2 * Copyright (c) 2017 Chelsio Communications, Inc.
4 * Written by: John Baldwin <jhb@FreeBSD.org>
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
10 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
11 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
12 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
13 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
16 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
17 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
18 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
19 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
20 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
21 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
22 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
23 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
24 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
28 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
29 __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
31 #include <sys/types.h>
34 #include <sys/malloc.h>
35 #include <sys/mutex.h>
36 #include <sys/module.h>
37 #include <sys/sglist.h>
39 #include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
40 #include <opencrypto/xform.h>
42 #include "cryptodev_if.h"
44 #include "common/common.h"
45 #include "crypto/t4_crypto.h"
48 * Requests consist of:
50 * +-------------------------------+
51 * | struct fw_crypto_lookaside_wr |
52 * +-------------------------------+
53 * | struct ulp_txpkt |
54 * +-------------------------------+
55 * | struct ulptx_idata |
56 * +-------------------------------+
57 * | struct cpl_tx_sec_pdu |
58 * +-------------------------------+
59 * | struct cpl_tls_tx_scmd_fmt |
60 * +-------------------------------+
61 * | key context header |
62 * +-------------------------------+
63 * | AES key | ----- For requests with AES
64 * +-------------------------------+ -
65 * | IPAD (16-byte aligned) | \
66 * +-------------------------------+ +---- For requests with HMAC
67 * | OPAD (16-byte aligned) | /
68 * +-------------------------------+ -
69 * | GMAC H | ----- For AES-GCM
70 * +-------------------------------+ -
71 * | struct cpl_rx_phys_dsgl | \
72 * +-------------------------------+ +---- Destination buffer for
73 * | PHYS_DSGL entries | / non-hash-only requests
74 * +-------------------------------+ -
75 * | 16 dummy bytes | ----- Only for hash-only requests
76 * +-------------------------------+
77 * | IV | ----- If immediate IV
78 * +-------------------------------+
79 * | Payload | ----- If immediate Payload
80 * +-------------------------------+ -
81 * | struct ulptx_sgl | \
82 * +-------------------------------+ +---- If payload via SGL
84 * +-------------------------------+ -
86 * Note that the key context must be padded to ensure 16-byte alignment.
87 * For HMAC requests, the key consists of the partial hash of the IPAD
88 * followed by the partial hash of the OPAD.
92 * +-------------------------------+
93 * | struct cpl_fw6_pld |
94 * +-------------------------------+
95 * | hash digest | ----- For HMAC request with
96 * +-------------------------------+ 'hash_size' set in work request
98 * A 32-bit big-endian error status word is supplied in the last 4
99 * bytes of data[0] in the CPL_FW6_PLD message. bit 0 indicates a
100 * "MAC" error and bit 1 indicates a "PAD" error.
102 * The 64-bit 'cookie' field from the fw_crypto_lookaside_wr message
103 * in the request is returned in data[1] of the CPL_FW6_PLD message.
105 * For block cipher replies, the updated IV is supplied in data[2] and
106 * data[3] of the CPL_FW6_PLD message.
108 * For hash replies where the work request set 'hash_size' to request
109 * a copy of the hash in the reply, the hash digest is supplied
110 * immediately following the CPL_FW6_PLD message.
114 * The crypto engine supports a maximum AAD size of 511 bytes.
116 #define MAX_AAD_LEN 511
119 * The documentation for CPL_RX_PHYS_DSGL claims a maximum of 32 SG
120 * entries. While the CPL includes a 16-bit length field, the T6 can
121 * sometimes hang if an error occurs while processing a request with a
122 * single DSGL entry larger than 2k.
124 #define MAX_RX_PHYS_DSGL_SGE 32
125 #define DSGL_SGE_MAXLEN 2048
128 * The adapter only supports requests with a total input or output
129 * length of 64k-1 or smaller. Longer requests either result in hung
130 * requests or incorrect results.
132 #define MAX_REQUEST_SIZE 65535
134 static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_CCR, "ccr", "Chelsio T6 crypto");
136 struct ccr_session_hmac {
137 struct auth_hash *auth_hash;
139 unsigned int partial_digest_len;
140 unsigned int auth_mode;
141 unsigned int mk_size;
142 char ipad[CHCR_HASH_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE_128];
143 char opad[CHCR_HASH_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE_128];
146 struct ccr_session_gmac {
148 char ghash_h[GMAC_BLOCK_LEN];
151 struct ccr_session_blkcipher {
152 unsigned int cipher_mode;
153 unsigned int key_len;
156 char enckey[CHCR_AES_MAX_KEY_LEN];
157 char deckey[CHCR_AES_MAX_KEY_LEN];
163 enum { HMAC, BLKCIPHER, AUTHENC, GCM } mode;
165 struct ccr_session_hmac hmac;
166 struct ccr_session_gmac gmac;
168 struct ccr_session_blkcipher blkcipher;
172 struct adapter *adapter;
176 struct ccr_session *sessions;
184 * Pre-allocate S/G lists used when preparing a work request.
185 * 'sg_crp' contains an sglist describing the entire buffer
186 * for a 'struct cryptop'. 'sg_ulptx' is used to describe
187 * the data the engine should DMA as input via ULPTX_SGL.
188 * 'sg_dsgl' is used to describe the destination that cipher
189 * text and a tag should be written to.
191 struct sglist *sg_crp;
192 struct sglist *sg_ulptx;
193 struct sglist *sg_dsgl;
196 * Pre-allocate a dummy output buffer for the IV and AAD for
200 struct sglist *sg_iv_aad;
203 uint64_t stats_blkcipher_encrypt;
204 uint64_t stats_blkcipher_decrypt;
206 uint64_t stats_authenc_encrypt;
207 uint64_t stats_authenc_decrypt;
208 uint64_t stats_gcm_encrypt;
209 uint64_t stats_gcm_decrypt;
210 uint64_t stats_wr_nomem;
211 uint64_t stats_inflight;
212 uint64_t stats_mac_error;
213 uint64_t stats_pad_error;
214 uint64_t stats_bad_session;
215 uint64_t stats_sglist_error;
216 uint64_t stats_process_error;
217 uint64_t stats_sw_fallback;
221 * Crypto requests involve two kind of scatter/gather lists.
223 * Non-hash-only requests require a PHYS_DSGL that describes the
224 * location to store the results of the encryption or decryption
225 * operation. This SGL uses a different format (PHYS_DSGL) and should
226 * exclude the crd_skip bytes at the start of the data as well as
227 * any AAD or IV. For authenticated encryption requests it should
228 * cover include the destination of the hash or tag.
230 * The input payload may either be supplied inline as immediate data,
231 * or via a standard ULP_TX SGL. This SGL should include AAD,
232 * ciphertext, and the hash or tag for authenticated decryption
235 * These scatter/gather lists can describe different subsets of the
236 * buffer described by the crypto operation. ccr_populate_sglist()
237 * generates a scatter/gather list that covers the entire crypto
238 * operation buffer that is then used to construct the other
239 * scatter/gather lists.
242 ccr_populate_sglist(struct sglist *sg, struct cryptop *crp)
247 if (crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IMBUF)
248 error = sglist_append_mbuf(sg, (struct mbuf *)crp->crp_buf);
249 else if (crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IOV)
250 error = sglist_append_uio(sg, (struct uio *)crp->crp_buf);
252 error = sglist_append(sg, crp->crp_buf, crp->crp_ilen);
257 * Segments in 'sg' larger than 'maxsegsize' are counted as multiple
261 ccr_count_sgl(struct sglist *sg, int maxsegsize)
266 for (i = 0; i < sg->sg_nseg; i++)
267 nsegs += howmany(sg->sg_segs[i].ss_len, maxsegsize);
271 /* These functions deal with PHYS_DSGL for the reply buffer. */
273 ccr_phys_dsgl_len(int nsegs)
277 len = (nsegs / 8) * sizeof(struct phys_sge_pairs);
278 if ((nsegs % 8) != 0) {
279 len += sizeof(uint16_t) * 8;
280 len += roundup2(nsegs % 8, 2) * sizeof(uint64_t);
286 ccr_write_phys_dsgl(struct ccr_softc *sc, void *dst, int nsegs)
289 struct cpl_rx_phys_dsgl *cpl;
290 struct phys_sge_pairs *sgl;
297 cpl->op_to_tid = htobe32(V_CPL_RX_PHYS_DSGL_OPCODE(CPL_RX_PHYS_DSGL) |
298 V_CPL_RX_PHYS_DSGL_ISRDMA(0));
299 cpl->pcirlxorder_to_noofsgentr = htobe32(
300 V_CPL_RX_PHYS_DSGL_PCIRLXORDER(0) |
301 V_CPL_RX_PHYS_DSGL_PCINOSNOOP(0) |
302 V_CPL_RX_PHYS_DSGL_PCITPHNTENB(0) | V_CPL_RX_PHYS_DSGL_DCAID(0) |
303 V_CPL_RX_PHYS_DSGL_NOOFSGENTR(nsegs));
304 cpl->rss_hdr_int.opcode = CPL_RX_PHYS_ADDR;
305 cpl->rss_hdr_int.qid = htobe16(sc->rxq->iq.abs_id);
306 cpl->rss_hdr_int.hash_val = 0;
307 sgl = (struct phys_sge_pairs *)(cpl + 1);
309 for (i = 0; i < sg->sg_nseg; i++) {
310 seglen = sg->sg_segs[i].ss_len;
311 paddr = sg->sg_segs[i].ss_paddr;
313 sgl->addr[j] = htobe64(paddr);
314 if (seglen > DSGL_SGE_MAXLEN) {
315 sgl->len[j] = htobe16(DSGL_SGE_MAXLEN);
316 paddr += DSGL_SGE_MAXLEN;
317 seglen -= DSGL_SGE_MAXLEN;
319 sgl->len[j] = htobe16(seglen);
327 } while (seglen != 0);
329 MPASS(j + 8 * (sgl - (struct phys_sge_pairs *)(cpl + 1)) == nsegs);
332 /* These functions deal with the ULPTX_SGL for input payload. */
334 ccr_ulptx_sgl_len(int nsegs)
338 nsegs--; /* first segment is part of ulptx_sgl */
339 n = sizeof(struct ulptx_sgl) + 8 * ((3 * nsegs) / 2 + (nsegs & 1));
340 return (roundup2(n, 16));
344 ccr_write_ulptx_sgl(struct ccr_softc *sc, void *dst, int nsegs)
346 struct ulptx_sgl *usgl;
348 struct sglist_seg *ss;
352 MPASS(nsegs == sg->sg_nseg);
353 ss = &sg->sg_segs[0];
355 usgl->cmd_nsge = htobe32(V_ULPTX_CMD(ULP_TX_SC_DSGL) |
356 V_ULPTX_NSGE(nsegs));
357 usgl->len0 = htobe32(ss->ss_len);
358 usgl->addr0 = htobe64(ss->ss_paddr);
360 for (i = 0; i < sg->sg_nseg - 1; i++) {
361 usgl->sge[i / 2].len[i & 1] = htobe32(ss->ss_len);
362 usgl->sge[i / 2].addr[i & 1] = htobe64(ss->ss_paddr);
369 ccr_use_imm_data(u_int transhdr_len, u_int input_len)
372 if (input_len > CRYPTO_MAX_IMM_TX_PKT_LEN)
374 if (roundup2(transhdr_len, 16) + roundup2(input_len, 16) >
381 ccr_populate_wreq(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct chcr_wr *crwr, u_int kctx_len,
382 u_int wr_len, uint32_t sid, u_int imm_len, u_int sgl_len, u_int hash_size,
387 cctx_size = sizeof(struct _key_ctx) + kctx_len;
388 crwr->wreq.op_to_cctx_size = htobe32(
389 V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_OPCODE(FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR) |
390 V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_COMPL(0) |
391 V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_IMM_LEN(imm_len) |
392 V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_CCTX_LOC(1) |
393 V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_CCTX_SIZE(cctx_size >> 4));
394 crwr->wreq.len16_pkd = htobe32(
395 V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_LEN16(wr_len / 16));
396 crwr->wreq.session_id = htobe32(sid);
397 crwr->wreq.rx_chid_to_rx_q_id = htobe32(
398 V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_RX_CHID(sc->tx_channel_id) |
399 V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_LCB(0) |
400 V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_PHASH(0) |
401 V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_IV(IV_NOP) |
402 V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_FQIDX(0) |
403 V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_TX_CH(0) |
404 V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_RX_Q_ID(sc->rxq->iq.abs_id));
405 crwr->wreq.key_addr = 0;
406 crwr->wreq.pld_size_hash_size = htobe32(
407 V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_PLD_SIZE(sgl_len) |
408 V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_HASH_SIZE(hash_size));
409 crwr->wreq.cookie = htobe64((uintptr_t)crp);
411 crwr->ulptx.cmd_dest = htobe32(V_ULPTX_CMD(ULP_TX_PKT) |
412 V_ULP_TXPKT_DATAMODIFY(0) |
413 V_ULP_TXPKT_CHANNELID(sc->tx_channel_id) | V_ULP_TXPKT_DEST(0) |
414 V_ULP_TXPKT_FID(0) | V_ULP_TXPKT_RO(1));
415 crwr->ulptx.len = htobe32(
416 ((wr_len - sizeof(struct fw_crypto_lookaside_wr)) / 16));
418 crwr->sc_imm.cmd_more = htobe32(V_ULPTX_CMD(ULP_TX_SC_IMM) |
419 V_ULP_TX_SC_MORE(imm_len != 0 ? 0 : 1));
420 crwr->sc_imm.len = htobe32(wr_len - offsetof(struct chcr_wr, sec_cpl) -
425 ccr_hmac(struct ccr_softc *sc, uint32_t sid, struct ccr_session *s,
428 struct chcr_wr *crwr;
430 struct auth_hash *axf;
431 struct cryptodesc *crd;
433 u_int hash_size_in_response, kctx_flits, kctx_len, transhdr_len, wr_len;
434 u_int imm_len, iopad_size;
435 int error, sgl_nsegs, sgl_len;
439 /* Reject requests with too large of an input buffer. */
440 if (crd->crd_len > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE)
443 axf = s->hmac.auth_hash;
445 /* PADs must be 128-bit aligned. */
446 iopad_size = roundup2(s->hmac.partial_digest_len, 16);
449 * The 'key' part of the context includes the aligned IPAD and
452 kctx_len = iopad_size * 2;
453 hash_size_in_response = axf->hashsize;
454 transhdr_len = HASH_TRANSHDR_SIZE(kctx_len);
456 if (crd->crd_len == 0) {
457 imm_len = axf->blocksize;
460 } else if (ccr_use_imm_data(transhdr_len, crd->crd_len)) {
461 imm_len = crd->crd_len;
466 sglist_reset(sc->sg_ulptx);
467 error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_ulptx, sc->sg_crp,
468 crd->crd_skip, crd->crd_len);
471 sgl_nsegs = sc->sg_ulptx->sg_nseg;
472 sgl_len = ccr_ulptx_sgl_len(sgl_nsegs);
475 wr_len = roundup2(transhdr_len, 16) + roundup2(imm_len, 16) + sgl_len;
476 if (wr_len > SGE_MAX_WR_LEN)
478 wr = alloc_wrqe(wr_len, sc->txq);
480 sc->stats_wr_nomem++;
484 memset(crwr, 0, wr_len);
486 ccr_populate_wreq(sc, crwr, kctx_len, wr_len, sid, imm_len, sgl_len,
487 hash_size_in_response, crp);
489 /* XXX: Hardcodes SGE loopback channel of 0. */
490 crwr->sec_cpl.op_ivinsrtofst = htobe32(
491 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_OPCODE(CPL_TX_SEC_PDU) |
492 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_RXCHID(sc->tx_channel_id) |
493 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ACKFOLLOWS(0) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ULPTXLPBK(1) |
494 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CPLLEN(2) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_PLACEHOLDER(0) |
495 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_IVINSRTOFST(0));
497 crwr->sec_cpl.pldlen = htobe32(crd->crd_len == 0 ? axf->blocksize :
500 crwr->sec_cpl.cipherstop_lo_authinsert = htobe32(
501 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AUTHSTART(1) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AUTHSTOP(0));
503 /* These two flits are actually a CPL_TLS_TX_SCMD_FMT. */
504 crwr->sec_cpl.seqno_numivs = htobe32(
505 V_SCMD_SEQ_NO_CTRL(0) |
506 V_SCMD_PROTO_VERSION(CHCR_SCMD_PROTO_VERSION_GENERIC) |
507 V_SCMD_CIPH_MODE(CHCR_SCMD_CIPHER_MODE_NOP) |
508 V_SCMD_AUTH_MODE(s->hmac.auth_mode) |
509 V_SCMD_HMAC_CTRL(CHCR_SCMD_HMAC_CTRL_NO_TRUNC));
510 crwr->sec_cpl.ivgen_hdrlen = htobe32(
511 V_SCMD_LAST_FRAG(0) |
512 V_SCMD_MORE_FRAGS(crd->crd_len == 0 ? 1 : 0) | V_SCMD_MAC_ONLY(1));
514 memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key, s->hmac.ipad, s->hmac.partial_digest_len);
515 memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key + iopad_size, s->hmac.opad,
516 s->hmac.partial_digest_len);
518 /* XXX: F_KEY_CONTEXT_SALT_PRESENT set, but 'salt' not set. */
519 kctx_flits = (sizeof(struct _key_ctx) + kctx_len) / 16;
520 crwr->key_ctx.ctx_hdr = htobe32(V_KEY_CONTEXT_CTX_LEN(kctx_flits) |
521 V_KEY_CONTEXT_OPAD_PRESENT(1) | V_KEY_CONTEXT_SALT_PRESENT(1) |
522 V_KEY_CONTEXT_CK_SIZE(CHCR_KEYCTX_NO_KEY) |
523 V_KEY_CONTEXT_MK_SIZE(s->hmac.mk_size) | V_KEY_CONTEXT_VALID(1));
525 dst = (char *)(crwr + 1) + kctx_len + DUMMY_BYTES;
526 if (crd->crd_len == 0) {
528 *(uint64_t *)(dst + axf->blocksize - sizeof(uint64_t)) =
529 htobe64(axf->blocksize << 3);
530 } else if (imm_len != 0)
531 crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, crd->crd_skip,
534 ccr_write_ulptx_sgl(sc, dst, sgl_nsegs);
536 /* XXX: TODO backpressure */
537 t4_wrq_tx(sc->adapter, wr);
543 ccr_hmac_done(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp,
544 const struct cpl_fw6_pld *cpl, int error)
546 struct cryptodesc *crd;
550 crypto_copyback(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, crd->crd_inject,
551 s->hmac.hash_len, (c_caddr_t)(cpl + 1));
558 ccr_blkcipher(struct ccr_softc *sc, uint32_t sid, struct ccr_session *s,
561 char iv[CHCR_MAX_CRYPTO_IV_LEN];
562 struct chcr_wr *crwr;
564 struct cryptodesc *crd;
566 u_int kctx_len, key_half, op_type, transhdr_len, wr_len;
568 int dsgl_nsegs, dsgl_len;
569 int sgl_nsegs, sgl_len;
574 if (s->blkcipher.key_len == 0 || crd->crd_len == 0)
576 if (crd->crd_alg == CRYPTO_AES_CBC &&
577 (crd->crd_len % AES_BLOCK_LEN) != 0)
580 /* Reject requests with too large of an input buffer. */
581 if (crd->crd_len > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE)
584 if (crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT)
585 op_type = CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP;
587 op_type = CHCR_DECRYPT_OP;
589 sglist_reset(sc->sg_dsgl);
590 error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_dsgl, sc->sg_crp, crd->crd_skip,
594 dsgl_nsegs = ccr_count_sgl(sc->sg_dsgl, DSGL_SGE_MAXLEN);
595 if (dsgl_nsegs > MAX_RX_PHYS_DSGL_SGE)
597 dsgl_len = ccr_phys_dsgl_len(dsgl_nsegs);
599 /* The 'key' must be 128-bit aligned. */
600 kctx_len = roundup2(s->blkcipher.key_len, 16);
601 transhdr_len = CIPHER_TRANSHDR_SIZE(kctx_len, dsgl_len);
603 if (ccr_use_imm_data(transhdr_len, crd->crd_len +
604 s->blkcipher.iv_len)) {
605 imm_len = crd->crd_len;
610 sglist_reset(sc->sg_ulptx);
611 error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_ulptx, sc->sg_crp,
612 crd->crd_skip, crd->crd_len);
615 sgl_nsegs = sc->sg_ulptx->sg_nseg;
616 sgl_len = ccr_ulptx_sgl_len(sgl_nsegs);
619 wr_len = roundup2(transhdr_len, 16) + s->blkcipher.iv_len +
620 roundup2(imm_len, 16) + sgl_len;
621 if (wr_len > SGE_MAX_WR_LEN)
623 wr = alloc_wrqe(wr_len, sc->txq);
625 sc->stats_wr_nomem++;
629 memset(crwr, 0, wr_len);
632 * Read the existing IV from the request or generate a random
633 * one if none is provided. Optionally copy the generated IV
634 * into the output buffer if requested.
636 if (op_type == CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP) {
637 if (crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT)
638 memcpy(iv, crd->crd_iv, s->blkcipher.iv_len);
640 arc4rand(iv, s->blkcipher.iv_len, 0);
641 if ((crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_PRESENT) == 0)
642 crypto_copyback(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
643 crd->crd_inject, s->blkcipher.iv_len, iv);
645 if (crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT)
646 memcpy(iv, crd->crd_iv, s->blkcipher.iv_len);
648 crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
649 crd->crd_inject, s->blkcipher.iv_len, iv);
652 ccr_populate_wreq(sc, crwr, kctx_len, wr_len, sid, imm_len, sgl_len, 0,
655 /* XXX: Hardcodes SGE loopback channel of 0. */
656 crwr->sec_cpl.op_ivinsrtofst = htobe32(
657 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_OPCODE(CPL_TX_SEC_PDU) |
658 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_RXCHID(sc->tx_channel_id) |
659 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ACKFOLLOWS(0) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ULPTXLPBK(1) |
660 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CPLLEN(2) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_PLACEHOLDER(0) |
661 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_IVINSRTOFST(1));
663 crwr->sec_cpl.pldlen = htobe32(s->blkcipher.iv_len + crd->crd_len);
665 crwr->sec_cpl.aadstart_cipherstop_hi = htobe32(
666 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CIPHERSTART(s->blkcipher.iv_len + 1) |
667 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CIPHERSTOP_HI(0));
668 crwr->sec_cpl.cipherstop_lo_authinsert = htobe32(
669 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CIPHERSTOP_LO(0));
671 /* These two flits are actually a CPL_TLS_TX_SCMD_FMT. */
672 crwr->sec_cpl.seqno_numivs = htobe32(
673 V_SCMD_SEQ_NO_CTRL(0) |
674 V_SCMD_PROTO_VERSION(CHCR_SCMD_PROTO_VERSION_GENERIC) |
675 V_SCMD_ENC_DEC_CTRL(op_type) |
676 V_SCMD_CIPH_MODE(s->blkcipher.cipher_mode) |
677 V_SCMD_AUTH_MODE(CHCR_SCMD_AUTH_MODE_NOP) |
678 V_SCMD_HMAC_CTRL(CHCR_SCMD_HMAC_CTRL_NOP) |
679 V_SCMD_IV_SIZE(s->blkcipher.iv_len / 2) |
681 crwr->sec_cpl.ivgen_hdrlen = htobe32(
682 V_SCMD_IV_GEN_CTRL(0) |
683 V_SCMD_MORE_FRAGS(0) | V_SCMD_LAST_FRAG(0) | V_SCMD_MAC_ONLY(0) |
684 V_SCMD_AADIVDROP(1) | V_SCMD_HDR_LEN(dsgl_len));
686 crwr->key_ctx.ctx_hdr = s->blkcipher.key_ctx_hdr;
687 switch (crd->crd_alg) {
689 if (crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT)
690 memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key, s->blkcipher.enckey,
691 s->blkcipher.key_len);
693 memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key, s->blkcipher.deckey,
694 s->blkcipher.key_len);
697 memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key, s->blkcipher.enckey,
698 s->blkcipher.key_len);
701 key_half = s->blkcipher.key_len / 2;
702 memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key, s->blkcipher.enckey + key_half,
704 if (crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT)
705 memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key + key_half,
706 s->blkcipher.enckey, key_half);
708 memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key + key_half,
709 s->blkcipher.deckey, key_half);
713 dst = (char *)(crwr + 1) + kctx_len;
714 ccr_write_phys_dsgl(sc, dst, dsgl_nsegs);
715 dst += sizeof(struct cpl_rx_phys_dsgl) + dsgl_len;
716 memcpy(dst, iv, s->blkcipher.iv_len);
717 dst += s->blkcipher.iv_len;
719 crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, crd->crd_skip,
722 ccr_write_ulptx_sgl(sc, dst, sgl_nsegs);
724 /* XXX: TODO backpressure */
725 t4_wrq_tx(sc->adapter, wr);
731 ccr_blkcipher_done(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s,
732 struct cryptop *crp, const struct cpl_fw6_pld *cpl, int error)
736 * The updated IV to permit chained requests is at
737 * cpl->data[2], but OCF doesn't permit chained requests.
743 * 'hashsize' is the length of a full digest. 'authsize' is the
744 * requested digest length for this operation which may be less
748 ccr_hmac_ctrl(unsigned int hashsize, unsigned int authsize)
752 return (CHCR_SCMD_HMAC_CTRL_TRUNC_RFC4366);
754 return (CHCR_SCMD_HMAC_CTRL_IPSEC_96BIT);
755 if (authsize == hashsize / 2)
756 return (CHCR_SCMD_HMAC_CTRL_DIV2);
757 return (CHCR_SCMD_HMAC_CTRL_NO_TRUNC);
761 ccr_authenc(struct ccr_softc *sc, uint32_t sid, struct ccr_session *s,
762 struct cryptop *crp, struct cryptodesc *crda, struct cryptodesc *crde)
764 char iv[CHCR_MAX_CRYPTO_IV_LEN];
765 struct chcr_wr *crwr;
767 struct auth_hash *axf;
769 u_int kctx_len, key_half, op_type, transhdr_len, wr_len;
770 u_int hash_size_in_response, imm_len, iopad_size;
771 u_int aad_start, aad_len, aad_stop;
772 u_int auth_start, auth_stop, auth_insert;
773 u_int cipher_start, cipher_stop;
774 u_int hmac_ctrl, input_len;
775 int dsgl_nsegs, dsgl_len;
776 int sgl_nsegs, sgl_len;
780 * If there is a need in the future, requests with an empty
781 * payload could be supported as HMAC-only requests.
783 if (s->blkcipher.key_len == 0 || crde->crd_len == 0)
785 if (crde->crd_alg == CRYPTO_AES_CBC &&
786 (crde->crd_len % AES_BLOCK_LEN) != 0)
790 * Compute the length of the AAD (data covered by the
791 * authentication descriptor but not the encryption
792 * descriptor). To simplify the logic, AAD is only permitted
793 * before the cipher/plain text, not after. This is true of
794 * all currently-generated requests.
796 if (crda->crd_len + crda->crd_skip > crde->crd_len + crde->crd_skip)
798 if (crda->crd_skip < crde->crd_skip) {
799 if (crda->crd_skip + crda->crd_len > crde->crd_skip)
800 aad_len = (crde->crd_skip - crda->crd_skip);
802 aad_len = crda->crd_len;
805 if (aad_len + s->blkcipher.iv_len > MAX_AAD_LEN)
808 axf = s->hmac.auth_hash;
809 hash_size_in_response = s->hmac.hash_len;
810 if (crde->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT)
811 op_type = CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP;
813 op_type = CHCR_DECRYPT_OP;
816 * The output buffer consists of the cipher text followed by
817 * the hash when encrypting. For decryption it only contains
820 * Due to a firmware bug, the output buffer must include a
821 * dummy output buffer for the IV and AAD prior to the real
824 if (op_type == CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP) {
825 if (s->blkcipher.iv_len + aad_len + crde->crd_len +
826 hash_size_in_response > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE)
829 if (s->blkcipher.iv_len + aad_len + crde->crd_len >
833 sglist_reset(sc->sg_dsgl);
834 error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_dsgl, sc->sg_iv_aad, 0,
835 s->blkcipher.iv_len + aad_len);
838 error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_dsgl, sc->sg_crp, crde->crd_skip,
842 if (op_type == CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP) {
843 error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_dsgl, sc->sg_crp,
844 crda->crd_inject, hash_size_in_response);
848 dsgl_nsegs = ccr_count_sgl(sc->sg_dsgl, DSGL_SGE_MAXLEN);
849 if (dsgl_nsegs > MAX_RX_PHYS_DSGL_SGE)
851 dsgl_len = ccr_phys_dsgl_len(dsgl_nsegs);
853 /* PADs must be 128-bit aligned. */
854 iopad_size = roundup2(s->hmac.partial_digest_len, 16);
857 * The 'key' part of the key context consists of the key followed
858 * by the IPAD and OPAD.
860 kctx_len = roundup2(s->blkcipher.key_len, 16) + iopad_size * 2;
861 transhdr_len = CIPHER_TRANSHDR_SIZE(kctx_len, dsgl_len);
864 * The input buffer consists of the IV, any AAD, and then the
865 * cipher/plain text. For decryption requests the hash is
866 * appended after the cipher text.
868 * The IV is always stored at the start of the input buffer
869 * even though it may be duplicated in the payload. The
870 * crypto engine doesn't work properly if the IV offset points
871 * inside of the AAD region, so a second copy is always
874 input_len = aad_len + crde->crd_len;
877 * The firmware hangs if sent a request which is a
878 * bit smaller than MAX_REQUEST_SIZE. In particular, the
879 * firmware appears to require 512 - 16 bytes of spare room
880 * along with the size of the hash even if the hash isn't
881 * included in the input buffer.
883 if (input_len + roundup2(axf->hashsize, 16) + (512 - 16) >
886 if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP)
887 input_len += hash_size_in_response;
888 if (ccr_use_imm_data(transhdr_len, s->blkcipher.iv_len + input_len)) {
894 sglist_reset(sc->sg_ulptx);
896 error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_ulptx, sc->sg_crp,
897 crda->crd_skip, aad_len);
901 error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_ulptx, sc->sg_crp,
902 crde->crd_skip, crde->crd_len);
905 if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP) {
906 error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_ulptx, sc->sg_crp,
907 crda->crd_inject, hash_size_in_response);
911 sgl_nsegs = sc->sg_ulptx->sg_nseg;
912 sgl_len = ccr_ulptx_sgl_len(sgl_nsegs);
916 * Any auth-only data before the cipher region is marked as AAD.
917 * Auth-data that overlaps with the cipher region is placed in
921 aad_start = s->blkcipher.iv_len + 1;
922 aad_stop = aad_start + aad_len - 1;
927 cipher_start = s->blkcipher.iv_len + aad_len + 1;
928 if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP)
929 cipher_stop = hash_size_in_response;
932 if (aad_len == crda->crd_len) {
937 auth_start = cipher_start;
939 auth_start = s->blkcipher.iv_len + crda->crd_skip -
941 auth_stop = (crde->crd_skip + crde->crd_len) -
942 (crda->crd_skip + crda->crd_len) + cipher_stop;
944 if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP)
945 auth_insert = hash_size_in_response;
949 wr_len = roundup2(transhdr_len, 16) + s->blkcipher.iv_len +
950 roundup2(imm_len, 16) + sgl_len;
951 if (wr_len > SGE_MAX_WR_LEN)
953 wr = alloc_wrqe(wr_len, sc->txq);
955 sc->stats_wr_nomem++;
959 memset(crwr, 0, wr_len);
962 * Read the existing IV from the request or generate a random
963 * one if none is provided. Optionally copy the generated IV
964 * into the output buffer if requested.
966 if (op_type == CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP) {
967 if (crde->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT)
968 memcpy(iv, crde->crd_iv, s->blkcipher.iv_len);
970 arc4rand(iv, s->blkcipher.iv_len, 0);
971 if ((crde->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_PRESENT) == 0)
972 crypto_copyback(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
973 crde->crd_inject, s->blkcipher.iv_len, iv);
975 if (crde->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT)
976 memcpy(iv, crde->crd_iv, s->blkcipher.iv_len);
978 crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
979 crde->crd_inject, s->blkcipher.iv_len, iv);
982 ccr_populate_wreq(sc, crwr, kctx_len, wr_len, sid, imm_len, sgl_len,
983 op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP ? hash_size_in_response : 0, crp);
985 /* XXX: Hardcodes SGE loopback channel of 0. */
986 crwr->sec_cpl.op_ivinsrtofst = htobe32(
987 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_OPCODE(CPL_TX_SEC_PDU) |
988 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_RXCHID(sc->tx_channel_id) |
989 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ACKFOLLOWS(0) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ULPTXLPBK(1) |
990 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CPLLEN(2) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_PLACEHOLDER(0) |
991 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_IVINSRTOFST(1));
993 crwr->sec_cpl.pldlen = htobe32(s->blkcipher.iv_len + input_len);
995 crwr->sec_cpl.aadstart_cipherstop_hi = htobe32(
996 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AADSTART(aad_start) |
997 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AADSTOP(aad_stop) |
998 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CIPHERSTART(cipher_start) |
999 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CIPHERSTOP_HI(cipher_stop >> 4));
1000 crwr->sec_cpl.cipherstop_lo_authinsert = htobe32(
1001 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CIPHERSTOP_LO(cipher_stop & 0xf) |
1002 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AUTHSTART(auth_start) |
1003 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AUTHSTOP(auth_stop) |
1004 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AUTHINSERT(auth_insert));
1006 /* These two flits are actually a CPL_TLS_TX_SCMD_FMT. */
1007 hmac_ctrl = ccr_hmac_ctrl(axf->hashsize, hash_size_in_response);
1008 crwr->sec_cpl.seqno_numivs = htobe32(
1009 V_SCMD_SEQ_NO_CTRL(0) |
1010 V_SCMD_PROTO_VERSION(CHCR_SCMD_PROTO_VERSION_GENERIC) |
1011 V_SCMD_ENC_DEC_CTRL(op_type) |
1012 V_SCMD_CIPH_AUTH_SEQ_CTRL(op_type == CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP ? 1 : 0) |
1013 V_SCMD_CIPH_MODE(s->blkcipher.cipher_mode) |
1014 V_SCMD_AUTH_MODE(s->hmac.auth_mode) |
1015 V_SCMD_HMAC_CTRL(hmac_ctrl) |
1016 V_SCMD_IV_SIZE(s->blkcipher.iv_len / 2) |
1018 crwr->sec_cpl.ivgen_hdrlen = htobe32(
1019 V_SCMD_IV_GEN_CTRL(0) |
1020 V_SCMD_MORE_FRAGS(0) | V_SCMD_LAST_FRAG(0) | V_SCMD_MAC_ONLY(0) |
1021 V_SCMD_AADIVDROP(0) | V_SCMD_HDR_LEN(dsgl_len));
1023 crwr->key_ctx.ctx_hdr = s->blkcipher.key_ctx_hdr;
1024 switch (crde->crd_alg) {
1025 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1026 if (crde->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT)
1027 memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key, s->blkcipher.enckey,
1028 s->blkcipher.key_len);
1030 memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key, s->blkcipher.deckey,
1031 s->blkcipher.key_len);
1033 case CRYPTO_AES_ICM:
1034 memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key, s->blkcipher.enckey,
1035 s->blkcipher.key_len);
1037 case CRYPTO_AES_XTS:
1038 key_half = s->blkcipher.key_len / 2;
1039 memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key, s->blkcipher.enckey + key_half,
1041 if (crde->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT)
1042 memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key + key_half,
1043 s->blkcipher.enckey, key_half);
1045 memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key + key_half,
1046 s->blkcipher.deckey, key_half);
1050 dst = crwr->key_ctx.key + roundup2(s->blkcipher.key_len, 16);
1051 memcpy(dst, s->hmac.ipad, s->hmac.partial_digest_len);
1052 memcpy(dst + iopad_size, s->hmac.opad, s->hmac.partial_digest_len);
1054 dst = (char *)(crwr + 1) + kctx_len;
1055 ccr_write_phys_dsgl(sc, dst, dsgl_nsegs);
1056 dst += sizeof(struct cpl_rx_phys_dsgl) + dsgl_len;
1057 memcpy(dst, iv, s->blkcipher.iv_len);
1058 dst += s->blkcipher.iv_len;
1061 crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
1062 crda->crd_skip, aad_len, dst);
1065 crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, crde->crd_skip,
1066 crde->crd_len, dst);
1067 dst += crde->crd_len;
1068 if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP)
1069 crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
1070 crda->crd_inject, hash_size_in_response, dst);
1072 ccr_write_ulptx_sgl(sc, dst, sgl_nsegs);
1074 /* XXX: TODO backpressure */
1075 t4_wrq_tx(sc->adapter, wr);
1081 ccr_authenc_done(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s,
1082 struct cryptop *crp, const struct cpl_fw6_pld *cpl, int error)
1084 struct cryptodesc *crd;
1087 * The updated IV to permit chained requests is at
1088 * cpl->data[2], but OCF doesn't permit chained requests.
1090 * For a decryption request, the hardware may do a verification
1091 * of the HMAC which will fail if the existing HMAC isn't in the
1092 * buffer. If that happens, clear the error and copy the HMAC
1093 * from the CPL reply into the buffer.
1095 * For encryption requests, crd should be the cipher request
1096 * which will have CRD_F_ENCRYPT set. For decryption
1097 * requests, crp_desc will be the HMAC request which should
1098 * not have this flag set.
1100 crd = crp->crp_desc;
1101 if (error == EBADMSG && !CHK_PAD_ERR_BIT(be64toh(cpl->data[0])) &&
1102 !(crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT)) {
1103 crypto_copyback(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, crd->crd_inject,
1104 s->hmac.hash_len, (c_caddr_t)(cpl + 1));
1111 ccr_gcm(struct ccr_softc *sc, uint32_t sid, struct ccr_session *s,
1112 struct cryptop *crp, struct cryptodesc *crda, struct cryptodesc *crde)
1114 char iv[CHCR_MAX_CRYPTO_IV_LEN];
1115 struct chcr_wr *crwr;
1118 u_int iv_len, kctx_len, op_type, transhdr_len, wr_len;
1119 u_int hash_size_in_response, imm_len;
1120 u_int aad_start, aad_stop, cipher_start, cipher_stop, auth_insert;
1121 u_int hmac_ctrl, input_len;
1122 int dsgl_nsegs, dsgl_len;
1123 int sgl_nsegs, sgl_len;
1126 if (s->blkcipher.key_len == 0)
1130 * The crypto engine doesn't handle GCM requests with an empty
1131 * payload, so handle those in software instead.
1133 if (crde->crd_len == 0)
1137 * AAD is only permitted before the cipher/plain text, not
1140 if (crda->crd_len + crda->crd_skip > crde->crd_len + crde->crd_skip)
1143 if (crda->crd_len + AES_BLOCK_LEN > MAX_AAD_LEN)
1146 hash_size_in_response = s->gmac.hash_len;
1147 if (crde->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT)
1148 op_type = CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP;
1150 op_type = CHCR_DECRYPT_OP;
1153 * The IV handling for GCM in OCF is a bit more complicated in
1154 * that IPSec provides a full 16-byte IV (including the
1155 * counter), whereas the /dev/crypto interface sometimes
1156 * provides a full 16-byte IV (if no IV is provided in the
1157 * ioctl) and sometimes a 12-byte IV (if the IV was explicit).
1159 * When provided a 12-byte IV, assume the IV is really 16 bytes
1160 * with a counter in the last 4 bytes initialized to 1.
1162 * While iv_len is checked below, the value is currently
1163 * always set to 12 when creating a GCM session in this driver
1164 * due to limitations in OCF (there is no way to know what the
1165 * IV length of a given request will be). This means that the
1166 * driver always assumes as 12-byte IV for now.
1168 if (s->blkcipher.iv_len == 12)
1169 iv_len = AES_BLOCK_LEN;
1171 iv_len = s->blkcipher.iv_len;
1174 * The output buffer consists of the cipher text followed by
1175 * the tag when encrypting. For decryption it only contains
1178 * Due to a firmware bug, the output buffer must include a
1179 * dummy output buffer for the IV and AAD prior to the real
1182 if (op_type == CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP) {
1183 if (iv_len + crda->crd_len + crde->crd_len +
1184 hash_size_in_response > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE)
1187 if (iv_len + crda->crd_len + crde->crd_len > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE)
1190 sglist_reset(sc->sg_dsgl);
1191 error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_dsgl, sc->sg_iv_aad, 0, iv_len +
1195 error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_dsgl, sc->sg_crp, crde->crd_skip,
1199 if (op_type == CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP) {
1200 error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_dsgl, sc->sg_crp,
1201 crda->crd_inject, hash_size_in_response);
1205 dsgl_nsegs = ccr_count_sgl(sc->sg_dsgl, DSGL_SGE_MAXLEN);
1206 if (dsgl_nsegs > MAX_RX_PHYS_DSGL_SGE)
1208 dsgl_len = ccr_phys_dsgl_len(dsgl_nsegs);
1211 * The 'key' part of the key context consists of the key followed
1212 * by the Galois hash key.
1214 kctx_len = roundup2(s->blkcipher.key_len, 16) + GMAC_BLOCK_LEN;
1215 transhdr_len = CIPHER_TRANSHDR_SIZE(kctx_len, dsgl_len);
1218 * The input buffer consists of the IV, any AAD, and then the
1219 * cipher/plain text. For decryption requests the hash is
1220 * appended after the cipher text.
1222 * The IV is always stored at the start of the input buffer
1223 * even though it may be duplicated in the payload. The
1224 * crypto engine doesn't work properly if the IV offset points
1225 * inside of the AAD region, so a second copy is always
1228 input_len = crda->crd_len + crde->crd_len;
1229 if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP)
1230 input_len += hash_size_in_response;
1231 if (input_len > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE)
1233 if (ccr_use_imm_data(transhdr_len, iv_len + input_len)) {
1234 imm_len = input_len;
1239 sglist_reset(sc->sg_ulptx);
1240 if (crda->crd_len != 0) {
1241 error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_ulptx, sc->sg_crp,
1242 crda->crd_skip, crda->crd_len);
1246 error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_ulptx, sc->sg_crp,
1247 crde->crd_skip, crde->crd_len);
1250 if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP) {
1251 error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_ulptx, sc->sg_crp,
1252 crda->crd_inject, hash_size_in_response);
1256 sgl_nsegs = sc->sg_ulptx->sg_nseg;
1257 sgl_len = ccr_ulptx_sgl_len(sgl_nsegs);
1260 if (crda->crd_len != 0) {
1261 aad_start = iv_len + 1;
1262 aad_stop = aad_start + crda->crd_len - 1;
1267 cipher_start = iv_len + crda->crd_len + 1;
1268 if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP)
1269 cipher_stop = hash_size_in_response;
1272 if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP)
1273 auth_insert = hash_size_in_response;
1277 wr_len = roundup2(transhdr_len, 16) + iv_len + roundup2(imm_len, 16) +
1279 if (wr_len > SGE_MAX_WR_LEN)
1281 wr = alloc_wrqe(wr_len, sc->txq);
1283 sc->stats_wr_nomem++;
1287 memset(crwr, 0, wr_len);
1290 * Read the existing IV from the request or generate a random
1291 * one if none is provided. Optionally copy the generated IV
1292 * into the output buffer if requested.
1294 * If the input IV is 12 bytes, append an explicit 4-byte
1297 if (op_type == CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP) {
1298 if (crde->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT)
1299 memcpy(iv, crde->crd_iv, s->blkcipher.iv_len);
1301 arc4rand(iv, s->blkcipher.iv_len, 0);
1302 if ((crde->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_PRESENT) == 0)
1303 crypto_copyback(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
1304 crde->crd_inject, s->blkcipher.iv_len, iv);
1306 if (crde->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT)
1307 memcpy(iv, crde->crd_iv, s->blkcipher.iv_len);
1309 crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
1310 crde->crd_inject, s->blkcipher.iv_len, iv);
1312 if (s->blkcipher.iv_len == 12)
1313 *(uint32_t *)&iv[12] = htobe32(1);
1315 ccr_populate_wreq(sc, crwr, kctx_len, wr_len, sid, imm_len, sgl_len,
1318 /* XXX: Hardcodes SGE loopback channel of 0. */
1319 crwr->sec_cpl.op_ivinsrtofst = htobe32(
1320 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_OPCODE(CPL_TX_SEC_PDU) |
1321 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_RXCHID(sc->tx_channel_id) |
1322 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ACKFOLLOWS(0) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ULPTXLPBK(1) |
1323 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CPLLEN(2) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_PLACEHOLDER(0) |
1324 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_IVINSRTOFST(1));
1326 crwr->sec_cpl.pldlen = htobe32(iv_len + input_len);
1329 * NB: cipherstop is explicitly set to 0. On encrypt it
1330 * should normally be set to 0 anyway (as the encrypt crd ends
1331 * at the end of the input). However, for decrypt the cipher
1332 * ends before the tag in the AUTHENC case (and authstop is
1333 * set to stop before the tag), but for GCM the cipher still
1334 * runs to the end of the buffer. Not sure if this is
1335 * intentional or a firmware quirk, but it is required for
1336 * working tag validation with GCM decryption.
1338 crwr->sec_cpl.aadstart_cipherstop_hi = htobe32(
1339 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AADSTART(aad_start) |
1340 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AADSTOP(aad_stop) |
1341 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CIPHERSTART(cipher_start) |
1342 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CIPHERSTOP_HI(0));
1343 crwr->sec_cpl.cipherstop_lo_authinsert = htobe32(
1344 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CIPHERSTOP_LO(0) |
1345 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AUTHSTART(cipher_start) |
1346 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AUTHSTOP(cipher_stop) |
1347 V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AUTHINSERT(auth_insert));
1349 /* These two flits are actually a CPL_TLS_TX_SCMD_FMT. */
1350 hmac_ctrl = ccr_hmac_ctrl(AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN, hash_size_in_response);
1351 crwr->sec_cpl.seqno_numivs = htobe32(
1352 V_SCMD_SEQ_NO_CTRL(0) |
1353 V_SCMD_PROTO_VERSION(CHCR_SCMD_PROTO_VERSION_GENERIC) |
1354 V_SCMD_ENC_DEC_CTRL(op_type) |
1355 V_SCMD_CIPH_AUTH_SEQ_CTRL(op_type == CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP ? 1 : 0) |
1356 V_SCMD_CIPH_MODE(CHCR_SCMD_CIPHER_MODE_AES_GCM) |
1357 V_SCMD_AUTH_MODE(CHCR_SCMD_AUTH_MODE_GHASH) |
1358 V_SCMD_HMAC_CTRL(hmac_ctrl) |
1359 V_SCMD_IV_SIZE(iv_len / 2) |
1361 crwr->sec_cpl.ivgen_hdrlen = htobe32(
1362 V_SCMD_IV_GEN_CTRL(0) |
1363 V_SCMD_MORE_FRAGS(0) | V_SCMD_LAST_FRAG(0) | V_SCMD_MAC_ONLY(0) |
1364 V_SCMD_AADIVDROP(0) | V_SCMD_HDR_LEN(dsgl_len));
1366 crwr->key_ctx.ctx_hdr = s->blkcipher.key_ctx_hdr;
1367 memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key, s->blkcipher.enckey, s->blkcipher.key_len);
1368 dst = crwr->key_ctx.key + roundup2(s->blkcipher.key_len, 16);
1369 memcpy(dst, s->gmac.ghash_h, GMAC_BLOCK_LEN);
1371 dst = (char *)(crwr + 1) + kctx_len;
1372 ccr_write_phys_dsgl(sc, dst, dsgl_nsegs);
1373 dst += sizeof(struct cpl_rx_phys_dsgl) + dsgl_len;
1374 memcpy(dst, iv, iv_len);
1377 if (crda->crd_len != 0) {
1378 crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
1379 crda->crd_skip, crda->crd_len, dst);
1380 dst += crda->crd_len;
1382 crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, crde->crd_skip,
1383 crde->crd_len, dst);
1384 dst += crde->crd_len;
1385 if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP)
1386 crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
1387 crda->crd_inject, hash_size_in_response, dst);
1389 ccr_write_ulptx_sgl(sc, dst, sgl_nsegs);
1391 /* XXX: TODO backpressure */
1392 t4_wrq_tx(sc->adapter, wr);
1398 ccr_gcm_done(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s,
1399 struct cryptop *crp, const struct cpl_fw6_pld *cpl, int error)
1403 * The updated IV to permit chained requests is at
1404 * cpl->data[2], but OCF doesn't permit chained requests.
1406 * Note that the hardware should always verify the GMAC hash.
1412 * Handle a GCM request that is not supported by the crypto engine by
1413 * performing the operation in software. Derived from swcr_authenc().
1416 ccr_gcm_soft(struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp,
1417 struct cryptodesc *crda, struct cryptodesc *crde)
1419 struct auth_hash *axf;
1420 struct enc_xform *exf;
1423 char block[GMAC_BLOCK_LEN];
1424 char digest[GMAC_DIGEST_LEN];
1425 char iv[AES_BLOCK_LEN];
1431 /* Initialize the MAC. */
1432 switch (s->blkcipher.key_len) {
1434 axf = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_128;
1437 axf = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_192;
1440 axf = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_256;
1446 auth_ctx = malloc(axf->ctxsize, M_CCR, M_NOWAIT);
1447 if (auth_ctx == NULL) {
1451 axf->Init(auth_ctx);
1452 axf->Setkey(auth_ctx, s->blkcipher.enckey, s->blkcipher.key_len);
1454 /* Initialize the cipher. */
1455 exf = &enc_xform_aes_nist_gcm;
1456 error = exf->setkey(&kschedule, s->blkcipher.enckey,
1457 s->blkcipher.key_len);
1462 * This assumes a 12-byte IV from the crp. See longer comment
1463 * above in ccr_gcm() for more details.
1465 if (crde->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT) {
1466 if (crde->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT)
1467 memcpy(iv, crde->crd_iv, 12);
1469 arc4rand(iv, 12, 0);
1470 if ((crde->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_PRESENT) == 0)
1471 crypto_copyback(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
1472 crde->crd_inject, 12, iv);
1474 if (crde->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT)
1475 memcpy(iv, crde->crd_iv, 12);
1477 crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
1478 crde->crd_inject, 12, iv);
1480 *(uint32_t *)&iv[12] = htobe32(1);
1482 axf->Reinit(auth_ctx, iv, sizeof(iv));
1485 for (i = 0; i < crda->crd_len; i += sizeof(block)) {
1486 len = imin(crda->crd_len - i, sizeof(block));
1487 crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, crda->crd_skip +
1489 bzero(block + len, sizeof(block) - len);
1490 axf->Update(auth_ctx, block, sizeof(block));
1493 exf->reinit(kschedule, iv);
1495 /* Do encryption with MAC */
1496 for (i = 0; i < crde->crd_len; i += sizeof(block)) {
1497 len = imin(crde->crd_len - i, sizeof(block));
1498 crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, crde->crd_skip +
1500 bzero(block + len, sizeof(block) - len);
1501 if (crde->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT) {
1502 exf->encrypt(kschedule, block);
1503 axf->Update(auth_ctx, block, len);
1504 crypto_copyback(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
1505 crde->crd_skip + i, len, block);
1507 axf->Update(auth_ctx, block, len);
1512 bzero(block, sizeof(block));
1513 ((uint32_t *)block)[1] = htobe32(crda->crd_len * 8);
1514 ((uint32_t *)block)[3] = htobe32(crde->crd_len * 8);
1515 axf->Update(auth_ctx, block, sizeof(block));
1518 axf->Final(digest, auth_ctx);
1520 /* Inject or validate tag. */
1521 if (crde->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT) {
1522 crypto_copyback(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, crda->crd_inject,
1523 sizeof(digest), digest);
1526 char digest2[GMAC_DIGEST_LEN];
1528 crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, crda->crd_inject,
1529 sizeof(digest2), digest2);
1530 if (timingsafe_bcmp(digest, digest2, sizeof(digest)) == 0) {
1533 /* Tag matches, decrypt data. */
1534 for (i = 0; i < crde->crd_len; i += sizeof(block)) {
1535 len = imin(crde->crd_len - i, sizeof(block));
1536 crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
1537 crde->crd_skip + i, len, block);
1538 bzero(block + len, sizeof(block) - len);
1539 exf->decrypt(kschedule, block);
1540 crypto_copyback(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
1541 crde->crd_skip + i, len, block);
1547 exf->zerokey(&kschedule);
1549 if (auth_ctx != NULL) {
1550 memset(auth_ctx, 0, axf->ctxsize);
1551 free(auth_ctx, M_CCR);
1553 crp->crp_etype = error;
1558 ccr_identify(driver_t *driver, device_t parent)
1562 sc = device_get_softc(parent);
1563 if (sc->cryptocaps & FW_CAPS_CONFIG_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE &&
1564 device_find_child(parent, "ccr", -1) == NULL)
1565 device_add_child(parent, "ccr", -1);
1569 ccr_probe(device_t dev)
1572 device_set_desc(dev, "Chelsio Crypto Accelerator");
1573 return (BUS_PROBE_DEFAULT);
1577 ccr_sysctls(struct ccr_softc *sc)
1579 struct sysctl_ctx_list *ctx;
1580 struct sysctl_oid *oid;
1581 struct sysctl_oid_list *children;
1583 ctx = device_get_sysctl_ctx(sc->dev);
1588 oid = device_get_sysctl_tree(sc->dev);
1589 children = SYSCTL_CHILDREN(oid);
1594 oid = SYSCTL_ADD_NODE(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "stats", CTLFLAG_RD,
1595 NULL, "statistics");
1596 children = SYSCTL_CHILDREN(oid);
1598 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "hmac", CTLFLAG_RD,
1599 &sc->stats_hmac, 0, "HMAC requests submitted");
1600 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "cipher_encrypt", CTLFLAG_RD,
1601 &sc->stats_blkcipher_encrypt, 0,
1602 "Cipher encryption requests submitted");
1603 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "cipher_decrypt", CTLFLAG_RD,
1604 &sc->stats_blkcipher_decrypt, 0,
1605 "Cipher decryption requests submitted");
1606 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "authenc_encrypt", CTLFLAG_RD,
1607 &sc->stats_authenc_encrypt, 0,
1608 "Combined AES+HMAC encryption requests submitted");
1609 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "authenc_decrypt", CTLFLAG_RD,
1610 &sc->stats_authenc_decrypt, 0,
1611 "Combined AES+HMAC decryption requests submitted");
1612 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "gcm_encrypt", CTLFLAG_RD,
1613 &sc->stats_gcm_encrypt, 0, "AES-GCM encryption requests submitted");
1614 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "gcm_decrypt", CTLFLAG_RD,
1615 &sc->stats_gcm_decrypt, 0, "AES-GCM decryption requests submitted");
1616 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "wr_nomem", CTLFLAG_RD,
1617 &sc->stats_wr_nomem, 0, "Work request memory allocation failures");
1618 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "inflight", CTLFLAG_RD,
1619 &sc->stats_inflight, 0, "Requests currently pending");
1620 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "mac_error", CTLFLAG_RD,
1621 &sc->stats_mac_error, 0, "MAC errors");
1622 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "pad_error", CTLFLAG_RD,
1623 &sc->stats_pad_error, 0, "Padding errors");
1624 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "bad_session", CTLFLAG_RD,
1625 &sc->stats_bad_session, 0, "Requests with invalid session ID");
1626 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "sglist_error", CTLFLAG_RD,
1627 &sc->stats_sglist_error, 0,
1628 "Requests for which DMA mapping failed");
1629 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "process_error", CTLFLAG_RD,
1630 &sc->stats_process_error, 0, "Requests failed during queueing");
1631 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "sw_fallback", CTLFLAG_RD,
1632 &sc->stats_sw_fallback, 0,
1633 "Requests processed by falling back to software");
1637 ccr_attach(device_t dev)
1639 struct ccr_softc *sc;
1643 * TODO: Crypto requests will panic if the parent device isn't
1644 * initialized so that the queues are up and running. Need to
1645 * figure out how to handle that correctly, maybe just reject
1646 * requests if the adapter isn't fully initialized?
1648 sc = device_get_softc(dev);
1650 sc->adapter = device_get_softc(device_get_parent(dev));
1651 sc->txq = &sc->adapter->sge.ctrlq[0];
1652 sc->rxq = &sc->adapter->sge.rxq[0];
1653 cid = crypto_get_driverid(dev, CRYPTOCAP_F_HARDWARE);
1655 device_printf(dev, "could not get crypto driver id\n");
1659 sc->adapter->ccr_softc = sc;
1662 sc->tx_channel_id = 0;
1664 mtx_init(&sc->lock, "ccr", NULL, MTX_DEF);
1665 sc->sg_crp = sglist_alloc(TX_SGL_SEGS, M_WAITOK);
1666 sc->sg_ulptx = sglist_alloc(TX_SGL_SEGS, M_WAITOK);
1667 sc->sg_dsgl = sglist_alloc(MAX_RX_PHYS_DSGL_SGE, M_WAITOK);
1668 sc->iv_aad_buf = malloc(MAX_AAD_LEN, M_CCR, M_WAITOK);
1669 sc->sg_iv_aad = sglist_build(sc->iv_aad_buf, MAX_AAD_LEN, M_WAITOK);
1672 crypto_register(cid, CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC, 0, 0);
1673 crypto_register(cid, CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC, 0, 0);
1674 crypto_register(cid, CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC, 0, 0);
1675 crypto_register(cid, CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC, 0, 0);
1676 crypto_register(cid, CRYPTO_AES_CBC, 0, 0);
1677 crypto_register(cid, CRYPTO_AES_ICM, 0, 0);
1678 crypto_register(cid, CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16, 0, 0);
1679 crypto_register(cid, CRYPTO_AES_128_NIST_GMAC, 0, 0);
1680 crypto_register(cid, CRYPTO_AES_192_NIST_GMAC, 0, 0);
1681 crypto_register(cid, CRYPTO_AES_256_NIST_GMAC, 0, 0);
1682 crypto_register(cid, CRYPTO_AES_XTS, 0, 0);
1687 ccr_detach(device_t dev)
1689 struct ccr_softc *sc;
1692 sc = device_get_softc(dev);
1694 mtx_lock(&sc->lock);
1695 for (i = 0; i < sc->nsessions; i++) {
1696 if (sc->sessions[i].active || sc->sessions[i].pending != 0) {
1697 mtx_unlock(&sc->lock);
1701 sc->detaching = true;
1702 mtx_unlock(&sc->lock);
1704 crypto_unregister_all(sc->cid);
1705 free(sc->sessions, M_CCR);
1706 mtx_destroy(&sc->lock);
1707 sglist_free(sc->sg_iv_aad);
1708 free(sc->iv_aad_buf, M_CCR);
1709 sglist_free(sc->sg_dsgl);
1710 sglist_free(sc->sg_ulptx);
1711 sglist_free(sc->sg_crp);
1712 sc->adapter->ccr_softc = NULL;
1717 ccr_copy_partial_hash(void *dst, int cri_alg, union authctx *auth_ctx)
1723 u32 = (uint32_t *)dst;
1724 u64 = (uint64_t *)dst;
1726 case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
1727 for (i = 0; i < SHA1_HASH_LEN / 4; i++)
1728 u32[i] = htobe32(auth_ctx->sha1ctx.h.b32[i]);
1730 case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
1731 for (i = 0; i < SHA2_256_HASH_LEN / 4; i++)
1732 u32[i] = htobe32(auth_ctx->sha256ctx.state[i]);
1734 case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
1735 for (i = 0; i < SHA2_512_HASH_LEN / 8; i++)
1736 u64[i] = htobe64(auth_ctx->sha384ctx.state[i]);
1738 case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
1739 for (i = 0; i < SHA2_512_HASH_LEN / 8; i++)
1740 u64[i] = htobe64(auth_ctx->sha512ctx.state[i]);
1746 ccr_init_hmac_digest(struct ccr_session *s, int cri_alg, char *key,
1749 union authctx auth_ctx;
1750 struct auth_hash *axf;
1754 * If the key is larger than the block size, use the digest of
1755 * the key as the key instead.
1757 axf = s->hmac.auth_hash;
1759 if (klen > axf->blocksize) {
1760 axf->Init(&auth_ctx);
1761 axf->Update(&auth_ctx, key, klen);
1762 axf->Final(s->hmac.ipad, &auth_ctx);
1763 klen = axf->hashsize;
1765 memcpy(s->hmac.ipad, key, klen);
1767 memset(s->hmac.ipad + klen, 0, axf->blocksize - klen);
1768 memcpy(s->hmac.opad, s->hmac.ipad, axf->blocksize);
1770 for (i = 0; i < axf->blocksize; i++) {
1771 s->hmac.ipad[i] ^= HMAC_IPAD_VAL;
1772 s->hmac.opad[i] ^= HMAC_OPAD_VAL;
1776 * Hash the raw ipad and opad and store the partial result in
1779 axf->Init(&auth_ctx);
1780 axf->Update(&auth_ctx, s->hmac.ipad, axf->blocksize);
1781 ccr_copy_partial_hash(s->hmac.ipad, cri_alg, &auth_ctx);
1783 axf->Init(&auth_ctx);
1784 axf->Update(&auth_ctx, s->hmac.opad, axf->blocksize);
1785 ccr_copy_partial_hash(s->hmac.opad, cri_alg, &auth_ctx);
1789 * Borrowed from AES_GMAC_Setkey().
1792 ccr_init_gmac_hash(struct ccr_session *s, char *key, int klen)
1794 static char zeroes[GMAC_BLOCK_LEN];
1795 uint32_t keysched[4 * (RIJNDAEL_MAXNR + 1)];
1798 rounds = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(keysched, key, klen);
1799 rijndaelEncrypt(keysched, rounds, zeroes, s->gmac.ghash_h);
1803 ccr_aes_check_keylen(int alg, int klen)
1809 if (alg == CRYPTO_AES_XTS)
1815 if (alg != CRYPTO_AES_XTS)
1825 ccr_aes_setkey(struct ccr_session *s, int alg, const void *key, int klen)
1827 unsigned int ck_size, iopad_size, kctx_flits, kctx_len, kbits, mk_size;
1828 unsigned int opad_present;
1830 if (alg == CRYPTO_AES_XTS)
1836 ck_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_CIPHER_KEY_SIZE_128;
1839 ck_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_CIPHER_KEY_SIZE_192;
1842 ck_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_CIPHER_KEY_SIZE_256;
1845 panic("should not get here");
1848 s->blkcipher.key_len = klen / 8;
1849 memcpy(s->blkcipher.enckey, key, s->blkcipher.key_len);
1851 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1852 case CRYPTO_AES_XTS:
1853 t4_aes_getdeckey(s->blkcipher.deckey, key, kbits);
1857 kctx_len = roundup2(s->blkcipher.key_len, 16);
1860 mk_size = s->hmac.mk_size;
1862 iopad_size = roundup2(s->hmac.partial_digest_len, 16);
1863 kctx_len += iopad_size * 2;
1866 mk_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_MAC_KEY_SIZE_128;
1868 kctx_len += GMAC_BLOCK_LEN;
1871 mk_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_NO_KEY;
1875 kctx_flits = (sizeof(struct _key_ctx) + kctx_len) / 16;
1876 s->blkcipher.key_ctx_hdr = htobe32(V_KEY_CONTEXT_CTX_LEN(kctx_flits) |
1877 V_KEY_CONTEXT_DUAL_CK(alg == CRYPTO_AES_XTS) |
1878 V_KEY_CONTEXT_OPAD_PRESENT(opad_present) |
1879 V_KEY_CONTEXT_SALT_PRESENT(1) | V_KEY_CONTEXT_CK_SIZE(ck_size) |
1880 V_KEY_CONTEXT_MK_SIZE(mk_size) | V_KEY_CONTEXT_VALID(1));
1884 ccr_newsession(device_t dev, uint32_t *sidp, struct cryptoini *cri)
1886 struct ccr_softc *sc;
1887 struct ccr_session *s;
1888 struct auth_hash *auth_hash;
1889 struct cryptoini *c, *hash, *cipher;
1890 unsigned int auth_mode, cipher_mode, iv_len, mk_size;
1891 unsigned int partial_digest_len;
1895 if (sidp == NULL || cri == NULL)
1902 auth_mode = CHCR_SCMD_AUTH_MODE_NOP;
1903 cipher_mode = CHCR_SCMD_CIPHER_MODE_NOP;
1906 partial_digest_len = 0;
1907 for (c = cri; c != NULL; c = c->cri_next) {
1908 switch (c->cri_alg) {
1909 case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
1910 case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
1911 case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
1912 case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
1913 case CRYPTO_AES_128_NIST_GMAC:
1914 case CRYPTO_AES_192_NIST_GMAC:
1915 case CRYPTO_AES_256_NIST_GMAC:
1919 switch (c->cri_alg) {
1920 case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
1921 auth_hash = &auth_hash_hmac_sha1;
1922 auth_mode = CHCR_SCMD_AUTH_MODE_SHA1;
1923 mk_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_MAC_KEY_SIZE_160;
1924 partial_digest_len = SHA1_HASH_LEN;
1926 case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
1927 auth_hash = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256;
1928 auth_mode = CHCR_SCMD_AUTH_MODE_SHA256;
1929 mk_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_MAC_KEY_SIZE_256;
1930 partial_digest_len = SHA2_256_HASH_LEN;
1932 case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
1933 auth_hash = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384;
1934 auth_mode = CHCR_SCMD_AUTH_MODE_SHA512_384;
1935 mk_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_MAC_KEY_SIZE_512;
1936 partial_digest_len = SHA2_512_HASH_LEN;
1938 case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
1939 auth_hash = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512;
1940 auth_mode = CHCR_SCMD_AUTH_MODE_SHA512_512;
1941 mk_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_MAC_KEY_SIZE_512;
1942 partial_digest_len = SHA2_512_HASH_LEN;
1944 case CRYPTO_AES_128_NIST_GMAC:
1945 case CRYPTO_AES_192_NIST_GMAC:
1946 case CRYPTO_AES_256_NIST_GMAC:
1948 auth_mode = CHCR_SCMD_AUTH_MODE_GHASH;
1949 mk_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_MAC_KEY_SIZE_128;
1953 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1954 case CRYPTO_AES_ICM:
1955 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
1956 case CRYPTO_AES_XTS:
1960 switch (c->cri_alg) {
1961 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1962 cipher_mode = CHCR_SCMD_CIPHER_MODE_AES_CBC;
1963 iv_len = AES_BLOCK_LEN;
1965 case CRYPTO_AES_ICM:
1966 cipher_mode = CHCR_SCMD_CIPHER_MODE_AES_CTR;
1967 iv_len = AES_BLOCK_LEN;
1969 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
1970 cipher_mode = CHCR_SCMD_CIPHER_MODE_AES_GCM;
1971 iv_len = AES_GCM_IV_LEN;
1973 case CRYPTO_AES_XTS:
1974 cipher_mode = CHCR_SCMD_CIPHER_MODE_AES_XTS;
1975 iv_len = AES_BLOCK_LEN;
1978 if (c->cri_key != NULL) {
1979 error = ccr_aes_check_keylen(c->cri_alg,
1989 if (gcm_hash != (cipher_mode == CHCR_SCMD_CIPHER_MODE_AES_GCM))
1991 if (hash == NULL && cipher == NULL)
1993 if (hash != NULL && hash->cri_key == NULL)
1996 sc = device_get_softc(dev);
1997 mtx_lock(&sc->lock);
1998 if (sc->detaching) {
1999 mtx_unlock(&sc->lock);
2003 for (i = 0; i < sc->nsessions; i++) {
2004 if (!sc->sessions[i].active && sc->sessions[i].pending == 0) {
2010 s = malloc(sizeof(*s) * (sc->nsessions + 1), M_CCR,
2013 mtx_unlock(&sc->lock);
2016 if (sc->sessions != NULL)
2017 memcpy(s, sc->sessions, sizeof(*s) * sc->nsessions);
2018 sess = sc->nsessions;
2019 free(sc->sessions, M_CCR);
2024 s = &sc->sessions[sess];
2028 else if (hash != NULL && cipher != NULL)
2030 else if (hash != NULL)
2033 MPASS(cipher != NULL);
2034 s->mode = BLKCIPHER;
2037 if (hash->cri_mlen == 0)
2038 s->gmac.hash_len = AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN;
2040 s->gmac.hash_len = hash->cri_mlen;
2041 ccr_init_gmac_hash(s, hash->cri_key, hash->cri_klen);
2042 } else if (hash != NULL) {
2043 s->hmac.auth_hash = auth_hash;
2044 s->hmac.auth_mode = auth_mode;
2045 s->hmac.mk_size = mk_size;
2046 s->hmac.partial_digest_len = partial_digest_len;
2047 if (hash->cri_mlen == 0)
2048 s->hmac.hash_len = auth_hash->hashsize;
2050 s->hmac.hash_len = hash->cri_mlen;
2051 ccr_init_hmac_digest(s, hash->cri_alg, hash->cri_key,
2054 if (cipher != NULL) {
2055 s->blkcipher.cipher_mode = cipher_mode;
2056 s->blkcipher.iv_len = iv_len;
2057 if (cipher->cri_key != NULL)
2058 ccr_aes_setkey(s, cipher->cri_alg, cipher->cri_key,
2063 mtx_unlock(&sc->lock);
2070 ccr_freesession(device_t dev, uint64_t tid)
2072 struct ccr_softc *sc;
2076 sc = device_get_softc(dev);
2077 sid = CRYPTO_SESID2LID(tid);
2078 mtx_lock(&sc->lock);
2079 if (sid >= sc->nsessions || !sc->sessions[sid].active)
2082 if (sc->sessions[sid].pending != 0)
2084 "session %d freed with %d pending requests\n", sid,
2085 sc->sessions[sid].pending);
2086 sc->sessions[sid].active = false;
2089 mtx_unlock(&sc->lock);
2094 ccr_process(device_t dev, struct cryptop *crp, int hint)
2096 struct ccr_softc *sc;
2097 struct ccr_session *s;
2098 struct cryptodesc *crd, *crda, *crde;
2105 crd = crp->crp_desc;
2106 sid = CRYPTO_SESID2LID(crp->crp_sid);
2107 sc = device_get_softc(dev);
2108 mtx_lock(&sc->lock);
2109 if (sid >= sc->nsessions || !sc->sessions[sid].active) {
2110 sc->stats_bad_session++;
2115 error = ccr_populate_sglist(sc->sg_crp, crp);
2117 sc->stats_sglist_error++;
2121 s = &sc->sessions[sid];
2124 if (crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT)
2125 ccr_init_hmac_digest(s, crd->crd_alg, crd->crd_key,
2127 error = ccr_hmac(sc, sid, s, crp);
2132 if (crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT) {
2133 error = ccr_aes_check_keylen(crd->crd_alg,
2137 ccr_aes_setkey(s, crd->crd_alg, crd->crd_key,
2140 error = ccr_blkcipher(sc, sid, s, crp);
2142 if (crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT)
2143 sc->stats_blkcipher_encrypt++;
2145 sc->stats_blkcipher_decrypt++;
2150 switch (crd->crd_alg) {
2151 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
2152 case CRYPTO_AES_ICM:
2153 case CRYPTO_AES_XTS:
2154 /* Only encrypt-then-authenticate supported. */
2156 crda = crd->crd_next;
2157 if (!(crde->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT)) {
2164 crde = crd->crd_next;
2165 if (crde->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT) {
2173 if (crda->crd_flags & CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT)
2174 ccr_init_hmac_digest(s, crda->crd_alg, crda->crd_key,
2176 if (crde->crd_flags & CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT) {
2177 error = ccr_aes_check_keylen(crde->crd_alg,
2181 ccr_aes_setkey(s, crde->crd_alg, crde->crd_key,
2184 error = ccr_authenc(sc, sid, s, crp, crda, crde);
2186 if (crde->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT)
2187 sc->stats_authenc_encrypt++;
2189 sc->stats_authenc_decrypt++;
2194 if (crd->crd_alg == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16) {
2196 crda = crd->crd_next;
2199 crde = crd->crd_next;
2201 if (crda->crd_flags & CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT)
2202 ccr_init_gmac_hash(s, crda->crd_key, crda->crd_klen);
2203 if (crde->crd_flags & CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT) {
2204 error = ccr_aes_check_keylen(crde->crd_alg,
2208 ccr_aes_setkey(s, crde->crd_alg, crde->crd_key,
2211 if (crde->crd_len == 0) {
2212 mtx_unlock(&sc->lock);
2213 ccr_gcm_soft(s, crp, crda, crde);
2216 error = ccr_gcm(sc, sid, s, crp, crda, crde);
2217 if (error == EMSGSIZE) {
2218 sc->stats_sw_fallback++;
2219 mtx_unlock(&sc->lock);
2220 ccr_gcm_soft(s, crp, crda, crde);
2224 if (crde->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT)
2225 sc->stats_gcm_encrypt++;
2227 sc->stats_gcm_decrypt++;
2234 sc->stats_inflight++;
2236 sc->stats_process_error++;
2239 mtx_unlock(&sc->lock);
2242 crp->crp_etype = error;
2250 do_cpl6_fw_pld(struct sge_iq *iq, const struct rss_header *rss,
2253 struct ccr_softc *sc = iq->adapter->ccr_softc;
2254 struct ccr_session *s;
2255 const struct cpl_fw6_pld *cpl;
2256 struct cryptop *crp;
2257 uint32_t sid, status;
2261 cpl = mtod(m, const void *);
2263 cpl = (const void *)(rss + 1);
2265 crp = (struct cryptop *)(uintptr_t)be64toh(cpl->data[1]);
2266 sid = CRYPTO_SESID2LID(crp->crp_sid);
2267 status = be64toh(cpl->data[0]);
2268 if (CHK_MAC_ERR_BIT(status) || CHK_PAD_ERR_BIT(status))
2273 mtx_lock(&sc->lock);
2274 MPASS(sid < sc->nsessions);
2275 s = &sc->sessions[sid];
2277 sc->stats_inflight--;
2281 error = ccr_hmac_done(sc, s, crp, cpl, error);
2284 error = ccr_blkcipher_done(sc, s, crp, cpl, error);
2287 error = ccr_authenc_done(sc, s, crp, cpl, error);
2290 error = ccr_gcm_done(sc, s, crp, cpl, error);
2294 if (error == EBADMSG) {
2295 if (CHK_MAC_ERR_BIT(status))
2296 sc->stats_mac_error++;
2297 if (CHK_PAD_ERR_BIT(status))
2298 sc->stats_pad_error++;
2300 mtx_unlock(&sc->lock);
2301 crp->crp_etype = error;
2308 ccr_modevent(module_t mod, int cmd, void *arg)
2313 t4_register_cpl_handler(CPL_FW6_PLD, do_cpl6_fw_pld);
2316 t4_register_cpl_handler(CPL_FW6_PLD, NULL);
2319 return (EOPNOTSUPP);
2323 static device_method_t ccr_methods[] = {
2324 DEVMETHOD(device_identify, ccr_identify),
2325 DEVMETHOD(device_probe, ccr_probe),
2326 DEVMETHOD(device_attach, ccr_attach),
2327 DEVMETHOD(device_detach, ccr_detach),
2329 DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_newsession, ccr_newsession),
2330 DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_freesession, ccr_freesession),
2331 DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_process, ccr_process),
2336 static driver_t ccr_driver = {
2339 sizeof(struct ccr_softc)
2342 static devclass_t ccr_devclass;
2344 DRIVER_MODULE(ccr, t6nex, ccr_driver, ccr_devclass, ccr_modevent, NULL);
2345 MODULE_VERSION(ccr, 1);
2346 MODULE_DEPEND(ccr, crypto, 1, 1, 1);
2347 MODULE_DEPEND(ccr, t6nex, 1, 1, 1);