == 0
634                             || n->n_metric > HOPCNT_INFINITY) {
635                                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
636                                        "bad metric %d from %s"
637                                        " for destination %s",
638                                        n->n_metric,
639                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
640                                        naddr_ntoa(dst));
641                                 return;
642                         }
643
644                         /* Notice the next-hop.
645                          */
646                         gate = FROM_NADDR;
647                         if (n->n_nhop != 0) {
648                                 if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv1) {
649                                         n->n_nhop = 0;
650                                 } else {
651                                     /* Use it only if it is valid. */
652                                     if (on_net(n->n_nhop,
653                                                aifp->int_net, aifp->int_mask)
654                                         && check_dst(n->n_nhop)) {
655                                             gate = n->n_nhop;
656                                     } else {
657                                             msglim(&bad_nhop, FROM_NADDR,
658                                                    "router %s to %s"
659                                                    " has bad next hop %s",
660                                                    naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
661                                                    naddr_ntoa(dst),
662                                                    naddr_ntoa(n->n_nhop));
663                                             n->n_nhop = 0;
664                                     }
665                                 }
666                         }
667
668                         if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv1
669                             || 0 == (mask = ntohl(n->n_mask))) {
670                                 mask = ripv1_mask_host(dst,aifp);
671                         } else if ((ntohl(dst) & ~mask) != 0) {
672                                 msglim(&bad_mask, FROM_NADDR,
673                                        "router %s sent bad netmask"
674                                        " %#lx with %s",
675                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
676                                        (u_long)mask,
677                                        naddr_ntoa(dst));
678                                 continue;
679                         }
680                         if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv1)
681                                 n->n_tag = 0;
682
683                         /* Adjust metric according to incoming interface..
684                          */
685                         n->n_metric += (aifp->int_metric
686                                         + aifp->int_adj_inmetric);
687                         if (n->n_metric > HOPCNT_INFINITY)
688                                 n->n_metric = HOPCNT_INFINITY;
689
690                         /* Should we trust this route from this router? */
691                         if (tg && (tn = tg->tgate_nets)->mask != 0) {
692                                 for (i = 0; i < MAX_TGATE_NETS; i++, tn++) {
693                                         if (on_net(dst, tn->net, tn->mask)
694                                             && tn->mask <= mask)
695                                             break;
696                                 }
697                                 if (i >= MAX_TGATE_NETS || tn->mask == 0) {
698                                         trace_pkt("   ignored unauthorized %s",
699                                                   addrname(dst,mask,0));
700                                         continue;
701                                 }
702                         }
703
704                         /* Recognize and ignore a default route we faked
705                          * which is being sent back to us by a machine with
706                          * broken split-horizon.
707                          * Be a little more paranoid than that, and reject
708                          * default routes with the same metric we advertised.
709                          */
710                         if (aifp->int_d_metric != 0
711                             && dst == RIP_DEFAULT
712                             && (int)n->n_metric >= aifp->int_d_metric)
713                                 continue;
714
715                         /* We can receive aggregated RIPv2 routes that must
716                          * be broken down before they are transmitted by
717                          * RIPv1 via an interface on a subnet.
718                          * We might also receive the same routes aggregated
719                          * via other RIPv2 interfaces.
720                          * This could cause duplicate routes to be sent on
721                          * the RIPv1 interfaces.  "Longest matching variable
722                          * length netmasks" lets RIPv2 listeners understand,
723                          * but breaking down the aggregated routes for RIPv1
724                          * listeners can produce duplicate routes.
725                          *
726                          * Breaking down aggregated routes here bloats
727                          * the daemon table, but does not hurt the kernel
728                          * table, since routes are always aggregated for
729                          * the kernel.
730                          *
731                          * Notice that this does not break down network
732                          * routes corresponding to subnets.  This is part
733                          * of the defense against RS_NET_SYN.
734                          */
735                         if (have_ripv1_out
736                             && (((rt = rtget(dst,mask)) == 0
737                                  || !(rt->rt_state & RS_NET_SYN)))
738                             && (v1_mask = ripv1_mask_net(dst,0)) > mask) {
739                                 ddst_h = v1_mask & -v1_mask;
740                                 i = (v1_mask & ~mask)/ddst_h;
741                                 if (i >= 511) {
742                                         /* Punt if we would have to generate
743                                          * an unreasonable number of routes.
744                                          */
745                                         if (TRACECONTENTS)
746                                             trace_misc("accept %s-->%s as 1"
747                                                        " instead of %d routes",
748                                                        addrname(dst,mask,0),
749                                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
750                                                        i+1);
751                                         i = 0;
752                                 } else {
753                                         mask = v1_mask;
754                                 }
755                         } else {
756                                 i = 0;
757                         }
758
759                         new.rts_gate = gate;
760                         new.rts_router = FROM_NADDR;
761                         new.rts_metric = n->n_metric;
762                         new.rts_tag = n->n_tag;
763                         new.rts_time = now.tv_sec;
764                         new.rts_ifp = aifp;
765                         new.rts_de_ag = i;
766                         j = 0;
767                         for (;;) {
768                                 input_route(dst, mask, &new, n);
769                                 if (++j > i)
770                                         break;
771                                 dst = htonl(ntohl(dst) + ddst_h);
772                         }
773                 } while (++n < lim);
774                 break;
775         }
776 #undef FROM_NADDR
777 }
778
779
780 /* Process a single input route.
781  */
782 static void
783 input_route(naddr dst,                  /* network order */
784             naddr mask,
785             struct rt_spare *new,
786             struct netinfo *n)
787 {
788         int i;
789         struct rt_entry *rt;
790         struct rt_spare *rts, *rts0;
791         struct interface *ifp1;
792
793
794         /* See if the other guy is telling us to send our packets to him.
795          * Sometimes network routes arrive over a point-to-point link for
796          * the network containing the address(es) of the link.
797          *
798          * If our interface is broken, switch to using the other guy.
799          */
800         ifp1 = ifwithaddr(dst, 1, 1);
801         if (ifp1 != 0
802             && (!(ifp1->int_state & IS_BROKE)
803                 || (ifp1->int_state & IS_PASSIVE)))
804                 return;
805
806         /* Look for the route in our table.
807          */
808         rt = rtget(dst, mask);
809
810         /* Consider adding the route if we do not already have it.
811          */
812         if (rt == 0) {
813                 /* Ignore unknown routes being poisoned.
814                  */
815                 if (new->rts_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY)
816                         return;
817
818                 /* Ignore the route if it points to us */
819                 if (n->n_nhop != 0
820                     && 0 != ifwithaddr(n->n_nhop, 1, 0))
821                         return;
822
823                 /* If something has not gone crazy and tried to fill
824                  * our memory, accept the new route.
825                  */
826                 if (total_routes < MAX_ROUTES)
827                         rtadd(dst, mask, 0, new);
828                 return;
829         }
830
831         /* We already know about the route.  Consider this update.
832          *
833          * If (rt->rt_state & RS_NET_SYN), then this route
834          * is the same as a network route we have inferred
835          * for subnets we know, in order to tell RIPv1 routers
836          * about the subnets.
837          *
838          * It is impossible to tell if the route is coming
839          * from a distant RIPv2 router with the standard
840          * netmask because that router knows about the entire
841          * network, or if it is a round-about echo of a
842          * synthetic, RIPv1 network route of our own.
843          * The worst is that both kinds of routes might be
844          * received, and the bad one might have the smaller
845          * metric.  Partly solve this problem by never
846          * aggregating into such a route.  Also keep it
847          * around as long as the interface exists.
848          */
849
850         rts0 = rt->rt_spares;
851         for (rts = rts0, i = NUM_SPARES; i != 0; i--, rts++) {
852                 if (rts->rts_router == new->rts_router)
853                         break;
854                 /* Note the worst slot to reuse,
855                  * other than the current slot.
856                  */
857                 if (rts0 == rt->rt_spares
858                     || BETTER_LINK(rt, rts0, rts))
859                         rts0 = rts;
860         }
861         if (i != 0) {
862                 /* Found a route from the router already in the table.
863                  */
864
865                 /* If the new route is a route broken down from an
866                  * aggregated route, and if the previous route is either
867                  * not a broken down route or was broken down from a finer
868                  * netmask, and if the previous route is current,
869                  * then forget this one.
870                  */
871                 if (new->rts_de_ag > rts->rts_de_ag
872                     && now_stale <= rts->rts_time)
873                         return;
874
875                 /* Keep poisoned routes around only long enough to pass
876                  * the poison on.  Use a new timestamp for good routes.
877                  */
878                 if (rts->rts_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY
879                     && new->rts_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY)
880                         new->rts_time = rts->rts_time;
881
882                 /* If this is an update for the router we currently prefer,
883                  * then note it.
884                  */
885                 if (i == NUM_SPARES) {
886                         rtchange(rt, rt->rt_state, new, 0);
887                         /* If the route got worse, check for something better.
888                          */
889                         if (new->rts_metric > rts->rts_metric)
890                                 rtswitch(rt, 0);
891                         return;
892                 }
893
894                 /* This is an update for a spare route.
895                  * Finished if the route is unchanged.
896                  */
897                 if (rts->rts_gate == new->rts_gate
898                     && rts->rts_metric == new->rts_metric
899                     && rts->rts_tag == new->rts_tag) {
900                         trace_upslot(rt, rts, new);
901                         *rts = *new;
902                         return;
903                 }
904                 /* Forget it if it has gone bad.
905                  */
906                 if (new->rts_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY) {
907                         rts_delete(rt, rts);
908                         return;
909                 }
910
911         } else {
912                 /* The update is for a route we know about,
913                  * but not from a familiar router.
914                  *
915                  * Ignore the route if it points to us.
916                  */
917                 if (n->n_nhop != 0
918                     && 0 != ifwithaddr(n->n_nhop, 1, 0))
919                         return;
920
921                 /* the loop above set rts0=worst spare */
922                 rts = rts0;
923
924                 /* Save the route as a spare only if it has
925                  * a better metric than our worst spare.
926                  * This also ignores poisoned routes (those
927                  * received with metric HOPCNT_INFINITY).
928                  */
929                 if (new->rts_metric >= rts->rts_metric)
930                         return;
931         }
932
933         trace_upslot(rt, rts, new);
934         *rts = *new;
935
936         /* try to switch to a better route */
937         rtswitch(rt, rts);
938 }
939
940
941 static int                              /* 0 if bad */
942 ck_passwd(struct interface *aifp,
943           struct rip *rip,
944           void *lim,
945           naddr from,
946           struct msg_limit *use_authp)
947 {
948 #       define NA (rip->rip_auths)
949         struct netauth *na2;
950         struct auth *ap;
951         MD5_CTX md5_ctx;
952         u_char hash[RIP_AUTH_PW_LEN];
953         int i, len;
954
955         assert(aifp != NULL);
956         if ((void *)NA >= lim || NA->a_family != RIP_AF_AUTH) {
957                 msglim(use_authp, from, "missing password from %s",
958                        naddr_ntoa(from));
959                 return 0;
960         }
961
962         /* accept any current (+/- 24 hours) password
963          */
964         for (ap = aifp->int_auth, i = 0; i < MAX_AUTH_KEYS; i++, ap++) {
965                 if (ap->type != NA->a_type
966                     || (u_long)ap->start > (u_long)clk.tv_sec+DAY
967                     || (u_long)ap->end+DAY < (u_long)clk.tv_sec)
968                         continue;
969
970                 if (NA->a_type == RIP_AUTH_PW) {
971                         if (!memcmp(NA->au.au_pw, ap->key, RIP_AUTH_PW_LEN))
972                                 return 1;
973
974                 } else {
975                         /* accept MD5 secret with the right key ID
976                          */
977                         if (NA->au.a_md5.md5_keyid != ap->keyid)
978                                 continue;
979
980                         len = ntohs(NA->au.a_md5.md5_pkt_len);
981                         if ((len-sizeof(*rip)) % sizeof(*NA) != 0
982                             || len != (char *)lim-(char*)rip-(int)sizeof(*NA)) {
983                                 msglim(use_authp, from,
984                                        "wrong MD5 RIPv2 packet length of %d"
985                                        " instead of %d from %s",
986                                        len, (int)((char *)lim-(char *)rip
987                                                   -sizeof(*NA)),
988                                        naddr_ntoa(from));
989                                 return 0;
990                         }
991                         na2 = (struct netauth *)((char *)rip+len);
992
993                         /* Given a good hash value, these are not security
994                          * problems so be generous and accept the routes,
995                          * after complaining.
996                          */
997                         if (TRACEPACKETS) {
998                                 if (NA->au.a_md5.md5_auth_len
999                                     != RIP_AUTH_MD5_HASH_LEN)
1000                                         msglim(use_authp, from,
1001                                                "unknown MD5 RIPv2 auth len %#x"
1002                                                " instead of %#x from %s",
1003                                                NA->au.a_md5.md5_auth_len,
1004                                                (unsigned)RIP_AUTH_MD5_HASH_LEN,
1005                                                naddr_ntoa(from));
1006                                 if (na2->a_family != RIP_AF_AUTH)
1007                                         msglim(use_authp, from,
1008                                                "unknown MD5 RIPv2 family %#x"
1009                                                " instead of %#x from %s",
1010                                                na2->a_family, RIP_AF_AUTH,
1011                                                naddr_ntoa(from));
1012                                 if (na2->a_type != ntohs(1))
1013                                         msglim(use_authp, from,
1014                                                "MD5 RIPv2 hash has %#x"
1015                                                " instead of %#x from %s",
1016                                                na2->a_type, ntohs(1),
1017                                                naddr_ntoa(from));
1018                         }
1019
1020                         MD5Init(&md5_ctx);
1021                         MD5Update(&md5_ctx, (u_char *)rip,
1022                                   len + RIP_AUTH_MD5_HASH_XTRA);
1023                         MD5Update(&md5_ctx, ap->key, RIP_AUTH_MD5_KEY_LEN);
1024                         MD5Final(hash, &md5_ctx);
1025                         if (!memcmp(hash, na2->au.au_pw, sizeof(hash)))
1026                                 return 1;
1027                 }
1028         }
1029
1030         msglim(use_authp, from, "bad password from %s",
1031                naddr_ntoa(from));
1032         return 0;
1033 #undef NA
1034 }