4 * This file and its contents are supplied under the terms of the
5 * Common Development and Distribution License ("CDDL"), version 1.0.
6 * You may only use this file in accordance with the terms of version
9 * A full copy of the text of the CDDL should have accompanied this
10 * source. A copy of the CDDL is also available via the Internet at
11 * http://www.illumos.org/license/CDDL.
17 * Copyright (c) 2017, Datto, Inc. All rights reserved.
18 * Copyright (c) 2018 by Delphix. All rights reserved.
21 #include <sys/dsl_crypt.h>
22 #include <sys/dsl_pool.h>
25 #include <sys/dsl_dir.h>
26 #include <sys/dsl_prop.h>
27 #include <sys/spa_impl.h>
28 #include <sys/dmu_objset.h>
32 * This file's primary purpose is for managing master encryption keys in
33 * memory and on disk. For more info on how these keys are used, see the
34 * block comment in zio_crypt.c.
36 * All master keys are stored encrypted on disk in the form of the DSL
37 * Crypto Key ZAP object. The binary key data in this object is always
38 * randomly generated and is encrypted with the user's wrapping key. This
39 * layer of indirection allows the user to change their key without
40 * needing to re-encrypt the entire dataset. The ZAP also holds on to the
41 * (non-encrypted) encryption algorithm identifier, IV, and MAC needed to
42 * safely decrypt the master key. For more info on the user's key see the
43 * block comment in libzfs_crypto.c
45 * In-memory encryption keys are managed through the spa_keystore. The
46 * keystore consists of 3 AVL trees, which are as follows:
48 * The Wrapping Key Tree:
49 * The wrapping key (wkey) tree stores the user's keys that are fed into the
50 * kernel through 'zfs load-key' and related commands. Datasets inherit their
51 * parent's wkey by default, so these structures are refcounted. The wrapping
52 * keys remain in memory until they are explicitly unloaded (with
53 * "zfs unload-key"). Unloading is only possible when no datasets are using
56 * The DSL Crypto Key Tree:
57 * The DSL Crypto Keys (DCK) are the in-memory representation of decrypted
58 * master keys. They are used by the functions in zio_crypt.c to perform
59 * encryption, decryption, and authentication. Snapshots and clones of a given
60 * dataset will share a DSL Crypto Key, so they are also refcounted. Once the
61 * refcount on a key hits zero, it is immediately zeroed out and freed.
63 * The Crypto Key Mapping Tree:
64 * The zio layer needs to lookup master keys by their dataset object id. Since
65 * the DSL Crypto Keys can belong to multiple datasets, we maintain a tree of
66 * dsl_key_mapping_t's which essentially just map the dataset object id to its
67 * appropriate DSL Crypto Key. The management for creating and destroying these
68 * mappings hooks into the code for owning and disowning datasets. Usually,
69 * there will only be one active dataset owner, but there are times
70 * (particularly during dataset creation and destruction) when this may not be
71 * true or the dataset may not be initialized enough to own. As a result, this
72 * object is also refcounted.
76 * This tunable allows datasets to be raw received even if the stream does
77 * not include IVset guids or if the guids don't match. This is used as part
78 * of the resolution for ZPOOL_ERRATA_ZOL_8308_ENCRYPTION.
80 int zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check = 0;
83 dsl_wrapping_key_hold(dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey, void *tag)
85 (void) zfs_refcount_add(&wkey->wk_refcnt, tag);
89 dsl_wrapping_key_rele(dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey, void *tag)
91 (void) zfs_refcount_remove(&wkey->wk_refcnt, tag);
95 dsl_wrapping_key_free(dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey)
97 ASSERT0(zfs_refcount_count(&wkey->wk_refcnt));
99 if (wkey->wk_key.ck_data) {
100 bzero(wkey->wk_key.ck_data,
101 CRYPTO_BITS2BYTES(wkey->wk_key.ck_length));
102 kmem_free(wkey->wk_key.ck_data,
103 CRYPTO_BITS2BYTES(wkey->wk_key.ck_length));
106 zfs_refcount_destroy(&wkey->wk_refcnt);
107 kmem_free(wkey, sizeof (dsl_wrapping_key_t));
111 dsl_wrapping_key_create(uint8_t *wkeydata, zfs_keyformat_t keyformat,
112 uint64_t salt, uint64_t iters, dsl_wrapping_key_t **wkey_out)
114 dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey;
116 /* allocate the wrapping key */
117 wkey = kmem_alloc(sizeof (dsl_wrapping_key_t), KM_SLEEP);
119 /* allocate and initialize the underlying crypto key */
120 wkey->wk_key.ck_data = kmem_alloc(WRAPPING_KEY_LEN, KM_SLEEP);
122 wkey->wk_key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW;
123 wkey->wk_key.ck_length = CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(WRAPPING_KEY_LEN);
124 bcopy(wkeydata, wkey->wk_key.ck_data, WRAPPING_KEY_LEN);
126 /* initialize the rest of the struct */
127 zfs_refcount_create(&wkey->wk_refcnt);
128 wkey->wk_keyformat = keyformat;
129 wkey->wk_salt = salt;
130 wkey->wk_iters = iters;
136 dsl_crypto_params_create_nvlist(dcp_cmd_t cmd, nvlist_t *props,
137 nvlist_t *crypto_args, dsl_crypto_params_t **dcp_out)
140 uint64_t crypt = ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT;
141 uint64_t keyformat = ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE;
142 uint64_t salt = 0, iters = 0;
143 dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp = NULL;
144 dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = NULL;
145 uint8_t *wkeydata = NULL;
146 uint_t wkeydata_len = 0;
147 char *keylocation = NULL;
149 dcp = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (dsl_crypto_params_t), KM_SLEEP);
152 /* get relevant arguments from the nvlists */
154 (void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(props,
155 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_ENCRYPTION), &crypt);
156 (void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(props,
157 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), &keyformat);
158 (void) nvlist_lookup_string(props,
159 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION), &keylocation);
160 (void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(props,
161 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), &salt);
162 (void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(props,
163 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), &iters);
165 dcp->cp_crypt = crypt;
168 if (crypto_args != NULL) {
169 (void) nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(crypto_args, "wkeydata",
170 &wkeydata, &wkeydata_len);
173 /* check for valid command */
174 if (dcp->cp_cmd >= DCP_CMD_MAX) {
175 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
181 /* check for valid crypt */
182 if (dcp->cp_crypt >= ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS) {
183 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
186 dcp->cp_crypt = crypt;
189 /* check for valid keyformat */
190 if (keyformat >= ZFS_KEYFORMAT_FORMATS) {
191 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
195 /* check for a valid keylocation (of any kind) and copy it in */
196 if (keylocation != NULL) {
197 if (!zfs_prop_valid_keylocation(keylocation, B_FALSE)) {
198 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
202 dcp->cp_keylocation = spa_strdup(keylocation);
205 /* check wrapping key length, if given */
206 if (wkeydata != NULL && wkeydata_len != WRAPPING_KEY_LEN) {
207 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
211 /* if the user asked for the default crypt, determine that now */
212 if (dcp->cp_crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_ON)
213 dcp->cp_crypt = ZIO_CRYPT_ON_VALUE;
215 /* create the wrapping key from the raw data */
216 if (wkeydata != NULL) {
217 /* create the wrapping key with the verified parameters */
218 dsl_wrapping_key_create(wkeydata, keyformat, salt,
224 * Remove the encryption properties from the nvlist since they are not
225 * maintained through the DSL.
227 (void) nvlist_remove_all(props, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_ENCRYPTION));
228 (void) nvlist_remove_all(props, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT));
229 (void) nvlist_remove_all(props, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT));
230 (void) nvlist_remove_all(props,
231 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS));
239 dsl_wrapping_key_free(wkey);
241 kmem_free(dcp, sizeof (dsl_crypto_params_t));
248 dsl_crypto_params_free(dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp, boolean_t unload)
253 if (dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL)
254 spa_strfree(dcp->cp_keylocation);
255 if (unload && dcp->cp_wkey != NULL)
256 dsl_wrapping_key_free(dcp->cp_wkey);
258 kmem_free(dcp, sizeof (dsl_crypto_params_t));
262 spa_crypto_key_compare(const void *a, const void *b)
264 const dsl_crypto_key_t *dcka = a;
265 const dsl_crypto_key_t *dckb = b;
267 if (dcka->dck_obj < dckb->dck_obj)
269 if (dcka->dck_obj > dckb->dck_obj)
275 spa_key_mapping_compare(const void *a, const void *b)
277 const dsl_key_mapping_t *kma = a;
278 const dsl_key_mapping_t *kmb = b;
280 if (kma->km_dsobj < kmb->km_dsobj)
282 if (kma->km_dsobj > kmb->km_dsobj)
288 spa_wkey_compare(const void *a, const void *b)
290 const dsl_wrapping_key_t *wka = a;
291 const dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkb = b;
293 if (wka->wk_ddobj < wkb->wk_ddobj)
295 if (wka->wk_ddobj > wkb->wk_ddobj)
301 spa_keystore_init(spa_keystore_t *sk)
303 rw_init(&sk->sk_dk_lock, NULL, RW_DEFAULT, NULL);
304 rw_init(&sk->sk_km_lock, NULL, RW_DEFAULT, NULL);
305 rw_init(&sk->sk_wkeys_lock, NULL, RW_DEFAULT, NULL);
306 avl_create(&sk->sk_dsl_keys, spa_crypto_key_compare,
307 sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t),
308 offsetof(dsl_crypto_key_t, dck_avl_link));
309 avl_create(&sk->sk_key_mappings, spa_key_mapping_compare,
310 sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t),
311 offsetof(dsl_key_mapping_t, km_avl_link));
312 avl_create(&sk->sk_wkeys, spa_wkey_compare, sizeof (dsl_wrapping_key_t),
313 offsetof(dsl_wrapping_key_t, wk_avl_link));
317 spa_keystore_fini(spa_keystore_t *sk)
319 dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey;
322 ASSERT(avl_is_empty(&sk->sk_dsl_keys));
323 ASSERT(avl_is_empty(&sk->sk_key_mappings));
325 while ((wkey = avl_destroy_nodes(&sk->sk_wkeys, &cookie)) != NULL)
326 dsl_wrapping_key_free(wkey);
328 avl_destroy(&sk->sk_wkeys);
329 avl_destroy(&sk->sk_key_mappings);
330 avl_destroy(&sk->sk_dsl_keys);
331 rw_destroy(&sk->sk_wkeys_lock);
332 rw_destroy(&sk->sk_km_lock);
333 rw_destroy(&sk->sk_dk_lock);
337 dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dsl_dir_t *dd, uint64_t *rddobj)
339 if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
340 return (SET_ERROR(ENOENT));
342 return (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
343 DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_ROOT_DDOBJ, 8, 1, rddobj));
347 dsl_dir_get_encryption_version(dsl_dir_t *dd, uint64_t *version)
351 if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
352 return (SET_ERROR(ENOENT));
354 /* version 0 is implied by ENOENT */
355 (void) zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
356 DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, 8, 1, version);
362 dsl_dir_incompatible_encryption_version(dsl_dir_t *dd)
365 uint64_t version = 0;
367 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_version(dd, &version);
371 return (version != ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION);
375 spa_keystore_wkey_hold_ddobj_impl(spa_t *spa, uint64_t ddobj,
376 void *tag, dsl_wrapping_key_t **wkey_out)
379 dsl_wrapping_key_t search_wkey;
380 dsl_wrapping_key_t *found_wkey;
382 ASSERT(RW_LOCK_HELD(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock));
384 /* init the search wrapping key */
385 search_wkey.wk_ddobj = ddobj;
387 /* lookup the wrapping key */
388 found_wkey = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, &search_wkey, NULL);
390 ret = SET_ERROR(ENOENT);
394 /* increment the refcount */
395 dsl_wrapping_key_hold(found_wkey, tag);
397 *wkey_out = found_wkey;
406 spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(spa_t *spa, dsl_dir_t *dd, void *tag,
407 dsl_wrapping_key_t **wkey_out)
410 dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey;
412 boolean_t locked = B_FALSE;
414 if (!RW_WRITE_HELD(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock)) {
415 rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_READER);
419 /* get the ddobj that the keylocation property was inherited from */
420 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj);
424 /* lookup the wkey in the avl tree */
425 ret = spa_keystore_wkey_hold_ddobj_impl(spa, rddobj, tag, &wkey);
429 /* unlock the wkey tree if we locked it */
431 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
438 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
445 dsl_crypto_can_set_keylocation(const char *dsname, const char *keylocation)
448 dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL;
449 dsl_pool_t *dp = NULL;
452 /* hold the dsl dir */
453 ret = dsl_pool_hold(dsname, FTAG, &dp);
457 ret = dsl_dir_hold(dp, dsname, FTAG, &dd, NULL);
463 /* if dd is not encrypted, the value may only be "none" */
464 if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) {
465 if (strcmp(keylocation, "none") != 0) {
466 ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
474 /* check for a valid keylocation for encrypted datasets */
475 if (!zfs_prop_valid_keylocation(keylocation, B_TRUE)) {
476 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
480 /* check that this is an encryption root */
481 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj);
485 if (rddobj != dd->dd_object) {
486 ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
490 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
491 dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
497 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
499 dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
505 dsl_crypto_key_free(dsl_crypto_key_t *dck)
507 ASSERT(zfs_refcount_count(&dck->dck_holds) == 0);
509 /* destroy the zio_crypt_key_t */
510 zio_crypt_key_destroy(&dck->dck_key);
512 /* free the refcount, wrapping key, and lock */
513 zfs_refcount_destroy(&dck->dck_holds);
515 dsl_wrapping_key_rele(dck->dck_wkey, dck);
518 kmem_free(dck, sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t));
522 dsl_crypto_key_rele(dsl_crypto_key_t *dck, void *tag)
524 if (zfs_refcount_remove(&dck->dck_holds, tag) == 0)
525 dsl_crypto_key_free(dck);
529 dsl_crypto_key_open(objset_t *mos, dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey,
530 uint64_t dckobj, void *tag, dsl_crypto_key_t **dck_out)
533 uint64_t crypt = 0, guid = 0, version = 0;
534 uint8_t raw_keydata[MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN];
535 uint8_t raw_hmac_keydata[SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN];
536 uint8_t iv[WRAPPING_IV_LEN];
537 uint8_t mac[WRAPPING_MAC_LEN];
538 dsl_crypto_key_t *dck;
540 /* allocate and initialize the key */
541 dck = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t), KM_SLEEP);
543 /* fetch all of the values we need from the ZAP */
544 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, 8, 1,
549 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1, &guid);
553 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY, 1,
554 MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN, raw_keydata);
558 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY, 1,
559 SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN, raw_hmac_keydata);
563 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, 1, WRAPPING_IV_LEN,
568 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, 1, WRAPPING_MAC_LEN,
573 /* the initial on-disk format for encryption did not have a version */
574 (void) zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, 8, 1, &version);
577 * Unwrap the keys. If there is an error return EACCES to indicate
578 * an authentication failure.
580 ret = zio_crypt_key_unwrap(&wkey->wk_key, crypt, version, guid,
581 raw_keydata, raw_hmac_keydata, iv, mac, &dck->dck_key);
583 ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
587 /* finish initializing the dsl_crypto_key_t */
588 zfs_refcount_create(&dck->dck_holds);
589 dsl_wrapping_key_hold(wkey, dck);
590 dck->dck_wkey = wkey;
591 dck->dck_obj = dckobj;
592 zfs_refcount_add(&dck->dck_holds, tag);
599 bzero(dck, sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t));
600 kmem_free(dck, sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t));
608 spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_impl(spa_t *spa, uint64_t dckobj, void *tag,
609 dsl_crypto_key_t **dck_out)
612 dsl_crypto_key_t search_dck;
613 dsl_crypto_key_t *found_dck;
615 ASSERT(RW_LOCK_HELD(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock));
617 /* init the search key */
618 search_dck.dck_obj = dckobj;
620 /* find the matching key in the keystore */
621 found_dck = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dsl_keys, &search_dck, NULL);
623 ret = SET_ERROR(ENOENT);
627 /* increment the refcount */
628 zfs_refcount_add(&found_dck->dck_holds, tag);
630 *dck_out = found_dck;
639 spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_dd(spa_t *spa, dsl_dir_t *dd, void *tag,
640 dsl_crypto_key_t **dck_out)
644 dsl_crypto_key_t *dck_io = NULL, *dck_ks = NULL;
645 dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = NULL;
646 uint64_t dckobj = dd->dd_crypto_obj;
648 /* Lookup the key in the tree of currently loaded keys */
649 rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock, RW_READER);
650 ret = spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_impl(spa, dckobj, tag, &dck_ks);
651 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock);
657 /* Lookup the wrapping key from the keystore */
658 ret = spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(spa, dd, FTAG, &wkey);
661 return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
664 /* Read the key from disk */
665 ret = dsl_crypto_key_open(spa->spa_meta_objset, wkey, dckobj,
668 dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG);
674 * Add the key to the keystore. It may already exist if it was
675 * added while performing the read from disk. In this case discard
676 * it and return the key from the keystore.
678 rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock, RW_WRITER);
679 ret = spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_impl(spa, dckobj, tag, &dck_ks);
681 avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dsl_keys, dck_io, &where);
682 avl_insert(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dsl_keys, dck_io, where);
685 dsl_crypto_key_free(dck_io);
689 /* Release the wrapping key (the dsl key now has a reference to it) */
690 dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG);
691 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock);
697 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa_t *spa, dsl_crypto_key_t *dck, void *tag)
699 rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock, RW_WRITER);
701 if (zfs_refcount_remove(&dck->dck_holds, tag) == 0) {
702 avl_remove(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dsl_keys, dck);
703 dsl_crypto_key_free(dck);
706 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock);
710 spa_keystore_load_wkey_impl(spa_t *spa, dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey)
714 dsl_wrapping_key_t *found_wkey;
716 rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_WRITER);
718 /* insert the wrapping key into the keystore */
719 found_wkey = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, wkey, &where);
720 if (found_wkey != NULL) {
721 ret = SET_ERROR(EEXIST);
724 avl_insert(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, wkey, where);
726 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
731 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
736 spa_keystore_load_wkey(const char *dsname, dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp,
740 dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL;
741 dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
742 dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = dcp->cp_wkey;
743 dsl_pool_t *dp = NULL;
744 uint64_t rddobj, keyformat, salt, iters;
747 * We don't validate the wrapping key's keyformat, salt, or iters
748 * since they will never be needed after the DCK has been wrapped.
750 if (dcp->cp_wkey == NULL ||
751 dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_NONE ||
752 dcp->cp_crypt != ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT ||
753 dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL)
754 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
756 ret = dsl_pool_hold(dsname, FTAG, &dp);
760 if (!spa_feature_is_enabled(dp->dp_spa, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION)) {
761 ret = SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP);
765 /* hold the dsl dir */
766 ret = dsl_dir_hold(dp, dsname, FTAG, &dd, NULL);
772 /* confirm that dd is the encryption root */
773 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj);
774 if (ret != 0 || rddobj != dd->dd_object) {
775 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
779 /* initialize the wkey's ddobj */
780 wkey->wk_ddobj = dd->dd_object;
782 /* verify that the wkey is correct by opening its dsl key */
783 ret = dsl_crypto_key_open(dp->dp_meta_objset, wkey,
784 dd->dd_crypto_obj, FTAG, &dck);
788 /* initialize the wkey encryption parameters from the DSL Crypto Key */
789 ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
790 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), 8, 1, &keyformat);
794 ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
795 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), 8, 1, &salt);
799 ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
800 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), 8, 1, &iters);
804 ASSERT3U(keyformat, <, ZFS_KEYFORMAT_FORMATS);
805 ASSERT3U(keyformat, !=, ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE);
806 IMPLY(keyformat == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, iters != 0);
807 IMPLY(keyformat == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, salt != 0);
808 IMPLY(keyformat != ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, iters == 0);
809 IMPLY(keyformat != ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, salt == 0);
811 wkey->wk_keyformat = keyformat;
812 wkey->wk_salt = salt;
813 wkey->wk_iters = iters;
816 * At this point we have verified the wkey and confirmed that it can
817 * be used to decrypt a DSL Crypto Key. We can simply cleanup and
818 * return if this is all the user wanted to do.
823 /* insert the wrapping key into the keystore */
824 ret = spa_keystore_load_wkey_impl(dp->dp_spa, wkey);
828 dsl_crypto_key_rele(dck, FTAG);
829 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
830 dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
832 /* create any zvols under this ds */
833 zvol_create_minors_recursive(dsname);
839 dsl_crypto_key_rele(dck, FTAG);
841 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
843 dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
849 spa_keystore_unload_wkey_impl(spa_t *spa, uint64_t ddobj)
852 dsl_wrapping_key_t search_wkey;
853 dsl_wrapping_key_t *found_wkey;
855 /* init the search wrapping key */
856 search_wkey.wk_ddobj = ddobj;
858 rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_WRITER);
860 /* remove the wrapping key from the keystore */
861 found_wkey = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys,
864 ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
866 } else if (zfs_refcount_count(&found_wkey->wk_refcnt) != 0) {
867 ret = SET_ERROR(EBUSY);
870 avl_remove(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, found_wkey);
872 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
874 /* free the wrapping key */
875 dsl_wrapping_key_free(found_wkey);
880 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
885 spa_keystore_unload_wkey(const char *dsname)
888 dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL;
889 dsl_pool_t *dp = NULL;
892 ret = spa_open(dsname, &spa, FTAG);
897 * Wait for any outstanding txg IO to complete, releasing any
898 * remaining references on the wkey.
900 if (spa_mode(spa) != SPA_MODE_READ)
901 txg_wait_synced(spa->spa_dsl_pool, 0);
903 spa_close(spa, FTAG);
905 /* hold the dsl dir */
906 ret = dsl_pool_hold(dsname, FTAG, &dp);
910 if (!spa_feature_is_enabled(dp->dp_spa, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION)) {
911 ret = (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP));
915 ret = dsl_dir_hold(dp, dsname, FTAG, &dd, NULL);
921 /* unload the wkey */
922 ret = spa_keystore_unload_wkey_impl(dp->dp_spa, dd->dd_object);
926 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
927 dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
929 /* remove any zvols under this ds */
930 zvol_remove_minors(dp->dp_spa, dsname, B_TRUE);
936 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
938 dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
944 key_mapping_add_ref(dsl_key_mapping_t *km, void *tag)
946 ASSERT3U(zfs_refcount_count(&km->km_refcnt), >=, 1);
947 zfs_refcount_add(&km->km_refcnt, tag);
951 * The locking here is a little tricky to ensure we don't cause unnecessary
952 * performance problems. We want to release a key mapping whenever someone
953 * decrements the refcount to 0, but freeing the mapping requires removing
954 * it from the spa_keystore, which requires holding sk_km_lock as a writer.
955 * Most of the time we don't want to hold this lock as a writer, since the
956 * same lock is held as a reader for each IO that needs to encrypt / decrypt
957 * data for any dataset and in practice we will only actually free the
958 * mapping after unmounting a dataset.
961 key_mapping_rele(spa_t *spa, dsl_key_mapping_t *km, void *tag)
963 ASSERT3U(zfs_refcount_count(&km->km_refcnt), >=, 1);
965 if (zfs_refcount_remove(&km->km_refcnt, tag) != 0)
969 * We think we are going to need to free the mapping. Add a
970 * reference to prevent most other releasers from thinking
971 * this might be their responsibility. This is inherently
972 * racy, so we will confirm that we are legitimately the
973 * last holder once we have the sk_km_lock as a writer.
975 zfs_refcount_add(&km->km_refcnt, FTAG);
977 rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock, RW_WRITER);
978 if (zfs_refcount_remove(&km->km_refcnt, FTAG) != 0) {
979 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
983 avl_remove(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings, km);
984 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
986 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, km->km_key, km);
987 zfs_refcount_destroy(&km->km_refcnt);
988 kmem_free(km, sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t));
992 spa_keystore_create_mapping(spa_t *spa, dsl_dataset_t *ds, void *tag,
993 dsl_key_mapping_t **km_out)
997 dsl_key_mapping_t *km, *found_km;
998 boolean_t should_free = B_FALSE;
1000 /* Allocate and initialize the mapping */
1001 km = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t), KM_SLEEP);
1002 zfs_refcount_create(&km->km_refcnt);
1004 ret = spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_dd(spa, ds->ds_dir, km, &km->km_key);
1006 zfs_refcount_destroy(&km->km_refcnt);
1007 kmem_free(km, sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t));
1014 km->km_dsobj = ds->ds_object;
1016 rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock, RW_WRITER);
1019 * If a mapping already exists, simply increment its refcount and
1020 * cleanup the one we made. We want to allocate / free outside of
1021 * the lock because this lock is also used by the zio layer to lookup
1022 * key mappings. Otherwise, use the one we created. Normally, there will
1023 * only be one active reference at a time (the objset owner), but there
1024 * are times when there could be multiple async users.
1026 found_km = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings, km, &where);
1027 if (found_km != NULL) {
1028 should_free = B_TRUE;
1029 zfs_refcount_add(&found_km->km_refcnt, tag);
1033 zfs_refcount_add(&km->km_refcnt, tag);
1034 avl_insert(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings, km, where);
1039 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
1042 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, km->km_key, km);
1043 zfs_refcount_destroy(&km->km_refcnt);
1044 kmem_free(km, sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t));
1051 spa_keystore_remove_mapping(spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj, void *tag)
1054 dsl_key_mapping_t search_km;
1055 dsl_key_mapping_t *found_km;
1057 /* init the search key mapping */
1058 search_km.km_dsobj = dsobj;
1060 rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock, RW_READER);
1062 /* find the matching mapping */
1063 found_km = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings,
1065 if (found_km == NULL) {
1066 ret = SET_ERROR(ENOENT);
1070 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
1072 key_mapping_rele(spa, found_km, tag);
1077 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
1082 * This function is primarily used by the zio and arc layer to lookup
1083 * DSL Crypto Keys for encryption. Callers must release the key with
1084 * spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(). The function may also be called with
1085 * dck_out == NULL and tag == NULL to simply check that a key exists
1086 * without getting a reference to it.
1089 spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj, void *tag,
1090 dsl_crypto_key_t **dck_out)
1093 dsl_key_mapping_t search_km;
1094 dsl_key_mapping_t *found_km;
1096 ASSERT((tag != NULL && dck_out != NULL) ||
1097 (tag == NULL && dck_out == NULL));
1099 /* init the search key mapping */
1100 search_km.km_dsobj = dsobj;
1102 rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock, RW_READER);
1104 /* remove the mapping from the tree */
1105 found_km = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings, &search_km,
1107 if (found_km == NULL) {
1108 ret = SET_ERROR(ENOENT);
1112 if (found_km && tag)
1113 zfs_refcount_add(&found_km->km_key->dck_holds, tag);
1115 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
1117 if (dck_out != NULL)
1118 *dck_out = found_km->km_key;
1122 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
1124 if (dck_out != NULL)
1130 dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dsl_dir_t *dd)
1133 dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = NULL;
1135 ret = spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(dd->dd_pool->dp_spa, dd, FTAG,
1138 return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
1140 dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG);
1145 static zfs_keystatus_t
1146 dsl_dataset_get_keystatus(dsl_dir_t *dd)
1148 /* check if this dd has a has a dsl key */
1149 if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
1150 return (ZFS_KEYSTATUS_NONE);
1152 return (dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dd) == 0 ?
1153 ZFS_KEYSTATUS_AVAILABLE : ZFS_KEYSTATUS_UNAVAILABLE);
1157 dsl_dir_get_crypt(dsl_dir_t *dd, uint64_t *crypt)
1159 if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) {
1160 *crypt = ZIO_CRYPT_OFF;
1164 return (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
1165 DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, 8, 1, crypt));
1169 dsl_crypto_key_sync_impl(objset_t *mos, uint64_t dckobj, uint64_t crypt,
1170 uint64_t root_ddobj, uint64_t guid, uint8_t *iv, uint8_t *mac,
1171 uint8_t *keydata, uint8_t *hmac_keydata, uint64_t keyformat,
1172 uint64_t salt, uint64_t iters, dmu_tx_t *tx)
1174 VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, 8, 1,
1176 VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_ROOT_DDOBJ, 8, 1,
1178 VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1,
1180 VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, 1, WRAPPING_IV_LEN,
1182 VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, 1, WRAPPING_MAC_LEN,
1184 VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY, 1,
1185 MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN, keydata, tx));
1186 VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY, 1,
1187 SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN, hmac_keydata, tx));
1188 VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT),
1189 8, 1, &keyformat, tx));
1190 VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT),
1192 VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS),
1197 dsl_crypto_key_sync(dsl_crypto_key_t *dck, dmu_tx_t *tx)
1199 zio_crypt_key_t *key = &dck->dck_key;
1200 dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = dck->dck_wkey;
1201 uint8_t keydata[MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN];
1202 uint8_t hmac_keydata[SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN];
1203 uint8_t iv[WRAPPING_IV_LEN];
1204 uint8_t mac[WRAPPING_MAC_LEN];
1206 ASSERT(dmu_tx_is_syncing(tx));
1207 ASSERT3U(key->zk_crypt, <, ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS);
1209 /* encrypt and store the keys along with the IV and MAC */
1210 VERIFY0(zio_crypt_key_wrap(&dck->dck_wkey->wk_key, key, iv, mac,
1211 keydata, hmac_keydata));
1213 /* update the ZAP with the obtained values */
1214 dsl_crypto_key_sync_impl(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset, dck->dck_obj,
1215 key->zk_crypt, wkey->wk_ddobj, key->zk_guid, iv, mac, keydata,
1216 hmac_keydata, wkey->wk_keyformat, wkey->wk_salt, wkey->wk_iters,
1220 typedef struct spa_keystore_change_key_args {
1221 const char *skcka_dsname;
1222 dsl_crypto_params_t *skcka_cp;
1223 } spa_keystore_change_key_args_t;
1226 spa_keystore_change_key_check(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx)
1229 dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL;
1230 dsl_pool_t *dp = dmu_tx_pool(tx);
1231 spa_keystore_change_key_args_t *skcka = arg;
1232 dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp = skcka->skcka_cp;
1235 /* check for the encryption feature */
1236 if (!spa_feature_is_enabled(dp->dp_spa, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION)) {
1237 ret = SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP);
1241 /* check for valid key change command */
1242 if (dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_NEW_KEY &&
1243 dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_INHERIT &&
1244 dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_FORCE_NEW_KEY &&
1245 dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_FORCE_INHERIT) {
1246 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1251 ret = dsl_dir_hold(dp, skcka->skcka_dsname, FTAG, &dd, NULL);
1257 /* verify that the dataset is encrypted */
1258 if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) {
1259 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1263 /* clones must always use their origin's key */
1264 if (dsl_dir_is_clone(dd)) {
1265 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1269 /* lookup the ddobj we are inheriting the keylocation from */
1270 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj);
1274 /* Handle inheritance */
1275 if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_INHERIT ||
1276 dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_INHERIT) {
1277 /* no other encryption params should be given */
1278 if (dcp->cp_crypt != ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT ||
1279 dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL ||
1280 dcp->cp_wkey != NULL) {
1281 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1285 /* check that this is an encryption root */
1286 if (dd->dd_object != rddobj) {
1287 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1291 /* check that the parent is encrypted */
1292 if (dd->dd_parent->dd_crypto_obj == 0) {
1293 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1297 /* if we are rewrapping check that both keys are loaded */
1298 if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_INHERIT) {
1299 ret = dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dd);
1303 ret = dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dd->dd_parent);
1308 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
1312 /* handle forcing an encryption root without rewrapping */
1313 if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_NEW_KEY) {
1314 /* no other encryption params should be given */
1315 if (dcp->cp_crypt != ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT ||
1316 dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL ||
1317 dcp->cp_wkey != NULL) {
1318 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1322 /* check that this is not an encryption root */
1323 if (dd->dd_object == rddobj) {
1324 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1328 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
1332 /* crypt cannot be changed after creation */
1333 if (dcp->cp_crypt != ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT) {
1334 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1338 /* we are not inheritting our parent's wkey so we need one ourselves */
1339 if (dcp->cp_wkey == NULL) {
1340 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1344 /* check for a valid keyformat for the new wrapping key */
1345 if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_keyformat >= ZFS_KEYFORMAT_FORMATS ||
1346 dcp->cp_wkey->wk_keyformat == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE) {
1347 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1352 * If this dataset is not currently an encryption root we need a new
1353 * keylocation for this dataset's new wrapping key. Otherwise we can
1354 * just keep the one we already had.
1356 if (dd->dd_object != rddobj && dcp->cp_keylocation == NULL) {
1357 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1361 /* check that the keylocation is valid if it is not NULL */
1362 if (dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL &&
1363 !zfs_prop_valid_keylocation(dcp->cp_keylocation, B_TRUE)) {
1364 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1368 /* passphrases require pbkdf2 salt and iters */
1369 if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_keyformat == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE) {
1370 if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_salt == 0 ||
1371 dcp->cp_wkey->wk_iters < MIN_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS) {
1372 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1376 if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_salt != 0 || dcp->cp_wkey->wk_iters != 0) {
1377 ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
1382 /* make sure the dd's wkey is loaded */
1383 ret = dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dd);
1387 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
1393 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
1399 * This function deals with the intricacies of updating wrapping
1400 * key references and encryption roots recursively in the event
1401 * of a call to 'zfs change-key' or 'zfs promote'. The 'skip'
1402 * parameter should always be set to B_FALSE when called
1406 spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(uint64_t rddobj, uint64_t ddobj,
1407 uint64_t new_rddobj, dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey, boolean_t skip,
1412 zap_attribute_t *za;
1413 dsl_pool_t *dp = dmu_tx_pool(tx);
1414 dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL;
1415 dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
1416 uint64_t curr_rddobj;
1418 ASSERT(RW_WRITE_HELD(&dp->dp_spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock));
1421 VERIFY0(dsl_dir_hold_obj(dp, ddobj, NULL, FTAG, &dd));
1423 /* ignore special dsl dirs */
1424 if (dd->dd_myname[0] == '$' || dd->dd_myname[0] == '%') {
1425 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
1429 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &curr_rddobj);
1430 VERIFY(ret == 0 || ret == ENOENT);
1433 * Stop recursing if this dsl dir didn't inherit from the root
1434 * or if this dd is a clone.
1436 if (ret == ENOENT ||
1437 (!skip && (curr_rddobj != rddobj || dsl_dir_is_clone(dd)))) {
1438 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
1443 * If we don't have a wrapping key just update the dck to reflect the
1444 * new encryption root. Otherwise rewrap the entire dck and re-sync it
1445 * to disk. If skip is set, we don't do any of this work.
1449 VERIFY0(zap_update(dp->dp_meta_objset,
1451 DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_ROOT_DDOBJ, 8, 1,
1454 VERIFY0(spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_dd(dp->dp_spa, dd,
1456 dsl_wrapping_key_hold(wkey, dck);
1457 dsl_wrapping_key_rele(dck->dck_wkey, dck);
1458 dck->dck_wkey = wkey;
1459 dsl_crypto_key_sync(dck, tx);
1460 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(dp->dp_spa, dck, FTAG);
1464 zc = kmem_alloc(sizeof (zap_cursor_t), KM_SLEEP);
1465 za = kmem_alloc(sizeof (zap_attribute_t), KM_SLEEP);
1467 /* Recurse into all child dsl dirs. */
1468 for (zap_cursor_init(zc, dp->dp_meta_objset,
1469 dsl_dir_phys(dd)->dd_child_dir_zapobj);
1470 zap_cursor_retrieve(zc, za) == 0;
1471 zap_cursor_advance(zc)) {
1472 spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(rddobj,
1473 za->za_first_integer, new_rddobj, wkey, B_FALSE, tx);
1475 zap_cursor_fini(zc);
1478 * Recurse into all dsl dirs of clones. We utilize the skip parameter
1479 * here so that we don't attempt to process the clones directly. This
1480 * is because the clone and its origin share the same dck, which has
1481 * already been updated.
1483 for (zap_cursor_init(zc, dp->dp_meta_objset,
1484 dsl_dir_phys(dd)->dd_clones);
1485 zap_cursor_retrieve(zc, za) == 0;
1486 zap_cursor_advance(zc)) {
1487 dsl_dataset_t *clone;
1489 VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold_obj(dp, za->za_first_integer,
1491 spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(rddobj,
1492 clone->ds_dir->dd_object, new_rddobj, wkey, B_TRUE, tx);
1493 dsl_dataset_rele(clone, FTAG);
1495 zap_cursor_fini(zc);
1497 kmem_free(za, sizeof (zap_attribute_t));
1498 kmem_free(zc, sizeof (zap_cursor_t));
1500 dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
1504 spa_keystore_change_key_sync(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx)
1508 dsl_pool_t *dp = dmu_tx_pool(tx);
1509 spa_t *spa = dp->dp_spa;
1510 spa_keystore_change_key_args_t *skcka = arg;
1511 dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp = skcka->skcka_cp;
1512 dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = NULL, *found_wkey;
1513 dsl_wrapping_key_t wkey_search;
1514 char *keylocation = dcp->cp_keylocation;
1515 uint64_t rddobj, new_rddobj;
1517 /* create and initialize the wrapping key */
1518 VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold(dp, skcka->skcka_dsname, FTAG, &ds));
1519 ASSERT(!ds->ds_is_snapshot);
1521 if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_NEW_KEY ||
1522 dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_NEW_KEY) {
1524 * We are changing to a new wkey. Set additional properties
1525 * which can be sent along with this ioctl. Note that this
1526 * command can set keylocation even if it can't normally be
1527 * set via 'zfs set' due to a non-local keylocation.
1529 if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_NEW_KEY) {
1530 wkey = dcp->cp_wkey;
1531 wkey->wk_ddobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_object;
1533 keylocation = "prompt";
1536 if (keylocation != NULL) {
1537 dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(ds,
1538 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION),
1539 ZPROP_SRC_LOCAL, 1, strlen(keylocation) + 1,
1543 VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(ds->ds_dir, &rddobj));
1544 new_rddobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_object;
1547 * We are inheritting the parent's wkey. Unset any local
1548 * keylocation and grab a reference to the wkey.
1550 if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_INHERIT) {
1551 VERIFY0(spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(spa,
1552 ds->ds_dir->dd_parent, FTAG, &wkey));
1555 dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(ds,
1556 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION), ZPROP_SRC_NONE,
1559 rddobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_object;
1560 VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(ds->ds_dir->dd_parent,
1565 ASSERT(dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_INHERIT ||
1566 dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_NEW_KEY);
1569 rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_WRITER);
1571 /* recurse through all children and rewrap their keys */
1572 spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(rddobj, ds->ds_dir->dd_object,
1573 new_rddobj, wkey, B_FALSE, tx);
1576 * All references to the old wkey should be released now (if it
1577 * existed). Replace the wrapping key.
1579 wkey_search.wk_ddobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_object;
1580 found_wkey = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, &wkey_search, NULL);
1581 if (found_wkey != NULL) {
1582 ASSERT0(zfs_refcount_count(&found_wkey->wk_refcnt));
1583 avl_remove(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, found_wkey);
1584 dsl_wrapping_key_free(found_wkey);
1587 if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_NEW_KEY) {
1588 avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, wkey, &where);
1589 avl_insert(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, wkey, where);
1590 } else if (wkey != NULL) {
1591 dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG);
1594 rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
1596 dsl_dataset_rele(ds, FTAG);
1600 spa_keystore_change_key(const char *dsname, dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp)
1602 spa_keystore_change_key_args_t skcka;
1604 /* initialize the args struct */
1605 skcka.skcka_dsname = dsname;
1606 skcka.skcka_cp = dcp;
1609 * Perform the actual work in syncing context. The blocks modified
1610 * here could be calculated but it would require holding the pool
1611 * lock and traversing all of the datasets that will have their keys
1614 return (dsl_sync_task(dsname, spa_keystore_change_key_check,
1615 spa_keystore_change_key_sync, &skcka, 15,
1616 ZFS_SPACE_CHECK_RESERVED));
1620 dsl_dir_rename_crypt_check(dsl_dir_t *dd, dsl_dir_t *newparent)
1623 uint64_t curr_rddobj, parent_rddobj;
1625 if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
1628 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &curr_rddobj);
1633 * if this is not an encryption root, we must make sure we are not
1634 * moving dd to a new encryption root
1636 if (dd->dd_object != curr_rddobj) {
1637 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(newparent,
1642 if (parent_rddobj != curr_rddobj) {
1643 ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
1655 * Check to make sure that a promote from targetdd to origindd will not require
1659 dsl_dataset_promote_crypt_check(dsl_dir_t *target, dsl_dir_t *origin)
1662 uint64_t rddobj, op_rddobj, tp_rddobj;
1664 /* If the dataset is not encrypted we don't need to check anything */
1665 if (origin->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
1669 * If we are not changing the first origin snapshot in a chain
1670 * the encryption root won't change either.
1672 if (dsl_dir_is_clone(origin))
1676 * If the origin is the encryption root we will update
1677 * the DSL Crypto Key to point to the target instead.
1679 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(origin, &rddobj);
1683 if (rddobj == origin->dd_object)
1687 * The origin is inheriting its encryption root from its parent.
1688 * Check that the parent of the target has the same encryption root.
1690 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(origin->dd_parent, &op_rddobj);
1692 return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
1696 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(target->dd_parent, &tp_rddobj);
1698 return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
1702 if (op_rddobj != tp_rddobj)
1703 return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
1709 dsl_dataset_promote_crypt_sync(dsl_dir_t *target, dsl_dir_t *origin,
1713 dsl_pool_t *dp = target->dd_pool;
1714 dsl_dataset_t *targetds;
1715 dsl_dataset_t *originds;
1718 if (origin->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
1720 if (dsl_dir_is_clone(origin))
1723 VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(origin, &rddobj));
1725 if (rddobj != origin->dd_object)
1729 * If the target is being promoted to the encryption root update the
1730 * DSL Crypto Key and keylocation to reflect that. We also need to
1731 * update the DSL Crypto Keys of all children inheritting their
1732 * encryption root to point to the new target. Otherwise, the check
1733 * function ensured that the encryption root will not change.
1735 keylocation = kmem_alloc(ZAP_MAXVALUELEN, KM_SLEEP);
1737 VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold_obj(dp,
1738 dsl_dir_phys(target)->dd_head_dataset_obj, FTAG, &targetds));
1739 VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold_obj(dp,
1740 dsl_dir_phys(origin)->dd_head_dataset_obj, FTAG, &originds));
1742 VERIFY0(dsl_prop_get_dd(origin, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION),
1743 1, ZAP_MAXVALUELEN, keylocation, NULL, B_FALSE));
1744 dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(targetds, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION),
1745 ZPROP_SRC_LOCAL, 1, strlen(keylocation) + 1, keylocation, tx);
1746 dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(originds, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION),
1747 ZPROP_SRC_NONE, 0, 0, NULL, tx);
1749 rw_enter(&dp->dp_spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_WRITER);
1750 spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(rddobj, origin->dd_object,
1751 target->dd_object, NULL, B_FALSE, tx);
1752 rw_exit(&dp->dp_spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
1754 dsl_dataset_rele(targetds, FTAG);
1755 dsl_dataset_rele(originds, FTAG);
1756 kmem_free(keylocation, ZAP_MAXVALUELEN);
1760 dmu_objset_create_crypt_check(dsl_dir_t *parentdd, dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp,
1761 boolean_t *will_encrypt)
1764 uint64_t pcrypt, crypt;
1765 dsl_crypto_params_t dummy_dcp = { 0 };
1767 if (will_encrypt != NULL)
1768 *will_encrypt = B_FALSE;
1773 if (dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_NONE)
1774 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1776 if (parentdd != NULL) {
1777 ret = dsl_dir_get_crypt(parentdd, &pcrypt);
1781 pcrypt = ZIO_CRYPT_OFF;
1784 crypt = (dcp->cp_crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT) ? pcrypt : dcp->cp_crypt;
1786 ASSERT3U(pcrypt, !=, ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT);
1787 ASSERT3U(crypt, !=, ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT);
1789 /* check for valid dcp with no encryption (inherited or local) */
1790 if (crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_OFF) {
1791 /* Must not specify encryption params */
1792 if (dcp->cp_wkey != NULL ||
1793 (dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL &&
1794 strcmp(dcp->cp_keylocation, "none") != 0))
1795 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1800 if (will_encrypt != NULL)
1801 *will_encrypt = B_TRUE;
1804 * We will now definitely be encrypting. Check the feature flag. When
1805 * creating the pool the caller will check this for us since we won't
1806 * technically have the feature activated yet.
1808 if (parentdd != NULL &&
1809 !spa_feature_is_enabled(parentdd->dd_pool->dp_spa,
1810 SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION)) {
1811 return (SET_ERROR(EOPNOTSUPP));
1814 /* Check for errata #4 (encryption enabled, bookmark_v2 disabled) */
1815 if (parentdd != NULL &&
1816 !spa_feature_is_enabled(parentdd->dd_pool->dp_spa,
1817 SPA_FEATURE_BOOKMARK_V2)) {
1818 return (SET_ERROR(EOPNOTSUPP));
1821 /* handle inheritance */
1822 if (dcp->cp_wkey == NULL) {
1823 ASSERT3P(parentdd, !=, NULL);
1825 /* key must be fully unspecified */
1826 if (dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL)
1827 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1829 /* parent must have a key to inherit */
1830 if (pcrypt == ZIO_CRYPT_OFF)
1831 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1833 /* check for parent key */
1834 ret = dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(parentdd);
1841 /* At this point we should have a fully specified key. Check location */
1842 if (dcp->cp_keylocation == NULL ||
1843 !zfs_prop_valid_keylocation(dcp->cp_keylocation, B_TRUE))
1844 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1846 /* Must have fully specified keyformat */
1847 switch (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_keyformat) {
1848 case ZFS_KEYFORMAT_HEX:
1849 case ZFS_KEYFORMAT_RAW:
1850 /* requires no pbkdf2 iters and salt */
1851 if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_salt != 0 || dcp->cp_wkey->wk_iters != 0)
1852 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1854 case ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE:
1855 /* requires pbkdf2 iters and salt */
1856 if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_salt == 0 ||
1857 dcp->cp_wkey->wk_iters < MIN_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS)
1858 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1860 case ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE:
1862 /* keyformat must be specified and valid */
1863 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1870 dsl_dataset_create_crypt_sync(uint64_t dsobj, dsl_dir_t *dd,
1871 dsl_dataset_t *origin, dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp, dmu_tx_t *tx)
1873 dsl_pool_t *dp = dd->dd_pool;
1875 dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey;
1877 /* clones always use their origin's wrapping key */
1878 if (dsl_dir_is_clone(dd)) {
1879 ASSERT3P(dcp, ==, NULL);
1882 * If this is an encrypted clone we just need to clone the
1883 * dck into dd. Zapify the dd so we can do that.
1885 if (origin->ds_dir->dd_crypto_obj != 0) {
1886 dmu_buf_will_dirty(dd->dd_dbuf, tx);
1887 dsl_dir_zapify(dd, tx);
1890 dsl_crypto_key_clone_sync(origin->ds_dir, tx);
1891 VERIFY0(zap_add(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_object,
1892 DD_FIELD_CRYPTO_KEY_OBJ, sizeof (uint64_t), 1,
1893 &dd->dd_crypto_obj, tx));
1900 * A NULL dcp at this point indicates this is the origin dataset
1901 * which does not have an objset to encrypt. Raw receives will handle
1902 * encryption separately later. In both cases we can simply return.
1904 if (dcp == NULL || dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_RAW_RECV)
1907 crypt = dcp->cp_crypt;
1908 wkey = dcp->cp_wkey;
1910 /* figure out the effective crypt */
1911 if (crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT && dd->dd_parent != NULL)
1912 VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_crypt(dd->dd_parent, &crypt));
1914 /* if we aren't doing encryption just return */
1915 if (crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_OFF || crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT)
1918 /* zapify the dd so that we can add the crypto key obj to it */
1919 dmu_buf_will_dirty(dd->dd_dbuf, tx);
1920 dsl_dir_zapify(dd, tx);
1922 /* use the new key if given or inherit from the parent */
1924 VERIFY0(spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(dp->dp_spa,
1925 dd->dd_parent, FTAG, &wkey));
1927 wkey->wk_ddobj = dd->dd_object;
1930 ASSERT3P(wkey, !=, NULL);
1932 /* Create or clone the DSL crypto key and activate the feature */
1933 dd->dd_crypto_obj = dsl_crypto_key_create_sync(crypt, wkey, tx);
1934 VERIFY0(zap_add(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_object,
1935 DD_FIELD_CRYPTO_KEY_OBJ, sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &dd->dd_crypto_obj,
1937 dsl_dataset_activate_feature(dsobj, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION,
1938 (void *)B_TRUE, tx);
1941 * If we inherited the wrapping key we release our reference now.
1942 * Otherwise, this is a new key and we need to load it into the
1945 if (dcp->cp_wkey == NULL) {
1946 dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG);
1948 VERIFY0(spa_keystore_load_wkey_impl(dp->dp_spa, wkey));
1952 typedef struct dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg {
1953 uint64_t dcrka_dsobj;
1954 uint64_t dcrka_fromobj;
1955 dmu_objset_type_t dcrka_ostype;
1956 nvlist_t *dcrka_nvl;
1957 boolean_t dcrka_do_key;
1958 } dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg_t;
1961 dsl_crypto_recv_raw_objset_check(dsl_dataset_t *ds, dsl_dataset_t *fromds,
1962 dmu_objset_type_t ostype, nvlist_t *nvl, dmu_tx_t *tx)
1967 uint8_t *buf = NULL;
1969 uint64_t intval, nlevels, blksz, ibs;
1970 uint64_t nblkptr, maxblkid;
1972 if (ostype != DMU_OST_ZFS && ostype != DMU_OST_ZVOL)
1973 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1975 /* raw receives also need info about the structure of the metadnode */
1976 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_compress", &intval);
1977 if (ret != 0 || intval >= ZIO_COMPRESS_LEGACY_FUNCTIONS)
1978 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1980 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_checksum", &intval);
1981 if (ret != 0 || intval >= ZIO_CHECKSUM_LEGACY_FUNCTIONS)
1982 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1984 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nlevels", &nlevels);
1985 if (ret != 0 || nlevels > DN_MAX_LEVELS)
1986 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1988 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_blksz", &blksz);
1989 if (ret != 0 || blksz < SPA_MINBLOCKSIZE)
1990 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
1991 else if (blksz > spa_maxblocksize(tx->tx_pool->dp_spa))
1992 return (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP));
1994 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_indblkshift", &ibs);
1995 if (ret != 0 || ibs < DN_MIN_INDBLKSHIFT || ibs > DN_MAX_INDBLKSHIFT)
1996 return (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP));
1998 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nblkptr", &nblkptr);
1999 if (ret != 0 || nblkptr != DN_MAX_NBLKPTR)
2000 return (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP));
2002 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_maxblkid", &maxblkid);
2004 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2006 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, "portable_mac", &buf, &len);
2007 if (ret != 0 || len != ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN)
2008 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2010 ret = dmu_objset_from_ds(ds, &os);
2015 * Useraccounting is not portable and must be done with the keys loaded.
2016 * Therefore, whenever we do any kind of receive the useraccounting
2017 * must not be present.
2019 ASSERT0(os->os_flags & OBJSET_FLAG_USERACCOUNTING_COMPLETE);
2020 ASSERT0(os->os_flags & OBJSET_FLAG_USEROBJACCOUNTING_COMPLETE);
2022 mdn = DMU_META_DNODE(os);
2025 * If we already created the objset, make sure its unchangeable
2026 * properties match the ones received in the nvlist.
2028 rrw_enter(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, RW_READER, FTAG);
2029 if (!BP_IS_HOLE(dsl_dataset_get_blkptr(ds)) &&
2030 (mdn->dn_nlevels != nlevels || mdn->dn_datablksz != blksz ||
2031 mdn->dn_indblkshift != ibs || mdn->dn_nblkptr != nblkptr)) {
2032 rrw_exit(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, FTAG);
2033 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2035 rrw_exit(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, FTAG);
2038 * Check that the ivset guid of the fromds matches the one from the
2039 * send stream. Older versions of the encryption code did not have
2040 * an ivset guid on the from dataset and did not send one in the
2041 * stream. For these streams we provide the
2042 * zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check tunable to allow these datasets to
2043 * be received with a generated ivset guid.
2045 if (fromds != NULL && !zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check) {
2046 uint64_t from_ivset_guid = 0;
2049 (void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "from_ivset_guid", &intval);
2050 (void) zap_lookup(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset,
2051 fromds->ds_object, DS_FIELD_IVSET_GUID,
2052 sizeof (from_ivset_guid), 1, &from_ivset_guid);
2054 if (intval == 0 || from_ivset_guid == 0)
2055 return (SET_ERROR(ZFS_ERR_FROM_IVSET_GUID_MISSING));
2057 if (intval != from_ivset_guid)
2058 return (SET_ERROR(ZFS_ERR_FROM_IVSET_GUID_MISMATCH));
2065 dsl_crypto_recv_raw_objset_sync(dsl_dataset_t *ds, dmu_objset_type_t ostype,
2066 nvlist_t *nvl, dmu_tx_t *tx)
2068 dsl_pool_t *dp = tx->tx_pool;
2072 uint8_t *portable_mac;
2074 uint64_t compress, checksum, nlevels, blksz, ibs, maxblkid;
2075 boolean_t newds = B_FALSE;
2077 VERIFY0(dmu_objset_from_ds(ds, &os));
2078 mdn = DMU_META_DNODE(os);
2081 * Fetch the values we need from the nvlist. "to_ivset_guid" must
2082 * be set on the snapshot, which doesn't exist yet. The receive
2083 * code will take care of this for us later.
2085 compress = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_compress");
2086 checksum = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_checksum");
2087 nlevels = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nlevels");
2088 blksz = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_blksz");
2089 ibs = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_indblkshift");
2090 maxblkid = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_maxblkid");
2091 VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, "portable_mac", &portable_mac,
2094 /* if we haven't created an objset for the ds yet, do that now */
2095 rrw_enter(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, RW_READER, FTAG);
2096 if (BP_IS_HOLE(dsl_dataset_get_blkptr(ds))) {
2097 (void) dmu_objset_create_impl_dnstats(dp->dp_spa, ds,
2098 dsl_dataset_get_blkptr(ds), ostype, nlevels, blksz,
2102 rrw_exit(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, FTAG);
2105 * Set the portable MAC. The local MAC will always be zero since the
2106 * incoming data will all be portable and user accounting will be
2107 * deferred until the next mount. Afterwards, flag the os to be
2108 * written out raw next time.
2110 arc_release(os->os_phys_buf, &os->os_phys_buf);
2111 bcopy(portable_mac, os->os_phys->os_portable_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN);
2112 bzero(os->os_phys->os_local_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN);
2113 os->os_next_write_raw[tx->tx_txg & TXG_MASK] = B_TRUE;
2115 /* set metadnode compression and checksum */
2116 mdn->dn_compress = compress;
2117 mdn->dn_checksum = checksum;
2119 rw_enter(&mdn->dn_struct_rwlock, RW_WRITER);
2120 dnode_new_blkid(mdn, maxblkid, tx, B_FALSE, B_TRUE);
2121 rw_exit(&mdn->dn_struct_rwlock);
2124 * We can't normally dirty the dataset in syncing context unless
2125 * we are creating a new dataset. In this case, we perform a
2126 * pseudo txg sync here instead.
2129 dsl_dataset_dirty(ds, tx);
2131 zio = zio_root(dp->dp_spa, NULL, NULL, ZIO_FLAG_MUSTSUCCEED);
2132 dsl_dataset_sync(ds, zio, tx);
2133 VERIFY0(zio_wait(zio));
2135 /* dsl_dataset_sync_done will drop this reference. */
2136 dmu_buf_add_ref(ds->ds_dbuf, ds);
2137 dsl_dataset_sync_done(ds, tx);
2142 dsl_crypto_recv_raw_key_check(dsl_dataset_t *ds, nvlist_t *nvl, dmu_tx_t *tx)
2145 objset_t *mos = tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset;
2146 uint8_t *buf = NULL;
2148 uint64_t intval, key_guid, version;
2149 boolean_t is_passphrase = B_FALSE;
2151 ASSERT(dsl_dataset_phys(ds)->ds_flags & DS_FLAG_INCONSISTENT);
2154 * Read and check all the encryption values from the nvlist. We need
2155 * all of the fields of a DSL Crypto Key, as well as a fully specified
2158 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, &intval);
2159 if (ret != 0 || intval >= ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS ||
2160 intval <= ZIO_CRYPT_OFF)
2161 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2163 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, &intval);
2165 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2168 * If this is an incremental receive make sure the given key guid
2169 * matches the one we already have.
2171 if (ds->ds_dir->dd_crypto_obj != 0) {
2172 ret = zap_lookup(mos, ds->ds_dir->dd_crypto_obj,
2173 DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1, &key_guid);
2176 if (intval != key_guid)
2177 return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
2180 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY,
2182 if (ret != 0 || len != MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN)
2183 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2185 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY,
2187 if (ret != 0 || len != SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN)
2188 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2190 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, &buf, &len);
2191 if (ret != 0 || len != WRAPPING_IV_LEN)
2192 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2194 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, &buf, &len);
2195 if (ret != 0 || len != WRAPPING_MAC_LEN)
2196 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2199 * We don't support receiving old on-disk formats. The version 0
2200 * implementation protected several fields in an objset that were
2201 * not always portable during a raw receive. As a result, we call
2202 * the old version an on-disk errata #3.
2204 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, &version);
2205 if (ret != 0 || version != ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION)
2206 return (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP));
2208 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT),
2210 if (ret != 0 || intval >= ZFS_KEYFORMAT_FORMATS ||
2211 intval == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE)
2212 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2214 is_passphrase = (intval == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE);
2217 * for raw receives we allow any number of pbkdf2iters since there
2218 * won't be a chance for the user to change it.
2220 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS),
2222 if (ret != 0 || (is_passphrase == (intval == 0)))
2223 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2225 ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT),
2227 if (ret != 0 || (is_passphrase == (intval == 0)))
2228 return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
2234 dsl_crypto_recv_raw_key_sync(dsl_dataset_t *ds, nvlist_t *nvl, dmu_tx_t *tx)
2236 dsl_pool_t *dp = tx->tx_pool;
2237 objset_t *mos = dp->dp_meta_objset;
2238 dsl_dir_t *dd = ds->ds_dir;
2240 uint64_t rddobj, one = 1;
2241 uint8_t *keydata, *hmac_keydata, *iv, *mac;
2242 uint64_t crypt, key_guid, keyformat, iters, salt;
2243 uint64_t version = ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION;
2244 char *keylocation = "prompt";
2246 /* lookup the values we need to create the DSL Crypto Key */
2247 crypt = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE);
2248 key_guid = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID);
2249 keyformat = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl,
2250 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT));
2251 iters = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl,
2252 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS));
2253 salt = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl,
2254 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT));
2255 VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY,
2257 VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY,
2258 &hmac_keydata, &len));
2259 VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, &iv, &len));
2260 VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, &mac, &len));
2262 /* if this is a new dataset setup the DSL Crypto Key. */
2263 if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) {
2264 /* zapify the dsl dir so we can add the key object to it */
2265 dmu_buf_will_dirty(dd->dd_dbuf, tx);
2266 dsl_dir_zapify(dd, tx);
2268 /* create the DSL Crypto Key on disk and activate the feature */
2269 dd->dd_crypto_obj = zap_create(mos,
2270 DMU_OTN_ZAP_METADATA, DMU_OT_NONE, 0, tx);
2271 VERIFY0(zap_update(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset,
2272 dd->dd_crypto_obj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT,
2273 sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &one, tx));
2274 VERIFY0(zap_update(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset,
2275 dd->dd_crypto_obj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION,
2276 sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &version, tx));
2278 dsl_dataset_activate_feature(ds->ds_object,
2279 SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION, (void *)B_TRUE, tx);
2280 ds->ds_feature[SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION] = (void *)B_TRUE;
2282 /* save the dd_crypto_obj on disk */
2283 VERIFY0(zap_add(mos, dd->dd_object, DD_FIELD_CRYPTO_KEY_OBJ,
2284 sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &dd->dd_crypto_obj, tx));
2287 * Set the keylocation to prompt by default. If keylocation
2288 * has been provided via the properties, this will be overridden
2291 dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(ds,
2292 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION),
2293 ZPROP_SRC_LOCAL, 1, strlen(keylocation) + 1,
2296 rddobj = dd->dd_object;
2298 VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj));
2301 /* sync the key data to the ZAP object on disk */
2302 dsl_crypto_key_sync_impl(mos, dd->dd_crypto_obj, crypt,
2303 rddobj, key_guid, iv, mac, keydata, hmac_keydata, keyformat, salt,
2308 dsl_crypto_recv_key_check(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx)
2311 dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg_t *dcrka = arg;
2312 dsl_dataset_t *ds = NULL, *fromds = NULL;
2314 ret = dsl_dataset_hold_obj(tx->tx_pool, dcrka->dcrka_dsobj,
2319 if (dcrka->dcrka_fromobj != 0) {
2320 ret = dsl_dataset_hold_obj(tx->tx_pool, dcrka->dcrka_fromobj,
2326 ret = dsl_crypto_recv_raw_objset_check(ds, fromds,
2327 dcrka->dcrka_ostype, dcrka->dcrka_nvl, tx);
2332 * We run this check even if we won't be doing this part of
2333 * the receive now so that we don't make the user wait until
2334 * the receive finishes to fail.
2336 ret = dsl_crypto_recv_raw_key_check(ds, dcrka->dcrka_nvl, tx);
2342 dsl_dataset_rele(ds, FTAG);
2344 dsl_dataset_rele(fromds, FTAG);
2349 dsl_crypto_recv_key_sync(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx)
2351 dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg_t *dcrka = arg;
2354 VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold_obj(tx->tx_pool, dcrka->dcrka_dsobj,
2356 dsl_crypto_recv_raw_objset_sync(ds, dcrka->dcrka_ostype,
2357 dcrka->dcrka_nvl, tx);
2358 if (dcrka->dcrka_do_key)
2359 dsl_crypto_recv_raw_key_sync(ds, dcrka->dcrka_nvl, tx);
2360 dsl_dataset_rele(ds, FTAG);
2364 * This function is used to sync an nvlist representing a DSL Crypto Key and
2365 * the associated encryption parameters. The key will be written exactly as is
2366 * without wrapping it.
2369 dsl_crypto_recv_raw(const char *poolname, uint64_t dsobj, uint64_t fromobj,
2370 dmu_objset_type_t ostype, nvlist_t *nvl, boolean_t do_key)
2372 dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg_t dcrka;
2374 dcrka.dcrka_dsobj = dsobj;
2375 dcrka.dcrka_fromobj = fromobj;
2376 dcrka.dcrka_ostype = ostype;
2377 dcrka.dcrka_nvl = nvl;
2378 dcrka.dcrka_do_key = do_key;
2380 return (dsl_sync_task(poolname, dsl_crypto_recv_key_check,
2381 dsl_crypto_recv_key_sync, &dcrka, 1, ZFS_SPACE_CHECK_NORMAL));
2385 dsl_crypto_populate_key_nvlist(objset_t *os, uint64_t from_ivset_guid,
2389 dsl_dataset_t *ds = os->os_dsl_dataset;
2392 nvlist_t *nvl = NULL;
2393 uint64_t dckobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_crypto_obj;
2394 dsl_dir_t *rdd = NULL;
2395 dsl_pool_t *dp = ds->ds_dir->dd_pool;
2396 objset_t *mos = dp->dp_meta_objset;
2397 uint64_t crypt = 0, key_guid = 0, format = 0;
2398 uint64_t iters = 0, salt = 0, version = 0;
2399 uint64_t to_ivset_guid = 0;
2400 uint8_t raw_keydata[MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN];
2401 uint8_t raw_hmac_keydata[SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN];
2402 uint8_t iv[WRAPPING_IV_LEN];
2403 uint8_t mac[WRAPPING_MAC_LEN];
2405 ASSERT(dckobj != 0);
2407 mdn = DMU_META_DNODE(os);
2409 nvl = fnvlist_alloc();
2411 /* lookup values from the DSL Crypto Key */
2412 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, 8, 1,
2417 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1, &key_guid);
2421 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY, 1,
2422 MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN, raw_keydata);
2426 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY, 1,
2427 SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN, raw_hmac_keydata);
2431 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, 1, WRAPPING_IV_LEN,
2436 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, 1, WRAPPING_MAC_LEN,
2441 /* see zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check tunable for errata info */
2442 ret = zap_lookup(mos, ds->ds_object, DS_FIELD_IVSET_GUID, 8, 1,
2445 ASSERT3U(dp->dp_spa->spa_errata, !=, 0);
2448 * We don't support raw sends of legacy on-disk formats. See the
2449 * comment in dsl_crypto_recv_key_check() for details.
2451 ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, 8, 1, &version);
2452 if (ret != 0 || version != ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION) {
2453 dp->dp_spa->spa_errata = ZPOOL_ERRATA_ZOL_6845_ENCRYPTION;
2454 ret = SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP);
2459 * Lookup wrapping key properties. An early version of the code did
2460 * not correctly add these values to the wrapping key or the DSL
2461 * Crypto Key on disk for non encryption roots, so to be safe we
2462 * always take the slightly circuitous route of looking it up from
2463 * the encryption root's key.
2465 ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(ds->ds_dir, &rddobj);
2469 dsl_pool_config_enter(dp, FTAG);
2471 ret = dsl_dir_hold_obj(dp, rddobj, NULL, FTAG, &rdd);
2475 ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, rdd->dd_crypto_obj,
2476 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), 8, 1, &format);
2480 if (format == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE) {
2481 ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, rdd->dd_crypto_obj,
2482 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), 8, 1, &iters);
2486 ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, rdd->dd_crypto_obj,
2487 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), 8, 1, &salt);
2492 dsl_dir_rele(rdd, FTAG);
2493 dsl_pool_config_exit(dp, FTAG);
2495 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, crypt);
2496 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, key_guid);
2497 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, version);
2498 VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY,
2499 raw_keydata, MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN));
2500 VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY,
2501 raw_hmac_keydata, SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN));
2502 VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, iv,
2504 VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, mac,
2506 VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, "portable_mac",
2507 os->os_phys->os_portable_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN));
2508 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), format);
2509 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), iters);
2510 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), salt);
2511 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_checksum", mdn->dn_checksum);
2512 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_compress", mdn->dn_compress);
2513 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nlevels", mdn->dn_nlevels);
2514 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_blksz", mdn->dn_datablksz);
2515 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_indblkshift", mdn->dn_indblkshift);
2516 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nblkptr", mdn->dn_nblkptr);
2517 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_maxblkid", mdn->dn_maxblkid);
2518 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "to_ivset_guid", to_ivset_guid);
2519 fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "from_ivset_guid", from_ivset_guid);
2525 dsl_pool_config_exit(dp, FTAG);
2528 dsl_dir_rele(rdd, FTAG);
2536 dsl_crypto_key_create_sync(uint64_t crypt, dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey,
2539 dsl_crypto_key_t dck;
2540 uint64_t version = ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION;
2541 uint64_t one = 1ULL;
2543 ASSERT(dmu_tx_is_syncing(tx));
2544 ASSERT3U(crypt, <, ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS);
2545 ASSERT3U(crypt, >, ZIO_CRYPT_OFF);
2547 /* create the DSL Crypto Key ZAP object */
2548 dck.dck_obj = zap_create(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset,
2549 DMU_OTN_ZAP_METADATA, DMU_OT_NONE, 0, tx);
2551 /* fill in the key (on the stack) and sync it to disk */
2552 dck.dck_wkey = wkey;
2553 VERIFY0(zio_crypt_key_init(crypt, &dck.dck_key));
2555 dsl_crypto_key_sync(&dck, tx);
2556 VERIFY0(zap_update(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset, dck.dck_obj,
2557 DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT, sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &one, tx));
2558 VERIFY0(zap_update(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset, dck.dck_obj,
2559 DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &version, tx));
2561 zio_crypt_key_destroy(&dck.dck_key);
2562 bzero(&dck.dck_key, sizeof (zio_crypt_key_t));
2564 return (dck.dck_obj);
2568 dsl_crypto_key_clone_sync(dsl_dir_t *origindd, dmu_tx_t *tx)
2570 objset_t *mos = tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset;
2572 ASSERT(dmu_tx_is_syncing(tx));
2574 VERIFY0(zap_increment(mos, origindd->dd_crypto_obj,
2575 DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT, 1, tx));
2577 return (origindd->dd_crypto_obj);
2581 dsl_crypto_key_destroy_sync(uint64_t dckobj, dmu_tx_t *tx)
2583 objset_t *mos = tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset;
2586 /* Decrement the refcount, destroy if this is the last reference */
2587 VERIFY0(zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT,
2588 sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &refcnt));
2591 VERIFY0(zap_increment(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT,
2594 VERIFY0(zap_destroy(mos, dckobj, tx));
2599 dsl_dataset_crypt_stats(dsl_dataset_t *ds, nvlist_t *nv)
2602 dsl_dir_t *dd = ds->ds_dir;
2603 dsl_dir_t *enc_root;
2604 char buf[ZFS_MAX_DATASET_NAME_LEN];
2606 if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
2609 intval = dsl_dataset_get_keystatus(dd);
2610 dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_KEYSTATUS, intval);
2612 if (dsl_dir_get_crypt(dd, &intval) == 0)
2613 dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_ENCRYPTION, intval);
2614 if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
2615 DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1, &intval) == 0) {
2616 dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_KEY_GUID, intval);
2618 if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
2619 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), 8, 1, &intval) == 0) {
2620 dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT, intval);
2622 if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
2623 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), 8, 1, &intval) == 0) {
2624 dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT, intval);
2626 if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
2627 zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), 8, 1, &intval) == 0) {
2628 dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS, intval);
2630 if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, ds->ds_object,
2631 DS_FIELD_IVSET_GUID, 8, 1, &intval) == 0) {
2632 dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_IVSET_GUID, intval);
2635 if (dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &intval) == 0) {
2636 if (dsl_dir_hold_obj(dd->dd_pool, intval, NULL, FTAG,
2638 dsl_dir_name(enc_root, buf);
2639 dsl_dir_rele(enc_root, FTAG);
2640 dsl_prop_nvlist_add_string(nv,
2641 ZFS_PROP_ENCRYPTION_ROOT, buf);
2647 spa_crypt_get_salt(spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj, uint8_t *salt)
2650 dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
2652 /* look up the key from the spa's keystore */
2653 ret = spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa, dsobj, FTAG, &dck);
2657 ret = zio_crypt_key_get_salt(&dck->dck_key, salt);
2661 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
2666 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
2671 * Objset blocks are a special case for MAC generation. These blocks have 2
2672 * 256-bit MACs which are embedded within the block itself, rather than a
2673 * single 128 bit MAC. As a result, this function handles encoding and decoding
2674 * the MACs on its own, unlike other functions in this file.
2677 spa_do_crypt_objset_mac_abd(boolean_t generate, spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj,
2678 abd_t *abd, uint_t datalen, boolean_t byteswap)
2681 dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
2682 void *buf = abd_borrow_buf_copy(abd, datalen);
2683 objset_phys_t *osp = buf;
2684 uint8_t portable_mac[ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN];
2685 uint8_t local_mac[ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN];
2687 /* look up the key from the spa's keystore */
2688 ret = spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa, dsobj, FTAG, &dck);
2692 /* calculate both HMACs */
2693 ret = zio_crypt_do_objset_hmacs(&dck->dck_key, buf, datalen,
2694 byteswap, portable_mac, local_mac);
2698 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
2700 /* if we are generating encode the HMACs in the objset_phys_t */
2702 bcopy(portable_mac, osp->os_portable_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN);
2703 bcopy(local_mac, osp->os_local_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN);
2704 abd_return_buf_copy(abd, buf, datalen);
2708 if (bcmp(portable_mac, osp->os_portable_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN) != 0 ||
2709 bcmp(local_mac, osp->os_local_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN) != 0) {
2710 abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen);
2711 return (SET_ERROR(ECKSUM));
2714 abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen);
2720 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
2721 abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen);
2726 spa_do_crypt_mac_abd(boolean_t generate, spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj, abd_t *abd,
2727 uint_t datalen, uint8_t *mac)
2730 dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
2731 uint8_t *buf = abd_borrow_buf_copy(abd, datalen);
2732 uint8_t digestbuf[ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN];
2734 /* look up the key from the spa's keystore */
2735 ret = spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa, dsobj, FTAG, &dck);
2739 /* perform the hmac */
2740 ret = zio_crypt_do_hmac(&dck->dck_key, buf, datalen,
2741 digestbuf, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN);
2745 abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen);
2746 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
2749 * Truncate and fill in mac buffer if we were asked to generate a MAC.
2750 * Otherwise verify that the MAC matched what we expected.
2753 bcopy(digestbuf, mac, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN);
2757 if (bcmp(digestbuf, mac, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN) != 0)
2758 return (SET_ERROR(ECKSUM));
2764 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
2765 abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen);
2770 * This function serves as a multiplexer for encryption and decryption of
2771 * all blocks (except the L2ARC). For encryption, it will populate the IV,
2772 * salt, MAC, and cabd (the ciphertext). On decryption it will simply use
2773 * these fields to populate pabd (the plaintext).
2776 spa_do_crypt_abd(boolean_t encrypt, spa_t *spa, const zbookmark_phys_t *zb,
2777 dmu_object_type_t ot, boolean_t dedup, boolean_t bswap, uint8_t *salt,
2778 uint8_t *iv, uint8_t *mac, uint_t datalen, abd_t *pabd, abd_t *cabd,
2779 boolean_t *no_crypt)
2782 dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
2783 uint8_t *plainbuf = NULL, *cipherbuf = NULL;
2785 ASSERT(spa_feature_is_active(spa, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION));
2787 /* look up the key from the spa's keystore */
2788 ret = spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa, zb->zb_objset, FTAG, &dck);
2790 ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
2795 plainbuf = abd_borrow_buf_copy(pabd, datalen);
2796 cipherbuf = abd_borrow_buf(cabd, datalen);
2798 plainbuf = abd_borrow_buf(pabd, datalen);
2799 cipherbuf = abd_borrow_buf_copy(cabd, datalen);
2803 * Both encryption and decryption functions need a salt for key
2804 * generation and an IV. When encrypting a non-dedup block, we
2805 * generate the salt and IV randomly to be stored by the caller. Dedup
2806 * blocks perform a (more expensive) HMAC of the plaintext to obtain
2807 * the salt and the IV. ZIL blocks have their salt and IV generated
2808 * at allocation time in zio_alloc_zil(). On decryption, we simply use
2809 * the provided values.
2811 if (encrypt && ot != DMU_OT_INTENT_LOG && !dedup) {
2812 ret = zio_crypt_key_get_salt(&dck->dck_key, salt);
2816 ret = zio_crypt_generate_iv(iv);
2819 } else if (encrypt && dedup) {
2820 ret = zio_crypt_generate_iv_salt_dedup(&dck->dck_key,
2821 plainbuf, datalen, iv, salt);
2826 /* call lower level function to perform encryption / decryption */
2827 ret = zio_do_crypt_data(encrypt, &dck->dck_key, ot, bswap, salt, iv,
2828 mac, datalen, plainbuf, cipherbuf, no_crypt);
2831 * Handle injected decryption faults. Unfortunately, we cannot inject
2832 * faults for dnode blocks because we might trigger the panic in
2833 * dbuf_prepare_encrypted_dnode_leaf(), which exists because syncing
2834 * context is not prepared to handle malicious decryption failures.
2836 if (zio_injection_enabled && !encrypt && ot != DMU_OT_DNODE && ret == 0)
2837 ret = zio_handle_decrypt_injection(spa, zb, ot, ECKSUM);
2842 abd_return_buf(pabd, plainbuf, datalen);
2843 abd_return_buf_copy(cabd, cipherbuf, datalen);
2845 abd_return_buf_copy(pabd, plainbuf, datalen);
2846 abd_return_buf(cabd, cipherbuf, datalen);
2849 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
2855 /* zero out any state we might have changed while encrypting */
2856 bzero(salt, ZIO_DATA_SALT_LEN);
2857 bzero(iv, ZIO_DATA_IV_LEN);
2858 bzero(mac, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN);
2859 abd_return_buf(pabd, plainbuf, datalen);
2860 abd_return_buf_copy(cabd, cipherbuf, datalen);
2862 abd_return_buf_copy(pabd, plainbuf, datalen);
2863 abd_return_buf(cabd, cipherbuf, datalen);
2866 spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
2871 ZFS_MODULE_PARAM(zfs, zfs_, disable_ivset_guid_check, INT, ZMOD_RW,
2872 "Set to allow raw receives without IVset guids");