2 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
4 * Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993
5 * The Regents of the University of California.
6 * (c) UNIX System Laboratories, Inc.
7 * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 Robert N. M. Watson.
10 * All or some portions of this file are derived from material licensed
11 * to the University of California by American Telephone and Telegraph
12 * Co. or Unix System Laboratories, Inc. and are reproduced herein with
13 * the permission of UNIX System Laboratories, Inc.
15 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
16 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
18 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
19 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
20 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
21 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
22 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
23 * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
24 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
25 * without specific prior written permission.
27 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
28 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
29 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
30 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
31 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
32 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
33 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
34 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
35 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
36 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
39 * @(#)kern_prot.c 8.6 (Berkeley) 1/21/94
43 * System calls related to processes and protection
46 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
47 __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
50 #include "opt_inet6.h"
52 #include <sys/param.h>
53 #include <sys/systm.h>
56 #include <sys/kernel.h>
58 #include <sys/loginclass.h>
59 #include <sys/malloc.h>
60 #include <sys/mutex.h>
61 #include <sys/refcount.h>
65 #include <sys/sysproto.h>
67 #include <sys/pioctl.h>
68 #include <sys/racct.h>
70 #include <sys/resourcevar.h>
71 #include <sys/socket.h>
72 #include <sys/socketvar.h>
73 #include <sys/syscallsubr.h>
74 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
78 "Kernel support for interfaces necessary for regression testing (SECURITY RISK!)");
81 #include <security/audit/audit.h>
82 #include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
84 static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_CRED, "cred", "credentials");
86 SYSCTL_NODE(_security, OID_AUTO, bsd, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, "BSD security policy");
88 static void crsetgroups_locked(struct ucred *cr, int ngrp,
91 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
98 sys_getpid(struct thread *td, struct getpid_args *uap)
100 struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
102 td->td_retval[0] = p->p_pid;
103 #if defined(COMPAT_43)
104 td->td_retval[1] = kern_getppid(td);
109 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
110 struct getppid_args {
116 sys_getppid(struct thread *td, struct getppid_args *uap)
119 td->td_retval[0] = kern_getppid(td);
124 kern_getppid(struct thread *td)
126 struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
132 * Get process group ID; note that POSIX getpgrp takes no parameter.
134 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
135 struct getpgrp_args {
140 sys_getpgrp(struct thread *td, struct getpgrp_args *uap)
142 struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
145 td->td_retval[0] = p->p_pgrp->pg_id;
150 /* Get an arbitrary pid's process group id */
151 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
152 struct getpgid_args {
157 sys_getpgid(struct thread *td, struct getpgid_args *uap)
169 error = p_cansee(td, p);
175 td->td_retval[0] = p->p_pgrp->pg_id;
181 * Get an arbitrary pid's session id.
183 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
189 sys_getsid(struct thread *td, struct getsid_args *uap)
201 error = p_cansee(td, p);
207 td->td_retval[0] = p->p_session->s_sid;
212 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
219 sys_getuid(struct thread *td, struct getuid_args *uap)
222 td->td_retval[0] = td->td_ucred->cr_ruid;
223 #if defined(COMPAT_43)
224 td->td_retval[1] = td->td_ucred->cr_uid;
229 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
230 struct geteuid_args {
236 sys_geteuid(struct thread *td, struct geteuid_args *uap)
239 td->td_retval[0] = td->td_ucred->cr_uid;
243 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
250 sys_getgid(struct thread *td, struct getgid_args *uap)
253 td->td_retval[0] = td->td_ucred->cr_rgid;
254 #if defined(COMPAT_43)
255 td->td_retval[1] = td->td_ucred->cr_groups[0];
261 * Get effective group ID. The "egid" is groups[0], and could be obtained
262 * via getgroups. This syscall exists because it is somewhat painful to do
263 * correctly in a library function.
265 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
266 struct getegid_args {
272 sys_getegid(struct thread *td, struct getegid_args *uap)
275 td->td_retval[0] = td->td_ucred->cr_groups[0];
279 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
280 struct getgroups_args {
286 sys_getgroups(struct thread *td, struct getgroups_args *uap)
293 ngrp = cred->cr_ngroups;
295 if (uap->gidsetsize == 0) {
299 if (uap->gidsetsize < ngrp)
302 error = copyout(cred->cr_groups, uap->gidset, ngrp * sizeof(gid_t));
304 td->td_retval[0] = ngrp;
308 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
315 sys_setsid(struct thread *td, struct setsid_args *uap)
319 struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
320 struct pgrp *newpgrp;
321 struct session *newsess;
326 newpgrp = malloc(sizeof(struct pgrp), M_PGRP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
327 newsess = malloc(sizeof(struct session), M_SESSION, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
329 sx_xlock(&proctree_lock);
331 if (p->p_pgid == p->p_pid || (pgrp = pgfind(p->p_pid)) != NULL) {
336 (void)enterpgrp(p, p->p_pid, newpgrp, newsess);
337 td->td_retval[0] = p->p_pid;
342 sx_xunlock(&proctree_lock);
345 free(newpgrp, M_PGRP);
347 free(newsess, M_SESSION);
353 * set process group (setpgid/old setpgrp)
355 * caller does setpgid(targpid, targpgid)
357 * pid must be caller or child of caller (ESRCH)
359 * pid must be in same session (EPERM)
360 * pid can't have done an exec (EACCES)
362 * there must exist some pid in same session having pgid (EPERM)
363 * pid must not be session leader (EPERM)
365 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
366 struct setpgid_args {
367 int pid; /* target process id */
368 int pgid; /* target pgrp id */
373 sys_setpgid(struct thread *td, struct setpgid_args *uap)
375 struct proc *curp = td->td_proc;
376 struct proc *targp; /* target process */
377 struct pgrp *pgrp; /* target pgrp */
379 struct pgrp *newpgrp;
386 newpgrp = malloc(sizeof(struct pgrp), M_PGRP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
388 sx_xlock(&proctree_lock);
389 if (uap->pid != 0 && uap->pid != curp->p_pid) {
390 if ((targp = pfind(uap->pid)) == NULL) {
394 if (!inferior(targp)) {
399 if ((error = p_cansee(td, targp))) {
403 if (targp->p_pgrp == NULL ||
404 targp->p_session != curp->p_session) {
409 if (targp->p_flag & P_EXEC) {
417 if (SESS_LEADER(targp)) {
422 uap->pgid = targp->p_pid;
423 if ((pgrp = pgfind(uap->pgid)) == NULL) {
424 if (uap->pgid == targp->p_pid) {
425 error = enterpgrp(targp, uap->pgid, newpgrp,
432 if (pgrp == targp->p_pgrp) {
436 if (pgrp->pg_id != targp->p_pid &&
437 pgrp->pg_session != curp->p_session) {
443 error = enterthispgrp(targp, pgrp);
446 sx_xunlock(&proctree_lock);
447 KASSERT((error == 0) || (newpgrp != NULL),
448 ("setpgid failed and newpgrp is NULL"));
450 free(newpgrp, M_PGRP);
455 * Use the clause in B.4.2.2 that allows setuid/setgid to be 4.2/4.3BSD
456 * compatible. It says that setting the uid/gid to euid/egid is a special
457 * case of "appropriate privilege". Once the rules are expanded out, this
458 * basically means that setuid(nnn) sets all three id's, in all permitted
459 * cases unless _POSIX_SAVED_IDS is enabled. In that case, setuid(getuid())
460 * does not set the saved id - this is dangerous for traditional BSD
461 * programs. For this reason, we *really* do not want to set
462 * _POSIX_SAVED_IDS and do not want to clear POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2.
464 #define POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2
466 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
473 sys_setuid(struct thread *td, struct setuid_args *uap)
475 struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
476 struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
487 * Copy credentials so other references do not see our changes.
489 oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred);
492 error = mac_cred_check_setuid(oldcred, uid);
498 * See if we have "permission" by POSIX 1003.1 rules.
500 * Note that setuid(geteuid()) is a special case of
501 * "appropriate privileges" in appendix B.4.2.2. We need
502 * to use this clause to be compatible with traditional BSD
503 * semantics. Basically, it means that "setuid(xx)" sets all
504 * three id's (assuming you have privs).
506 * Notes on the logic. We do things in three steps.
507 * 1: We determine if the euid is going to change, and do EPERM
508 * right away. We unconditionally change the euid later if this
509 * test is satisfied, simplifying that part of the logic.
510 * 2: We determine if the real and/or saved uids are going to
511 * change. Determined by compile options.
512 * 3: Change euid last. (after tests in #2 for "appropriate privs")
514 if (uid != oldcred->cr_ruid && /* allow setuid(getuid()) */
515 #ifdef _POSIX_SAVED_IDS
516 uid != oldcred->cr_svuid && /* allow setuid(saved gid) */
518 #ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 /* Use BSD-compat clause from B.4.2.2 */
519 uid != oldcred->cr_uid && /* allow setuid(geteuid()) */
521 (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETUID)) != 0)
524 #ifdef _POSIX_SAVED_IDS
526 * Do we have "appropriate privileges" (are we root or uid == euid)
527 * If so, we are changing the real uid and/or saved uid.
530 #ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 /* Use the clause from B.4.2.2 */
531 uid == oldcred->cr_uid ||
533 /* We are using privs. */
534 priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETUID) == 0)
538 * Set the real uid and transfer proc count to new user.
540 if (uid != oldcred->cr_ruid) {
541 change_ruid(newcred, uip);
547 * XXX always set saved uid even if not _POSIX_SAVED_IDS, as
548 * the security of seteuid() depends on it. B.4.2.2 says it
549 * is important that we should do this.
551 if (uid != oldcred->cr_svuid) {
552 change_svuid(newcred, uid);
558 * In all permitted cases, we are changing the euid.
560 if (uid != oldcred->cr_uid) {
561 change_euid(newcred, uip);
564 proc_set_cred(p, newcred);
566 racct_proc_ucred_changed(p, oldcred, newcred);
571 rctl_proc_ucred_changed(p, newcred);
585 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
586 struct seteuid_args {
592 sys_seteuid(struct thread *td, struct seteuid_args *uap)
594 struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
595 struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
597 struct uidinfo *euip;
601 AUDIT_ARG_EUID(euid);
606 * Copy credentials so other references do not see our changes.
608 oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred);
611 error = mac_cred_check_seteuid(oldcred, euid);
616 if (euid != oldcred->cr_ruid && /* allow seteuid(getuid()) */
617 euid != oldcred->cr_svuid && /* allow seteuid(saved uid) */
618 (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETEUID)) != 0)
622 * Everything's okay, do it.
624 if (oldcred->cr_uid != euid) {
625 change_euid(newcred, euip);
628 proc_set_cred(p, newcred);
641 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
648 sys_setgid(struct thread *td, struct setgid_args *uap)
650 struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
651 struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
659 oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred);
662 error = mac_cred_check_setgid(oldcred, gid);
668 * See if we have "permission" by POSIX 1003.1 rules.
670 * Note that setgid(getegid()) is a special case of
671 * "appropriate privileges" in appendix B.4.2.2. We need
672 * to use this clause to be compatible with traditional BSD
673 * semantics. Basically, it means that "setgid(xx)" sets all
674 * three id's (assuming you have privs).
676 * For notes on the logic here, see setuid() above.
678 if (gid != oldcred->cr_rgid && /* allow setgid(getgid()) */
679 #ifdef _POSIX_SAVED_IDS
680 gid != oldcred->cr_svgid && /* allow setgid(saved gid) */
682 #ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 /* Use BSD-compat clause from B.4.2.2 */
683 gid != oldcred->cr_groups[0] && /* allow setgid(getegid()) */
685 (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETGID)) != 0)
688 #ifdef _POSIX_SAVED_IDS
690 * Do we have "appropriate privileges" (are we root or gid == egid)
691 * If so, we are changing the real uid and saved gid.
694 #ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 /* use the clause from B.4.2.2 */
695 gid == oldcred->cr_groups[0] ||
697 /* We are using privs. */
698 priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETGID) == 0)
704 if (oldcred->cr_rgid != gid) {
705 change_rgid(newcred, gid);
711 * XXX always set saved gid even if not _POSIX_SAVED_IDS, as
712 * the security of setegid() depends on it. B.4.2.2 says it
713 * is important that we should do this.
715 if (oldcred->cr_svgid != gid) {
716 change_svgid(newcred, gid);
721 * In all cases permitted cases, we are changing the egid.
722 * Copy credentials so other references do not see our changes.
724 if (oldcred->cr_groups[0] != gid) {
725 change_egid(newcred, gid);
728 proc_set_cred(p, newcred);
739 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
740 struct setegid_args {
746 sys_setegid(struct thread *td, struct setegid_args *uap)
748 struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
749 struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
754 AUDIT_ARG_EGID(egid);
757 oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred);
760 error = mac_cred_check_setegid(oldcred, egid);
765 if (egid != oldcred->cr_rgid && /* allow setegid(getgid()) */
766 egid != oldcred->cr_svgid && /* allow setegid(saved gid) */
767 (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETEGID)) != 0)
770 if (oldcred->cr_groups[0] != egid) {
771 change_egid(newcred, egid);
774 proc_set_cred(p, newcred);
785 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
786 struct setgroups_args {
793 sys_setgroups(struct thread *td, struct setgroups_args *uap)
795 gid_t smallgroups[XU_NGROUPS];
800 gidsetsize = uap->gidsetsize;
801 if (gidsetsize > ngroups_max + 1)
804 if (gidsetsize > XU_NGROUPS)
805 groups = malloc(gidsetsize * sizeof(gid_t), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
807 groups = smallgroups;
809 error = copyin(uap->gidset, groups, gidsetsize * sizeof(gid_t));
811 error = kern_setgroups(td, gidsetsize, groups);
813 if (gidsetsize > XU_NGROUPS)
814 free(groups, M_TEMP);
819 kern_setgroups(struct thread *td, u_int ngrp, gid_t *groups)
821 struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
822 struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
825 MPASS(ngrp <= ngroups_max + 1);
826 AUDIT_ARG_GROUPSET(groups, ngrp);
828 crextend(newcred, ngrp);
830 oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred);
833 error = mac_cred_check_setgroups(oldcred, ngrp, groups);
838 error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETGROUPS);
844 * setgroups(0, NULL) is a legitimate way of clearing the
845 * groups vector on non-BSD systems (which generally do not
846 * have the egid in the groups[0]). We risk security holes
847 * when running non-BSD software if we do not do the same.
849 newcred->cr_ngroups = 1;
851 crsetgroups_locked(newcred, ngrp, groups);
854 proc_set_cred(p, newcred);
865 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
866 struct setreuid_args {
873 sys_setreuid(struct thread *td, struct setreuid_args *uap)
875 struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
876 struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
878 struct uidinfo *euip, *ruip;
883 AUDIT_ARG_EUID(euid);
884 AUDIT_ARG_RUID(ruid);
889 oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred);
892 error = mac_cred_check_setreuid(oldcred, ruid, euid);
897 if (((ruid != (uid_t)-1 && ruid != oldcred->cr_ruid &&
898 ruid != oldcred->cr_svuid) ||
899 (euid != (uid_t)-1 && euid != oldcred->cr_uid &&
900 euid != oldcred->cr_ruid && euid != oldcred->cr_svuid)) &&
901 (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETREUID)) != 0)
904 if (euid != (uid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_uid != euid) {
905 change_euid(newcred, euip);
908 if (ruid != (uid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_ruid != ruid) {
909 change_ruid(newcred, ruip);
912 if ((ruid != (uid_t)-1 || newcred->cr_uid != newcred->cr_ruid) &&
913 newcred->cr_svuid != newcred->cr_uid) {
914 change_svuid(newcred, newcred->cr_uid);
917 proc_set_cred(p, newcred);
919 racct_proc_ucred_changed(p, oldcred, newcred);
924 rctl_proc_ucred_changed(p, newcred);
940 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
941 struct setregid_args {
948 sys_setregid(struct thread *td, struct setregid_args *uap)
950 struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
951 struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
957 AUDIT_ARG_EGID(egid);
958 AUDIT_ARG_RGID(rgid);
961 oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred);
964 error = mac_cred_check_setregid(oldcred, rgid, egid);
969 if (((rgid != (gid_t)-1 && rgid != oldcred->cr_rgid &&
970 rgid != oldcred->cr_svgid) ||
971 (egid != (gid_t)-1 && egid != oldcred->cr_groups[0] &&
972 egid != oldcred->cr_rgid && egid != oldcred->cr_svgid)) &&
973 (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETREGID)) != 0)
976 if (egid != (gid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_groups[0] != egid) {
977 change_egid(newcred, egid);
980 if (rgid != (gid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_rgid != rgid) {
981 change_rgid(newcred, rgid);
984 if ((rgid != (gid_t)-1 || newcred->cr_groups[0] != newcred->cr_rgid) &&
985 newcred->cr_svgid != newcred->cr_groups[0]) {
986 change_svgid(newcred, newcred->cr_groups[0]);
989 proc_set_cred(p, newcred);
1001 * setresuid(ruid, euid, suid) is like setreuid except control over the saved
1004 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1005 struct setresuid_args {
1013 sys_setresuid(struct thread *td, struct setresuid_args *uap)
1015 struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
1016 struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
1017 uid_t euid, ruid, suid;
1018 struct uidinfo *euip, *ruip;
1024 AUDIT_ARG_EUID(euid);
1025 AUDIT_ARG_RUID(ruid);
1026 AUDIT_ARG_SUID(suid);
1028 euip = uifind(euid);
1029 ruip = uifind(ruid);
1031 oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred);
1034 error = mac_cred_check_setresuid(oldcred, ruid, euid, suid);
1039 if (((ruid != (uid_t)-1 && ruid != oldcred->cr_ruid &&
1040 ruid != oldcred->cr_svuid &&
1041 ruid != oldcred->cr_uid) ||
1042 (euid != (uid_t)-1 && euid != oldcred->cr_ruid &&
1043 euid != oldcred->cr_svuid &&
1044 euid != oldcred->cr_uid) ||
1045 (suid != (uid_t)-1 && suid != oldcred->cr_ruid &&
1046 suid != oldcred->cr_svuid &&
1047 suid != oldcred->cr_uid)) &&
1048 (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETRESUID)) != 0)
1051 if (euid != (uid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_uid != euid) {
1052 change_euid(newcred, euip);
1055 if (ruid != (uid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_ruid != ruid) {
1056 change_ruid(newcred, ruip);
1059 if (suid != (uid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_svuid != suid) {
1060 change_svuid(newcred, suid);
1063 proc_set_cred(p, newcred);
1065 racct_proc_ucred_changed(p, oldcred, newcred);
1070 rctl_proc_ucred_changed(p, newcred);
1088 * setresgid(rgid, egid, sgid) is like setregid except control over the saved
1091 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1092 struct setresgid_args {
1100 sys_setresgid(struct thread *td, struct setresgid_args *uap)
1102 struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
1103 struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
1104 gid_t egid, rgid, sgid;
1110 AUDIT_ARG_EGID(egid);
1111 AUDIT_ARG_RGID(rgid);
1112 AUDIT_ARG_SGID(sgid);
1115 oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred);
1118 error = mac_cred_check_setresgid(oldcred, rgid, egid, sgid);
1123 if (((rgid != (gid_t)-1 && rgid != oldcred->cr_rgid &&
1124 rgid != oldcred->cr_svgid &&
1125 rgid != oldcred->cr_groups[0]) ||
1126 (egid != (gid_t)-1 && egid != oldcred->cr_rgid &&
1127 egid != oldcred->cr_svgid &&
1128 egid != oldcred->cr_groups[0]) ||
1129 (sgid != (gid_t)-1 && sgid != oldcred->cr_rgid &&
1130 sgid != oldcred->cr_svgid &&
1131 sgid != oldcred->cr_groups[0])) &&
1132 (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETRESGID)) != 0)
1135 if (egid != (gid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_groups[0] != egid) {
1136 change_egid(newcred, egid);
1139 if (rgid != (gid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_rgid != rgid) {
1140 change_rgid(newcred, rgid);
1143 if (sgid != (gid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_svgid != sgid) {
1144 change_svgid(newcred, sgid);
1147 proc_set_cred(p, newcred);
1158 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1159 struct getresuid_args {
1167 sys_getresuid(struct thread *td, struct getresuid_args *uap)
1170 int error1 = 0, error2 = 0, error3 = 0;
1172 cred = td->td_ucred;
1174 error1 = copyout(&cred->cr_ruid,
1175 uap->ruid, sizeof(cred->cr_ruid));
1177 error2 = copyout(&cred->cr_uid,
1178 uap->euid, sizeof(cred->cr_uid));
1180 error3 = copyout(&cred->cr_svuid,
1181 uap->suid, sizeof(cred->cr_svuid));
1182 return (error1 ? error1 : error2 ? error2 : error3);
1185 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1186 struct getresgid_args {
1194 sys_getresgid(struct thread *td, struct getresgid_args *uap)
1197 int error1 = 0, error2 = 0, error3 = 0;
1199 cred = td->td_ucred;
1201 error1 = copyout(&cred->cr_rgid,
1202 uap->rgid, sizeof(cred->cr_rgid));
1204 error2 = copyout(&cred->cr_groups[0],
1205 uap->egid, sizeof(cred->cr_groups[0]));
1207 error3 = copyout(&cred->cr_svgid,
1208 uap->sgid, sizeof(cred->cr_svgid));
1209 return (error1 ? error1 : error2 ? error2 : error3);
1212 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1213 struct issetugid_args {
1219 sys_issetugid(struct thread *td, struct issetugid_args *uap)
1221 struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
1224 * Note: OpenBSD sets a P_SUGIDEXEC flag set at execve() time,
1225 * we use P_SUGID because we consider changing the owners as
1226 * "tainting" as well.
1227 * This is significant for procs that start as root and "become"
1228 * a user without an exec - programs cannot know *everything*
1229 * that libc *might* have put in their data segment.
1231 td->td_retval[0] = (p->p_flag & P_SUGID) ? 1 : 0;
1236 sys___setugid(struct thread *td, struct __setugid_args *uap)
1242 switch (uap->flag) {
1245 p->p_flag &= ~P_SUGID;
1250 p->p_flag |= P_SUGID;
1256 #else /* !REGRESSION */
1259 #endif /* REGRESSION */
1263 * Check if gid is a member of the group set.
1266 groupmember(gid_t gid, struct ucred *cred)
1272 if (cred->cr_groups[0] == gid)
1276 * If gid was not our primary group, perform a binary search
1277 * of the supplemental groups. This is possible because we
1278 * sort the groups in crsetgroups().
1281 h = cred->cr_ngroups;
1283 m = l + ((h - l) / 2);
1284 if (cred->cr_groups[m] < gid)
1289 if ((l < cred->cr_ngroups) && (cred->cr_groups[l] == gid))
1296 * Test the active securelevel against a given level. securelevel_gt()
1297 * implements (securelevel > level). securelevel_ge() implements
1298 * (securelevel >= level). Note that the logic is inverted -- these
1299 * functions return EPERM on "success" and 0 on "failure".
1301 * Due to care taken when setting the securelevel, we know that no jail will
1302 * be less secure that its parent (or the physical system), so it is sufficient
1303 * to test the current jail only.
1305 * XXXRW: Possibly since this has to do with privilege, it should move to
1309 securelevel_gt(struct ucred *cr, int level)
1312 return (cr->cr_prison->pr_securelevel > level ? EPERM : 0);
1316 securelevel_ge(struct ucred *cr, int level)
1319 return (cr->cr_prison->pr_securelevel >= level ? EPERM : 0);
1323 * 'see_other_uids' determines whether or not visibility of processes
1324 * and sockets with credentials holding different real uids is possible
1325 * using a variety of system MIBs.
1326 * XXX: data declarations should be together near the beginning of the file.
1328 static int see_other_uids = 1;
1329 SYSCTL_INT(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, see_other_uids, CTLFLAG_RW,
1331 "Unprivileged processes may see subjects/objects with different real uid");
1334 * Determine if u1 "can see" the subject specified by u2, according to the
1335 * 'see_other_uids' policy.
1336 * Returns: 0 for permitted, ESRCH otherwise
1338 * References: *u1 and *u2 must not change during the call
1339 * u1 may equal u2, in which case only one reference is required
1342 cr_canseeotheruids(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2)
1345 if (!see_other_uids && u1->cr_ruid != u2->cr_ruid) {
1346 if (priv_check_cred(u1, PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS) != 0)
1353 * 'see_other_gids' determines whether or not visibility of processes
1354 * and sockets with credentials holding different real gids is possible
1355 * using a variety of system MIBs.
1356 * XXX: data declarations should be together near the beginning of the file.
1358 static int see_other_gids = 1;
1359 SYSCTL_INT(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, see_other_gids, CTLFLAG_RW,
1361 "Unprivileged processes may see subjects/objects with different real gid");
1364 * Determine if u1 can "see" the subject specified by u2, according to the
1365 * 'see_other_gids' policy.
1366 * Returns: 0 for permitted, ESRCH otherwise
1368 * References: *u1 and *u2 must not change during the call
1369 * u1 may equal u2, in which case only one reference is required
1372 cr_canseeothergids(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2)
1376 if (!see_other_gids) {
1378 for (i = 0; i < u1->cr_ngroups; i++) {
1379 if (groupmember(u1->cr_groups[i], u2))
1385 if (priv_check_cred(u1, PRIV_SEEOTHERGIDS) != 0)
1393 * 'see_jail_proc' determines whether or not visibility of processes and
1394 * sockets with credentials holding different jail ids is possible using a
1395 * variety of system MIBs.
1397 * XXX: data declarations should be together near the beginning of the file.
1400 static int see_jail_proc = 1;
1401 SYSCTL_INT(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, see_jail_proc, CTLFLAG_RW,
1403 "Unprivileged processes may see subjects/objects with different jail ids");
1406 * Determine if u1 "can see" the subject specified by u2, according to the
1407 * 'see_jail_proc' policy.
1408 * Returns: 0 for permitted, ESRCH otherwise
1410 * References: *u1 and *u2 must not change during the call
1411 * u1 may equal u2, in which case only one reference is required
1414 cr_canseejailproc(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2)
1416 if (u1->cr_uid == 0)
1418 return (!see_jail_proc && u1->cr_prison != u2->cr_prison ? ESRCH : 0);
1422 * Determine if u1 "can see" the subject specified by u2.
1423 * Returns: 0 for permitted, an errno value otherwise
1425 * References: *u1 and *u2 must not change during the call
1426 * u1 may equal u2, in which case only one reference is required
1429 cr_cansee(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2)
1433 if ((error = prison_check(u1, u2)))
1436 if ((error = mac_cred_check_visible(u1, u2)))
1439 if ((error = cr_canseeotheruids(u1, u2)))
1441 if ((error = cr_canseeothergids(u1, u2)))
1443 if ((error = cr_canseejailproc(u1, u2)))
1449 * Determine if td "can see" the subject specified by p.
1450 * Returns: 0 for permitted, an errno value otherwise
1451 * Locks: Sufficient locks to protect p->p_ucred must be held. td really
1452 * should be curthread.
1453 * References: td and p must be valid for the lifetime of the call
1456 p_cansee(struct thread *td, struct proc *p)
1459 /* Wrap cr_cansee() for all functionality. */
1460 KASSERT(td == curthread, ("%s: td not curthread", __func__));
1461 PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
1462 return (cr_cansee(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred));
1466 * 'conservative_signals' prevents the delivery of a broad class of
1467 * signals by unprivileged processes to processes that have changed their
1468 * credentials since the last invocation of execve(). This can prevent
1469 * the leakage of cached information or retained privileges as a result
1470 * of a common class of signal-related vulnerabilities. However, this
1471 * may interfere with some applications that expect to be able to
1472 * deliver these signals to peer processes after having given up
1475 static int conservative_signals = 1;
1476 SYSCTL_INT(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, conservative_signals, CTLFLAG_RW,
1477 &conservative_signals, 0, "Unprivileged processes prevented from "
1478 "sending certain signals to processes whose credentials have changed");
1480 * Determine whether cred may deliver the specified signal to proc.
1481 * Returns: 0 for permitted, an errno value otherwise.
1482 * Locks: A lock must be held for proc.
1483 * References: cred and proc must be valid for the lifetime of the call.
1486 cr_cansignal(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc, int signum)
1490 PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED);
1492 * Jail semantics limit the scope of signalling to proc in the
1493 * same jail as cred, if cred is in jail.
1495 error = prison_check(cred, proc->p_ucred);
1499 if ((error = mac_proc_check_signal(cred, proc, signum)))
1502 if ((error = cr_canseeotheruids(cred, proc->p_ucred)))
1504 if ((error = cr_canseeothergids(cred, proc->p_ucred)))
1508 * UNIX signal semantics depend on the status of the P_SUGID
1509 * bit on the target process. If the bit is set, then additional
1510 * restrictions are placed on the set of available signals.
1512 if (conservative_signals && (proc->p_flag & P_SUGID)) {
1527 * Generally, permit job and terminal control
1532 /* Not permitted without privilege. */
1533 error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_SIGNAL_SUGID);
1540 * Generally, the target credential's ruid or svuid must match the
1541 * subject credential's ruid or euid.
1543 if (cred->cr_ruid != proc->p_ucred->cr_ruid &&
1544 cred->cr_ruid != proc->p_ucred->cr_svuid &&
1545 cred->cr_uid != proc->p_ucred->cr_ruid &&
1546 cred->cr_uid != proc->p_ucred->cr_svuid) {
1547 error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_SIGNAL_DIFFCRED);
1556 * Determine whether td may deliver the specified signal to p.
1557 * Returns: 0 for permitted, an errno value otherwise
1558 * Locks: Sufficient locks to protect various components of td and p
1559 * must be held. td must be curthread, and a lock must be
1561 * References: td and p must be valid for the lifetime of the call
1564 p_cansignal(struct thread *td, struct proc *p, int signum)
1567 KASSERT(td == curthread, ("%s: td not curthread", __func__));
1568 PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
1569 if (td->td_proc == p)
1573 * UNIX signalling semantics require that processes in the same
1574 * session always be able to deliver SIGCONT to one another,
1575 * overriding the remaining protections.
1577 /* XXX: This will require an additional lock of some sort. */
1578 if (signum == SIGCONT && td->td_proc->p_session == p->p_session)
1581 * Some compat layers use SIGTHR and higher signals for
1582 * communication between different kernel threads of the same
1583 * process, so that they expect that it's always possible to
1584 * deliver them, even for suid applications where cr_cansignal() can
1585 * deny such ability for security consideration. It should be
1586 * pretty safe to do since the only way to create two processes
1587 * with the same p_leader is via rfork(2).
1589 if (td->td_proc->p_leader != NULL && signum >= SIGTHR &&
1590 signum < SIGTHR + 4 && td->td_proc->p_leader == p->p_leader)
1593 return (cr_cansignal(td->td_ucred, p, signum));
1597 * Determine whether td may reschedule p.
1598 * Returns: 0 for permitted, an errno value otherwise
1599 * Locks: Sufficient locks to protect various components of td and p
1600 * must be held. td must be curthread, and a lock must
1602 * References: td and p must be valid for the lifetime of the call
1605 p_cansched(struct thread *td, struct proc *p)
1609 KASSERT(td == curthread, ("%s: td not curthread", __func__));
1610 PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
1611 if (td->td_proc == p)
1613 if ((error = prison_check(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred)))
1616 if ((error = mac_proc_check_sched(td->td_ucred, p)))
1619 if ((error = cr_canseeotheruids(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred)))
1621 if ((error = cr_canseeothergids(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred)))
1623 if (td->td_ucred->cr_ruid != p->p_ucred->cr_ruid &&
1624 td->td_ucred->cr_uid != p->p_ucred->cr_ruid) {
1625 error = priv_check(td, PRIV_SCHED_DIFFCRED);
1633 * Handle getting or setting the prison's unprivileged_proc_debug
1637 sysctl_unprivileged_proc_debug(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
1642 val = prison_allow(req->td->td_ucred, PR_ALLOW_UNPRIV_DEBUG) != 0;
1643 error = sysctl_handle_int(oidp, &val, 0, req);
1644 if (error != 0 || req->newptr == NULL)
1646 pr = req->td->td_ucred->cr_prison;
1647 mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
1650 pr->pr_allow &= ~(PR_ALLOW_UNPRIV_DEBUG);
1653 pr->pr_allow |= PR_ALLOW_UNPRIV_DEBUG;
1658 mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
1664 * The 'unprivileged_proc_debug' flag may be used to disable a variety of
1665 * unprivileged inter-process debugging services, including some procfs
1666 * functionality, ptrace(), and ktrace(). In the past, inter-process
1667 * debugging has been involved in a variety of security problems, and sites
1668 * not requiring the service might choose to disable it when hardening
1671 SYSCTL_PROC(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, unprivileged_proc_debug,
1672 CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_PRISON | CTLFLAG_SECURE, 0, 0,
1673 sysctl_unprivileged_proc_debug, "I",
1674 "Unprivileged processes may use process debugging facilities");
1677 * Determine whether td may debug p.
1678 * Returns: 0 for permitted, an errno value otherwise
1679 * Locks: Sufficient locks to protect various components of td and p
1680 * must be held. td must be curthread, and a lock must
1682 * References: td and p must be valid for the lifetime of the call
1685 p_candebug(struct thread *td, struct proc *p)
1687 int credentialchanged, error, grpsubset, i, uidsubset;
1689 KASSERT(td == curthread, ("%s: td not curthread", __func__));
1690 PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
1691 if ((error = priv_check(td, PRIV_DEBUG_UNPRIV)))
1693 if (td->td_proc == p)
1695 if ((error = prison_check(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred)))
1698 if ((error = mac_proc_check_debug(td->td_ucred, p)))
1701 if ((error = cr_canseeotheruids(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred)))
1703 if ((error = cr_canseeothergids(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred)))
1707 * Is p's group set a subset of td's effective group set? This
1708 * includes p's egid, group access list, rgid, and svgid.
1711 for (i = 0; i < p->p_ucred->cr_ngroups; i++) {
1712 if (!groupmember(p->p_ucred->cr_groups[i], td->td_ucred)) {
1717 grpsubset = grpsubset &&
1718 groupmember(p->p_ucred->cr_rgid, td->td_ucred) &&
1719 groupmember(p->p_ucred->cr_svgid, td->td_ucred);
1722 * Are the uids present in p's credential equal to td's
1723 * effective uid? This includes p's euid, svuid, and ruid.
1725 uidsubset = (td->td_ucred->cr_uid == p->p_ucred->cr_uid &&
1726 td->td_ucred->cr_uid == p->p_ucred->cr_svuid &&
1727 td->td_ucred->cr_uid == p->p_ucred->cr_ruid);
1730 * Has the credential of the process changed since the last exec()?
1732 credentialchanged = (p->p_flag & P_SUGID);
1735 * If p's gids aren't a subset, or the uids aren't a subset,
1736 * or the credential has changed, require appropriate privilege
1737 * for td to debug p.
1739 if (!grpsubset || !uidsubset) {
1740 error = priv_check(td, PRIV_DEBUG_DIFFCRED);
1745 if (credentialchanged) {
1746 error = priv_check(td, PRIV_DEBUG_SUGID);
1751 /* Can't trace init when securelevel > 0. */
1752 if (p == initproc) {
1753 error = securelevel_gt(td->td_ucred, 0);
1759 * Can't trace a process that's currently exec'ing.
1761 * XXX: Note, this is not a security policy decision, it's a
1762 * basic correctness/functionality decision. Therefore, this check
1763 * should be moved to the caller's of p_candebug().
1765 if ((p->p_flag & P_INEXEC) != 0)
1768 /* Denied explicitely */
1769 if ((p->p_flag2 & P2_NOTRACE) != 0) {
1770 error = priv_check(td, PRIV_DEBUG_DENIED);
1779 * Determine whether the subject represented by cred can "see" a socket.
1780 * Returns: 0 for permitted, ENOENT otherwise.
1783 cr_canseesocket(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so)
1787 error = prison_check(cred, so->so_cred);
1791 error = mac_socket_check_visible(cred, so);
1795 if (cr_canseeotheruids(cred, so->so_cred))
1797 if (cr_canseeothergids(cred, so->so_cred))
1804 * Determine whether td can wait for the exit of p.
1805 * Returns: 0 for permitted, an errno value otherwise
1806 * Locks: Sufficient locks to protect various components of td and p
1807 * must be held. td must be curthread, and a lock must
1809 * References: td and p must be valid for the lifetime of the call
1813 p_canwait(struct thread *td, struct proc *p)
1817 KASSERT(td == curthread, ("%s: td not curthread", __func__));
1818 PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
1819 if ((error = prison_check(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred)))
1822 if ((error = mac_proc_check_wait(td->td_ucred, p)))
1826 /* XXXMAC: This could have odd effects on some shells. */
1827 if ((error = cr_canseeotheruids(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred)))
1835 * Allocate a zeroed cred structure.
1842 cr = malloc(sizeof(*cr), M_CRED, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
1843 refcount_init(&cr->cr_ref, 1);
1845 audit_cred_init(cr);
1850 cr->cr_groups = cr->cr_smallgroups;
1852 sizeof(cr->cr_smallgroups) / sizeof(cr->cr_smallgroups[0]);
1857 * Claim another reference to a ucred structure.
1860 crhold(struct ucred *cr)
1863 refcount_acquire(&cr->cr_ref);
1868 * Free a cred structure. Throws away space when ref count gets to 0.
1871 crfree(struct ucred *cr)
1874 KASSERT(cr->cr_ref > 0, ("bad ucred refcount: %d", cr->cr_ref));
1875 KASSERT(cr->cr_ref != 0xdeadc0de, ("dangling reference to ucred"));
1876 if (refcount_release(&cr->cr_ref)) {
1878 * Some callers of crget(), such as nfs_statfs(),
1879 * allocate a temporary credential, but don't
1880 * allocate a uidinfo structure.
1882 if (cr->cr_uidinfo != NULL)
1883 uifree(cr->cr_uidinfo);
1884 if (cr->cr_ruidinfo != NULL)
1885 uifree(cr->cr_ruidinfo);
1887 * Free a prison, if any.
1889 if (cr->cr_prison != NULL)
1890 prison_free(cr->cr_prison);
1891 if (cr->cr_loginclass != NULL)
1892 loginclass_free(cr->cr_loginclass);
1894 audit_cred_destroy(cr);
1897 mac_cred_destroy(cr);
1899 if (cr->cr_groups != cr->cr_smallgroups)
1900 free(cr->cr_groups, M_CRED);
1906 * Copy a ucred's contents from a template. Does not block.
1909 crcopy(struct ucred *dest, struct ucred *src)
1912 KASSERT(dest->cr_ref == 1, ("crcopy of shared ucred"));
1913 bcopy(&src->cr_startcopy, &dest->cr_startcopy,
1914 (unsigned)((caddr_t)&src->cr_endcopy -
1915 (caddr_t)&src->cr_startcopy));
1916 crsetgroups(dest, src->cr_ngroups, src->cr_groups);
1917 uihold(dest->cr_uidinfo);
1918 uihold(dest->cr_ruidinfo);
1919 prison_hold(dest->cr_prison);
1920 loginclass_hold(dest->cr_loginclass);
1922 audit_cred_copy(src, dest);
1925 mac_cred_copy(src, dest);
1930 * Dup cred struct to a new held one.
1933 crdup(struct ucred *cr)
1935 struct ucred *newcr;
1943 * Fill in a struct xucred based on a struct ucred.
1946 cru2x(struct ucred *cr, struct xucred *xcr)
1950 bzero(xcr, sizeof(*xcr));
1951 xcr->cr_version = XUCRED_VERSION;
1952 xcr->cr_uid = cr->cr_uid;
1954 ngroups = MIN(cr->cr_ngroups, XU_NGROUPS);
1955 xcr->cr_ngroups = ngroups;
1956 bcopy(cr->cr_groups, xcr->cr_groups,
1957 ngroups * sizeof(*cr->cr_groups));
1961 * Set initial process credentials.
1962 * Callers are responsible for providing the reference for provided credentials.
1965 proc_set_cred_init(struct proc *p, struct ucred *newcred)
1968 p->p_ucred = newcred;
1972 * Change process credentials.
1973 * Callers are responsible for providing the reference for passed credentials
1974 * and for freeing old ones.
1976 * Process has to be locked except when it does not have credentials (as it
1977 * should not be visible just yet) or when newcred is NULL (as this can be
1978 * only used when the process is about to be freed, at which point it should
1979 * not be visible anymore).
1982 proc_set_cred(struct proc *p, struct ucred *newcred)
1984 struct ucred *oldcred;
1986 MPASS(p->p_ucred != NULL);
1987 if (newcred == NULL)
1988 MPASS(p->p_state == PRS_ZOMBIE);
1990 PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
1992 oldcred = p->p_ucred;
1993 p->p_ucred = newcred;
1994 if (newcred != NULL)
2000 crcopysafe(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cr)
2002 struct ucred *oldcred;
2005 PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
2007 oldcred = p->p_ucred;
2008 while (cr->cr_agroups < oldcred->cr_agroups) {
2009 groups = oldcred->cr_agroups;
2011 crextend(cr, groups);
2013 oldcred = p->p_ucred;
2015 crcopy(cr, oldcred);
2021 * Extend the passed in credential to hold n items.
2024 crextend(struct ucred *cr, int n)
2029 if (n <= cr->cr_agroups)
2033 * We extend by 2 each time since we're using a power of two
2034 * allocator until we need enough groups to fill a page.
2035 * Once we're allocating multiple pages, only allocate as many
2036 * as we actually need. The case of processes needing a
2037 * non-power of two number of pages seems more likely than
2038 * a real world process that adds thousands of groups one at a
2041 if ( n < PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(gid_t) ) {
2042 if (cr->cr_agroups == 0)
2043 cnt = MINALLOCSIZE / sizeof(gid_t);
2045 cnt = cr->cr_agroups * 2;
2050 cnt = roundup2(n, PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(gid_t));
2052 /* Free the old array. */
2053 if (cr->cr_groups != cr->cr_smallgroups)
2054 free(cr->cr_groups, M_CRED);
2056 cr->cr_groups = malloc(cnt * sizeof(gid_t), M_CRED, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
2057 cr->cr_agroups = cnt;
2061 * Copy groups in to a credential, preserving any necessary invariants.
2062 * Currently this includes the sorting of all supplemental gids.
2063 * crextend() must have been called before hand to ensure sufficient
2064 * space is available.
2067 crsetgroups_locked(struct ucred *cr, int ngrp, gid_t *groups)
2073 KASSERT(cr->cr_agroups >= ngrp, ("cr_ngroups is too small"));
2075 bcopy(groups, cr->cr_groups, ngrp * sizeof(gid_t));
2076 cr->cr_ngroups = ngrp;
2079 * Sort all groups except cr_groups[0] to allow groupmember to
2080 * perform a binary search.
2082 * XXX: If large numbers of groups become common this should
2083 * be replaced with shell sort like linux uses or possibly
2086 for (i = 2; i < ngrp; i++) {
2087 g = cr->cr_groups[i];
2088 for (j = i-1; j >= 1 && g < cr->cr_groups[j]; j--)
2089 cr->cr_groups[j + 1] = cr->cr_groups[j];
2090 cr->cr_groups[j + 1] = g;
2095 * Copy groups in to a credential after expanding it if required.
2096 * Truncate the list to (ngroups_max + 1) if it is too large.
2099 crsetgroups(struct ucred *cr, int ngrp, gid_t *groups)
2102 if (ngrp > ngroups_max + 1)
2103 ngrp = ngroups_max + 1;
2106 crsetgroups_locked(cr, ngrp, groups);
2110 * Get login name, if available.
2112 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
2113 struct getlogin_args {
2120 sys_getlogin(struct thread *td, struct getlogin_args *uap)
2122 char login[MAXLOGNAME];
2123 struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
2126 if (uap->namelen > MAXLOGNAME)
2127 uap->namelen = MAXLOGNAME;
2129 SESS_LOCK(p->p_session);
2130 len = strlcpy(login, p->p_session->s_login, uap->namelen) + 1;
2131 SESS_UNLOCK(p->p_session);
2133 if (len > uap->namelen)
2135 return (copyout(login, uap->namebuf, len));
2141 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
2142 struct setlogin_args {
2148 sys_setlogin(struct thread *td, struct setlogin_args *uap)
2150 struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
2152 char logintmp[MAXLOGNAME];
2154 CTASSERT(sizeof(p->p_session->s_login) >= sizeof(logintmp));
2156 error = priv_check(td, PRIV_PROC_SETLOGIN);
2159 error = copyinstr(uap->namebuf, logintmp, sizeof(logintmp), NULL);
2161 if (error == ENAMETOOLONG)
2165 AUDIT_ARG_LOGIN(logintmp);
2167 SESS_LOCK(p->p_session);
2168 strcpy(p->p_session->s_login, logintmp);
2169 SESS_UNLOCK(p->p_session);
2175 setsugid(struct proc *p)
2178 PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
2179 p->p_flag |= P_SUGID;
2180 if (!(p->p_pfsflags & PF_ISUGID))
2185 * Change a process's effective uid.
2186 * Side effects: newcred->cr_uid and newcred->cr_uidinfo will be modified.
2187 * References: newcred must be an exclusive credential reference for the
2188 * duration of the call.
2191 change_euid(struct ucred *newcred, struct uidinfo *euip)
2194 newcred->cr_uid = euip->ui_uid;
2196 uifree(newcred->cr_uidinfo);
2197 newcred->cr_uidinfo = euip;
2201 * Change a process's effective gid.
2202 * Side effects: newcred->cr_gid will be modified.
2203 * References: newcred must be an exclusive credential reference for the
2204 * duration of the call.
2207 change_egid(struct ucred *newcred, gid_t egid)
2210 newcred->cr_groups[0] = egid;
2214 * Change a process's real uid.
2215 * Side effects: newcred->cr_ruid will be updated, newcred->cr_ruidinfo
2216 * will be updated, and the old and new cr_ruidinfo proc
2217 * counts will be updated.
2218 * References: newcred must be an exclusive credential reference for the
2219 * duration of the call.
2222 change_ruid(struct ucred *newcred, struct uidinfo *ruip)
2225 (void)chgproccnt(newcred->cr_ruidinfo, -1, 0);
2226 newcred->cr_ruid = ruip->ui_uid;
2228 uifree(newcred->cr_ruidinfo);
2229 newcred->cr_ruidinfo = ruip;
2230 (void)chgproccnt(newcred->cr_ruidinfo, 1, 0);
2234 * Change a process's real gid.
2235 * Side effects: newcred->cr_rgid will be updated.
2236 * References: newcred must be an exclusive credential reference for the
2237 * duration of the call.
2240 change_rgid(struct ucred *newcred, gid_t rgid)
2243 newcred->cr_rgid = rgid;
2247 * Change a process's saved uid.
2248 * Side effects: newcred->cr_svuid will be updated.
2249 * References: newcred must be an exclusive credential reference for the
2250 * duration of the call.
2253 change_svuid(struct ucred *newcred, uid_t svuid)
2256 newcred->cr_svuid = svuid;
2260 * Change a process's saved gid.
2261 * Side effects: newcred->cr_svgid will be updated.
2262 * References: newcred must be an exclusive credential reference for the
2263 * duration of the call.
2266 change_svgid(struct ucred *newcred, gid_t svgid)
2269 newcred->cr_svgid = svgid;