2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_local.h"
15 #include "statem_local.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types.
25 typedef struct x509err2alert_st {
30 /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
31 const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = {
32 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
33 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
34 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
38 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
39 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
41 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
46 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
47 s->init_num, &written);
50 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
52 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
53 * ignore the result anyway
54 * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
56 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
57 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
58 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE))
59 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
60 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
63 if (written == s->init_num) {
65 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
66 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
70 s->init_off += written;
71 s->init_num -= written;
75 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
79 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
80 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
83 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
89 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s)
91 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
92 /* SSLfatal() already called */
96 /* Reset any extension flags */
97 memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags));
100 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
101 int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0;
104 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
105 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
108 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) {
109 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
110 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
113 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
114 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
116 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
117 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) &&
118 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls))
120 } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) {
127 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
128 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
129 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
133 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
134 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
135 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept);
137 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
138 tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
140 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
143 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
144 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect);
146 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
148 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
149 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
152 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
155 s->statem.use_timer = 1;
162 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
163 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
165 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
166 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
168 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
169 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
171 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
172 static const char servercontext[] = { 0x54, 0x4c, 0x53, 0x20, 0x31, 0x2e,
173 0x33, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65,
174 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x56, 0x65, 0x72,
175 0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x00 };
176 static const char clientcontext[] = { 0x54, 0x4c, 0x53, 0x20, 0x31, 0x2e,
177 0x33, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65,
178 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x56, 0x65, 0x72,
179 0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x00 };
181 static const char servercontext[] = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
182 static const char clientcontext[] = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
184 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
187 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
188 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
189 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
190 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
191 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
192 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
194 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
197 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
198 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
199 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
201 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
202 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
203 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
204 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
205 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
206 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
207 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
208 /* SSLfatal() already called */
213 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
218 retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
220 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA,
221 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
230 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
232 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
233 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
234 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
235 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
236 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
238 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
239 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
240 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
242 if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) {
243 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
244 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
247 pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
249 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
250 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
251 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
255 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
258 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
262 /* Get the data to be signed */
263 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
264 /* SSLfatal() already called */
268 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
269 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
270 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
273 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
274 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
277 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
281 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
282 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
287 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
288 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
289 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
290 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
296 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
297 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
298 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
299 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
300 s->session->master_key)
301 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
307 } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
315 int pktype = lu->sig;
317 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
318 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
319 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
320 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
324 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
325 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
326 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
330 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
331 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
332 /* SSLfatal() already called */
337 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
341 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
345 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
347 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
348 const unsigned char *data;
349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
350 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
352 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
356 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
359 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
360 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
361 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
364 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
365 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
369 peer = s->session->peer;
370 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
372 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
373 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
377 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) {
378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
379 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
383 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
386 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
387 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
391 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) {
392 /* SSLfatal() already called */
395 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
396 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
397 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
401 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
402 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
403 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
408 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
409 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
410 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
413 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
415 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
416 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
419 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)
420 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
421 && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
422 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
423 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128
424 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) {
425 len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
428 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
429 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
430 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
434 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
435 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
436 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
438 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
441 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
442 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
443 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
447 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
448 /* SSLfatal() already called */
453 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n",
454 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
456 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
457 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
463 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
464 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
465 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
466 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
467 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
468 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
469 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
472 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
478 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
479 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
480 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
481 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
487 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
488 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
489 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
490 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
491 s->session->master_key)) {
492 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
496 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
498 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
502 j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
504 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
505 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
511 * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client
512 * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the
513 * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest
514 * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We
515 * want to make sure that SSL_get_peer_certificate() will return the actual
516 * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback.
518 if (!s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
519 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
521 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
523 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
524 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
525 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
526 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
527 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
532 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
534 size_t finish_md_len;
538 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
539 if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
540 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
543 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
548 && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0
549 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
550 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {;
551 /* SSLfatal() already called */
556 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
557 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
559 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
560 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
563 finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
565 s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
566 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
567 /* SSLfatal() already called */
571 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
573 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
574 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED,
575 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
580 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
581 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
583 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL,
584 s->session->master_key,
585 s->session->master_key_length)) {
586 /* SSLfatal() already called */
591 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
593 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
594 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED,
595 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
599 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
601 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
603 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
605 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
611 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
613 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) {
614 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE,
615 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
619 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
623 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
625 unsigned int updatetype;
628 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
629 * be on a record boundary.
631 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
632 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
633 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
634 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
637 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
638 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
639 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
640 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
641 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
645 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
648 if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
649 && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
650 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
651 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
652 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
656 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
657 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
658 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
660 if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)
661 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
663 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
664 /* SSLfatal() already called */
665 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
668 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
672 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
675 int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
681 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
682 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
684 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
685 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
688 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len =
689 s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen,
690 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
692 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) {
693 /* SSLfatal() already called */
700 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
704 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
706 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
707 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
708 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
710 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
711 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
712 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
713 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
714 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
715 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
716 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
717 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
718 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
722 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
723 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
724 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
725 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
729 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
730 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
731 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
732 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
733 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
736 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
737 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
738 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
739 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
740 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
743 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
744 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
746 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
747 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
751 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
752 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
755 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
759 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
762 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
767 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
770 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We
771 * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less
774 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
775 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
776 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
777 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
778 /* SSLfatal() already called */
779 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
784 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
785 * message must be on a record boundary.
787 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
788 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
789 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
790 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
793 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
794 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
795 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
796 SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
797 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
799 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
801 md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
803 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
805 SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
806 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
809 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
811 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
812 SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
813 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
817 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
819 if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
820 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
821 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
822 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
825 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
827 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
829 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
831 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
835 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
836 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
838 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
840 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED &&
841 !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
842 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
843 /* SSLfatal() already called */
844 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
847 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
849 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
850 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
852 /* SSLfatal() already called */
853 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
855 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
856 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
857 /* SSLfatal() already called */
858 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
860 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
861 /* SSLfatal() already called */
862 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
867 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
870 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
872 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
874 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
881 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
882 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain)
885 unsigned char *outbytes;
887 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
889 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET,
893 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
894 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
895 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET,
896 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
901 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
903 /* SSLfatal() already called */
910 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
911 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
915 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
916 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
917 X509_STORE *chain_store;
919 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
925 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
927 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
928 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
930 extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
932 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
934 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
935 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
937 chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
939 if (chain_store != NULL) {
940 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
942 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
943 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,
944 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
947 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
948 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
949 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,
954 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
955 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
956 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
957 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
959 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
960 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
962 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
963 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
966 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
971 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
972 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
975 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
976 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
977 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
979 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) {
980 /* SSLfatal() already called */
981 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
985 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
987 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
989 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
992 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) {
993 /* SSLfatal() already called */
996 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
997 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
998 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) {
999 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1007 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
1009 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) {
1010 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,
1011 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1015 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk))
1018 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1019 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,
1020 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1028 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
1029 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
1032 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop)
1034 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1035 int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand;
1039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1041 * RFC6083: SCTP provides a reliable and in-sequence transport service for DTLS
1042 * messages that require it. Therefore, DTLS procedures for retransmissions
1044 * Hence the init_buf can be cleared when DTLS over SCTP as transport is used.
1046 || BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
1050 * We don't do this in DTLS over UDP because we may still need the init_buf
1051 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1053 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
1057 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) {
1058 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE,
1059 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1065 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server
1066 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
1067 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1070 * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
1071 * post handshake exchange
1074 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1077 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
1078 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1080 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
1084 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the
1087 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1088 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
1090 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1091 tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
1092 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
1094 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1096 * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once,
1097 * so we remove this one from the cache.
1099 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode
1100 & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0)
1101 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1104 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1107 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
1110 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit);
1112 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
1113 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
1116 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1117 /* done with handshaking */
1118 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
1119 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
1120 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
1121 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
1125 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1126 cb = s->info_callback;
1127 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1128 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1130 /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
1131 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
1136 || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1137 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
1141 /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
1142 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1143 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1146 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1149 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
1151 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1152 int skip_message, i, recvd_type;
1154 size_t l, readbytes;
1156 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1159 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1160 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
1162 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
1165 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1168 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1170 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1171 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1173 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
1174 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1175 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1176 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1179 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE
1180 && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) {
1182 * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
1183 * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
1184 * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
1185 * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
1186 * with a valid cookie.
1190 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1191 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
1192 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1193 s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
1195 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1196 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1197 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1198 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1201 s->init_num += readbytes;
1206 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
1207 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
1209 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1210 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1211 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1214 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
1218 if (s->msg_callback)
1219 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1220 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1221 s->msg_callback_arg);
1223 } while (skip_message);
1224 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1227 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
1229 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1231 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1234 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1235 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1237 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
1238 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1239 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
1241 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1242 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1245 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1246 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1248 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
1251 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
1253 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1260 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
1262 size_t n, readbytes;
1266 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1267 /* We've already read everything in */
1268 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
1273 n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
1275 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
1276 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
1278 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1282 s->init_num += readbytes;
1287 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1288 * Finished verification.
1290 if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) {
1291 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1296 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1297 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1298 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1300 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1304 if (s->msg_callback)
1305 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
1306 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1309 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1310 * processing the message
1311 * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
1314 #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
1315 /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
1316 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
1317 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) {
1318 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
1319 || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1320 || memcmp(hrrrandom,
1321 s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET,
1322 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) {
1323 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1324 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1325 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1331 if (s->msg_callback)
1332 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1333 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1334 s->msg_callback_arg);
1341 static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = {
1342 {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE},
1343 {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1344 {X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1345 {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1346 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1347 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1348 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1349 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1350 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED},
1351 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1352 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1353 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1354 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1355 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1356 {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1357 {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1358 {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1359 {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1360 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1361 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1362 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1363 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1364 {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1365 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1366 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1367 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE},
1368 {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1369 {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1370 {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1371 {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1372 {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1373 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1374 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1375 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1376 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1377 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1378 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1379 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1380 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1381 {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1383 /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */
1384 {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN}
1387 int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err)
1389 const X509ERR2ALERT *tp;
1391 for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp)
1392 if (tp->x509err == x509err)
1397 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
1399 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1401 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1404 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
1406 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
1411 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1412 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1417 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1418 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1421 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1422 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1425 /* Must be in order high to low */
1426 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1427 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1428 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1430 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1433 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1435 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1438 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1440 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1442 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1443 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1445 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1448 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1450 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1455 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1456 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1459 /* Must be in order high to low */
1460 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1462 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1464 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1467 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1468 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1470 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1471 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1477 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1479 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1480 * @method: the intended method.
1482 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1484 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1486 int version = method->version;
1488 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1489 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1490 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1491 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1493 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1494 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1495 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1497 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1498 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1499 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1500 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1506 * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
1507 * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured, or has
1508 * a servername callback configured. Otherwise returns 0.
1510 static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s)
1513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1518 if (!ossl_assert(s->ctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL))
1522 * A servername callback can change the available certs, so if a servername
1523 * cb is set then we just assume TLSv1.3 will be ok
1525 if (s->ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL
1526 || s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL)
1529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1530 if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL)
1534 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL)
1537 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1538 /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */
1540 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1541 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1542 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1543 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1548 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i))
1550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1551 if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC)
1554 * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is
1555 * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this
1556 * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446.
1558 eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
1561 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey));
1562 if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve))
1573 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1576 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1577 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1579 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1581 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version, const SSL_METHOD **meth)
1583 const version_info *vent;
1584 const version_info *table;
1586 switch (s->method->version) {
1588 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1589 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1590 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1591 table = tls_version_table;
1593 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1594 table = dtls_version_table;
1599 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1601 if (vent->cmeth != NULL
1602 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0
1603 && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0
1605 || version != TLS1_3_VERSION
1606 || is_tls13_capable(s))) {
1608 *meth = vent->cmeth();
1616 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1617 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1618 * supported protocol version.
1620 * @s server SSL handle.
1622 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1624 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
1626 const version_info *vent;
1627 const version_info *table;
1630 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1631 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1634 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
1638 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1639 * highest protocol version).
1641 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
1642 table = tls_version_table;
1643 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
1644 table = dtls_version_table;
1646 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1650 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1651 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
1652 return s->version == vent->version;
1658 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1659 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1660 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1661 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1663 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1664 * @version: the intended limit.
1665 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1667 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1669 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
1679 valid_tls = version >= SSL3_VERSION && version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION;
1681 DTLS_VERSION_LE(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) &&
1682 DTLS_VERSION_GE(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER);
1684 if (!valid_tls && !valid_dtls)
1688 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1689 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1690 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1692 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1693 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1694 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1695 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1696 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1698 * We ignore attempts to set bounds on version-inflexible methods,
1699 * returning success.
1701 switch (method_version) {
1705 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1710 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1718 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1720 if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
1721 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) {
1722 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
1723 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1724 && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
1726 * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2
1727 * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still
1728 * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and
1729 * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is
1730 * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not.
1732 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) {
1733 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
1735 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1740 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1741 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1742 * the version specific method.
1744 * @s: server SSL handle.
1746 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1748 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1751 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1753 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1754 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1756 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1759 int server_version = s->method->version;
1760 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1761 const version_info *vent;
1762 const version_info *table;
1764 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1766 s->client_version = client_version;
1768 switch (server_version) {
1770 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1771 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1772 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1773 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1775 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1776 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1777 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1778 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1779 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1784 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1785 * a HelloRetryRequest
1788 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1789 table = tls_version_table;
1791 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1792 table = dtls_version_table;
1796 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
1798 /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
1799 if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE)
1800 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1802 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1803 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1804 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1805 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1806 PACKET versionslist;
1808 suppversions->parsed = 1;
1810 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1811 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1812 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1816 * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION.
1817 * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3:
1818 * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with
1819 * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to
1820 * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert."
1821 * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower.
1822 * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1.
1824 if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION)
1825 return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION;
1827 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1828 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1830 if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method))
1831 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1833 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1834 /* Trailing data? */
1835 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1838 if (best_vers > 0) {
1839 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1841 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
1842 * negotiated TLSv1.3
1844 if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
1845 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1848 check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
1849 s->version = best_vers;
1850 s->method = best_method;
1853 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1857 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1858 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1860 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1861 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1864 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1867 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1868 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1870 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1871 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1873 method = vent->smeth();
1874 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1875 check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd);
1876 s->version = vent->version;
1882 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1886 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1887 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1888 * the version specific method.
1890 * @s: client SSL handle.
1891 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1892 * @extensions: The extensions received
1894 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
1896 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
1898 const version_info *vent;
1899 const version_info *table;
1900 int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv;
1903 s->version = version;
1905 /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
1906 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions,
1907 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1908 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions,
1914 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE
1915 && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1917 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1918 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1922 switch (s->method->version) {
1924 if (s->version != s->method->version) {
1926 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1927 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1928 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1932 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1933 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1934 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1935 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1936 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1939 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1940 table = tls_version_table;
1942 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1943 table = dtls_version_table;
1947 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max);
1950 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1951 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, ret);
1954 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min)
1955 : s->version < ver_min) {
1957 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1958 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1960 } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max)
1961 : s->version > ver_max) {
1963 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1964 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1968 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0)
1971 /* Check for downgrades */
1972 if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) {
1973 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
1974 s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1975 - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
1976 sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
1978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1979 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1980 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1983 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1984 && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION
1985 && real_max > s->version) {
1986 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
1987 s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1988 - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
1989 sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
1991 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1992 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1993 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1998 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1999 if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version)
2002 s->method = vent->cmeth();
2007 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
2008 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
2013 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
2014 * @s: The SSL connection
2015 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
2016 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
2017 * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole
2018 * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled
2021 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
2022 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
2023 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
2024 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
2025 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
2027 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
2028 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
2029 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
2031 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
2032 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
2034 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version,
2037 int version, tmp_real_max;
2039 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
2040 const SSL_METHOD *method;
2041 const version_info *table;
2042 const version_info *vent;
2044 switch (s->method->version) {
2047 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2048 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2049 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2050 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2051 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2053 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
2055 * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version
2058 if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL))
2059 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2061 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
2062 table = tls_version_table;
2064 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
2065 table = dtls_version_table;
2070 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
2071 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
2072 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
2073 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
2075 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
2076 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
2077 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
2079 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
2080 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
2081 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
2083 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
2084 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
2085 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
2086 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
2087 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
2088 * selected, as we start from scratch.
2090 *min_version = version = 0;
2092 if (real_max != NULL)
2095 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2097 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
2098 * "version capability" vector.
2100 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
2105 method = vent->cmeth();
2107 if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0)
2108 tmp_real_max = vent->version;
2110 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
2114 *min_version = method->version;
2116 if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0)
2117 *real_max = tmp_real_max;
2118 version = (single = method)->version;
2119 *min_version = version;
2124 *max_version = version;
2126 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
2128 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
2134 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
2135 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
2137 * @s: client SSL handle.
2139 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2141 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
2143 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
2146 * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
2147 * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated.
2149 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
2152 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL);
2157 s->version = ver_max;
2159 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
2160 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION)
2161 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
2163 s->client_version = ver_max;
2168 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
2169 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
2170 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
2171 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
2173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2174 int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups,
2175 size_t num_groups, int checkallow)
2179 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
2182 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
2183 uint16_t group = groups[i];
2185 if (group_id == group
2187 || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
2196 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2197 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval,
2198 size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr,
2201 unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2202 unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
2204 memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
2206 if (hashval == NULL) {
2207 hashval = hashvaltmp;
2209 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2210 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
2211 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp),
2213 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2218 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2219 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
2220 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2224 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2225 msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
2226 msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen;
2227 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
2228 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
2229 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2234 * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
2235 * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
2236 * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
2239 && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen)
2240 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
2241 s->s3->tmp.message_size
2242 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) {
2243 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2250 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2252 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
2255 int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2257 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
2258 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2261 if (ca_sk == NULL) {
2262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2263 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2266 /* get the CA RDNs */
2267 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2268 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2269 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2273 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2274 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2275 unsigned int name_len;
2277 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2278 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2279 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2280 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2284 namestart = namebytes;
2285 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
2286 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2290 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2292 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2296 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2298 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2304 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2305 s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
2310 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2315 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s)
2317 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;;
2320 ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2321 if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
2326 ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
2331 int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt)
2333 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2334 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2335 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2336 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2340 if (ca_sk != NULL) {
2343 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) {
2344 unsigned char *namebytes;
2345 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i);
2349 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2350 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2352 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2354 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2360 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2361 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2362 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2369 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2370 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
2371 const void *param, size_t paramlen)
2373 size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen;
2374 unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen);
2377 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS,
2378 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2381 memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2382 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2384 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen);
2391 * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
2392 * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
2394 int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s)
2396 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2397 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1))
2398 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2401 s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2402 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2403 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2404 SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2405 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2408 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst,
2409 s->s3->handshake_dgst)) {
2410 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2411 SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2412 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2420 * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
2421 * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
2423 int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s)
2425 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2427 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2428 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2431 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst,
2433 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2434 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2435 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);