4 * This file and its contents are supplied under the terms of the
5 * Common Development and Distribution License ("CDDL"), version 1.0.
6 * You may only use this file in accordance with the terms of version
9 * A full copy of the text of the CDDL should have accompanied this
10 * source. A copy of the CDDL is also available via the Internet at
11 * http://www.illumos.org/license/CDDL.
17 * Copyright (c) 2017, Datto, Inc. All rights reserved.
18 * Copyright (c) 2018 by Delphix. All rights reserved.
21 #include <sys/dsl_crypt.h>
22 #include <sys/dsl_pool.h>
25 #include <sys/dsl_dir.h>
26 #include <sys/dsl_prop.h>
27 #include <sys/spa_impl.h>
28 #include <sys/dmu_objset.h>
32 * This file's primary purpose is for managing master encryption keys in
33 * memory and on disk. For more info on how these keys are used, see the
34 * block comment in zio_crypt.c.
36 * All master keys are stored encrypted on disk in the form of the DSL
37 * Crypto Key ZAP object. The binary key data in this object is always
38 * randomly generated and is encrypted with the user's wrapping key. This
39 * layer of indirection allows the user to change their key without
40 * needing to re-encrypt the entire dataset. The ZAP also holds on to the
41 * (non-encrypted) encryption algorithm identifier, IV, and MAC needed to
42 * safely decrypt the master key. For more info on the user's key see the
43 * block comment in libzfs_crypto.c
45 * In-memory encryption keys are managed through the spa_keystore. The
46 * keystore consists of 3 AVL trees, which are as follows:
48 * The Wrapping Key Tree:
49 * The wrapping key (wkey) tree stores the user's keys that are fed into the
50 * kernel through 'zfs load-key' and related commands. Datasets inherit their
51 * parent's wkey by default, so these structures are refcounted. The wrapping
52 * keys remain in memory until they are explicitly unloaded (with
53 * "zfs unload-key"). Unloading is only possible when no datasets are using
56 * The DSL Crypto Key Tree:
57 * The DSL Crypto Keys (DCK) are the in-memory representation of decrypted
58 * master keys. They are used by the functions in zio_crypt.c to perform
59 * encryption, decryption, and authentication. Snapshots and clones of a given
60 * dataset will share a DSL Crypto Key, so they are also refcounted. Once the
61 * refcount on a key hits zero, it is immediately zeroed out and freed.
63 * The Crypto Key Mapping Tree:
64 * The zio layer needs to lookup master keys by their dataset object id. Since
65 * the DSL Crypto Keys can belong to multiple datasets, we maintain a tree of
66 * dsl_key_mapping_t's which essentially just map the dataset object id to its
67 * appropriate DSL Crypto Key. The management for creating and destroying these
68 * mappings hooks into the code for owning and disowning datasets. Usually,
69 * there will only be one active dataset owner, but there are times
70 * (particularly during dataset creation and destruction) when this may not be
71 * true or the dataset may not be initialized enough to own. As a result, this
72 * object is also refcounted.
76 * This tunable allows datasets to be raw received even if the stream does
77 * not include IVset guids or if the guids don't match. This is used as part
78 * of the resolution for ZPOOL_ERRATA_ZOL_8308_ENCRYPTION.
80 int zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check = 0;
83 dsl_wrapping_key_hold(dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey, void *tag)
85 (void) zfs_refcount_add(&wkey->wk_refcnt, tag);
89 dsl_wrapping_key_rele(dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey, void *tag)
91 (void) zfs_refcount_remove(&wkey->wk_refcnt, tag);
95 dsl_wrapping_key_free(dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey)
97 ASSERT0(zfs_refcount_count(&wkey->wk_refcnt));
99 if (wkey->wk_key.ck_data) {
100 bzero(wkey->wk_key.ck_data,
101 CRYPTO_BITS2BYTES(wkey->wk_key.ck_length));
102 kmem_free(wkey->wk_key.ck_data,
103 CRYPTO_BITS2BYTES(wkey->wk_key.ck_length));
106 zfs_refcount_destroy(&wkey->wk_refcnt);
107 kmem_free(wkey, sizeof (dsl_wrapping_key_t));
111 dsl_wrapping_key_create(uint8_t *wkeydata, zfs_keyformat_t keyformat,
112 uint64_t salt, uint64_t iters, dsl_wrapping_key_t **wkey_out)
114 dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey;
116 /* allocate the wrapping key */
117 wkey = kmem_alloc(sizeof (dsl_wrapping_key_t), KM_SLEEP);
119 /* allocate and initialize the underlying crypto key */
120 wkey->wk_key.ck_data = kmem_alloc(WRAPPING_KEY_LEN, KM_SLEEP);
122 wkey->wk_key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW;
123 wkey->wk_key.ck_length = CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(WRAPPING_KEY_LEN);
124 bcopy(wkeydata, wkey->wk_key.ck_data, WRAPPING_KEY_LEN);
126 /* initialize the rest of the struct */
127 zfs_refcount_create(&wkey->wk_refcnt);
128 wkey->wk_keyformat = keyformat;
129 wkey->wk_salt = salt;
130 wkey->wk_iters = iters;
136 dsl_crypto_params_create_nvlist(dcp_cmd_t cmd, nvlist_t *props,
137 nvlist_t *crypto_args, dsl_crypto_params_t **dcp_out)
140 uint64_t crypt = ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT;
141 uint64_t keyformat = ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE;
142 uint64_t salt = 0, iters = 0;
143 dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp = NULL;
144 dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = NULL;
145 uint8_t *wkeydata = NULL;
146 uint_t wkeydata_len = 0;
147 char *keylocation = NULL;
149 dcp = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (dsl_crypto_params_t), KM_SLEEP);
152 /* get relevant arguments from the nvlists */
154 (void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(props,
155 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_ENCRYPTION), &crypt);
156 (void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(props,
157 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), &keyformat);
158 (void) nvlist_lookup_string(props,
159 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION), &keylocation);
160 (void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(props,
161 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), &salt);
162 (void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(props,
163 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), &iters);
165 dcp->cp_crypt = crypt;
168 if (crypto_args != NULL) {
169 (void) nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(crypto_args, "wkeydata",
170 &wkeydata, &wkeydata_len);
173 /* check for valid command */
174 if (dcp->cp_cmd >= DCP_CMD_MAX) {
175 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
181 /* check for valid crypt */
182 if (dcp->cp_crypt >= ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS) {
183 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
186 dcp->cp_crypt = crypt;
189 /* check for valid keyformat */
190 if (keyformat >= ZFS_KEYFORMAT_FORMATS) {
191 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
195 /* check for a valid keylocation (of any kind) and copy it in */
196 if (keylocation != NULL) {
197 if (!zfs_prop_valid_keylocation(keylocation, B_FALSE)) {
198 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
202 dcp->cp_keylocation = spa_strdup(keylocation);
205 /* check wrapping key length, if given */
206 if (wkeydata != NULL && wkeydata_len != WRAPPING_KEY_LEN) {
207 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
211 /* if the user asked for the default crypt, determine that now */
212 if (dcp->cp_crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_ON)
213 dcp->cp_crypt = ZIO_CRYPT_ON_VALUE;
215 /* create the wrapping key from the raw data */
216 if (wkeydata != NULL) {
217 /* create the wrapping key with the verified parameters */
218 dsl_wrapping_key_create(wkeydata, keyformat, salt,
224 * Remove the encryption properties from the nvlist since they are not
225 * maintained through the DSL.
227 (void) nvlist_remove_all(props, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_ENCRYPTION));
228 (void) nvlist_remove_all(props, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT));
229 (void) nvlist_remove_all(props, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT));
230 (void) nvlist_remove_all(props,
231 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS));
238 kmem_free(dcp, sizeof (dsl_crypto_params_t));
244 dsl_crypto_params_free(dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp, boolean_t unload)
249 if (dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL)
250 spa_strfree(dcp->cp_keylocation);
251 if (unload && dcp->cp_wkey != NULL)
252 dsl_wrapping_key_free(dcp->cp_wkey);
254 kmem_free(dcp, sizeof (dsl_crypto_params_t));
258 spa_crypto_key_compare(const void *a, const void *b)
260 const dsl_crypto_key_t *dcka = a;
261 const dsl_crypto_key_t *dckb = b;
263 if (dcka->dck_obj < dckb->dck_obj)
265 if (dcka->dck_obj > dckb->dck_obj)
271 spa_key_mapping_compare(const void *a, const void *b)
273 const dsl_key_mapping_t *kma = a;
274 const dsl_key_mapping_t *kmb = b;
276 if (kma->km_dsobj < kmb->km_dsobj)
278 if (kma->km_dsobj > kmb->km_dsobj)
284 spa_wkey_compare(const void *a, const void *b)
286 const dsl_wrapping_key_t *wka = a;
287 const dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkb = b;
289 if (wka->wk_ddobj < wkb->wk_ddobj)
291 if (wka->wk_ddobj > wkb->wk_ddobj)
297 spa_keystore_init(spa_keystore_t *sk)
299 rw_init(&sk->sk_dk_lock, NULL, RW_DEFAULT, NULL);
300 rw_init(&sk->sk_km_lock, NULL, RW_DEFAULT, NULL);
301 rw_init(&sk->sk_wkeys_lock, NULL, RW_DEFAULT, NULL);
302 avl_create(&sk->sk_dsl_keys, spa_crypto_key_compare,
303 sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t),
304 offsetof(dsl_crypto_key_t, dck_avl_link));
305 avl_create(&sk->sk_key_mappings, spa_key_mapping_compare,
306 sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t),
307 offsetof(dsl_key_mapping_t, km_avl_link));
308 avl_create(&sk->sk_wkeys, spa_wkey_compare, sizeof (dsl_wrapping_key_t),
309 offsetof(dsl_wrapping_key_t, wk_avl_link));
313 spa_keystore_fini(spa_keystore_t *sk)
315 dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey;
318 ASSERT(avl_is_empty(&sk->sk_dsl_keys));
319 ASSERT(avl_is_empty(&sk->sk_key_mappings));
321 while ((wkey = avl_destroy_nodes(&sk->sk_wkeys, &cookie)) != NULL)
322 dsl_wrapping_key_free(wkey);
324 avl_destroy(&sk->sk_wkeys);
325 avl_destroy(&sk->sk_key_mappings);
326 avl_destroy(&sk->sk_dsl_keys);
327 rw_destroy(&sk->sk_wkeys_lock);
328 rw_destroy(&sk->sk_km_lock);
329 rw_destroy(&sk->sk_dk_lock);
333 dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dsl_dir_t *dd, uint64_t *rddobj)
335 if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
336 return (SET_ERROR(ENOENT));
338 return (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
339 DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_ROOT_DDOBJ, 8, 1, rddobj));
343 dsl_dir_get_encryption_version(dsl_dir_t *dd, uint64_t *version)
347 if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
348 return (SET_ERROR(ENOENT));
350 /* version 0 is implied by ENOENT */
351 (void) zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
352 DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, 8, 1, version);
358 dsl_dir_incompatible_encryption_version(dsl_dir_t *dd)
361 uint64_t version = 0;
363 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_version(dd, &version);
367 return (version != ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION);
371 spa_keystore_wkey_hold_ddobj_impl(spa_t *spa, uint64_t ddobj,
372 void *tag, dsl_wrapping_key_t **wkey_out)
375 dsl_wrapping_key_t search_wkey;
376 dsl_wrapping_key_t *found_wkey;
378 ASSERT(RW_LOCK_HELD(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock));
380 /* init the search wrapping key */
381 search_wkey.wk_ddobj = ddobj;
383 /* lookup the wrapping key */
384 found_wkey = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, &search_wkey, NULL);
386 ret = SET_ERROR(ENOENT);
390 /* increment the refcount */
391 dsl_wrapping_key_hold(found_wkey, tag);
393 *wkey_out = found_wkey;
402 spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(spa_t *spa, dsl_dir_t *dd, void *tag,
403 dsl_wrapping_key_t **wkey_out)
406 dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey;
408 boolean_t locked = B_FALSE;
410 if (!RW_WRITE_HELD(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock)) {
411 rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_READER);
415 /* get the ddobj that the keylocation property was inherited from */
416 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj);
420 /* lookup the wkey in the avl tree */
421 ret = spa_keystore_wkey_hold_ddobj_impl(spa, rddobj, tag, &wkey);
425 /* unlock the wkey tree if we locked it */
427 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
434 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
441 dsl_crypto_can_set_keylocation(const char *dsname, const char *keylocation)
444 dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL;
445 dsl_pool_t *dp = NULL;
448 /* hold the dsl dir */
449 ret = dsl_pool_hold(dsname, FTAG, &dp);
453 ret = dsl_dir_hold(dp, dsname, FTAG, &dd, NULL);
459 /* if dd is not encrypted, the value may only be "none" */
460 if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) {
461 if (strcmp(keylocation, "none") != 0) {
462 ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
470 /* check for a valid keylocation for encrypted datasets */
471 if (!zfs_prop_valid_keylocation(keylocation, B_TRUE)) {
472 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
476 /* check that this is an encryption root */
477 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj);
481 if (rddobj != dd->dd_object) {
482 ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
486 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
487 dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
493 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
495 dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
501 dsl_crypto_key_free(dsl_crypto_key_t *dck)
503 ASSERT(zfs_refcount_count(&dck->dck_holds) == 0);
505 /* destroy the zio_crypt_key_t */
506 zio_crypt_key_destroy(&dck->dck_key);
508 /* free the refcount, wrapping key, and lock */
509 zfs_refcount_destroy(&dck->dck_holds);
511 dsl_wrapping_key_rele(dck->dck_wkey, dck);
514 kmem_free(dck, sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t));
518 dsl_crypto_key_rele(dsl_crypto_key_t *dck, void *tag)
520 if (zfs_refcount_remove(&dck->dck_holds, tag) == 0)
521 dsl_crypto_key_free(dck);
525 dsl_crypto_key_open(objset_t *mos, dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey,
526 uint64_t dckobj, void *tag, dsl_crypto_key_t **dck_out)
529 uint64_t crypt = 0, guid = 0, version = 0;
530 uint8_t raw_keydata[MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN];
531 uint8_t raw_hmac_keydata[SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN];
532 uint8_t iv[WRAPPING_IV_LEN];
533 uint8_t mac[WRAPPING_MAC_LEN];
534 dsl_crypto_key_t *dck;
536 /* allocate and initialize the key */
537 dck = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t), KM_SLEEP);
539 /* fetch all of the values we need from the ZAP */
540 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, 8, 1,
545 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1, &guid);
549 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY, 1,
550 MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN, raw_keydata);
554 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY, 1,
555 SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN, raw_hmac_keydata);
559 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, 1, WRAPPING_IV_LEN,
564 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, 1, WRAPPING_MAC_LEN,
569 /* the initial on-disk format for encryption did not have a version */
570 (void) zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, 8, 1, &version);
573 * Unwrap the keys. If there is an error return EACCES to indicate
574 * an authentication failure.
576 ret = zio_crypt_key_unwrap(&wkey->wk_key, crypt, version, guid,
577 raw_keydata, raw_hmac_keydata, iv, mac, &dck->dck_key);
579 ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
583 /* finish initializing the dsl_crypto_key_t */
584 zfs_refcount_create(&dck->dck_holds);
585 dsl_wrapping_key_hold(wkey, dck);
586 dck->dck_wkey = wkey;
587 dck->dck_obj = dckobj;
588 zfs_refcount_add(&dck->dck_holds, tag);
595 bzero(dck, sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t));
596 kmem_free(dck, sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t));
604 spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_impl(spa_t *spa, uint64_t dckobj, void *tag,
605 dsl_crypto_key_t **dck_out)
608 dsl_crypto_key_t search_dck;
609 dsl_crypto_key_t *found_dck;
611 ASSERT(RW_LOCK_HELD(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock));
613 /* init the search key */
614 search_dck.dck_obj = dckobj;
616 /* find the matching key in the keystore */
617 found_dck = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dsl_keys, &search_dck, NULL);
619 ret = SET_ERROR(ENOENT);
623 /* increment the refcount */
624 zfs_refcount_add(&found_dck->dck_holds, tag);
626 *dck_out = found_dck;
635 spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_dd(spa_t *spa, dsl_dir_t *dd, void *tag,
636 dsl_crypto_key_t **dck_out)
640 dsl_crypto_key_t *dck_io = NULL, *dck_ks = NULL;
641 dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = NULL;
642 uint64_t dckobj = dd->dd_crypto_obj;
644 /* Lookup the key in the tree of currently loaded keys */
645 rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock, RW_READER);
646 ret = spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_impl(spa, dckobj, tag, &dck_ks);
647 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock);
653 /* Lookup the wrapping key from the keystore */
654 ret = spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(spa, dd, FTAG, &wkey);
657 return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
660 /* Read the key from disk */
661 ret = dsl_crypto_key_open(spa->spa_meta_objset, wkey, dckobj,
664 dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG);
670 * Add the key to the keystore. It may already exist if it was
671 * added while performing the read from disk. In this case discard
672 * it and return the key from the keystore.
674 rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock, RW_WRITER);
675 ret = spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_impl(spa, dckobj, tag, &dck_ks);
677 avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dsl_keys, dck_io, &where);
678 avl_insert(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dsl_keys, dck_io, where);
681 dsl_crypto_key_free(dck_io);
685 /* Release the wrapping key (the dsl key now has a reference to it) */
686 dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG);
687 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock);
693 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa_t *spa, dsl_crypto_key_t *dck, void *tag)
695 rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock, RW_WRITER);
697 if (zfs_refcount_remove(&dck->dck_holds, tag) == 0) {
698 avl_remove(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dsl_keys, dck);
699 dsl_crypto_key_free(dck);
702 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock);
706 spa_keystore_load_wkey_impl(spa_t *spa, dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey)
710 dsl_wrapping_key_t *found_wkey;
712 rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_WRITER);
714 /* insert the wrapping key into the keystore */
715 found_wkey = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, wkey, &where);
716 if (found_wkey != NULL) {
717 ret = SET_ERROR(EEXIST);
720 avl_insert(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, wkey, where);
722 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
727 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
732 spa_keystore_load_wkey(const char *dsname, dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp,
736 dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL;
737 dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
738 dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = dcp->cp_wkey;
739 dsl_pool_t *dp = NULL;
740 uint64_t rddobj, keyformat, salt, iters;
743 * We don't validate the wrapping key's keyformat, salt, or iters
744 * since they will never be needed after the DCK has been wrapped.
746 if (dcp->cp_wkey == NULL ||
747 dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_NONE ||
748 dcp->cp_crypt != ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT ||
749 dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL)
750 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
752 ret = dsl_pool_hold(dsname, FTAG, &dp);
756 if (!spa_feature_is_enabled(dp->dp_spa, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION)) {
757 ret = SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP);
761 /* hold the dsl dir */
762 ret = dsl_dir_hold(dp, dsname, FTAG, &dd, NULL);
768 /* confirm that dd is the encryption root */
769 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj);
770 if (ret != 0 || rddobj != dd->dd_object) {
771 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
775 /* initialize the wkey's ddobj */
776 wkey->wk_ddobj = dd->dd_object;
778 /* verify that the wkey is correct by opening its dsl key */
779 ret = dsl_crypto_key_open(dp->dp_meta_objset, wkey,
780 dd->dd_crypto_obj, FTAG, &dck);
784 /* initialize the wkey encryption parameters from the DSL Crypto Key */
785 ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
786 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), 8, 1, &keyformat);
790 ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
791 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), 8, 1, &salt);
795 ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
796 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), 8, 1, &iters);
800 ASSERT3U(keyformat, <, ZFS_KEYFORMAT_FORMATS);
801 ASSERT3U(keyformat, !=, ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE);
802 IMPLY(keyformat == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, iters != 0);
803 IMPLY(keyformat == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, salt != 0);
804 IMPLY(keyformat != ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, iters == 0);
805 IMPLY(keyformat != ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, salt == 0);
807 wkey->wk_keyformat = keyformat;
808 wkey->wk_salt = salt;
809 wkey->wk_iters = iters;
812 * At this point we have verified the wkey and confirmed that it can
813 * be used to decrypt a DSL Crypto Key. We can simply cleanup and
814 * return if this is all the user wanted to do.
819 /* insert the wrapping key into the keystore */
820 ret = spa_keystore_load_wkey_impl(dp->dp_spa, wkey);
824 dsl_crypto_key_rele(dck, FTAG);
825 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
826 dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
828 /* create any zvols under this ds */
829 zvol_create_minors_recursive(dsname);
835 dsl_crypto_key_rele(dck, FTAG);
837 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
839 dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
845 spa_keystore_unload_wkey_impl(spa_t *spa, uint64_t ddobj)
848 dsl_wrapping_key_t search_wkey;
849 dsl_wrapping_key_t *found_wkey;
851 /* init the search wrapping key */
852 search_wkey.wk_ddobj = ddobj;
854 rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_WRITER);
856 /* remove the wrapping key from the keystore */
857 found_wkey = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys,
860 ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
862 } else if (zfs_refcount_count(&found_wkey->wk_refcnt) != 0) {
863 ret = SET_ERROR(EBUSY);
866 avl_remove(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, found_wkey);
868 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
870 /* free the wrapping key */
871 dsl_wrapping_key_free(found_wkey);
876 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
881 spa_keystore_unload_wkey(const char *dsname)
884 dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL;
885 dsl_pool_t *dp = NULL;
888 ret = spa_open(dsname, &spa, FTAG);
893 * Wait for any outstanding txg IO to complete, releasing any
894 * remaining references on the wkey.
896 if (spa_mode(spa) != SPA_MODE_READ)
897 txg_wait_synced(spa->spa_dsl_pool, 0);
899 spa_close(spa, FTAG);
901 /* hold the dsl dir */
902 ret = dsl_pool_hold(dsname, FTAG, &dp);
906 if (!spa_feature_is_enabled(dp->dp_spa, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION)) {
907 ret = (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP));
911 ret = dsl_dir_hold(dp, dsname, FTAG, &dd, NULL);
917 /* unload the wkey */
918 ret = spa_keystore_unload_wkey_impl(dp->dp_spa, dd->dd_object);
922 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
923 dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
925 /* remove any zvols under this ds */
926 zvol_remove_minors(dp->dp_spa, dsname, B_TRUE);
932 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
934 dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
940 key_mapping_add_ref(dsl_key_mapping_t *km, void *tag)
942 ASSERT3U(zfs_refcount_count(&km->km_refcnt), >=, 1);
943 zfs_refcount_add(&km->km_refcnt, tag);
947 * The locking here is a little tricky to ensure we don't cause unnecessary
948 * performance problems. We want to release a key mapping whenever someone
949 * decrements the refcount to 0, but freeing the mapping requires removing
950 * it from the spa_keystore, which requires holding sk_km_lock as a writer.
951 * Most of the time we don't want to hold this lock as a writer, since the
952 * same lock is held as a reader for each IO that needs to encrypt / decrypt
953 * data for any dataset and in practice we will only actually free the
954 * mapping after unmounting a dataset.
957 key_mapping_rele(spa_t *spa, dsl_key_mapping_t *km, void *tag)
959 ASSERT3U(zfs_refcount_count(&km->km_refcnt), >=, 1);
961 if (zfs_refcount_remove(&km->km_refcnt, tag) != 0)
965 * We think we are going to need to free the mapping. Add a
966 * reference to prevent most other releasers from thinking
967 * this might be their responsibility. This is inherently
968 * racy, so we will confirm that we are legitimately the
969 * last holder once we have the sk_km_lock as a writer.
971 zfs_refcount_add(&km->km_refcnt, FTAG);
973 rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock, RW_WRITER);
974 if (zfs_refcount_remove(&km->km_refcnt, FTAG) != 0) {
975 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
979 avl_remove(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings, km);
980 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
982 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, km->km_key, km);
983 zfs_refcount_destroy(&km->km_refcnt);
984 kmem_free(km, sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t));
988 spa_keystore_create_mapping(spa_t *spa, dsl_dataset_t *ds, void *tag,
989 dsl_key_mapping_t **km_out)
993 dsl_key_mapping_t *km, *found_km;
994 boolean_t should_free = B_FALSE;
996 /* Allocate and initialize the mapping */
997 km = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t), KM_SLEEP);
998 zfs_refcount_create(&km->km_refcnt);
1000 ret = spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_dd(spa, ds->ds_dir, km, &km->km_key);
1002 zfs_refcount_destroy(&km->km_refcnt);
1003 kmem_free(km, sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t));
1010 km->km_dsobj = ds->ds_object;
1012 rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock, RW_WRITER);
1015 * If a mapping already exists, simply increment its refcount and
1016 * cleanup the one we made. We want to allocate / free outside of
1017 * the lock because this lock is also used by the zio layer to lookup
1018 * key mappings. Otherwise, use the one we created. Normally, there will
1019 * only be one active reference at a time (the objset owner), but there
1020 * are times when there could be multiple async users.
1022 found_km = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings, km, &where);
1023 if (found_km != NULL) {
1024 should_free = B_TRUE;
1025 zfs_refcount_add(&found_km->km_refcnt, tag);
1029 zfs_refcount_add(&km->km_refcnt, tag);
1030 avl_insert(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings, km, where);
1035 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
1038 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, km->km_key, km);
1039 zfs_refcount_destroy(&km->km_refcnt);
1040 kmem_free(km, sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t));
1047 spa_keystore_remove_mapping(spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj, void *tag)
1050 dsl_key_mapping_t search_km;
1051 dsl_key_mapping_t *found_km;
1053 /* init the search key mapping */
1054 search_km.km_dsobj = dsobj;
1056 rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock, RW_READER);
1058 /* find the matching mapping */
1059 found_km = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings,
1061 if (found_km == NULL) {
1062 ret = SET_ERROR(ENOENT);
1066 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
1068 key_mapping_rele(spa, found_km, tag);
1073 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
1078 * This function is primarily used by the zio and arc layer to lookup
1079 * DSL Crypto Keys for encryption. Callers must release the key with
1080 * spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(). The function may also be called with
1081 * dck_out == NULL and tag == NULL to simply check that a key exists
1082 * without getting a reference to it.
1085 spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj, void *tag,
1086 dsl_crypto_key_t **dck_out)
1089 dsl_key_mapping_t search_km;
1090 dsl_key_mapping_t *found_km;
1092 ASSERT((tag != NULL && dck_out != NULL) ||
1093 (tag == NULL && dck_out == NULL));
1095 /* init the search key mapping */
1096 search_km.km_dsobj = dsobj;
1098 rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock, RW_READER);
1100 /* remove the mapping from the tree */
1101 found_km = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings, &search_km,
1103 if (found_km == NULL) {
1104 ret = SET_ERROR(ENOENT);
1108 if (found_km && tag)
1109 zfs_refcount_add(&found_km->km_key->dck_holds, tag);
1111 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
1113 if (dck_out != NULL)
1114 *dck_out = found_km->km_key;
1118 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
1120 if (dck_out != NULL)
1126 dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dsl_dir_t *dd)
1129 dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = NULL;
1131 ret = spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(dd->dd_pool->dp_spa, dd, FTAG,
1134 return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
1136 dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG);
1141 static zfs_keystatus_t
1142 dsl_dataset_get_keystatus(dsl_dir_t *dd)
1144 /* check if this dd has a has a dsl key */
1145 if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
1146 return (ZFS_KEYSTATUS_NONE);
1148 return (dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dd) == 0 ?
1149 ZFS_KEYSTATUS_AVAILABLE : ZFS_KEYSTATUS_UNAVAILABLE);
1153 dsl_dir_get_crypt(dsl_dir_t *dd, uint64_t *crypt)
1155 if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) {
1156 *crypt = ZIO_CRYPT_OFF;
1160 return (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
1161 DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, 8, 1, crypt));
1165 dsl_crypto_key_sync_impl(objset_t *mos, uint64_t dckobj, uint64_t crypt,
1166 uint64_t root_ddobj, uint64_t guid, uint8_t *iv, uint8_t *mac,
1167 uint8_t *keydata, uint8_t *hmac_keydata, uint64_t keyformat,
1168 uint64_t salt, uint64_t iters, dmu_tx_t *tx)
1170 VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, 8, 1,
1172 VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_ROOT_DDOBJ, 8, 1,
1174 VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1,
1176 VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, 1, WRAPPING_IV_LEN,
1178 VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, 1, WRAPPING_MAC_LEN,
1180 VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY, 1,
1181 MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN, keydata, tx));
1182 VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY, 1,
1183 SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN, hmac_keydata, tx));
1184 VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT),
1185 8, 1, &keyformat, tx));
1186 VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT),
1188 VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS),
1193 dsl_crypto_key_sync(dsl_crypto_key_t *dck, dmu_tx_t *tx)
1195 zio_crypt_key_t *key = &dck->dck_key;
1196 dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = dck->dck_wkey;
1197 uint8_t keydata[MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN];
1198 uint8_t hmac_keydata[SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN];
1199 uint8_t iv[WRAPPING_IV_LEN];
1200 uint8_t mac[WRAPPING_MAC_LEN];
1202 ASSERT(dmu_tx_is_syncing(tx));
1203 ASSERT3U(key->zk_crypt, <, ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS);
1205 /* encrypt and store the keys along with the IV and MAC */
1206 VERIFY0(zio_crypt_key_wrap(&dck->dck_wkey->wk_key, key, iv, mac,
1207 keydata, hmac_keydata));
1209 /* update the ZAP with the obtained values */
1210 dsl_crypto_key_sync_impl(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset, dck->dck_obj,
1211 key->zk_crypt, wkey->wk_ddobj, key->zk_guid, iv, mac, keydata,
1212 hmac_keydata, wkey->wk_keyformat, wkey->wk_salt, wkey->wk_iters,
1216 typedef struct spa_keystore_change_key_args {
1217 const char *skcka_dsname;
1218 dsl_crypto_params_t *skcka_cp;
1219 } spa_keystore_change_key_args_t;
1222 spa_keystore_change_key_check(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx)
1225 dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL;
1226 dsl_pool_t *dp = dmu_tx_pool(tx);
1227 spa_keystore_change_key_args_t *skcka = arg;
1228 dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp = skcka->skcka_cp;
1231 /* check for the encryption feature */
1232 if (!spa_feature_is_enabled(dp->dp_spa, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION)) {
1233 ret = SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP);
1237 /* check for valid key change command */
1238 if (dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_NEW_KEY &&
1239 dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_INHERIT &&
1240 dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_FORCE_NEW_KEY &&
1241 dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_FORCE_INHERIT) {
1242 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1247 ret = dsl_dir_hold(dp, skcka->skcka_dsname, FTAG, &dd, NULL);
1253 /* verify that the dataset is encrypted */
1254 if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) {
1255 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1259 /* clones must always use their origin's key */
1260 if (dsl_dir_is_clone(dd)) {
1261 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1265 /* lookup the ddobj we are inheriting the keylocation from */
1266 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj);
1270 /* Handle inheritance */
1271 if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_INHERIT ||
1272 dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_INHERIT) {
1273 /* no other encryption params should be given */
1274 if (dcp->cp_crypt != ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT ||
1275 dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL ||
1276 dcp->cp_wkey != NULL) {
1277 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1281 /* check that this is an encryption root */
1282 if (dd->dd_object != rddobj) {
1283 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1287 /* check that the parent is encrypted */
1288 if (dd->dd_parent->dd_crypto_obj == 0) {
1289 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1293 /* if we are rewrapping check that both keys are loaded */
1294 if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_INHERIT) {
1295 ret = dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dd);
1299 ret = dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dd->dd_parent);
1304 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
1308 /* handle forcing an encryption root without rewrapping */
1309 if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_NEW_KEY) {
1310 /* no other encryption params should be given */
1311 if (dcp->cp_crypt != ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT ||
1312 dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL ||
1313 dcp->cp_wkey != NULL) {
1314 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1318 /* check that this is not an encryption root */
1319 if (dd->dd_object == rddobj) {
1320 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1324 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
1328 /* crypt cannot be changed after creation */
1329 if (dcp->cp_crypt != ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT) {
1330 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1334 /* we are not inheritting our parent's wkey so we need one ourselves */
1335 if (dcp->cp_wkey == NULL) {
1336 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1340 /* check for a valid keyformat for the new wrapping key */
1341 if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_keyformat >= ZFS_KEYFORMAT_FORMATS ||
1342 dcp->cp_wkey->wk_keyformat == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE) {
1343 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1348 * If this dataset is not currently an encryption root we need a new
1349 * keylocation for this dataset's new wrapping key. Otherwise we can
1350 * just keep the one we already had.
1352 if (dd->dd_object != rddobj && dcp->cp_keylocation == NULL) {
1353 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1357 /* check that the keylocation is valid if it is not NULL */
1358 if (dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL &&
1359 !zfs_prop_valid_keylocation(dcp->cp_keylocation, B_TRUE)) {
1360 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1364 /* passphrases require pbkdf2 salt and iters */
1365 if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_keyformat == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE) {
1366 if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_salt == 0 ||
1367 dcp->cp_wkey->wk_iters < MIN_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS) {
1368 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1372 if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_salt != 0 || dcp->cp_wkey->wk_iters != 0) {
1373 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1378 /* make sure the dd's wkey is loaded */
1379 ret = dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dd);
1383 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
1389 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
1395 * This function deals with the intricacies of updating wrapping
1396 * key references and encryption roots recursively in the event
1397 * of a call to 'zfs change-key' or 'zfs promote'. The 'skip'
1398 * parameter should always be set to B_FALSE when called
1402 spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(uint64_t rddobj, uint64_t ddobj,
1403 uint64_t new_rddobj, dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey, boolean_t skip,
1408 zap_attribute_t *za;
1409 dsl_pool_t *dp = dmu_tx_pool(tx);
1410 dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL;
1411 dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
1412 uint64_t curr_rddobj;
1414 ASSERT(RW_WRITE_HELD(&dp->dp_spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock));
1417 VERIFY0(dsl_dir_hold_obj(dp, ddobj, NULL, FTAG, &dd));
1419 /* ignore special dsl dirs */
1420 if (dd->dd_myname[0] == '$' || dd->dd_myname[0] == '%') {
1421 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
1425 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &curr_rddobj);
1426 VERIFY(ret == 0 || ret == ENOENT);
1429 * Stop recursing if this dsl dir didn't inherit from the root
1430 * or if this dd is a clone.
1432 if (ret == ENOENT ||
1433 (!skip && (curr_rddobj != rddobj || dsl_dir_is_clone(dd)))) {
1434 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
1439 * If we don't have a wrapping key just update the dck to reflect the
1440 * new encryption root. Otherwise rewrap the entire dck and re-sync it
1441 * to disk. If skip is set, we don't do any of this work.
1445 VERIFY0(zap_update(dp->dp_meta_objset,
1447 DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_ROOT_DDOBJ, 8, 1,
1450 VERIFY0(spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_dd(dp->dp_spa, dd,
1452 dsl_wrapping_key_hold(wkey, dck);
1453 dsl_wrapping_key_rele(dck->dck_wkey, dck);
1454 dck->dck_wkey = wkey;
1455 dsl_crypto_key_sync(dck, tx);
1456 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(dp->dp_spa, dck, FTAG);
1460 zc = kmem_alloc(sizeof (zap_cursor_t), KM_SLEEP);
1461 za = kmem_alloc(sizeof (zap_attribute_t), KM_SLEEP);
1463 /* Recurse into all child dsl dirs. */
1464 for (zap_cursor_init(zc, dp->dp_meta_objset,
1465 dsl_dir_phys(dd)->dd_child_dir_zapobj);
1466 zap_cursor_retrieve(zc, za) == 0;
1467 zap_cursor_advance(zc)) {
1468 spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(rddobj,
1469 za->za_first_integer, new_rddobj, wkey, B_FALSE, tx);
1471 zap_cursor_fini(zc);
1474 * Recurse into all dsl dirs of clones. We utilize the skip parameter
1475 * here so that we don't attempt to process the clones directly. This
1476 * is because the clone and its origin share the same dck, which has
1477 * already been updated.
1479 for (zap_cursor_init(zc, dp->dp_meta_objset,
1480 dsl_dir_phys(dd)->dd_clones);
1481 zap_cursor_retrieve(zc, za) == 0;
1482 zap_cursor_advance(zc)) {
1483 dsl_dataset_t *clone;
1485 VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold_obj(dp, za->za_first_integer,
1487 spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(rddobj,
1488 clone->ds_dir->dd_object, new_rddobj, wkey, B_TRUE, tx);
1489 dsl_dataset_rele(clone, FTAG);
1491 zap_cursor_fini(zc);
1493 kmem_free(za, sizeof (zap_attribute_t));
1494 kmem_free(zc, sizeof (zap_cursor_t));
1496 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
1500 spa_keystore_change_key_sync(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx)
1504 dsl_pool_t *dp = dmu_tx_pool(tx);
1505 spa_t *spa = dp->dp_spa;
1506 spa_keystore_change_key_args_t *skcka = arg;
1507 dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp = skcka->skcka_cp;
1508 dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = NULL, *found_wkey;
1509 dsl_wrapping_key_t wkey_search;
1510 char *keylocation = dcp->cp_keylocation;
1511 uint64_t rddobj, new_rddobj;
1513 /* create and initialize the wrapping key */
1514 VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold(dp, skcka->skcka_dsname, FTAG, &ds));
1515 ASSERT(!ds->ds_is_snapshot);
1517 if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_NEW_KEY ||
1518 dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_NEW_KEY) {
1520 * We are changing to a new wkey. Set additional properties
1521 * which can be sent along with this ioctl. Note that this
1522 * command can set keylocation even if it can't normally be
1523 * set via 'zfs set' due to a non-local keylocation.
1525 if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_NEW_KEY) {
1526 wkey = dcp->cp_wkey;
1527 wkey->wk_ddobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_object;
1529 keylocation = "prompt";
1532 if (keylocation != NULL) {
1533 dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(ds,
1534 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION),
1535 ZPROP_SRC_LOCAL, 1, strlen(keylocation) + 1,
1539 VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(ds->ds_dir, &rddobj));
1540 new_rddobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_object;
1543 * We are inheritting the parent's wkey. Unset any local
1544 * keylocation and grab a reference to the wkey.
1546 if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_INHERIT) {
1547 VERIFY0(spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(spa,
1548 ds->ds_dir->dd_parent, FTAG, &wkey));
1551 dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(ds,
1552 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION), ZPROP_SRC_NONE,
1555 rddobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_object;
1556 VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(ds->ds_dir->dd_parent,
1561 ASSERT(dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_INHERIT ||
1562 dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_NEW_KEY);
1565 rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_WRITER);
1567 /* recurse through all children and rewrap their keys */
1568 spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(rddobj, ds->ds_dir->dd_object,
1569 new_rddobj, wkey, B_FALSE, tx);
1572 * All references to the old wkey should be released now (if it
1573 * existed). Replace the wrapping key.
1575 wkey_search.wk_ddobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_object;
1576 found_wkey = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, &wkey_search, NULL);
1577 if (found_wkey != NULL) {
1578 ASSERT0(zfs_refcount_count(&found_wkey->wk_refcnt));
1579 avl_remove(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, found_wkey);
1580 dsl_wrapping_key_free(found_wkey);
1583 if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_NEW_KEY) {
1584 avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, wkey, &where);
1585 avl_insert(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, wkey, where);
1586 } else if (wkey != NULL) {
1587 dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG);
1590 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
1592 dsl_dataset_rele(ds, FTAG);
1596 spa_keystore_change_key(const char *dsname, dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp)
1598 spa_keystore_change_key_args_t skcka;
1600 /* initialize the args struct */
1601 skcka.skcka_dsname = dsname;
1602 skcka.skcka_cp = dcp;
1605 * Perform the actual work in syncing context. The blocks modified
1606 * here could be calculated but it would require holding the pool
1607 * lock and traversing all of the datasets that will have their keys
1610 return (dsl_sync_task(dsname, spa_keystore_change_key_check,
1611 spa_keystore_change_key_sync, &skcka, 15,
1612 ZFS_SPACE_CHECK_RESERVED));
1616 dsl_dir_rename_crypt_check(dsl_dir_t *dd, dsl_dir_t *newparent)
1619 uint64_t curr_rddobj, parent_rddobj;
1621 if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
1624 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &curr_rddobj);
1629 * if this is not an encryption root, we must make sure we are not
1630 * moving dd to a new encryption root
1632 if (dd->dd_object != curr_rddobj) {
1633 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(newparent,
1638 if (parent_rddobj != curr_rddobj) {
1639 ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
1651 * Check to make sure that a promote from targetdd to origindd will not require
1655 dsl_dataset_promote_crypt_check(dsl_dir_t *target, dsl_dir_t *origin)
1658 uint64_t rddobj, op_rddobj, tp_rddobj;
1660 /* If the dataset is not encrypted we don't need to check anything */
1661 if (origin->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
1665 * If we are not changing the first origin snapshot in a chain
1666 * the encryption root won't change either.
1668 if (dsl_dir_is_clone(origin))
1672 * If the origin is the encryption root we will update
1673 * the DSL Crypto Key to point to the target instead.
1675 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(origin, &rddobj);
1679 if (rddobj == origin->dd_object)
1683 * The origin is inheriting its encryption root from its parent.
1684 * Check that the parent of the target has the same encryption root.
1686 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(origin->dd_parent, &op_rddobj);
1688 return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
1692 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(target->dd_parent, &tp_rddobj);
1694 return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
1698 if (op_rddobj != tp_rddobj)
1699 return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
1705 dsl_dataset_promote_crypt_sync(dsl_dir_t *target, dsl_dir_t *origin,
1709 dsl_pool_t *dp = target->dd_pool;
1710 dsl_dataset_t *targetds;
1711 dsl_dataset_t *originds;
1714 if (origin->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
1716 if (dsl_dir_is_clone(origin))
1719 VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(origin, &rddobj));
1721 if (rddobj != origin->dd_object)
1725 * If the target is being promoted to the encryption root update the
1726 * DSL Crypto Key and keylocation to reflect that. We also need to
1727 * update the DSL Crypto Keys of all children inheritting their
1728 * encryption root to point to the new target. Otherwise, the check
1729 * function ensured that the encryption root will not change.
1731 keylocation = kmem_alloc(ZAP_MAXVALUELEN, KM_SLEEP);
1733 VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold_obj(dp,
1734 dsl_dir_phys(target)->dd_head_dataset_obj, FTAG, &targetds));
1735 VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold_obj(dp,
1736 dsl_dir_phys(origin)->dd_head_dataset_obj, FTAG, &originds));
1738 VERIFY0(dsl_prop_get_dd(origin, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION),
1739 1, ZAP_MAXVALUELEN, keylocation, NULL, B_FALSE));
1740 dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(targetds, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION),
1741 ZPROP_SRC_LOCAL, 1, strlen(keylocation) + 1, keylocation, tx);
1742 dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(originds, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION),
1743 ZPROP_SRC_NONE, 0, 0, NULL, tx);
1745 rw_enter(&dp->dp_spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_WRITER);
1746 spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(rddobj, origin->dd_object,
1747 target->dd_object, NULL, B_FALSE, tx);
1748 rw_exit(&dp->dp_spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
1750 dsl_dataset_rele(targetds, FTAG);
1751 dsl_dataset_rele(originds, FTAG);
1752 kmem_free(keylocation, ZAP_MAXVALUELEN);
1756 dmu_objset_create_crypt_check(dsl_dir_t *parentdd, dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp,
1757 boolean_t *will_encrypt)
1760 uint64_t pcrypt, crypt;
1761 dsl_crypto_params_t dummy_dcp = { 0 };
1763 if (will_encrypt != NULL)
1764 *will_encrypt = B_FALSE;
1769 if (dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_NONE)
1770 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1772 if (parentdd != NULL) {
1773 ret = dsl_dir_get_crypt(parentdd, &pcrypt);
1777 pcrypt = ZIO_CRYPT_OFF;
1780 crypt = (dcp->cp_crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT) ? pcrypt : dcp->cp_crypt;
1782 ASSERT3U(pcrypt, !=, ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT);
1783 ASSERT3U(crypt, !=, ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT);
1785 /* check for valid dcp with no encryption (inherited or local) */
1786 if (crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_OFF) {
1787 /* Must not specify encryption params */
1788 if (dcp->cp_wkey != NULL ||
1789 (dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL &&
1790 strcmp(dcp->cp_keylocation, "none") != 0))
1791 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1796 if (will_encrypt != NULL)
1797 *will_encrypt = B_TRUE;
1800 * We will now definitely be encrypting. Check the feature flag. When
1801 * creating the pool the caller will check this for us since we won't
1802 * technically have the feature activated yet.
1804 if (parentdd != NULL &&
1805 !spa_feature_is_enabled(parentdd->dd_pool->dp_spa,
1806 SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION)) {
1807 return (SET_ERROR(EOPNOTSUPP));
1810 /* Check for errata #4 (encryption enabled, bookmark_v2 disabled) */
1811 if (parentdd != NULL &&
1812 !spa_feature_is_enabled(parentdd->dd_pool->dp_spa,
1813 SPA_FEATURE_BOOKMARK_V2)) {
1814 return (SET_ERROR(EOPNOTSUPP));
1817 /* handle inheritance */
1818 if (dcp->cp_wkey == NULL) {
1819 ASSERT3P(parentdd, !=, NULL);
1821 /* key must be fully unspecified */
1822 if (dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL)
1823 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1825 /* parent must have a key to inherit */
1826 if (pcrypt == ZIO_CRYPT_OFF)
1827 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1829 /* check for parent key */
1830 ret = dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(parentdd);
1837 /* At this point we should have a fully specified key. Check location */
1838 if (dcp->cp_keylocation == NULL ||
1839 !zfs_prop_valid_keylocation(dcp->cp_keylocation, B_TRUE))
1840 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1842 /* Must have fully specified keyformat */
1843 switch (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_keyformat) {
1844 case ZFS_KEYFORMAT_HEX:
1845 case ZFS_KEYFORMAT_RAW:
1846 /* requires no pbkdf2 iters and salt */
1847 if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_salt != 0 || dcp->cp_wkey->wk_iters != 0)
1848 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1850 case ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE:
1851 /* requires pbkdf2 iters and salt */
1852 if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_salt == 0 ||
1853 dcp->cp_wkey->wk_iters < MIN_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS)
1854 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1856 case ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE:
1858 /* keyformat must be specified and valid */
1859 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1866 dsl_dataset_create_crypt_sync(uint64_t dsobj, dsl_dir_t *dd,
1867 dsl_dataset_t *origin, dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp, dmu_tx_t *tx)
1869 dsl_pool_t *dp = dd->dd_pool;
1871 dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey;
1873 /* clones always use their origin's wrapping key */
1874 if (dsl_dir_is_clone(dd)) {
1875 ASSERT3P(dcp, ==, NULL);
1878 * If this is an encrypted clone we just need to clone the
1879 * dck into dd. Zapify the dd so we can do that.
1881 if (origin->ds_dir->dd_crypto_obj != 0) {
1882 dmu_buf_will_dirty(dd->dd_dbuf, tx);
1883 dsl_dir_zapify(dd, tx);
1886 dsl_crypto_key_clone_sync(origin->ds_dir, tx);
1887 VERIFY0(zap_add(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_object,
1888 DD_FIELD_CRYPTO_KEY_OBJ, sizeof (uint64_t), 1,
1889 &dd->dd_crypto_obj, tx));
1896 * A NULL dcp at this point indicates this is the origin dataset
1897 * which does not have an objset to encrypt. Raw receives will handle
1898 * encryption separately later. In both cases we can simply return.
1900 if (dcp == NULL || dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_RAW_RECV)
1903 crypt = dcp->cp_crypt;
1904 wkey = dcp->cp_wkey;
1906 /* figure out the effective crypt */
1907 if (crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT && dd->dd_parent != NULL)
1908 VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_crypt(dd->dd_parent, &crypt));
1910 /* if we aren't doing encryption just return */
1911 if (crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_OFF || crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT)
1914 /* zapify the dd so that we can add the crypto key obj to it */
1915 dmu_buf_will_dirty(dd->dd_dbuf, tx);
1916 dsl_dir_zapify(dd, tx);
1918 /* use the new key if given or inherit from the parent */
1920 VERIFY0(spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(dp->dp_spa,
1921 dd->dd_parent, FTAG, &wkey));
1923 wkey->wk_ddobj = dd->dd_object;
1926 ASSERT3P(wkey, !=, NULL);
1928 /* Create or clone the DSL crypto key and activate the feature */
1929 dd->dd_crypto_obj = dsl_crypto_key_create_sync(crypt, wkey, tx);
1930 VERIFY0(zap_add(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_object,
1931 DD_FIELD_CRYPTO_KEY_OBJ, sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &dd->dd_crypto_obj,
1933 dsl_dataset_activate_feature(dsobj, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION,
1934 (void *)B_TRUE, tx);
1937 * If we inherited the wrapping key we release our reference now.
1938 * Otherwise, this is a new key and we need to load it into the
1941 if (dcp->cp_wkey == NULL) {
1942 dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG);
1944 VERIFY0(spa_keystore_load_wkey_impl(dp->dp_spa, wkey));
1948 typedef struct dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg {
1949 uint64_t dcrka_dsobj;
1950 uint64_t dcrka_fromobj;
1951 dmu_objset_type_t dcrka_ostype;
1952 nvlist_t *dcrka_nvl;
1953 boolean_t dcrka_do_key;
1954 } dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg_t;
1957 dsl_crypto_recv_raw_objset_check(dsl_dataset_t *ds, dsl_dataset_t *fromds,
1958 dmu_objset_type_t ostype, nvlist_t *nvl, dmu_tx_t *tx)
1963 uint8_t *buf = NULL;
1965 uint64_t intval, nlevels, blksz, ibs;
1966 uint64_t nblkptr, maxblkid;
1968 if (ostype != DMU_OST_ZFS && ostype != DMU_OST_ZVOL)
1969 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1971 /* raw receives also need info about the structure of the metadnode */
1972 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_compress", &intval);
1973 if (ret != 0 || intval >= ZIO_COMPRESS_LEGACY_FUNCTIONS)
1974 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1976 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_checksum", &intval);
1977 if (ret != 0 || intval >= ZIO_CHECKSUM_LEGACY_FUNCTIONS)
1978 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1980 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nlevels", &nlevels);
1981 if (ret != 0 || nlevels > DN_MAX_LEVELS)
1982 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1984 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_blksz", &blksz);
1985 if (ret != 0 || blksz < SPA_MINBLOCKSIZE)
1986 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1987 else if (blksz > spa_maxblocksize(tx->tx_pool->dp_spa))
1988 return (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP));
1990 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_indblkshift", &ibs);
1991 if (ret != 0 || ibs < DN_MIN_INDBLKSHIFT || ibs > DN_MAX_INDBLKSHIFT)
1992 return (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP));
1994 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nblkptr", &nblkptr);
1995 if (ret != 0 || nblkptr != DN_MAX_NBLKPTR)
1996 return (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP));
1998 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_maxblkid", &maxblkid);
2000 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2002 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, "portable_mac", &buf, &len);
2003 if (ret != 0 || len != ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN)
2004 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2006 ret = dmu_objset_from_ds(ds, &os);
2011 * Useraccounting is not portable and must be done with the keys loaded.
2012 * Therefore, whenever we do any kind of receive the useraccounting
2013 * must not be present.
2015 ASSERT0(os->os_flags & OBJSET_FLAG_USERACCOUNTING_COMPLETE);
2016 ASSERT0(os->os_flags & OBJSET_FLAG_USEROBJACCOUNTING_COMPLETE);
2018 mdn = DMU_META_DNODE(os);
2021 * If we already created the objset, make sure its unchangeable
2022 * properties match the ones received in the nvlist.
2024 rrw_enter(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, RW_READER, FTAG);
2025 if (!BP_IS_HOLE(dsl_dataset_get_blkptr(ds)) &&
2026 (mdn->dn_nlevels != nlevels || mdn->dn_datablksz != blksz ||
2027 mdn->dn_indblkshift != ibs || mdn->dn_nblkptr != nblkptr)) {
2028 rrw_exit(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, FTAG);
2029 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2031 rrw_exit(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, FTAG);
2034 * Check that the ivset guid of the fromds matches the one from the
2035 * send stream. Older versions of the encryption code did not have
2036 * an ivset guid on the from dataset and did not send one in the
2037 * stream. For these streams we provide the
2038 * zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check tunable to allow these datasets to
2039 * be received with a generated ivset guid.
2041 if (fromds != NULL && !zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check) {
2042 uint64_t from_ivset_guid = 0;
2045 (void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "from_ivset_guid", &intval);
2046 (void) zap_lookup(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset,
2047 fromds->ds_object, DS_FIELD_IVSET_GUID,
2048 sizeof (from_ivset_guid), 1, &from_ivset_guid);
2050 if (intval == 0 || from_ivset_guid == 0)
2051 return (SET_ERROR(ZFS_ERR_FROM_IVSET_GUID_MISSING));
2053 if (intval != from_ivset_guid)
2054 return (SET_ERROR(ZFS_ERR_FROM_IVSET_GUID_MISMATCH));
2061 dsl_crypto_recv_raw_objset_sync(dsl_dataset_t *ds, dmu_objset_type_t ostype,
2062 nvlist_t *nvl, dmu_tx_t *tx)
2064 dsl_pool_t *dp = tx->tx_pool;
2068 uint8_t *portable_mac;
2070 uint64_t compress, checksum, nlevels, blksz, ibs, maxblkid;
2071 boolean_t newds = B_FALSE;
2073 VERIFY0(dmu_objset_from_ds(ds, &os));
2074 mdn = DMU_META_DNODE(os);
2077 * Fetch the values we need from the nvlist. "to_ivset_guid" must
2078 * be set on the snapshot, which doesn't exist yet. The receive
2079 * code will take care of this for us later.
2081 compress = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_compress");
2082 checksum = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_checksum");
2083 nlevels = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nlevels");
2084 blksz = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_blksz");
2085 ibs = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_indblkshift");
2086 maxblkid = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_maxblkid");
2087 VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, "portable_mac", &portable_mac,
2090 /* if we haven't created an objset for the ds yet, do that now */
2091 rrw_enter(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, RW_READER, FTAG);
2092 if (BP_IS_HOLE(dsl_dataset_get_blkptr(ds))) {
2093 (void) dmu_objset_create_impl_dnstats(dp->dp_spa, ds,
2094 dsl_dataset_get_blkptr(ds), ostype, nlevels, blksz,
2098 rrw_exit(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, FTAG);
2101 * Set the portable MAC. The local MAC will always be zero since the
2102 * incoming data will all be portable and user accounting will be
2103 * deferred until the next mount. Afterwards, flag the os to be
2104 * written out raw next time.
2106 arc_release(os->os_phys_buf, &os->os_phys_buf);
2107 bcopy(portable_mac, os->os_phys->os_portable_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN);
2108 bzero(os->os_phys->os_local_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN);
2109 os->os_next_write_raw[tx->tx_txg & TXG_MASK] = B_TRUE;
2111 /* set metadnode compression and checksum */
2112 mdn->dn_compress = compress;
2113 mdn->dn_checksum = checksum;
2115 rw_enter(&mdn->dn_struct_rwlock, RW_WRITER);
2116 dnode_new_blkid(mdn, maxblkid, tx, B_FALSE, B_TRUE);
2117 rw_exit(&mdn->dn_struct_rwlock);
2120 * We can't normally dirty the dataset in syncing context unless
2121 * we are creating a new dataset. In this case, we perform a
2122 * pseudo txg sync here instead.
2125 dsl_dataset_dirty(ds, tx);
2127 zio = zio_root(dp->dp_spa, NULL, NULL, ZIO_FLAG_MUSTSUCCEED);
2128 dsl_dataset_sync(ds, zio, tx);
2129 VERIFY0(zio_wait(zio));
2131 /* dsl_dataset_sync_done will drop this reference. */
2132 dmu_buf_add_ref(ds->ds_dbuf, ds);
2133 dsl_dataset_sync_done(ds, tx);
2138 dsl_crypto_recv_raw_key_check(dsl_dataset_t *ds, nvlist_t *nvl, dmu_tx_t *tx)
2141 objset_t *mos = tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset;
2142 uint8_t *buf = NULL;
2144 uint64_t intval, key_guid, version;
2145 boolean_t is_passphrase = B_FALSE;
2147 ASSERT(dsl_dataset_phys(ds)->ds_flags & DS_FLAG_INCONSISTENT);
2150 * Read and check all the encryption values from the nvlist. We need
2151 * all of the fields of a DSL Crypto Key, as well as a fully specified
2154 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, &intval);
2155 if (ret != 0 || intval >= ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS ||
2156 intval <= ZIO_CRYPT_OFF)
2157 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2159 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, &intval);
2161 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2164 * If this is an incremental receive make sure the given key guid
2165 * matches the one we already have.
2167 if (ds->ds_dir->dd_crypto_obj != 0) {
2168 ret = zap_lookup(mos, ds->ds_dir->dd_crypto_obj,
2169 DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1, &key_guid);
2172 if (intval != key_guid)
2173 return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
2176 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY,
2178 if (ret != 0 || len != MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN)
2179 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2181 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY,
2183 if (ret != 0 || len != SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN)
2184 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2186 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, &buf, &len);
2187 if (ret != 0 || len != WRAPPING_IV_LEN)
2188 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2190 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, &buf, &len);
2191 if (ret != 0 || len != WRAPPING_MAC_LEN)
2192 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2195 * We don't support receiving old on-disk formats. The version 0
2196 * implementation protected several fields in an objset that were
2197 * not always portable during a raw receive. As a result, we call
2198 * the old version an on-disk errata #3.
2200 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, &version);
2201 if (ret != 0 || version != ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION)
2202 return (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP));
2204 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT),
2206 if (ret != 0 || intval >= ZFS_KEYFORMAT_FORMATS ||
2207 intval == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE)
2208 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2210 is_passphrase = (intval == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE);
2213 * for raw receives we allow any number of pbkdf2iters since there
2214 * won't be a chance for the user to change it.
2216 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS),
2218 if (ret != 0 || (is_passphrase == (intval == 0)))
2219 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2221 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT),
2223 if (ret != 0 || (is_passphrase == (intval == 0)))
2224 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2230 dsl_crypto_recv_raw_key_sync(dsl_dataset_t *ds, nvlist_t *nvl, dmu_tx_t *tx)
2232 dsl_pool_t *dp = tx->tx_pool;
2233 objset_t *mos = dp->dp_meta_objset;
2234 dsl_dir_t *dd = ds->ds_dir;
2236 uint64_t rddobj, one = 1;
2237 uint8_t *keydata, *hmac_keydata, *iv, *mac;
2238 uint64_t crypt, key_guid, keyformat, iters, salt;
2239 uint64_t version = ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION;
2240 char *keylocation = "prompt";
2242 /* lookup the values we need to create the DSL Crypto Key */
2243 crypt = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE);
2244 key_guid = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID);
2245 keyformat = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl,
2246 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT));
2247 iters = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl,
2248 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS));
2249 salt = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl,
2250 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT));
2251 VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY,
2253 VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY,
2254 &hmac_keydata, &len));
2255 VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, &iv, &len));
2256 VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, &mac, &len));
2258 /* if this is a new dataset setup the DSL Crypto Key. */
2259 if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) {
2260 /* zapify the dsl dir so we can add the key object to it */
2261 dmu_buf_will_dirty(dd->dd_dbuf, tx);
2262 dsl_dir_zapify(dd, tx);
2264 /* create the DSL Crypto Key on disk and activate the feature */
2265 dd->dd_crypto_obj = zap_create(mos,
2266 DMU_OTN_ZAP_METADATA, DMU_OT_NONE, 0, tx);
2267 VERIFY0(zap_update(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset,
2268 dd->dd_crypto_obj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT,
2269 sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &one, tx));
2270 VERIFY0(zap_update(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset,
2271 dd->dd_crypto_obj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION,
2272 sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &version, tx));
2274 dsl_dataset_activate_feature(ds->ds_object,
2275 SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION, (void *)B_TRUE, tx);
2276 ds->ds_feature[SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION] = (void *)B_TRUE;
2278 /* save the dd_crypto_obj on disk */
2279 VERIFY0(zap_add(mos, dd->dd_object, DD_FIELD_CRYPTO_KEY_OBJ,
2280 sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &dd->dd_crypto_obj, tx));
2283 * Set the keylocation to prompt by default. If keylocation
2284 * has been provided via the properties, this will be overridden
2287 dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(ds,
2288 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION),
2289 ZPROP_SRC_LOCAL, 1, strlen(keylocation) + 1,
2292 rddobj = dd->dd_object;
2294 VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj));
2297 /* sync the key data to the ZAP object on disk */
2298 dsl_crypto_key_sync_impl(mos, dd->dd_crypto_obj, crypt,
2299 rddobj, key_guid, iv, mac, keydata, hmac_keydata, keyformat, salt,
2304 dsl_crypto_recv_key_check(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx)
2307 dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg_t *dcrka = arg;
2308 dsl_dataset_t *ds = NULL, *fromds = NULL;
2310 ret = dsl_dataset_hold_obj(tx->tx_pool, dcrka->dcrka_dsobj,
2315 if (dcrka->dcrka_fromobj != 0) {
2316 ret = dsl_dataset_hold_obj(tx->tx_pool, dcrka->dcrka_fromobj,
2322 ret = dsl_crypto_recv_raw_objset_check(ds, fromds,
2323 dcrka->dcrka_ostype, dcrka->dcrka_nvl, tx);
2328 * We run this check even if we won't be doing this part of
2329 * the receive now so that we don't make the user wait until
2330 * the receive finishes to fail.
2332 ret = dsl_crypto_recv_raw_key_check(ds, dcrka->dcrka_nvl, tx);
2338 dsl_dataset_rele(ds, FTAG);
2340 dsl_dataset_rele(fromds, FTAG);
2345 dsl_crypto_recv_key_sync(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx)
2347 dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg_t *dcrka = arg;
2350 VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold_obj(tx->tx_pool, dcrka->dcrka_dsobj,
2352 dsl_crypto_recv_raw_objset_sync(ds, dcrka->dcrka_ostype,
2353 dcrka->dcrka_nvl, tx);
2354 if (dcrka->dcrka_do_key)
2355 dsl_crypto_recv_raw_key_sync(ds, dcrka->dcrka_nvl, tx);
2356 dsl_dataset_rele(ds, FTAG);
2360 * This function is used to sync an nvlist representing a DSL Crypto Key and
2361 * the associated encryption parameters. The key will be written exactly as is
2362 * without wrapping it.
2365 dsl_crypto_recv_raw(const char *poolname, uint64_t dsobj, uint64_t fromobj,
2366 dmu_objset_type_t ostype, nvlist_t *nvl, boolean_t do_key)
2368 dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg_t dcrka;
2370 dcrka.dcrka_dsobj = dsobj;
2371 dcrka.dcrka_fromobj = fromobj;
2372 dcrka.dcrka_ostype = ostype;
2373 dcrka.dcrka_nvl = nvl;
2374 dcrka.dcrka_do_key = do_key;
2376 return (dsl_sync_task(poolname, dsl_crypto_recv_key_check,
2377 dsl_crypto_recv_key_sync, &dcrka, 1, ZFS_SPACE_CHECK_NORMAL));
2381 dsl_crypto_populate_key_nvlist(objset_t *os, uint64_t from_ivset_guid,
2385 dsl_dataset_t *ds = os->os_dsl_dataset;
2388 nvlist_t *nvl = NULL;
2389 uint64_t dckobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_crypto_obj;
2390 dsl_dir_t *rdd = NULL;
2391 dsl_pool_t *dp = ds->ds_dir->dd_pool;
2392 objset_t *mos = dp->dp_meta_objset;
2393 uint64_t crypt = 0, key_guid = 0, format = 0;
2394 uint64_t iters = 0, salt = 0, version = 0;
2395 uint64_t to_ivset_guid = 0;
2396 uint8_t raw_keydata[MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN];
2397 uint8_t raw_hmac_keydata[SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN];
2398 uint8_t iv[WRAPPING_IV_LEN];
2399 uint8_t mac[WRAPPING_MAC_LEN];
2401 ASSERT(dckobj != 0);
2403 mdn = DMU_META_DNODE(os);
2405 nvl = fnvlist_alloc();
2407 /* lookup values from the DSL Crypto Key */
2408 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, 8, 1,
2413 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1, &key_guid);
2417 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY, 1,
2418 MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN, raw_keydata);
2422 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY, 1,
2423 SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN, raw_hmac_keydata);
2427 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, 1, WRAPPING_IV_LEN,
2432 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, 1, WRAPPING_MAC_LEN,
2437 /* see zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check tunable for errata info */
2438 ret = zap_lookup(mos, ds->ds_object, DS_FIELD_IVSET_GUID, 8, 1,
2441 ASSERT3U(dp->dp_spa->spa_errata, !=, 0);
2444 * We don't support raw sends of legacy on-disk formats. See the
2445 * comment in dsl_crypto_recv_key_check() for details.
2447 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, 8, 1, &version);
2448 if (ret != 0 || version != ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION) {
2449 dp->dp_spa->spa_errata = ZPOOL_ERRATA_ZOL_6845_ENCRYPTION;
2450 ret = SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP);
2455 * Lookup wrapping key properties. An early version of the code did
2456 * not correctly add these values to the wrapping key or the DSL
2457 * Crypto Key on disk for non encryption roots, so to be safe we
2458 * always take the slightly circuitous route of looking it up from
2459 * the encryption root's key.
2461 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(ds->ds_dir, &rddobj);
2465 dsl_pool_config_enter(dp, FTAG);
2467 ret = dsl_dir_hold_obj(dp, rddobj, NULL, FTAG, &rdd);
2471 ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, rdd->dd_crypto_obj,
2472 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), 8, 1, &format);
2476 if (format == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE) {
2477 ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, rdd->dd_crypto_obj,
2478 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), 8, 1, &iters);
2482 ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, rdd->dd_crypto_obj,
2483 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), 8, 1, &salt);
2488 dsl_dir_rele(rdd, FTAG);
2489 dsl_pool_config_exit(dp, FTAG);
2491 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, crypt);
2492 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, key_guid);
2493 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, version);
2494 VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY,
2495 raw_keydata, MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN));
2496 VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY,
2497 raw_hmac_keydata, SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN));
2498 VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, iv,
2500 VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, mac,
2502 VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, "portable_mac",
2503 os->os_phys->os_portable_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN));
2504 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), format);
2505 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), iters);
2506 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), salt);
2507 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_checksum", mdn->dn_checksum);
2508 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_compress", mdn->dn_compress);
2509 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nlevels", mdn->dn_nlevels);
2510 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_blksz", mdn->dn_datablksz);
2511 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_indblkshift", mdn->dn_indblkshift);
2512 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nblkptr", mdn->dn_nblkptr);
2513 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_maxblkid", mdn->dn_maxblkid);
2514 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "to_ivset_guid", to_ivset_guid);
2515 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "from_ivset_guid", from_ivset_guid);
2521 dsl_pool_config_exit(dp, FTAG);
2524 dsl_dir_rele(rdd, FTAG);
2532 dsl_crypto_key_create_sync(uint64_t crypt, dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey,
2535 dsl_crypto_key_t dck;
2536 uint64_t version = ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION;
2537 uint64_t one = 1ULL;
2539 ASSERT(dmu_tx_is_syncing(tx));
2540 ASSERT3U(crypt, <, ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS);
2541 ASSERT3U(crypt, >, ZIO_CRYPT_OFF);
2543 /* create the DSL Crypto Key ZAP object */
2544 dck.dck_obj = zap_create(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset,
2545 DMU_OTN_ZAP_METADATA, DMU_OT_NONE, 0, tx);
2547 /* fill in the key (on the stack) and sync it to disk */
2548 dck.dck_wkey = wkey;
2549 VERIFY0(zio_crypt_key_init(crypt, &dck.dck_key));
2551 dsl_crypto_key_sync(&dck, tx);
2552 VERIFY0(zap_update(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset, dck.dck_obj,
2553 DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT, sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &one, tx));
2554 VERIFY0(zap_update(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset, dck.dck_obj,
2555 DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &version, tx));
2557 zio_crypt_key_destroy(&dck.dck_key);
2558 bzero(&dck.dck_key, sizeof (zio_crypt_key_t));
2560 return (dck.dck_obj);
2564 dsl_crypto_key_clone_sync(dsl_dir_t *origindd, dmu_tx_t *tx)
2566 objset_t *mos = tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset;
2568 ASSERT(dmu_tx_is_syncing(tx));
2570 VERIFY0(zap_increment(mos, origindd->dd_crypto_obj,
2571 DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT, 1, tx));
2573 return (origindd->dd_crypto_obj);
2577 dsl_crypto_key_destroy_sync(uint64_t dckobj, dmu_tx_t *tx)
2579 objset_t *mos = tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset;
2582 /* Decrement the refcount, destroy if this is the last reference */
2583 VERIFY0(zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT,
2584 sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &refcnt));
2587 VERIFY0(zap_increment(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT,
2590 VERIFY0(zap_destroy(mos, dckobj, tx));
2595 dsl_dataset_crypt_stats(dsl_dataset_t *ds, nvlist_t *nv)
2598 dsl_dir_t *dd = ds->ds_dir;
2599 dsl_dir_t *enc_root;
2600 char buf[ZFS_MAX_DATASET_NAME_LEN];
2602 if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
2605 intval = dsl_dataset_get_keystatus(dd);
2606 dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_KEYSTATUS, intval);
2608 if (dsl_dir_get_crypt(dd, &intval) == 0)
2609 dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_ENCRYPTION, intval);
2610 if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
2611 DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1, &intval) == 0) {
2612 dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_KEY_GUID, intval);
2614 if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
2615 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), 8, 1, &intval) == 0) {
2616 dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT, intval);
2618 if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
2619 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), 8, 1, &intval) == 0) {
2620 dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT, intval);
2622 if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
2623 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), 8, 1, &intval) == 0) {
2624 dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS, intval);
2626 if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, ds->ds_object,
2627 DS_FIELD_IVSET_GUID, 8, 1, &intval) == 0) {
2628 dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_IVSET_GUID, intval);
2631 if (dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &intval) == 0) {
2632 if (dsl_dir_hold_obj(dd->dd_pool, intval, NULL, FTAG,
2634 dsl_dir_name(enc_root, buf);
2635 dsl_dir_rele(enc_root, FTAG);
2636 dsl_prop_nvlist_add_string(nv,
2637 ZFS_PROP_ENCRYPTION_ROOT, buf);
2643 spa_crypt_get_salt(spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj, uint8_t *salt)
2646 dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
2648 /* look up the key from the spa's keystore */
2649 ret = spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa, dsobj, FTAG, &dck);
2653 ret = zio_crypt_key_get_salt(&dck->dck_key, salt);
2657 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
2662 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
2667 * Objset blocks are a special case for MAC generation. These blocks have 2
2668 * 256-bit MACs which are embedded within the block itself, rather than a
2669 * single 128 bit MAC. As a result, this function handles encoding and decoding
2670 * the MACs on its own, unlike other functions in this file.
2673 spa_do_crypt_objset_mac_abd(boolean_t generate, spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj,
2674 abd_t *abd, uint_t datalen, boolean_t byteswap)
2677 dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
2678 void *buf = abd_borrow_buf_copy(abd, datalen);
2679 objset_phys_t *osp = buf;
2680 uint8_t portable_mac[ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN];
2681 uint8_t local_mac[ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN];
2683 /* look up the key from the spa's keystore */
2684 ret = spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa, dsobj, FTAG, &dck);
2688 /* calculate both HMACs */
2689 ret = zio_crypt_do_objset_hmacs(&dck->dck_key, buf, datalen,
2690 byteswap, portable_mac, local_mac);
2694 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
2696 /* if we are generating encode the HMACs in the objset_phys_t */
2698 bcopy(portable_mac, osp->os_portable_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN);
2699 bcopy(local_mac, osp->os_local_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN);
2700 abd_return_buf_copy(abd, buf, datalen);
2704 if (bcmp(portable_mac, osp->os_portable_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN) != 0 ||
2705 bcmp(local_mac, osp->os_local_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN) != 0) {
2706 abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen);
2707 return (SET_ERROR(ECKSUM));
2710 abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen);
2716 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
2717 abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen);
2722 spa_do_crypt_mac_abd(boolean_t generate, spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj, abd_t *abd,
2723 uint_t datalen, uint8_t *mac)
2726 dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
2727 uint8_t *buf = abd_borrow_buf_copy(abd, datalen);
2728 uint8_t digestbuf[ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN];
2730 /* look up the key from the spa's keystore */
2731 ret = spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa, dsobj, FTAG, &dck);
2735 /* perform the hmac */
2736 ret = zio_crypt_do_hmac(&dck->dck_key, buf, datalen,
2737 digestbuf, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN);
2741 abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen);
2742 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
2745 * Truncate and fill in mac buffer if we were asked to generate a MAC.
2746 * Otherwise verify that the MAC matched what we expected.
2749 bcopy(digestbuf, mac, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN);
2753 if (bcmp(digestbuf, mac, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN) != 0)
2754 return (SET_ERROR(ECKSUM));
2760 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
2761 abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen);
2766 * This function serves as a multiplexer for encryption and decryption of
2767 * all blocks (except the L2ARC). For encryption, it will populate the IV,
2768 * salt, MAC, and cabd (the ciphertext). On decryption it will simply use
2769 * these fields to populate pabd (the plaintext).
2772 spa_do_crypt_abd(boolean_t encrypt, spa_t *spa, const zbookmark_phys_t *zb,
2773 dmu_object_type_t ot, boolean_t dedup, boolean_t bswap, uint8_t *salt,
2774 uint8_t *iv, uint8_t *mac, uint_t datalen, abd_t *pabd, abd_t *cabd,
2775 boolean_t *no_crypt)
2778 dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
2779 uint8_t *plainbuf = NULL, *cipherbuf = NULL;
2781 ASSERT(spa_feature_is_active(spa, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION));
2783 /* look up the key from the spa's keystore */
2784 ret = spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa, zb->zb_objset, FTAG, &dck);
2786 ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
2791 plainbuf = abd_borrow_buf_copy(pabd, datalen);
2792 cipherbuf = abd_borrow_buf(cabd, datalen);
2794 plainbuf = abd_borrow_buf(pabd, datalen);
2795 cipherbuf = abd_borrow_buf_copy(cabd, datalen);
2799 * Both encryption and decryption functions need a salt for key
2800 * generation and an IV. When encrypting a non-dedup block, we
2801 * generate the salt and IV randomly to be stored by the caller. Dedup
2802 * blocks perform a (more expensive) HMAC of the plaintext to obtain
2803 * the salt and the IV. ZIL blocks have their salt and IV generated
2804 * at allocation time in zio_alloc_zil(). On decryption, we simply use
2805 * the provided values.
2807 if (encrypt && ot != DMU_OT_INTENT_LOG && !dedup) {
2808 ret = zio_crypt_key_get_salt(&dck->dck_key, salt);
2812 ret = zio_crypt_generate_iv(iv);
2815 } else if (encrypt && dedup) {
2816 ret = zio_crypt_generate_iv_salt_dedup(&dck->dck_key,
2817 plainbuf, datalen, iv, salt);
2822 /* call lower level function to perform encryption / decryption */
2823 ret = zio_do_crypt_data(encrypt, &dck->dck_key, ot, bswap, salt, iv,
2824 mac, datalen, plainbuf, cipherbuf, no_crypt);
2827 * Handle injected decryption faults. Unfortunately, we cannot inject
2828 * faults for dnode blocks because we might trigger the panic in
2829 * dbuf_prepare_encrypted_dnode_leaf(), which exists because syncing
2830 * context is not prepared to handle malicious decryption failures.
2832 if (zio_injection_enabled && !encrypt && ot != DMU_OT_DNODE && ret == 0)
2833 ret = zio_handle_decrypt_injection(spa, zb, ot, ECKSUM);
2838 abd_return_buf(pabd, plainbuf, datalen);
2839 abd_return_buf_copy(cabd, cipherbuf, datalen);
2841 abd_return_buf_copy(pabd, plainbuf, datalen);
2842 abd_return_buf(cabd, cipherbuf, datalen);
2845 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
2851 /* zero out any state we might have changed while encrypting */
2852 bzero(salt, ZIO_DATA_SALT_LEN);
2853 bzero(iv, ZIO_DATA_IV_LEN);
2854 bzero(mac, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN);
2855 abd_return_buf(pabd, plainbuf, datalen);
2856 abd_return_buf_copy(cabd, cipherbuf, datalen);
2858 abd_return_buf_copy(pabd, plainbuf, datalen);
2859 abd_return_buf(cabd, cipherbuf, datalen);
2862 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
2867 ZFS_MODULE_PARAM(zfs, zfs_, disable_ivset_guid_check, INT, ZMOD_RW,
2868 "Set to allow raw receives without IVset guids");