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Fix ure device driver susceptible to packet-in-packet attack.
[FreeBSD/FreeBSD.git] / sbin / routed / input.c
1 /*
2  * Copyright (c) 1983, 1988, 1993
3  *      The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
6  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
7  * are met:
8  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
9  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
10  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
11  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
12  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
13  * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
14  *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
15  *    without specific prior written permission.
16  *
17  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
18  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
19  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
20  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
21  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
22  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
23  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
24  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
25  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
26  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
27  * SUCH DAMAGE.
28  *
29  * $FreeBSD$
30  */
31
32 #include "defs.h"
33
34 #ifdef __NetBSD__
35 __RCSID("$NetBSD$");
36 #elif defined(__FreeBSD__)
37 __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
38 #else
39 __RCSID("$Revision: 2.26 $");
40 #ident "$Revision: 2.26 $"
41 #endif
42
43 static void input(struct sockaddr_in *, struct interface *, struct interface *,
44                   struct rip *, int);
45 static void input_route(naddr, naddr, struct rt_spare *, struct netinfo *);
46 static int ck_passwd(struct interface *, struct rip *, void *,
47                      naddr, struct msg_limit *);
48
49
50 /* process RIP input
51  */
52 void
53 read_rip(int sock,
54          struct interface *sifp)
55 {
56         struct sockaddr_in from;
57         struct interface *aifp;
58         socklen_t fromlen;
59         int cc;
60 #ifdef USE_PASSIFNAME
61         static struct msg_limit  bad_name;
62         struct {
63                 char    ifname[IFNAMSIZ];
64                 union pkt_buf pbuf;
65         } inbuf;
66 #else
67         struct {
68                 union pkt_buf pbuf;
69         } inbuf;
70 #endif
71
72
73         for (;;) {
74                 fromlen = sizeof(from);
75                 cc = recvfrom(sock, &inbuf, sizeof(inbuf), 0,
76                               (struct sockaddr*)&from, &fromlen);
77                 if (cc <= 0) {
78                         if (cc < 0 && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
79                                 LOGERR("recvfrom(rip)");
80                         break;
81                 }
82                 if (fromlen != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
83                         logbad(1,"impossible recvfrom(rip) fromlen=%d",
84                                (int)fromlen);
85
86                 /* aifp is the "authenticated" interface via which the packet
87                  *      arrived.  In fact, it is only the interface on which
88                  *      the packet should have arrived based on is source
89                  *      address.
90                  * sifp is interface associated with the socket through which
91                  *      the packet was received.
92                  */
93 #ifdef USE_PASSIFNAME
94                 if ((cc -= sizeof(inbuf.ifname)) < 0)
95                         logbad(0,"missing USE_PASSIFNAME; only %d bytes",
96                                cc+sizeof(inbuf.ifname));
97
98                 /* check the remote interfaces first */
99                 LIST_FOREACH(aifp, &remote_if, remote_list) {
100                         if (aifp->int_addr == from.sin_addr.s_addr)
101                                 break;
102                 }
103                 if (aifp == NULL) {
104                         aifp = ifwithname(inbuf.ifname, 0);
105                         if (aifp == NULL) {
106                                 msglim(&bad_name, from.sin_addr.s_addr,
107                                        "impossible interface name %.*s",
108                                        IFNAMSIZ, inbuf.ifname);
109                         } else if (((aifp->int_if_flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT)
110                                     && aifp->int_dstaddr!=from.sin_addr.s_addr)
111                                    || (!(aifp->int_if_flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT)
112                                        && !on_net(from.sin_addr.s_addr,
113                                                   aifp->int_net,
114                                                   aifp->int_mask))) {
115                                 /* If it came via the wrong interface, do not
116                                  * trust it.
117                                  */
118                                 aifp = NULL;
119                         }
120                 }
121 #else
122                 aifp = iflookup(from.sin_addr.s_addr);
123 #endif
124                 if (sifp == NULL)
125                         sifp = aifp;
126
127                 input(&from, sifp, aifp, &inbuf.pbuf.rip, cc);
128         }
129 }
130
131
132 /* Process a RIP packet
133  */
134 static void
135 input(struct sockaddr_in *from,         /* received from this IP address */
136       struct interface *sifp,           /* interface of incoming socket */
137       struct interface *aifp,           /* "authenticated" interface */
138       struct rip *rip,
139       int cc)
140 {
141 #       define FROM_NADDR from->sin_addr.s_addr
142         static struct msg_limit use_auth, bad_len, bad_mask;
143         static struct msg_limit unk_router, bad_router, bad_nhop;
144
145         struct rt_entry *rt;
146         struct rt_spare new;
147         struct netinfo *n, *lim;
148         struct interface *ifp1;
149         naddr gate, mask, v1_mask, dst, ddst_h = 0;
150         struct auth *ap;
151         struct tgate *tg = NULL;
152         struct tgate_net *tn;
153         int i, j;
154
155         /* Notice when we hear from a remote gateway
156          */
157         if (aifp != NULL
158             && (aifp->int_state & IS_REMOTE))
159                 aifp->int_act_time = now.tv_sec;
160
161         trace_rip("Recv", "from", from, sifp, rip, cc);
162
163         if (sifp == NULL) {
164                 trace_pkt("    discard a request from an indirect router"
165                     " (possibly an attack)");
166                 return;
167         }
168
169         if (rip->rip_vers == 0) {
170                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
171                        "RIP version 0, cmd %d, packet received from %s",
172                        rip->rip_cmd, naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
173                 return;
174         } else if (rip->rip_vers > RIPv2) {
175                 rip->rip_vers = RIPv2;
176         }
177         if (cc > (int)OVER_MAXPACKETSIZE) {
178                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
179                        "packet at least %d bytes too long received from %s",
180                        cc-MAXPACKETSIZE, naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
181                 return;
182         }
183
184         n = rip->rip_nets;
185         lim = (struct netinfo *)((char*)rip + cc);
186
187         /* Notice authentication.
188          * As required by section 4.2 in RFC 1723, discard authenticated
189          * RIPv2 messages, but only if configured for that silliness.
190          *
191          * RIPv2 authentication is lame.  Why authenticate queries?
192          * Why should a RIPv2 implementation with authentication disabled
193          * not be able to listen to RIPv2 packets with authentication, while
194          * RIPv1 systems will listen?  Crazy!
195          */
196         if (!auth_ok
197             && rip->rip_vers == RIPv2
198             && n < lim && n->n_family == RIP_AF_AUTH) {
199                 msglim(&use_auth, FROM_NADDR,
200                        "RIPv2 message with authentication from %s discarded",
201                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
202                 return;
203         }
204
205         switch (rip->rip_cmd) {
206         case RIPCMD_REQUEST:
207                 /* For mere requests, be a little sloppy about the source
208                  */
209                 if (aifp == NULL)
210                         aifp = sifp;
211
212                 /* Are we talking to ourself or a remote gateway?
213                  */
214                 ifp1 = ifwithaddr(FROM_NADDR, 0, 1);
215                 if (ifp1) {
216                         if (ifp1->int_state & IS_REMOTE) {
217                                 /* remote gateway */
218                                 aifp = ifp1;
219                                 if (check_remote(aifp)) {
220                                         aifp->int_act_time = now.tv_sec;
221                                         (void)if_ok(aifp, "remote ");
222                                 }
223                         } else if (from->sin_port == htons(RIP_PORT)) {
224                                 trace_pkt("    discard our own RIP request");
225                                 return;
226                         }
227                 }
228
229                 /* did the request come from a router?
230                  */
231                 if (from->sin_port == htons(RIP_PORT)) {
232                         /* yes, ignore the request if RIP is off so that
233                          * the router does not depend on us.
234                          */
235                         if (rip_sock < 0
236                             || (aifp != NULL
237                                 && IS_RIP_OUT_OFF(aifp->int_state))) {
238                                 trace_pkt("    discard request while RIP off");
239                                 return;
240                         }
241                 }
242
243                 /* According to RFC 1723, we should ignore unauthenticated
244                  * queries.  That is too silly to bother with.  Sheesh!
245                  * Are forwarding tables supposed to be secret, when
246                  * a bad guy can infer them with test traffic?  When RIP
247                  * is still the most common router-discovery protocol
248                  * and so hosts need to send queries that will be answered?
249                  * What about `rtquery`?
250                  * Maybe on firewalls you'd care, but not enough to
251                  * give up the diagnostic facilities of remote probing.
252                  */
253
254                 if (n >= lim) {
255                         msglim(&bad_len, FROM_NADDR, "empty request from %s",
256                                naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
257                         return;
258                 }
259                 if (cc%sizeof(*n) != sizeof(struct rip)%sizeof(*n)) {
260                         msglim(&bad_len, FROM_NADDR,
261                                "request of bad length (%d) from %s",
262                                cc, naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
263                 }
264
265                 if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv2
266                     && (aifp == NULL || (aifp->int_state & IS_NO_RIPV1_OUT))) {
267                         v12buf.buf->rip_vers = RIPv2;
268                         /* If we have a secret but it is a cleartext secret,
269                          * do not disclose our secret unless the other guy
270                          * already knows it.
271                          */
272                         ap = find_auth(aifp);
273                         if (ap != NULL && ap->type == RIP_AUTH_PW
274                             && n->n_family == RIP_AF_AUTH
275                             && !ck_passwd(aifp,rip,lim,FROM_NADDR,&use_auth))
276                                 ap = NULL;
277                 } else {
278                         v12buf.buf->rip_vers = RIPv1;
279                         ap = NULL;
280                 }
281                 clr_ws_buf(&v12buf, ap);
282
283                 do {
284                         n->n_metric = ntohl(n->n_metric);
285
286                         /* A single entry with family RIP_AF_UNSPEC and
287                          * metric HOPCNT_INFINITY means "all routes".
288                          * We respond to routers only if we are acting
289                          * as a supplier, or to anyone other than a router
290                          * (i.e. a query).
291                          */
292                         if (n->n_family == RIP_AF_UNSPEC
293                             && n->n_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY) {
294                                 /* Answer a query from a utility program
295                                  * with all we know.
296                                  */
297                                 if (aifp == NULL) {
298                                         trace_pkt("ignore remote query");
299                                         return;
300                                 }
301                                 if (from->sin_port != htons(RIP_PORT)) {
302                                         /*
303                                          * insecure: query from non-router node
304                                          *   > 1: allow from distant node
305                                          *   > 0: allow from neighbor node
306                                          *  == 0: deny
307                                          */
308                                         if ((aifp != NULL && insecure > 0) ||
309                                             (aifp == NULL && insecure > 1))
310                                                 supply(from, aifp, OUT_QUERY, 0,
311                                                        rip->rip_vers,
312                                                        ap != NULL);
313                                         else
314                                                 trace_pkt("Warning: "
315                                                     "possible attack detected");
316                                         return;
317                                 }
318
319                                 /* A router trying to prime its tables.
320                                  * Filter the answer in the about same way
321                                  * broadcasts are filtered.
322                                  *
323                                  * Only answer a router if we are a supplier
324                                  * to keep an unwary host that is just starting
325                                  * from picking us as a router.
326                                  */
327                                 if (aifp == NULL) {
328                                         trace_pkt("ignore distant router");
329                                         return;
330                                 }
331                                 if (!supplier
332                                     || IS_RIP_OFF(aifp->int_state)) {
333                                         trace_pkt("ignore; not supplying");
334                                         return;
335                                 }
336
337                                 /* Do not answer a RIPv1 router if
338                                  * we are sending RIPv2.  But do offer
339                                  * poor man's router discovery.
340                                  */
341                                 if ((aifp->int_state & IS_NO_RIPV1_OUT)
342                                     && rip->rip_vers == RIPv1) {
343                                         if (!(aifp->int_state & IS_PM_RDISC)) {
344                                             trace_pkt("ignore; sending RIPv2");
345                                             return;
346                                         }
347
348                                         v12buf.n->n_family = RIP_AF_INET;
349                                         v12buf.n->n_dst = RIP_DEFAULT;
350                                         i = aifp->int_d_metric;
351                                         if (NULL != (rt = rtget(RIP_DEFAULT, 0))) {
352                                             j = (rt->rt_metric
353                                                  +aifp->int_metric
354                                                  +aifp->int_adj_outmetric
355                                                  +1);
356                                             if (i > j)
357                                                 i = j;
358                                         }
359                                         v12buf.n->n_metric = htonl(i);
360                                         v12buf.n++;
361                                         break;
362                                 }
363
364                                 /* Respond with RIPv1 instead of RIPv2 if
365                                  * that is what we are broadcasting on the
366                                  * interface to keep the remote router from
367                                  * getting the wrong initial idea of the
368                                  * routes we send.
369                                  */
370                                 supply(from, aifp, OUT_UNICAST, 0,
371                                        (aifp->int_state & IS_NO_RIPV1_OUT)
372                                        ? RIPv2 : RIPv1,
373                                        ap != NULL);
374                                 return;
375                         }
376
377                         /* Ignore authentication */
378                         if (n->n_family == RIP_AF_AUTH)
379                                 continue;
380
381                         if (n->n_family != RIP_AF_INET) {
382                                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
383                                        "request from %s for unsupported"
384                                        " (af %d) %s",
385                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
386                                        ntohs(n->n_family),
387                                        naddr_ntoa(n->n_dst));
388                                 return;
389                         }
390
391                         /* We are being asked about a specific destination.
392                          */
393                         dst = n->n_dst;
394                         if (!check_dst(dst)) {
395                                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
396                                        "bad queried destination %s from %s",
397                                        naddr_ntoa(dst),
398                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
399                                 return;
400                         }
401
402                         /* decide what mask was intended */
403                         if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv1
404                             || 0 == (mask = ntohl(n->n_mask))
405                             || 0 != (ntohl(dst) & ~mask))
406                                 mask = ripv1_mask_host(dst, aifp);
407
408                         /* try to find the answer */
409                         rt = rtget(dst, mask);
410                         if (!rt && dst != RIP_DEFAULT)
411                                 rt = rtfind(n->n_dst);
412
413                         if (v12buf.buf->rip_vers != RIPv1)
414                                 v12buf.n->n_mask = mask;
415                         if (rt == NULL) {
416                                 /* we do not have the answer */
417                                 v12buf.n->n_metric = HOPCNT_INFINITY;
418                         } else {
419                                 /* we have the answer, so compute the
420                                  * right metric and next hop.
421                                  */
422                                 v12buf.n->n_family = RIP_AF_INET;
423                                 v12buf.n->n_dst = dst;
424                                 j = rt->rt_metric+1;
425                                 if (!aifp)
426                                         ++j;
427                                 else
428                                         j += (aifp->int_metric
429                                               + aifp->int_adj_outmetric);
430                                 if (j < HOPCNT_INFINITY)
431                                         v12buf.n->n_metric = j;
432                                 else
433                                         v12buf.n->n_metric = HOPCNT_INFINITY;
434                                 if (v12buf.buf->rip_vers != RIPv1) {
435                                         v12buf.n->n_tag = rt->rt_tag;
436                                         v12buf.n->n_mask = mask;
437                                         if (aifp != NULL
438                                             && on_net(rt->rt_gate,
439                                                       aifp->int_net,
440                                                       aifp->int_mask)
441                                             && rt->rt_gate != aifp->int_addr)
442                                             v12buf.n->n_nhop = rt->rt_gate;
443                                 }
444                         }
445                         v12buf.n->n_metric = htonl(v12buf.n->n_metric);
446
447                         /* Stop paying attention if we fill the output buffer.
448                          */
449                         if (++v12buf.n >= v12buf.lim)
450                                 break;
451                 } while (++n < lim);
452
453                 /* Send the answer about specific routes.
454                  */
455                 if (ap != NULL && ap->type == RIP_AUTH_MD5)
456                         end_md5_auth(&v12buf, ap);
457
458                 if (from->sin_port != htons(RIP_PORT)) {
459                         /* query */
460                         (void)output(OUT_QUERY, from, aifp,
461                                      v12buf.buf,
462                                      ((char *)v12buf.n - (char*)v12buf.buf));
463                 } else if (supplier) {
464                         (void)output(OUT_UNICAST, from, aifp,
465                                      v12buf.buf,
466                                      ((char *)v12buf.n - (char*)v12buf.buf));
467                 } else {
468                         /* Only answer a router if we are a supplier
469                          * to keep an unwary host that is just starting
470                          * from picking us an a router.
471                          */
472                         ;
473                 }
474                 return;
475
476         case RIPCMD_TRACEON:
477         case RIPCMD_TRACEOFF:
478                 /* Notice that trace messages are turned off for all possible
479                  * abuse if _PATH_TRACE is undefined in pathnames.h.
480                  * Notice also that because of the way the trace file is
481                  * handled in trace.c, no abuse is plausible even if
482                  * _PATH_TRACE_ is defined.
483                  *
484                  * First verify message came from a privileged port. */
485                 if (ntohs(from->sin_port) > IPPORT_RESERVED) {
486                         msglog("trace command from untrusted port on %s",
487                                naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
488                         return;
489                 }
490                 if (aifp == NULL) {
491                         msglog("trace command from unknown router %s",
492                                naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
493                         return;
494                 }
495                 if (rip->rip_cmd == RIPCMD_TRACEON) {
496                         rip->rip_tracefile[cc-4] = '\0';
497                         set_tracefile((char*)rip->rip_tracefile,
498                                       "trace command: %s\n", 0);
499                 } else {
500                         trace_off("tracing turned off by %s",
501                                   naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
502                 }
503                 return;
504
505         case RIPCMD_RESPONSE:
506                 if (cc%sizeof(*n) != sizeof(struct rip)%sizeof(*n)) {
507                         msglim(&bad_len, FROM_NADDR,
508                                "response of bad length (%d) from %s",
509                                cc, naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
510                 }
511
512                 /* verify message came from a router */
513                 if (from->sin_port != ntohs(RIP_PORT)) {
514                         msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
515                                "    discard RIP response from unknown port"
516                                " %d on %s",
517                                ntohs(from->sin_port), naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
518                         return;
519                 }
520
521                 if (rip_sock < 0) {
522                         trace_pkt("    discard response while RIP off");
523                         return;
524                 }
525
526                 /* Are we talking to ourself or a remote gateway?
527                  */
528                 ifp1 = ifwithaddr(FROM_NADDR, 0, 1);
529                 if (ifp1) {
530                         if (ifp1->int_state & IS_REMOTE) {
531                                 /* remote gateway */
532                                 aifp = ifp1;
533                                 if (check_remote(aifp)) {
534                                         aifp->int_act_time = now.tv_sec;
535                                         (void)if_ok(aifp, "remote ");
536                                 }
537                         } else {
538                                 trace_pkt("    discard our own RIP response");
539                                 return;
540                         }
541                 }
542
543                 /* Accept routing packets from routers directly connected
544                  * via broadcast or point-to-point networks, and from
545                  * those listed in /etc/gateways.
546                  */
547                 if (aifp == NULL) {
548                         msglim(&unk_router, FROM_NADDR,
549                                "   discard response from %s"
550                                " via unexpected interface",
551                                naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
552                         return;
553                 }
554                 if (IS_RIP_IN_OFF(aifp->int_state)) {
555                         trace_pkt("    discard RIPv%d response"
556                                   " via disabled interface %s",
557                                   rip->rip_vers, aifp->int_name);
558                         return;
559                 }
560
561                 if (n >= lim) {
562                         msglim(&bad_len, FROM_NADDR, "empty response from %s",
563                                naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
564                         return;
565                 }
566
567                 if (((aifp->int_state & IS_NO_RIPV1_IN)
568                      && rip->rip_vers == RIPv1)
569                     || ((aifp->int_state & IS_NO_RIPV2_IN)
570                         && rip->rip_vers != RIPv1)) {
571                         trace_pkt("    discard RIPv%d response",
572                                   rip->rip_vers);
573                         return;
574                 }
575
576                 /* Ignore routes via dead interface.
577                  */
578                 if (aifp->int_state & IS_BROKE) {
579                         trace_pkt("discard response via broken interface %s",
580                                   aifp->int_name);
581                         return;
582                 }
583
584                 /* If the interface cares, ignore bad routers.
585                  * Trace but do not log this problem, because where it
586                  * happens, it happens frequently.
587                  */
588                 if (aifp->int_state & IS_DISTRUST) {
589                         tg = tgates;
590                         while (tg->tgate_addr != FROM_NADDR) {
591                                 tg = tg->tgate_next;
592                                 if (tg == NULL) {
593                                         trace_pkt("    discard RIP response"
594                                                   " from untrusted router %s",
595                                                   naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
596                                         return;
597                                 }
598                         }
599                 }
600
601                 /* Authenticate the packet if we have a secret.
602                  * If we do not have any secrets, ignore the error in
603                  * RFC 1723 and accept it regardless.
604                  */
605                 if (aifp->int_auth[0].type != RIP_AUTH_NONE
606                     && rip->rip_vers != RIPv1
607                     && !ck_passwd(aifp,rip,lim,FROM_NADDR,&use_auth))
608                         return;
609
610                 do {
611                         if (n->n_family == RIP_AF_AUTH)
612                                 continue;
613
614                         n->n_metric = ntohl(n->n_metric);
615                         dst = n->n_dst;
616                         if (n->n_family != RIP_AF_INET
617                             && (n->n_family != RIP_AF_UNSPEC
618                                 || dst != RIP_DEFAULT)) {
619                                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
620                                        "route from %s to unsupported"
621                                        " address family=%d destination=%s",
622                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
623                                        n->n_family,
624                                        naddr_ntoa(dst));
625                                 continue;
626                         }
627                         if (!check_dst(dst)) {
628                                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
629                                        "bad destination %s from %s",
630                                        naddr_ntoa(dst),
631                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
632                                 return;
633                         }
634                         if (n->n_metric == 0
635                             || n->n_metric > HOPCNT_INFINITY) {
636                                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
637                                        "bad metric %d from %s"
638                                        " for destination %s",
639                                        n->n_metric,
640                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
641                                        naddr_ntoa(dst));
642                                 return;
643                         }
644
645                         /* Notice the next-hop.
646                          */
647                         gate = FROM_NADDR;
648                         if (n->n_nhop != 0) {
649                                 if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv1) {
650                                         n->n_nhop = 0;
651                                 } else {
652                                     /* Use it only if it is valid. */
653                                     if (on_net(n->n_nhop,
654                                                aifp->int_net, aifp->int_mask)
655                                         && check_dst(n->n_nhop)) {
656                                             gate = n->n_nhop;
657                                     } else {
658                                             msglim(&bad_nhop, FROM_NADDR,
659                                                    "router %s to %s"
660                                                    " has bad next hop %s",
661                                                    naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
662                                                    naddr_ntoa(dst),
663                                                    naddr_ntoa(n->n_nhop));
664                                             n->n_nhop = 0;
665                                     }
666                                 }
667                         }
668
669                         if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv1
670                             || 0 == (mask = ntohl(n->n_mask))) {
671                                 mask = ripv1_mask_host(dst,aifp);
672                         } else if ((ntohl(dst) & ~mask) != 0) {
673                                 msglim(&bad_mask, FROM_NADDR,
674                                        "router %s sent bad netmask"
675                                        " %#lx with %s",
676                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
677                                        (u_long)mask,
678                                        naddr_ntoa(dst));
679                                 continue;
680                         }
681                         if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv1)
682                                 n->n_tag = 0;
683
684                         /* Adjust metric according to incoming interface..
685                          */
686                         n->n_metric += (aifp->int_metric
687                                         + aifp->int_adj_inmetric);
688                         if (n->n_metric > HOPCNT_INFINITY)
689                                 n->n_metric = HOPCNT_INFINITY;
690
691                         /* Should we trust this route from this router? */
692                         if (tg && (tn = tg->tgate_nets)->mask != 0) {
693                                 for (i = 0; i < MAX_TGATE_NETS; i++, tn++) {
694                                         if (on_net(dst, tn->net, tn->mask)
695                                             && tn->mask <= mask)
696                                             break;
697                                 }
698                                 if (i >= MAX_TGATE_NETS || tn->mask == 0) {
699                                         trace_pkt("   ignored unauthorized %s",
700                                                   addrname(dst,mask,0));
701                                         continue;
702                                 }
703                         }
704
705                         /* Recognize and ignore a default route we faked
706                          * which is being sent back to us by a machine with
707                          * broken split-horizon.
708                          * Be a little more paranoid than that, and reject
709                          * default routes with the same metric we advertised.
710                          */
711                         if (aifp->int_d_metric != 0
712                             && dst == RIP_DEFAULT
713                             && (int)n->n_metric >= aifp->int_d_metric)
714                                 continue;
715
716                         /* We can receive aggregated RIPv2 routes that must
717                          * be broken down before they are transmitted by
718                          * RIPv1 via an interface on a subnet.
719                          * We might also receive the same routes aggregated
720                          * via other RIPv2 interfaces.
721                          * This could cause duplicate routes to be sent on
722                          * the RIPv1 interfaces.  "Longest matching variable
723                          * length netmasks" lets RIPv2 listeners understand,
724                          * but breaking down the aggregated routes for RIPv1
725                          * listeners can produce duplicate routes.
726                          *
727                          * Breaking down aggregated routes here bloats
728                          * the daemon table, but does not hurt the kernel
729                          * table, since routes are always aggregated for
730                          * the kernel.
731                          *
732                          * Notice that this does not break down network
733                          * routes corresponding to subnets.  This is part
734                          * of the defense against RS_NET_SYN.
735                          */
736                         if (have_ripv1_out
737                             && (((rt = rtget(dst,mask)) == NULL
738                                  || !(rt->rt_state & RS_NET_SYN)))
739                             && (v1_mask = ripv1_mask_net(dst,0)) > mask) {
740                                 ddst_h = v1_mask & -v1_mask;
741                                 i = (v1_mask & ~mask)/ddst_h;
742                                 if (i >= 511) {
743                                         /* Punt if we would have to generate
744                                          * an unreasonable number of routes.
745                                          */
746                                         if (TRACECONTENTS)
747                                             trace_misc("accept %s-->%s as 1"
748                                                        " instead of %d routes",
749                                                        addrname(dst,mask,0),
750                                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
751                                                        i+1);
752                                         i = 0;
753                                 } else {
754                                         mask = v1_mask;
755                                 }
756                         } else {
757                                 i = 0;
758                         }
759
760                         new.rts_gate = gate;
761                         new.rts_router = FROM_NADDR;
762                         new.rts_metric = n->n_metric;
763                         new.rts_tag = n->n_tag;
764                         new.rts_time = now.tv_sec;
765                         new.rts_ifp = aifp;
766                         new.rts_de_ag = i;
767                         j = 0;
768                         for (;;) {
769                                 input_route(dst, mask, &new, n);
770                                 if (++j > i)
771                                         break;
772                                 dst = htonl(ntohl(dst) + ddst_h);
773                         }
774                 } while (++n < lim);
775                 break;
776         }
777 #undef FROM_NADDR
778 }
779
780
781 /* Process a single input route.
782  */
783 static void
784 input_route(naddr dst,                  /* network order */
785             naddr mask,
786             struct rt_spare *new,
787             struct netinfo *n)
788 {
789         int i;
790         struct rt_entry *rt;
791         struct rt_spare *rts, *rts0;
792         struct interface *ifp1;
793
794
795         /* See if the other guy is telling us to send our packets to him.
796          * Sometimes network routes arrive over a point-to-point link for
797          * the network containing the address(es) of the link.
798          *
799          * If our interface is broken, switch to using the other guy.
800          */
801         ifp1 = ifwithaddr(dst, 1, 1);
802         if (ifp1 != NULL
803             && (!(ifp1->int_state & IS_BROKE)
804                 || (ifp1->int_state & IS_PASSIVE)))
805                 return;
806
807         /* Look for the route in our table.
808          */
809         rt = rtget(dst, mask);
810
811         /* Consider adding the route if we do not already have it.
812          */
813         if (rt == NULL) {
814                 /* Ignore unknown routes being poisoned.
815                  */
816                 if (new->rts_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY)
817                         return;
818
819                 /* Ignore the route if it points to us */
820                 if (n->n_nhop != 0
821                     && ifwithaddr(n->n_nhop, 1, 0) != NULL)
822                         return;
823
824                 /* If something has not gone crazy and tried to fill
825                  * our memory, accept the new route.
826                  */
827                 if (total_routes < MAX_ROUTES)
828                         rtadd(dst, mask, 0, new);
829                 return;
830         }
831
832         /* We already know about the route.  Consider this update.
833          *
834          * If (rt->rt_state & RS_NET_SYN), then this route
835          * is the same as a network route we have inferred
836          * for subnets we know, in order to tell RIPv1 routers
837          * about the subnets.
838          *
839          * It is impossible to tell if the route is coming
840          * from a distant RIPv2 router with the standard
841          * netmask because that router knows about the entire
842          * network, or if it is a round-about echo of a
843          * synthetic, RIPv1 network route of our own.
844          * The worst is that both kinds of routes might be
845          * received, and the bad one might have the smaller
846          * metric.  Partly solve this problem by never
847          * aggregating into such a route.  Also keep it
848          * around as long as the interface exists.
849          */
850
851         rts0 = rt->rt_spares;
852         for (rts = rts0, i = NUM_SPARES; i != 0; i--, rts++) {
853                 if (rts->rts_router == new->rts_router)
854                         break;
855                 /* Note the worst slot to reuse,
856                  * other than the current slot.
857                  */
858                 if (rts0 == rt->rt_spares
859                     || BETTER_LINK(rt, rts0, rts))
860                         rts0 = rts;
861         }
862         if (i != 0) {
863                 /* Found a route from the router already in the table.
864                  */
865
866                 /* If the new route is a route broken down from an
867                  * aggregated route, and if the previous route is either
868                  * not a broken down route or was broken down from a finer
869                  * netmask, and if the previous route is current,
870                  * then forget this one.
871                  */
872                 if (new->rts_de_ag > rts->rts_de_ag
873                     && now_stale <= rts->rts_time)
874                         return;
875
876                 /* Keep poisoned routes around only long enough to pass
877                  * the poison on.  Use a new timestamp for good routes.
878                  */
879                 if (rts->rts_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY
880                     && new->rts_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY)
881                         new->rts_time = rts->rts_time;
882
883                 /* If this is an update for the router we currently prefer,
884                  * then note it.
885                  */
886                 if (i == NUM_SPARES) {
887                         rtchange(rt, rt->rt_state, new, 0);
888                         /* If the route got worse, check for something better.
889                          */
890                         if (new->rts_metric > rts->rts_metric)
891                                 rtswitch(rt, 0);
892                         return;
893                 }
894
895                 /* This is an update for a spare route.
896                  * Finished if the route is unchanged.
897                  */
898                 if (rts->rts_gate == new->rts_gate
899                     && rts->rts_metric == new->rts_metric
900                     && rts->rts_tag == new->rts_tag) {
901                         trace_upslot(rt, rts, new);
902                         *rts = *new;
903                         return;
904                 }
905                 /* Forget it if it has gone bad.
906                  */
907                 if (new->rts_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY) {
908                         rts_delete(rt, rts);
909                         return;
910                 }
911
912         } else {
913                 /* The update is for a route we know about,
914                  * but not from a familiar router.
915                  *
916                  * Ignore the route if it points to us.
917                  */
918                 if (n->n_nhop != 0
919                     && NULL != ifwithaddr(n->n_nhop, 1, 0))
920                         return;
921
922                 /* the loop above set rts0=worst spare */
923                 rts = rts0;
924
925                 /* Save the route as a spare only if it has
926                  * a better metric than our worst spare.
927                  * This also ignores poisoned routes (those
928                  * received with metric HOPCNT_INFINITY).
929                  */
930                 if (new->rts_metric >= rts->rts_metric)
931                         return;
932         }
933
934         trace_upslot(rt, rts, new);
935         *rts = *new;
936
937         /* try to switch to a better route */
938         rtswitch(rt, rts);
939 }
940
941
942 static int                              /* 0 if bad */
943 ck_passwd(struct interface *aifp,
944           struct rip *rip,
945           void *lim,
946           naddr from,
947           struct msg_limit *use_authp)
948 {
949 #       define NA (rip->rip_auths)
950         struct netauth *na2;
951         struct auth *ap;
952         MD5_CTX md5_ctx;
953         u_char hash[RIP_AUTH_PW_LEN];
954         int i, len;
955
956         assert(aifp != NULL);
957         if ((void *)NA >= lim || NA->a_family != RIP_AF_AUTH) {
958                 msglim(use_authp, from, "missing password from %s",
959                        naddr_ntoa(from));
960                 return 0;
961         }
962
963         /* accept any current (+/- 24 hours) password
964          */
965         for (ap = aifp->int_auth, i = 0; i < MAX_AUTH_KEYS; i++, ap++) {
966                 if (ap->type != NA->a_type
967                     || (u_long)ap->start > (u_long)clk.tv_sec+DAY
968                     || (u_long)ap->end+DAY < (u_long)clk.tv_sec)
969                         continue;
970
971                 if (NA->a_type == RIP_AUTH_PW) {
972                         if (!memcmp(NA->au.au_pw, ap->key, RIP_AUTH_PW_LEN))
973                                 return 1;
974
975                 } else {
976                         /* accept MD5 secret with the right key ID
977                          */
978                         if (NA->au.a_md5.md5_keyid != ap->keyid)
979                                 continue;
980
981                         len = ntohs(NA->au.a_md5.md5_pkt_len);
982                         if ((len-sizeof(*rip)) % sizeof(*NA) != 0
983                             || len != (char *)lim-(char*)rip-(int)sizeof(*NA)) {
984                                 msglim(use_authp, from,
985                                        "wrong MD5 RIPv2 packet length of %d"
986                                        " instead of %d from %s",
987                                        len, (int)((char *)lim-(char *)rip
988                                                   -sizeof(*NA)),
989                                        naddr_ntoa(from));
990                                 return 0;
991                         }
992                         na2 = (struct netauth *)((char *)rip+len);
993
994                         /* Given a good hash value, these are not security
995                          * problems so be generous and accept the routes,
996                          * after complaining.
997                          */
998                         if (TRACEPACKETS) {
999                                 if (NA->au.a_md5.md5_auth_len
1000                                     != RIP_AUTH_MD5_HASH_LEN)
1001                                         msglim(use_authp, from,
1002                                                "unknown MD5 RIPv2 auth len %#x"
1003                                                " instead of %#x from %s",
1004                                                NA->au.a_md5.md5_auth_len,
1005                                                (unsigned)RIP_AUTH_MD5_HASH_LEN,
1006                                                naddr_ntoa(from));
1007                                 if (na2->a_family != RIP_AF_AUTH)
1008                                         msglim(use_authp, from,
1009                                                "unknown MD5 RIPv2 family %#x"
1010                                                " instead of %#x from %s",
1011                                                na2->a_family, RIP_AF_AUTH,
1012                                                naddr_ntoa(from));
1013                                 if (na2->a_type != ntohs(1))
1014                                         msglim(use_authp, from,
1015                                                "MD5 RIPv2 hash has %#x"
1016                                                " instead of %#x from %s",
1017                                                na2->a_type, ntohs(1),
1018                                                naddr_ntoa(from));
1019                         }
1020
1021                         MD5Init(&md5_ctx);
1022                         MD5Update(&md5_ctx, (u_char *)rip,
1023                                   len + RIP_AUTH_MD5_HASH_XTRA);
1024                         MD5Update(&md5_ctx, ap->key, RIP_AUTH_MD5_KEY_LEN);
1025                         MD5Final(hash, &md5_ctx);
1026                         if (!memcmp(hash, na2->au.au_pw, sizeof(hash)))
1027                                 return 1;
1028                 }
1029         }
1030
1031         msglim(use_authp, from, "bad password from %s",
1032                naddr_ntoa(from));
1033         return 0;
1034 #undef NA
1035 }