2 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
4 * Copyright (c) 2014-2019 Netflix Inc.
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
10 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
11 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
12 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
13 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
16 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
17 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
18 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
19 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
20 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
21 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
22 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
23 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
24 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
28 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
30 #include "opt_inet6.h"
31 #include "opt_kern_tls.h"
32 #include "opt_ratelimit.h"
35 #include <sys/param.h>
36 #include <sys/kernel.h>
37 #include <sys/domainset.h>
38 #include <sys/endian.h>
42 #include <sys/mutex.h>
43 #include <sys/rmlock.h>
45 #include <sys/protosw.h>
46 #include <sys/refcount.h>
48 #include <sys/socket.h>
49 #include <sys/socketvar.h>
50 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
51 #include <sys/taskqueue.h>
52 #include <sys/kthread.h>
54 #include <sys/vmmeter.h>
55 #if defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__i386__)
56 #include <machine/pcb.h>
58 #include <machine/vmparam.h>
60 #include <net/if_var.h>
62 #include <net/netisr.h>
63 #include <net/rss_config.h>
65 #include <net/route.h>
66 #include <net/route/nhop.h>
67 #include <netinet/in.h>
68 #include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
69 #include <netinet/tcp_var.h>
71 #include <netinet/tcp_offload.h>
73 #include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
74 #include <opencrypto/ktls.h>
76 #include <vm/vm_pageout.h>
77 #include <vm/vm_page.h>
78 #include <vm/vm_pagequeue.h>
82 STAILQ_HEAD(, mbuf) m_head;
83 STAILQ_HEAD(, socket) so_head;
86 } __aligned(CACHE_LINE_SIZE);
88 struct ktls_reclaim_thread {
95 struct ktls_domain_info {
98 struct ktls_reclaim_thread reclaim_td;
101 struct ktls_domain_info ktls_domains[MAXMEMDOM];
102 static struct ktls_wq *ktls_wq;
103 static struct proc *ktls_proc;
104 static uma_zone_t ktls_session_zone;
105 static uma_zone_t ktls_buffer_zone;
106 static uint16_t ktls_cpuid_lookup[MAXCPU];
107 static int ktls_init_state;
108 static struct sx ktls_init_lock;
109 SX_SYSINIT(ktls_init_lock, &ktls_init_lock, "ktls init");
111 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc, OID_AUTO, tls, CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
112 "Kernel TLS offload");
113 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, stats, CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
114 "Kernel TLS offload stats");
117 static int ktls_bind_threads = 1;
119 static int ktls_bind_threads;
121 SYSCTL_INT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, bind_threads, CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
122 &ktls_bind_threads, 0,
123 "Bind crypto threads to cores (1) or cores and domains (2) at boot");
125 static u_int ktls_maxlen = 16384;
126 SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, maxlen, CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
127 &ktls_maxlen, 0, "Maximum TLS record size");
129 static int ktls_number_threads;
130 SYSCTL_INT(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, threads, CTLFLAG_RD,
131 &ktls_number_threads, 0,
132 "Number of TLS threads in thread-pool");
134 unsigned int ktls_ifnet_max_rexmit_pct = 2;
135 SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, ifnet_max_rexmit_pct, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
136 &ktls_ifnet_max_rexmit_pct, 2,
137 "Max percent bytes retransmitted before ifnet TLS is disabled");
139 static bool ktls_offload_enable;
140 SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, enable, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
141 &ktls_offload_enable, 0,
142 "Enable support for kernel TLS offload");
144 static bool ktls_cbc_enable = true;
145 SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, cbc_enable, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
147 "Enable support of AES-CBC crypto for kernel TLS");
149 static bool ktls_sw_buffer_cache = true;
150 SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, sw_buffer_cache, CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
151 &ktls_sw_buffer_cache, 1,
152 "Enable caching of output buffers for SW encryption");
154 static int ktls_max_reclaim = 1024;
155 SYSCTL_INT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, max_reclaim, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
156 &ktls_max_reclaim, 128,
157 "Max number of 16k buffers to reclaim in thread context");
159 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_tasks_active);
160 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, tasks_active, CTLFLAG_RD,
161 &ktls_tasks_active, "Number of active tasks");
163 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_cnt_tx_pending);
164 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, sw_tx_pending, CTLFLAG_RD,
165 &ktls_cnt_tx_pending,
166 "Number of TLS 1.0 records waiting for earlier TLS records");
168 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_cnt_tx_queued);
169 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, sw_tx_inqueue, CTLFLAG_RD,
171 "Number of TLS records in queue to tasks for SW encryption");
173 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_cnt_rx_queued);
174 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, sw_rx_inqueue, CTLFLAG_RD,
176 "Number of TLS sockets in queue to tasks for SW decryption");
178 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_total);
179 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, offload_total,
180 CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_offload_total,
181 "Total successful TLS setups (parameters set)");
183 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_enable_calls);
184 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, enable_calls,
185 CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_offload_enable_calls,
186 "Total number of TLS enable calls made");
188 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_active);
189 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, active, CTLFLAG_RD,
190 &ktls_offload_active, "Total Active TLS sessions");
192 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_corrupted_records);
193 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, corrupted_records, CTLFLAG_RD,
194 &ktls_offload_corrupted_records, "Total corrupted TLS records received");
196 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_failed_crypto);
197 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, failed_crypto, CTLFLAG_RD,
198 &ktls_offload_failed_crypto, "Total TLS crypto failures");
200 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_switch_to_ifnet);
201 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, switch_to_ifnet, CTLFLAG_RD,
202 &ktls_switch_to_ifnet, "TLS sessions switched from SW to ifnet");
204 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_switch_to_sw);
205 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, switch_to_sw, CTLFLAG_RD,
206 &ktls_switch_to_sw, "TLS sessions switched from ifnet to SW");
208 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_switch_failed);
209 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, switch_failed, CTLFLAG_RD,
210 &ktls_switch_failed, "TLS sessions unable to switch between SW and ifnet");
212 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_disable_fail);
213 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, ifnet_disable_failed, CTLFLAG_RD,
214 &ktls_ifnet_disable_fail, "TLS sessions unable to switch to SW from ifnet");
216 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_disable_ok);
217 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, ifnet_disable_ok, CTLFLAG_RD,
218 &ktls_ifnet_disable_ok, "TLS sessions able to switch to SW from ifnet");
220 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_destroy_task);
221 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, destroy_task, CTLFLAG_RD,
223 "Number of times ktls session was destroyed via taskqueue");
225 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, sw, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
226 "Software TLS session stats");
227 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, ifnet, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
228 "Hardware (ifnet) TLS session stats");
230 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, toe, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
231 "TOE TLS session stats");
234 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_sw_cbc);
235 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_sw, OID_AUTO, cbc, CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_sw_cbc,
236 "Active number of software TLS sessions using AES-CBC");
238 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_sw_gcm);
239 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_sw, OID_AUTO, gcm, CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_sw_gcm,
240 "Active number of software TLS sessions using AES-GCM");
242 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_sw_chacha20);
243 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_sw, OID_AUTO, chacha20, CTLFLAG_RD,
245 "Active number of software TLS sessions using Chacha20-Poly1305");
247 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_cbc);
248 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, cbc, CTLFLAG_RD,
250 "Active number of ifnet TLS sessions using AES-CBC");
252 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_gcm);
253 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, gcm, CTLFLAG_RD,
255 "Active number of ifnet TLS sessions using AES-GCM");
257 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_chacha20);
258 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, chacha20, CTLFLAG_RD,
259 &ktls_ifnet_chacha20,
260 "Active number of ifnet TLS sessions using Chacha20-Poly1305");
262 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_reset);
263 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, reset, CTLFLAG_RD,
264 &ktls_ifnet_reset, "TLS sessions updated to a new ifnet send tag");
266 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_reset_dropped);
267 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, reset_dropped, CTLFLAG_RD,
268 &ktls_ifnet_reset_dropped,
269 "TLS sessions dropped after failing to update ifnet send tag");
271 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_reset_failed);
272 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, reset_failed, CTLFLAG_RD,
273 &ktls_ifnet_reset_failed,
274 "TLS sessions that failed to allocate a new ifnet send tag");
276 static int ktls_ifnet_permitted;
277 SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, permitted, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
278 &ktls_ifnet_permitted, 1,
279 "Whether to permit hardware (ifnet) TLS sessions");
282 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_toe_cbc);
283 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_toe, OID_AUTO, cbc, CTLFLAG_RD,
285 "Active number of TOE TLS sessions using AES-CBC");
287 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_toe_gcm);
288 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_toe, OID_AUTO, gcm, CTLFLAG_RD,
290 "Active number of TOE TLS sessions using AES-GCM");
292 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_toe_chacha20);
293 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_toe, OID_AUTO, chacha20, CTLFLAG_RD,
295 "Active number of TOE TLS sessions using Chacha20-Poly1305");
298 static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_KTLS, "ktls", "Kernel TLS");
300 static void ktls_reset_receive_tag(void *context, int pending);
301 static void ktls_reset_send_tag(void *context, int pending);
302 static void ktls_work_thread(void *ctx);
303 static void ktls_reclaim_thread(void *ctx);
306 ktls_get_cpu(struct socket *so)
310 struct ktls_domain_info *di;
316 cpuid = rss_hash2cpuid(inp->inp_flowid, inp->inp_flowtype);
317 if (cpuid != NETISR_CPUID_NONE)
321 * Just use the flowid to shard connections in a repeatable
322 * fashion. Note that TLS 1.0 sessions rely on the
323 * serialization provided by having the same connection use
327 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1 && inp->inp_numa_domain != M_NODOM) {
328 di = &ktls_domains[inp->inp_numa_domain];
329 cpuid = di->cpu[inp->inp_flowid % di->count];
332 cpuid = ktls_cpuid_lookup[inp->inp_flowid % ktls_number_threads];
337 ktls_buffer_import(void *arg, void **store, int count, int domain, int flags)
342 KASSERT((ktls_maxlen & PAGE_MASK) == 0,
343 ("%s: ktls max length %d is not page size-aligned",
344 __func__, ktls_maxlen));
346 req = VM_ALLOC_WIRED | VM_ALLOC_NODUMP | malloc2vm_flags(flags);
347 for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
348 m = vm_page_alloc_noobj_contig_domain(domain, req,
349 atop(ktls_maxlen), 0, ~0ul, PAGE_SIZE, 0,
353 store[i] = (void *)PHYS_TO_DMAP(VM_PAGE_TO_PHYS(m));
359 ktls_buffer_release(void *arg __unused, void **store, int count)
364 for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
365 m = PHYS_TO_VM_PAGE(DMAP_TO_PHYS((vm_offset_t)store[i]));
366 for (j = 0; j < atop(ktls_maxlen); j++) {
367 (void)vm_page_unwire_noq(m + j);
374 ktls_free_mext_contig(struct mbuf *m)
377 uma_zfree(ktls_buffer_zone, (void *)PHYS_TO_DMAP(m->m_epg_pa[0]));
385 int count, domain, error, i;
387 ktls_wq = malloc(sizeof(*ktls_wq) * (mp_maxid + 1), M_KTLS,
390 ktls_session_zone = uma_zcreate("ktls_session",
391 sizeof(struct ktls_session),
392 NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
395 if (ktls_sw_buffer_cache) {
396 ktls_buffer_zone = uma_zcache_create("ktls_buffers",
397 roundup2(ktls_maxlen, PAGE_SIZE), NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
398 ktls_buffer_import, ktls_buffer_release, NULL,
399 UMA_ZONE_FIRSTTOUCH);
403 * Initialize the workqueues to run the TLS work. We create a
404 * work queue for each CPU.
407 STAILQ_INIT(&ktls_wq[i].m_head);
408 STAILQ_INIT(&ktls_wq[i].so_head);
409 mtx_init(&ktls_wq[i].mtx, "ktls work queue", NULL, MTX_DEF);
410 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1) {
412 domain = pc->pc_domain;
413 count = ktls_domains[domain].count;
414 ktls_domains[domain].cpu[count] = i;
415 ktls_domains[domain].count++;
417 ktls_cpuid_lookup[ktls_number_threads] = i;
418 ktls_number_threads++;
422 * If we somehow have an empty domain, fall back to choosing
423 * among all KTLS threads.
425 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1) {
426 for (i = 0; i < vm_ndomains; i++) {
427 if (ktls_domains[i].count == 0) {
428 ktls_bind_threads = 1;
434 /* Start kthreads for each workqueue. */
436 error = kproc_kthread_add(ktls_work_thread, &ktls_wq[i],
437 &ktls_proc, &td, 0, 0, "KTLS", "thr_%d", i);
439 printf("Can't add KTLS thread %d error %d\n", i, error);
445 * Start an allocation thread per-domain to perform blocking allocations
446 * of 16k physically contiguous TLS crypto destination buffers.
448 if (ktls_sw_buffer_cache) {
449 for (domain = 0; domain < vm_ndomains; domain++) {
450 if (VM_DOMAIN_EMPTY(domain))
452 if (CPU_EMPTY(&cpuset_domain[domain]))
454 error = kproc_kthread_add(ktls_reclaim_thread,
455 &ktls_domains[domain], &ktls_proc,
456 &ktls_domains[domain].reclaim_td.td,
457 0, 0, "KTLS", "reclaim_%d", domain);
459 printf("Can't add KTLS reclaim thread %d error %d\n",
467 printf("KTLS: Initialized %d threads\n", ktls_number_threads);
472 ktls_start_kthreads(void)
477 state = atomic_load_acq_int(&ktls_init_state);
478 if (__predict_true(state > 0))
483 sx_xlock(&ktls_init_lock);
484 if (ktls_init_state != 0) {
485 sx_xunlock(&ktls_init_lock);
494 atomic_store_rel_int(&ktls_init_state, state);
495 sx_xunlock(&ktls_init_lock);
500 ktls_create_session(struct socket *so, struct tls_enable *en,
501 struct ktls_session **tlsp, int direction)
503 struct ktls_session *tls;
506 /* Only TLS 1.0 - 1.3 are supported. */
507 if (en->tls_vmajor != TLS_MAJOR_VER_ONE)
509 if (en->tls_vminor < TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO ||
510 en->tls_vminor > TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
513 if (en->auth_key_len < 0 || en->auth_key_len > TLS_MAX_PARAM_SIZE)
515 if (en->cipher_key_len < 0 || en->cipher_key_len > TLS_MAX_PARAM_SIZE)
517 if (en->iv_len < 0 || en->iv_len > sizeof(tls->params.iv))
520 /* All supported algorithms require a cipher key. */
521 if (en->cipher_key_len == 0)
524 /* No flags are currently supported. */
528 /* Common checks for supported algorithms. */
529 switch (en->cipher_algorithm) {
530 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
532 * auth_algorithm isn't used, but permit GMAC values
535 switch (en->auth_algorithm) {
537 #ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD12
538 /* XXX: Really 13.0-current COMPAT. */
539 case CRYPTO_AES_128_NIST_GMAC:
540 case CRYPTO_AES_192_NIST_GMAC:
541 case CRYPTO_AES_256_NIST_GMAC:
547 if (en->auth_key_len != 0)
549 switch (en->tls_vminor) {
550 case TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO:
551 if (en->iv_len != TLS_AEAD_GCM_LEN)
554 case TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE:
555 if (en->iv_len != TLS_1_3_GCM_IV_LEN)
563 switch (en->auth_algorithm) {
564 case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
566 case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
567 case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
568 if (en->tls_vminor != TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO)
574 if (en->auth_key_len == 0)
578 * TLS 1.0 requires an implicit IV. TLS 1.1 and 1.2
581 switch (en->tls_vminor) {
582 case TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO:
583 if (en->iv_len != TLS_CBC_IMPLICIT_IV_LEN)
586 case TLS_MINOR_VER_ONE:
587 case TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO:
588 /* Ignore any supplied IV. */
595 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
596 if (en->auth_algorithm != 0 || en->auth_key_len != 0)
598 if (en->tls_vminor != TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO &&
599 en->tls_vminor != TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
601 if (en->iv_len != TLS_CHACHA20_IV_LEN)
608 error = ktls_start_kthreads();
612 tls = uma_zalloc(ktls_session_zone, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
614 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_active, 1);
616 refcount_init(&tls->refcount, 1);
617 if (direction == KTLS_RX) {
618 TASK_INIT(&tls->reset_tag_task, 0, ktls_reset_receive_tag, tls);
620 TASK_INIT(&tls->reset_tag_task, 0, ktls_reset_send_tag, tls);
621 tls->inp = so->so_pcb;
626 tls->wq_index = ktls_get_cpu(so);
628 tls->params.cipher_algorithm = en->cipher_algorithm;
629 tls->params.auth_algorithm = en->auth_algorithm;
630 tls->params.tls_vmajor = en->tls_vmajor;
631 tls->params.tls_vminor = en->tls_vminor;
632 tls->params.flags = en->flags;
633 tls->params.max_frame_len = min(TLS_MAX_MSG_SIZE_V10_2, ktls_maxlen);
635 /* Set the header and trailer lengths. */
636 tls->params.tls_hlen = sizeof(struct tls_record_layer);
637 switch (en->cipher_algorithm) {
638 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
640 * TLS 1.2 uses a 4 byte implicit IV with an explicit 8 byte
641 * nonce. TLS 1.3 uses a 12 byte implicit IV.
643 if (en->tls_vminor < TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
644 tls->params.tls_hlen += sizeof(uint64_t);
645 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN;
646 tls->params.tls_bs = 1;
649 switch (en->auth_algorithm) {
650 case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
651 if (en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO) {
652 /* Implicit IV, no nonce. */
653 tls->sequential_records = true;
654 tls->next_seqno = be64dec(en->rec_seq);
655 STAILQ_INIT(&tls->pending_records);
657 tls->params.tls_hlen += AES_BLOCK_LEN;
659 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_BLOCK_LEN +
662 case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
663 tls->params.tls_hlen += AES_BLOCK_LEN;
664 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_BLOCK_LEN +
667 case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
668 tls->params.tls_hlen += AES_BLOCK_LEN;
669 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_BLOCK_LEN +
673 panic("invalid hmac");
675 tls->params.tls_bs = AES_BLOCK_LEN;
677 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
679 * Chacha20 uses a 12 byte implicit IV.
681 tls->params.tls_tlen = POLY1305_HASH_LEN;
682 tls->params.tls_bs = 1;
685 panic("invalid cipher");
689 * TLS 1.3 includes optional padding which we do not support,
690 * and also puts the "real" record type at the end of the
693 if (en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
694 tls->params.tls_tlen += sizeof(uint8_t);
696 KASSERT(tls->params.tls_hlen <= MBUF_PEXT_HDR_LEN,
697 ("TLS header length too long: %d", tls->params.tls_hlen));
698 KASSERT(tls->params.tls_tlen <= MBUF_PEXT_TRAIL_LEN,
699 ("TLS trailer length too long: %d", tls->params.tls_tlen));
701 if (en->auth_key_len != 0) {
702 tls->params.auth_key_len = en->auth_key_len;
703 tls->params.auth_key = malloc(en->auth_key_len, M_KTLS,
705 error = copyin(en->auth_key, tls->params.auth_key,
711 tls->params.cipher_key_len = en->cipher_key_len;
712 tls->params.cipher_key = malloc(en->cipher_key_len, M_KTLS, M_WAITOK);
713 error = copyin(en->cipher_key, tls->params.cipher_key,
719 * This holds the implicit portion of the nonce for AEAD
720 * ciphers and the initial implicit IV for TLS 1.0. The
721 * explicit portions of the IV are generated in ktls_frame().
723 if (en->iv_len != 0) {
724 tls->params.iv_len = en->iv_len;
725 error = copyin(en->iv, tls->params.iv, en->iv_len);
730 * For TLS 1.2 with GCM, generate an 8-byte nonce as a
731 * counter to generate unique explicit IVs.
733 * Store this counter in the last 8 bytes of the IV
734 * array so that it is 8-byte aligned.
736 if (en->cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16 &&
737 en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO)
738 arc4rand(tls->params.iv + 8, sizeof(uint64_t), 0);
749 static struct ktls_session *
750 ktls_clone_session(struct ktls_session *tls, int direction)
752 struct ktls_session *tls_new;
754 tls_new = uma_zalloc(ktls_session_zone, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
756 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_active, 1);
758 refcount_init(&tls_new->refcount, 1);
759 if (direction == KTLS_RX) {
760 TASK_INIT(&tls_new->reset_tag_task, 0, ktls_reset_receive_tag,
763 TASK_INIT(&tls_new->reset_tag_task, 0, ktls_reset_send_tag,
765 tls_new->inp = tls->inp;
767 in_pcbref(tls_new->inp);
770 /* Copy fields from existing session. */
771 tls_new->params = tls->params;
772 tls_new->wq_index = tls->wq_index;
774 /* Deep copy keys. */
775 if (tls_new->params.auth_key != NULL) {
776 tls_new->params.auth_key = malloc(tls->params.auth_key_len,
778 memcpy(tls_new->params.auth_key, tls->params.auth_key,
779 tls->params.auth_key_len);
782 tls_new->params.cipher_key = malloc(tls->params.cipher_key_len, M_KTLS,
784 memcpy(tls_new->params.cipher_key, tls->params.cipher_key,
785 tls->params.cipher_key_len);
792 ktls_try_toe(struct socket *so, struct ktls_session *tls, int direction)
800 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
804 if (inp->inp_socket == NULL) {
809 if (!(tp->t_flags & TF_TOE)) {
814 error = tcp_offload_alloc_tls_session(tp, tls, direction);
817 tls->mode = TCP_TLS_MODE_TOE;
818 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
820 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_cbc, 1);
822 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
823 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_gcm, 1);
825 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
826 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_chacha20, 1);
835 * Common code used when first enabling ifnet TLS on a connection or
836 * when allocating a new ifnet TLS session due to a routing change.
837 * This function allocates a new TLS send tag on whatever interface
838 * the connection is currently routed over.
841 ktls_alloc_snd_tag(struct inpcb *inp, struct ktls_session *tls, bool force,
842 struct m_snd_tag **mstp)
844 union if_snd_tag_alloc_params params;
846 struct nhop_object *nh;
851 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
855 if (inp->inp_socket == NULL) {
862 * Check administrative controls on ifnet TLS to determine if
863 * ifnet TLS should be denied.
865 * - Always permit 'force' requests.
866 * - ktls_ifnet_permitted == 0: always deny.
868 if (!force && ktls_ifnet_permitted == 0) {
874 * XXX: Use the cached route in the inpcb to find the
875 * interface. This should perhaps instead use
876 * rtalloc1_fib(dst, 0, 0, fibnum). Since KTLS is only
877 * enabled after a connection has completed key negotiation in
878 * userland, the cached route will be present in practice.
880 nh = inp->inp_route.ro_nh;
889 * Allocate a TLS + ratelimit tag if the connection has an
890 * existing pacing rate.
892 if (tp->t_pacing_rate != -1 &&
893 (if_getcapenable(ifp) & IFCAP_TXTLS_RTLMT) != 0) {
894 params.hdr.type = IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RATE_LIMIT;
895 params.tls_rate_limit.inp = inp;
896 params.tls_rate_limit.tls = tls;
897 params.tls_rate_limit.max_rate = tp->t_pacing_rate;
899 params.hdr.type = IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS;
900 params.tls.inp = inp;
901 params.tls.tls = tls;
903 params.hdr.flowid = inp->inp_flowid;
904 params.hdr.flowtype = inp->inp_flowtype;
905 params.hdr.numa_domain = inp->inp_numa_domain;
908 if ((if_getcapenable(ifp) & IFCAP_MEXTPG) == 0) {
912 if (inp->inp_vflag & INP_IPV6) {
913 if ((if_getcapenable(ifp) & IFCAP_TXTLS6) == 0) {
918 if ((if_getcapenable(ifp) & IFCAP_TXTLS4) == 0) {
923 error = m_snd_tag_alloc(ifp, ¶ms, mstp);
930 * Allocate an initial TLS receive tag for doing HW decryption of TLS
933 * This function allocates a new TLS receive tag on whatever interface
934 * the connection is currently routed over. If the connection ends up
935 * using a different interface for receive this will get fixed up via
936 * ktls_input_ifp_mismatch as future packets arrive.
939 ktls_alloc_rcv_tag(struct inpcb *inp, struct ktls_session *tls,
940 struct m_snd_tag **mstp)
942 union if_snd_tag_alloc_params params;
944 struct nhop_object *nh;
947 if (!ktls_ocf_recrypt_supported(tls))
951 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
955 if (inp->inp_socket == NULL) {
961 * Check administrative controls on ifnet TLS to determine if
962 * ifnet TLS should be denied.
964 if (ktls_ifnet_permitted == 0) {
970 * XXX: As with ktls_alloc_snd_tag, use the cached route in
971 * the inpcb to find the interface.
973 nh = inp->inp_route.ro_nh;
982 params.hdr.type = IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RX;
983 params.hdr.flowid = inp->inp_flowid;
984 params.hdr.flowtype = inp->inp_flowtype;
985 params.hdr.numa_domain = inp->inp_numa_domain;
986 params.tls_rx.inp = inp;
987 params.tls_rx.tls = tls;
988 params.tls_rx.vlan_id = 0;
992 if (inp->inp_vflag & INP_IPV6) {
993 if ((if_getcapenable2(ifp) & IFCAP2_BIT(IFCAP2_RXTLS6)) == 0) {
998 if ((if_getcapenable2(ifp) & IFCAP2_BIT(IFCAP2_RXTLS4)) == 0) {
1003 error = m_snd_tag_alloc(ifp, ¶ms, mstp);
1006 * If this connection is over a vlan, vlan_snd_tag_alloc
1007 * rewrites vlan_id with the saved interface. Save the VLAN
1008 * ID for use in ktls_reset_receive_tag which allocates new
1009 * receive tags directly from the leaf interface bypassing
1013 tls->rx_vlan_id = params.tls_rx.vlan_id;
1019 ktls_try_ifnet(struct socket *so, struct ktls_session *tls, int direction,
1022 struct m_snd_tag *mst;
1025 switch (direction) {
1027 error = ktls_alloc_snd_tag(so->so_pcb, tls, force, &mst);
1028 if (__predict_false(error != 0))
1032 KASSERT(!force, ("%s: forced receive tag", __func__));
1033 error = ktls_alloc_rcv_tag(so->so_pcb, tls, &mst);
1034 if (__predict_false(error != 0))
1038 __assert_unreachable();
1041 tls->mode = TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET;
1044 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
1045 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1046 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_cbc, 1);
1048 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
1049 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_gcm, 1);
1051 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
1052 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_chacha20, 1);
1062 ktls_use_sw(struct ktls_session *tls)
1064 tls->mode = TCP_TLS_MODE_SW;
1065 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
1066 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1067 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_cbc, 1);
1069 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
1070 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_gcm, 1);
1072 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
1073 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_chacha20, 1);
1079 ktls_try_sw(struct socket *so, struct ktls_session *tls, int direction)
1083 error = ktls_ocf_try(so, tls, direction);
1091 * KTLS RX stores data in the socket buffer as a list of TLS records,
1092 * where each record is stored as a control message containg the TLS
1093 * header followed by data mbufs containing the decrypted data. This
1094 * is different from KTLS TX which always uses an mb_ext_pgs mbuf for
1095 * both encrypted and decrypted data. TLS records decrypted by a NIC
1096 * should be queued to the socket buffer as records, but encrypted
1097 * data which needs to be decrypted by software arrives as a stream of
1098 * regular mbufs which need to be converted. In addition, there may
1099 * already be pending encrypted data in the socket buffer when KTLS RX
1102 * To manage not-yet-decrypted data for KTLS RX, the following scheme
1105 * - A single chain of NOTREADY mbufs is hung off of sb_mtls.
1107 * - ktls_check_rx checks this chain of mbufs reading the TLS header
1108 * from the first mbuf. Once all of the data for that TLS record is
1109 * queued, the socket is queued to a worker thread.
1111 * - The worker thread calls ktls_decrypt to decrypt TLS records in
1112 * the TLS chain. Each TLS record is detached from the TLS chain,
1113 * decrypted, and inserted into the regular socket buffer chain as
1114 * record starting with a control message holding the TLS header and
1115 * a chain of mbufs holding the encrypted data.
1119 sb_mark_notready(struct sockbuf *sb)
1126 sb->sb_mbtail = NULL;
1127 sb->sb_lastrecord = NULL;
1128 for (; m != NULL; m = m->m_next) {
1129 KASSERT(m->m_nextpkt == NULL, ("%s: m_nextpkt != NULL",
1131 KASSERT((m->m_flags & M_NOTAVAIL) == 0, ("%s: mbuf not avail",
1133 KASSERT(sb->sb_acc >= m->m_len, ("%s: sb_acc < m->m_len",
1135 m->m_flags |= M_NOTREADY;
1136 sb->sb_acc -= m->m_len;
1137 sb->sb_tlscc += m->m_len;
1138 sb->sb_mtlstail = m;
1140 KASSERT(sb->sb_acc == 0 && sb->sb_tlscc == sb->sb_ccc,
1141 ("%s: acc %u tlscc %u ccc %u", __func__, sb->sb_acc, sb->sb_tlscc,
1146 * Return information about the pending TLS data in a socket
1147 * buffer. On return, 'seqno' is set to the sequence number
1148 * of the next TLS record to be received, 'resid' is set to
1149 * the amount of bytes still needed for the last pending
1150 * record. The function returns 'false' if the last pending
1151 * record contains a partial TLS header. In that case, 'resid'
1152 * is the number of bytes needed to complete the TLS header.
1155 ktls_pending_rx_info(struct sockbuf *sb, uint64_t *seqnop, size_t *residp)
1157 struct tls_record_layer hdr;
1161 u_int offset, record_len;
1163 SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(sb);
1164 MPASS(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX);
1165 seqno = sb->sb_tls_seqno;
1166 resid = sb->sb_tlscc;
1179 if (resid < sizeof(hdr)) {
1181 *residp = sizeof(hdr) - resid;
1185 m_copydata(m, offset, sizeof(hdr), (void *)&hdr);
1187 record_len = sizeof(hdr) + ntohs(hdr.tls_length);
1188 if (resid <= record_len) {
1190 *residp = record_len - resid;
1193 resid -= record_len;
1195 while (record_len != 0) {
1196 if (m->m_len - offset > record_len) {
1197 offset += record_len;
1201 record_len -= (m->m_len - offset);
1209 ktls_enable_rx(struct socket *so, struct tls_enable *en)
1211 struct ktls_session *tls;
1214 if (!ktls_offload_enable)
1217 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_enable_calls, 1);
1220 * This should always be true since only the TCP socket option
1221 * invokes this function.
1223 if (so->so_proto->pr_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)
1227 * XXX: Don't overwrite existing sessions. We should permit
1228 * this to support rekeying in the future.
1230 if (so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info != NULL)
1233 if (en->cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC && !ktls_cbc_enable)
1236 error = ktls_create_session(so, en, &tls, KTLS_RX);
1240 error = ktls_ocf_try(so, tls, KTLS_RX);
1246 /* Mark the socket as using TLS offload. */
1247 SOCK_RECVBUF_LOCK(so);
1248 if (SOLISTENING(so)) {
1249 SOCK_RECVBUF_UNLOCK(so);
1253 so->so_rcv.sb_tls_seqno = be64dec(en->rec_seq);
1254 so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info = tls;
1255 so->so_rcv.sb_flags |= SB_TLS_RX;
1257 /* Mark existing data as not ready until it can be decrypted. */
1258 sb_mark_notready(&so->so_rcv);
1259 ktls_check_rx(&so->so_rcv);
1260 SOCK_RECVBUF_UNLOCK(so);
1262 /* Prefer TOE -> ifnet TLS -> software TLS. */
1264 error = ktls_try_toe(so, tls, KTLS_RX);
1267 error = ktls_try_ifnet(so, tls, KTLS_RX, false);
1271 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_total, 1);
1277 ktls_enable_tx(struct socket *so, struct tls_enable *en)
1279 struct ktls_session *tls;
1284 if (!ktls_offload_enable)
1287 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_enable_calls, 1);
1290 * This should always be true since only the TCP socket option
1291 * invokes this function.
1293 if (so->so_proto->pr_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)
1297 * XXX: Don't overwrite existing sessions. We should permit
1298 * this to support rekeying in the future.
1300 if (so->so_snd.sb_tls_info != NULL)
1303 if (en->cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC && !ktls_cbc_enable)
1306 /* TLS requires ext pgs */
1307 if (mb_use_ext_pgs == 0)
1310 error = ktls_create_session(so, en, &tls, KTLS_TX);
1314 /* Prefer TOE -> ifnet TLS -> software TLS. */
1316 error = ktls_try_toe(so, tls, KTLS_TX);
1319 error = ktls_try_ifnet(so, tls, KTLS_TX, false);
1321 error = ktls_try_sw(so, tls, KTLS_TX);
1329 * Serialize with sosend_generic() and make sure that we're not
1330 * operating on a listening socket.
1332 error = SOCK_IO_SEND_LOCK(so, SBL_WAIT);
1339 * Write lock the INP when setting sb_tls_info so that
1340 * routines in tcp_ratelimit.c can read sb_tls_info while
1341 * holding the INP lock.
1345 SOCK_SENDBUF_LOCK(so);
1346 so->so_snd.sb_tls_seqno = be64dec(en->rec_seq);
1347 so->so_snd.sb_tls_info = tls;
1348 if (tls->mode != TCP_TLS_MODE_SW) {
1349 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
1350 MPASS(tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit == 0);
1351 tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit = 1;
1352 if (tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change != NULL)
1353 (*tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change)(tp, 1);
1355 SOCK_SENDBUF_UNLOCK(so);
1357 SOCK_IO_SEND_UNLOCK(so);
1359 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_total, 1);
1365 ktls_get_rx_mode(struct socket *so, int *modep)
1367 struct ktls_session *tls;
1368 struct inpcb *inp __diagused;
1370 if (SOLISTENING(so))
1373 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1374 SOCK_RECVBUF_LOCK(so);
1375 tls = so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info;
1377 *modep = TCP_TLS_MODE_NONE;
1380 SOCK_RECVBUF_UNLOCK(so);
1385 * ktls_get_rx_sequence - get the next TCP- and TLS- sequence number.
1387 * This function gets information about the next TCP- and TLS-
1388 * sequence number to be processed by the TLS receive worker
1389 * thread. The information is extracted from the given "inpcb"
1390 * structure. The values are stored in host endian format at the two
1391 * given output pointer locations. The TCP sequence number points to
1392 * the beginning of the TLS header.
1394 * This function returns zero on success, else a non-zero error code
1398 ktls_get_rx_sequence(struct inpcb *inp, uint32_t *tcpseq, uint64_t *tlsseq)
1404 so = inp->inp_socket;
1405 if (__predict_false(so == NULL)) {
1409 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
1411 return (ECONNRESET);
1414 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
1417 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1418 *tcpseq = tp->rcv_nxt - so->so_rcv.sb_tlscc;
1419 *tlsseq = so->so_rcv.sb_tls_seqno;
1420 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1428 ktls_get_tx_mode(struct socket *so, int *modep)
1430 struct ktls_session *tls;
1431 struct inpcb *inp __diagused;
1433 if (SOLISTENING(so))
1436 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1437 SOCK_SENDBUF_LOCK(so);
1438 tls = so->so_snd.sb_tls_info;
1440 *modep = TCP_TLS_MODE_NONE;
1443 SOCK_SENDBUF_UNLOCK(so);
1448 * Switch between SW and ifnet TLS sessions as requested.
1451 ktls_set_tx_mode(struct socket *so, int mode)
1453 struct ktls_session *tls, *tls_new;
1458 if (SOLISTENING(so))
1461 case TCP_TLS_MODE_SW:
1462 case TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET:
1469 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1470 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
1472 if (mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET) {
1473 /* Don't allow enabling ifnet ktls multiple times */
1474 if (tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit)
1478 * Don't enable ifnet ktls if we disabled it due to an
1479 * excessive retransmission rate
1481 if (tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit_dis)
1485 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_snd);
1486 tls = so->so_snd.sb_tls_info;
1488 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
1492 if (tls->mode == mode) {
1493 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
1497 tls = ktls_hold(tls);
1498 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
1501 tls_new = ktls_clone_session(tls, KTLS_TX);
1503 if (mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET)
1504 error = ktls_try_ifnet(so, tls_new, KTLS_TX, true);
1506 error = ktls_try_sw(so, tls_new, KTLS_TX);
1508 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_failed, 1);
1515 error = SOCK_IO_SEND_LOCK(so, SBL_WAIT);
1517 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_failed, 1);
1525 * If we raced with another session change, keep the existing
1528 if (tls != so->so_snd.sb_tls_info) {
1529 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_failed, 1);
1530 SOCK_IO_SEND_UNLOCK(so);
1538 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_snd);
1539 so->so_snd.sb_tls_info = tls_new;
1540 if (tls_new->mode != TCP_TLS_MODE_SW) {
1541 MPASS(tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit == 0);
1542 tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit = 1;
1543 if (tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change != NULL)
1544 (*tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change)(tp, 1);
1546 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
1547 SOCK_IO_SEND_UNLOCK(so);
1550 * Drop two references on 'tls'. The first is for the
1551 * ktls_hold() above. The second drops the reference from the
1554 KASSERT(tls->refcount >= 2, ("too few references on old session"));
1558 if (mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET)
1559 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_to_ifnet, 1);
1561 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_to_sw, 1);
1567 * Try to allocate a new TLS receive tag. This task is scheduled when
1568 * sbappend_ktls_rx detects an input path change. If a new tag is
1569 * allocated, replace the tag in the TLS session. If a new tag cannot
1570 * be allocated, let the session fall back to software decryption.
1573 ktls_reset_receive_tag(void *context, int pending)
1575 union if_snd_tag_alloc_params params;
1576 struct ktls_session *tls;
1577 struct m_snd_tag *mst;
1583 MPASS(pending == 1);
1591 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
1596 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1598 tls->snd_tag = NULL;
1600 m_snd_tag_rele(mst);
1604 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1606 params.hdr.type = IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RX;
1607 params.hdr.flowid = inp->inp_flowid;
1608 params.hdr.flowtype = inp->inp_flowtype;
1609 params.hdr.numa_domain = inp->inp_numa_domain;
1610 params.tls_rx.inp = inp;
1611 params.tls_rx.tls = tls;
1612 params.tls_rx.vlan_id = tls->rx_vlan_id;
1615 if (inp->inp_vflag & INP_IPV6) {
1616 if ((if_getcapenable2(ifp) & IFCAP2_RXTLS6) == 0)
1619 if ((if_getcapenable2(ifp) & IFCAP2_RXTLS4) == 0)
1623 error = m_snd_tag_alloc(ifp, ¶ms, &mst);
1625 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1627 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1629 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset, 1);
1632 * Just fall back to software decryption if a tag
1633 * cannot be allocated leaving the connection intact.
1634 * If a future input path change switches to another
1635 * interface this connection will resume ifnet TLS.
1637 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset_failed, 1);
1641 mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1642 tls->reset_pending = false;
1643 mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1647 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
1654 * Try to allocate a new TLS send tag. This task is scheduled when
1655 * ip_output detects a route change while trying to transmit a packet
1656 * holding a TLS record. If a new tag is allocated, replace the tag
1657 * in the TLS session. Subsequent packets on the connection will use
1658 * the new tag. If a new tag cannot be allocated, drop the
1662 ktls_reset_send_tag(void *context, int pending)
1664 struct epoch_tracker et;
1665 struct ktls_session *tls;
1666 struct m_snd_tag *old, *new;
1671 MPASS(pending == 1);
1677 * Free the old tag first before allocating a new one.
1678 * ip[6]_output_send() will treat a NULL send tag the same as
1679 * an ifp mismatch and drop packets until a new tag is
1682 * Write-lock the INP when changing tls->snd_tag since
1683 * ip[6]_output_send() holds a read-lock when reading the
1688 tls->snd_tag = NULL;
1691 m_snd_tag_rele(old);
1693 error = ktls_alloc_snd_tag(inp, tls, true, &new);
1698 mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1699 tls->reset_pending = false;
1700 mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1703 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset, 1);
1706 * XXX: Should we kick tcp_output explicitly now that
1707 * the send tag is fixed or just rely on timers?
1710 NET_EPOCH_ENTER(et);
1712 if (!(inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED)) {
1713 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
1714 CURVNET_SET(inp->inp_vnet);
1715 tp = tcp_drop(tp, ECONNABORTED);
1718 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset_dropped, 1);
1725 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset_failed, 1);
1728 * Leave reset_pending true to avoid future tasks while
1729 * the socket goes away.
1737 ktls_input_ifp_mismatch(struct sockbuf *sb, struct ifnet *ifp)
1739 struct ktls_session *tls;
1742 SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(sb);
1743 KASSERT(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX, ("%s: sockbuf %p isn't TLS RX",
1745 so = __containerof(sb, struct socket, so_rcv);
1747 tls = sb->sb_tls_info;
1748 if_rele(tls->rx_ifp);
1753 * See if we should schedule a task to update the receive tag for
1756 mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1757 if (!tls->reset_pending) {
1758 (void) ktls_hold(tls);
1761 tls->reset_pending = true;
1762 taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &tls->reset_tag_task);
1764 mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1768 ktls_output_eagain(struct inpcb *inp, struct ktls_session *tls)
1774 INP_LOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1777 * See if we should schedule a task to update the send tag for
1780 mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1781 if (!tls->reset_pending) {
1782 (void) ktls_hold(tls);
1783 tls->reset_pending = true;
1784 taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &tls->reset_tag_task);
1786 mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1792 ktls_modify_txrtlmt(struct ktls_session *tls, uint64_t max_pacing_rate)
1794 union if_snd_tag_modify_params params = {
1795 .rate_limit.max_rate = max_pacing_rate,
1796 .rate_limit.flags = M_NOWAIT,
1798 struct m_snd_tag *mst;
1800 /* Can't get to the inp, but it should be locked. */
1801 /* INP_LOCK_ASSERT(inp); */
1803 MPASS(tls->mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET);
1805 if (tls->snd_tag == NULL) {
1807 * Resetting send tag, ignore this change. The
1808 * pending reset may or may not see this updated rate
1809 * in the tcpcb. If it doesn't, we will just lose
1818 MPASS(mst->sw->type == IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RATE_LIMIT);
1820 return (mst->sw->snd_tag_modify(mst, ¶ms));
1825 ktls_destroy_help(void *context, int pending __unused)
1827 ktls_destroy(context);
1831 ktls_destroy(struct ktls_session *tls)
1837 MPASS(tls->refcount == 0);
1841 wlocked = INP_WLOCKED(inp);
1842 if (!wlocked && !INP_TRY_WLOCK(inp)) {
1844 * rwlocks read locks are anonymous, and there
1845 * is no way to know if our current thread
1846 * holds an rlock on the inp. As a rough
1847 * estimate, check to see if the thread holds
1848 * *any* rlocks at all. If it does not, then we
1849 * know that we don't hold the inp rlock, and
1850 * can safely take the wlock
1852 if (curthread->td_rw_rlocks == 0) {
1856 * We might hold the rlock, so let's
1857 * do the destroy in a taskqueue
1858 * context to avoid a potential
1859 * deadlock. This should be very
1862 counter_u64_add(ktls_destroy_task, 1);
1863 TASK_INIT(&tls->destroy_task, 0,
1864 ktls_destroy_help, tls);
1865 (void)taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread,
1866 &tls->destroy_task);
1872 if (tls->sequential_records) {
1876 STAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(m, &tls->pending_records, m_epg_stailq, n) {
1877 page_count = m->m_epg_enc_cnt;
1878 while (page_count > 0) {
1879 KASSERT(page_count >= m->m_epg_nrdy,
1880 ("%s: too few pages", __func__));
1881 page_count -= m->m_epg_nrdy;
1887 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_active, -1);
1888 switch (tls->mode) {
1889 case TCP_TLS_MODE_SW:
1890 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
1891 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1892 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_cbc, -1);
1894 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
1895 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_gcm, -1);
1897 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
1898 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_chacha20, -1);
1902 case TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET:
1903 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
1904 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1905 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_cbc, -1);
1907 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
1908 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_gcm, -1);
1910 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
1911 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_chacha20, -1);
1914 if (tls->snd_tag != NULL)
1915 m_snd_tag_rele(tls->snd_tag);
1916 if (tls->rx_ifp != NULL)
1917 if_rele(tls->rx_ifp);
1919 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1920 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
1921 MPASS(tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit == 1);
1922 tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit = 0;
1926 case TCP_TLS_MODE_TOE:
1927 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
1928 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1929 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_cbc, -1);
1931 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
1932 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_gcm, -1);
1934 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
1935 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_chacha20, -1);
1941 if (tls->ocf_session != NULL)
1943 if (tls->params.auth_key != NULL) {
1944 zfree(tls->params.auth_key, M_KTLS);
1945 tls->params.auth_key = NULL;
1946 tls->params.auth_key_len = 0;
1948 if (tls->params.cipher_key != NULL) {
1949 zfree(tls->params.cipher_key, M_KTLS);
1950 tls->params.cipher_key = NULL;
1951 tls->params.cipher_key_len = 0;
1954 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1955 if (!in_pcbrele_wlocked(inp) && !wlocked)
1958 explicit_bzero(tls->params.iv, sizeof(tls->params.iv));
1960 uma_zfree(ktls_session_zone, tls);
1964 ktls_seq(struct sockbuf *sb, struct mbuf *m)
1967 for (; m != NULL; m = m->m_next) {
1968 KASSERT((m->m_flags & M_EXTPG) != 0,
1969 ("ktls_seq: mapped mbuf %p", m));
1971 m->m_epg_seqno = sb->sb_tls_seqno;
1977 * Add TLS framing (headers and trailers) to a chain of mbufs. Each
1978 * mbuf in the chain must be an unmapped mbuf. The payload of the
1979 * mbuf must be populated with the payload of each TLS record.
1981 * The record_type argument specifies the TLS record type used when
1982 * populating the TLS header.
1984 * The enq_count argument on return is set to the number of pages of
1985 * payload data for this entire chain that need to be encrypted via SW
1986 * encryption. The returned value should be passed to ktls_enqueue
1987 * when scheduling encryption of this chain of mbufs. To handle the
1988 * special case of empty fragments for TLS 1.0 sessions, an empty
1989 * fragment counts as one page.
1992 ktls_frame(struct mbuf *top, struct ktls_session *tls, int *enq_cnt,
1993 uint8_t record_type)
1995 struct tls_record_layer *tlshdr;
1999 int maxlen __diagused;
2001 maxlen = tls->params.max_frame_len;
2003 for (m = top; m != NULL; m = m->m_next) {
2005 * All mbufs in the chain should be TLS records whose
2006 * payload does not exceed the maximum frame length.
2008 * Empty TLS 1.0 records are permitted when using CBC.
2010 KASSERT(m->m_len <= maxlen && m->m_len >= 0 &&
2011 (m->m_len > 0 || ktls_permit_empty_frames(tls)),
2012 ("ktls_frame: m %p len %d", m, m->m_len));
2015 * TLS frames require unmapped mbufs to store session
2018 KASSERT((m->m_flags & M_EXTPG) != 0,
2019 ("ktls_frame: mapped mbuf %p (top = %p)", m, top));
2023 /* Save a reference to the session. */
2024 m->m_epg_tls = ktls_hold(tls);
2026 m->m_epg_hdrlen = tls->params.tls_hlen;
2027 m->m_epg_trllen = tls->params.tls_tlen;
2028 if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC) {
2032 * AES-CBC pads messages to a multiple of the
2033 * block size. Note that the padding is
2034 * applied after the digest and the encryption
2035 * is done on the "plaintext || mac || padding".
2036 * At least one byte of padding is always
2039 * Compute the final trailer length assuming
2040 * at most one block of padding.
2041 * tls->params.tls_tlen is the maximum
2042 * possible trailer length (padding + digest).
2043 * delta holds the number of excess padding
2044 * bytes if the maximum were used. Those
2045 * extra bytes are removed.
2047 bs = tls->params.tls_bs;
2048 delta = (tls_len + tls->params.tls_tlen) & (bs - 1);
2049 m->m_epg_trllen -= delta;
2051 m->m_len += m->m_epg_hdrlen + m->m_epg_trllen;
2053 /* Populate the TLS header. */
2054 tlshdr = (void *)m->m_epg_hdr;
2055 tlshdr->tls_vmajor = tls->params.tls_vmajor;
2058 * TLS 1.3 masquarades as TLS 1.2 with a record type
2059 * of TLS_RLTYPE_APP.
2061 if (tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE &&
2062 tls->params.tls_vmajor == TLS_MAJOR_VER_ONE) {
2063 tlshdr->tls_vminor = TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO;
2064 tlshdr->tls_type = TLS_RLTYPE_APP;
2065 /* save the real record type for later */
2066 m->m_epg_record_type = record_type;
2067 m->m_epg_trail[0] = record_type;
2069 tlshdr->tls_vminor = tls->params.tls_vminor;
2070 tlshdr->tls_type = record_type;
2072 tlshdr->tls_length = htons(m->m_len - sizeof(*tlshdr));
2075 * Store nonces / explicit IVs after the end of the
2078 * For GCM with TLS 1.2, an 8 byte nonce is copied
2079 * from the end of the IV. The nonce is then
2080 * incremented for use by the next record.
2082 * For CBC, a random nonce is inserted for TLS 1.1+.
2084 if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16 &&
2085 tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO) {
2086 noncep = (uint64_t *)(tls->params.iv + 8);
2087 be64enc(tlshdr + 1, *noncep);
2089 } else if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC &&
2090 tls->params.tls_vminor >= TLS_MINOR_VER_ONE)
2091 arc4rand(tlshdr + 1, AES_BLOCK_LEN, 0);
2094 * When using SW encryption, mark the mbuf not ready.
2095 * It will be marked ready via sbready() after the
2096 * record has been encrypted.
2098 * When using ifnet TLS, unencrypted TLS records are
2099 * sent down the stack to the NIC.
2101 if (tls->mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_SW) {
2102 m->m_flags |= M_NOTREADY;
2103 if (__predict_false(tls_len == 0)) {
2104 /* TLS 1.0 empty fragment. */
2107 m->m_epg_nrdy = m->m_epg_npgs;
2108 *enq_cnt += m->m_epg_nrdy;
2114 ktls_permit_empty_frames(struct ktls_session *tls)
2116 return (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC &&
2117 tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO);
2121 ktls_check_rx(struct sockbuf *sb)
2123 struct tls_record_layer hdr;
2128 SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(sb);
2129 KASSERT(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX, ("%s: sockbuf %p isn't TLS RX",
2131 so = __containerof(sb, struct socket, so_rcv);
2133 if (sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING)
2136 /* Is there enough queued for a TLS header? */
2137 if (sb->sb_tlscc < sizeof(hdr)) {
2138 if ((sb->sb_state & SBS_CANTRCVMORE) != 0 && sb->sb_tlscc != 0)
2139 so->so_error = EMSGSIZE;
2143 m_copydata(sb->sb_mtls, 0, sizeof(hdr), (void *)&hdr);
2145 /* Is the entire record queued? */
2146 if (sb->sb_tlscc < sizeof(hdr) + ntohs(hdr.tls_length)) {
2147 if ((sb->sb_state & SBS_CANTRCVMORE) != 0)
2148 so->so_error = EMSGSIZE;
2152 sb->sb_flags |= SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING;
2155 wq = &ktls_wq[so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info->wq_index];
2157 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->so_head, so, so_ktls_rx_list);
2158 running = wq->running;
2159 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx);
2162 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_rx_queued, 1);
2165 static struct mbuf *
2166 ktls_detach_record(struct sockbuf *sb, int len)
2168 struct mbuf *m, *n, *top;
2171 SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(sb);
2172 MPASS(len <= sb->sb_tlscc);
2175 * If TLS chain is the exact size of the record,
2176 * just grab the whole record.
2179 if (sb->sb_tlscc == len) {
2181 sb->sb_mtlstail = NULL;
2186 * While it would be nice to use m_split() here, we need
2187 * to know exactly what m_split() allocates to update the
2188 * accounting, so do it inline instead.
2191 for (m = top; remain > m->m_len; m = m->m_next)
2194 /* Easy case: don't have to split 'm'. */
2195 if (remain == m->m_len) {
2196 sb->sb_mtls = m->m_next;
2197 if (sb->sb_mtls == NULL)
2198 sb->sb_mtlstail = NULL;
2204 * Need to allocate an mbuf to hold the remainder of 'm'. Try
2205 * with M_NOWAIT first.
2207 n = m_get(M_NOWAIT, MT_DATA);
2210 * Use M_WAITOK with socket buffer unlocked. If
2211 * 'sb_mtls' changes while the lock is dropped, return
2212 * NULL to force the caller to retry.
2216 n = m_get(M_WAITOK, MT_DATA);
2219 if (sb->sb_mtls != top) {
2224 n->m_flags |= (m->m_flags & (M_NOTREADY | M_DECRYPTED));
2226 /* Store remainder in 'n'. */
2227 n->m_len = m->m_len - remain;
2228 if (m->m_flags & M_EXT) {
2229 n->m_data = m->m_data + remain;
2232 bcopy(mtod(m, caddr_t) + remain, mtod(n, caddr_t), n->m_len);
2235 /* Trim 'm' and update accounting. */
2236 m->m_len -= n->m_len;
2237 sb->sb_tlscc -= n->m_len;
2238 sb->sb_ccc -= n->m_len;
2240 /* Account for 'n'. */
2241 sballoc_ktls_rx(sb, n);
2243 /* Insert 'n' into the TLS chain. */
2245 n->m_next = m->m_next;
2246 if (sb->sb_mtlstail == m)
2247 sb->sb_mtlstail = n;
2249 /* Detach the record from the TLS chain. */
2253 MPASS(m_length(top, NULL) == len);
2254 for (m = top; m != NULL; m = m->m_next)
2255 sbfree_ktls_rx(sb, m);
2256 sb->sb_tlsdcc = len;
2263 * Determine the length of the trailing zero padding and find the real
2264 * record type in the byte before the padding.
2266 * Walking the mbuf chain backwards is clumsy, so another option would
2267 * be to scan forwards remembering the last non-zero byte before the
2268 * trailer. However, it would be expensive to scan the entire record.
2269 * Instead, find the last non-zero byte of each mbuf in the chain
2270 * keeping track of the relative offset of that nonzero byte.
2272 * trail_len is the size of the MAC/tag on input and is set to the
2273 * size of the full trailer including padding and the record type on
2277 tls13_find_record_type(struct ktls_session *tls, struct mbuf *m, int tls_len,
2278 int *trailer_len, uint8_t *record_typep)
2281 u_int digest_start, last_offset, m_len, offset;
2282 uint8_t record_type;
2284 digest_start = tls_len - *trailer_len;
2287 for (; m != NULL && offset < digest_start;
2288 offset += m->m_len, m = m->m_next) {
2289 /* Don't look for padding in the tag. */
2290 m_len = min(digest_start - offset, m->m_len);
2291 cp = mtod(m, char *);
2293 /* Find last non-zero byte in this mbuf. */
2294 while (m_len > 0 && cp[m_len - 1] == 0)
2297 record_type = cp[m_len - 1];
2298 last_offset = offset + m_len;
2301 if (last_offset < tls->params.tls_hlen)
2304 *record_typep = record_type;
2305 *trailer_len = tls_len - last_offset + 1;
2310 * Check if a mbuf chain is fully decrypted at the given offset and
2311 * length. Returns KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_DECRYPTED if all data is
2312 * decrypted. KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_MIXED if there is a mix of encrypted
2313 * and decrypted data. Else KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_ENCRYPTED if all data
2316 ktls_mbuf_crypto_st_t
2317 ktls_mbuf_crypto_state(struct mbuf *mb, int offset, int len)
2319 int m_flags_ored = 0;
2320 int m_flags_anded = -1;
2322 for (; mb != NULL; mb = mb->m_next) {
2323 if (offset < mb->m_len)
2325 offset -= mb->m_len;
2329 for (; mb != NULL; mb = mb->m_next) {
2330 m_flags_ored |= mb->m_flags;
2331 m_flags_anded &= mb->m_flags;
2333 if (offset <= mb->m_len)
2335 offset -= mb->m_len;
2337 MPASS(mb != NULL || offset == 0);
2339 if ((m_flags_ored ^ m_flags_anded) & M_DECRYPTED)
2340 return (KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_MIXED);
2342 return ((m_flags_ored & M_DECRYPTED) ?
2343 KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_DECRYPTED :
2344 KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_ENCRYPTED);
2348 * ktls_resync_ifnet - get HW TLS RX back on track after packet loss
2351 ktls_resync_ifnet(struct socket *so, uint32_t tls_len, uint64_t tls_rcd_num)
2353 union if_snd_tag_modify_params params;
2354 struct m_snd_tag *mst;
2358 mst = so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info->snd_tag;
2359 if (__predict_false(mst == NULL))
2362 inp = sotoinpcb(so);
2363 if (__predict_false(inp == NULL))
2367 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
2369 return (ECONNRESET);
2372 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
2375 /* Get the TCP sequence number of the next valid TLS header. */
2376 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv);
2377 params.tls_rx.tls_hdr_tcp_sn =
2378 tp->rcv_nxt - so->so_rcv.sb_tlscc - tls_len;
2379 params.tls_rx.tls_rec_length = tls_len;
2380 params.tls_rx.tls_seq_number = tls_rcd_num;
2381 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv);
2385 MPASS(mst->sw->type == IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RX);
2386 return (mst->sw->snd_tag_modify(mst, ¶ms));
2390 ktls_drop(struct socket *so, int error)
2392 struct epoch_tracker et;
2393 struct inpcb *inp = sotoinpcb(so);
2396 NET_EPOCH_ENTER(et);
2398 if (!(inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED)) {
2399 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
2400 CURVNET_SET(inp->inp_vnet);
2401 tp = tcp_drop(tp, error);
2406 so->so_error = error;
2407 SOCK_RECVBUF_LOCK(so);
2408 sorwakeup_locked(so);
2415 ktls_decrypt(struct socket *so)
2417 char tls_header[MBUF_PEXT_HDR_LEN];
2418 struct ktls_session *tls;
2420 struct tls_record_layer *hdr;
2421 struct tls_get_record tgr;
2422 struct mbuf *control, *data, *m;
2423 ktls_mbuf_crypto_st_t state;
2425 int error, remain, tls_len, trail_len;
2427 uint8_t vminor, record_type;
2429 hdr = (struct tls_record_layer *)tls_header;
2432 KASSERT(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING,
2433 ("%s: socket %p not running", __func__, so));
2435 tls = sb->sb_tls_info;
2438 tls13 = (tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE);
2440 vminor = TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO;
2442 vminor = tls->params.tls_vminor;
2444 /* Is there enough queued for a TLS header? */
2445 if (sb->sb_tlscc < tls->params.tls_hlen)
2448 m_copydata(sb->sb_mtls, 0, tls->params.tls_hlen, tls_header);
2449 tls_len = sizeof(*hdr) + ntohs(hdr->tls_length);
2451 if (hdr->tls_vmajor != tls->params.tls_vmajor ||
2452 hdr->tls_vminor != vminor)
2454 else if (tls13 && hdr->tls_type != TLS_RLTYPE_APP)
2456 else if (tls_len < tls->params.tls_hlen || tls_len >
2457 tls->params.tls_hlen + TLS_MAX_MSG_SIZE_V10_2 +
2458 tls->params.tls_tlen)
2462 if (__predict_false(error != 0)) {
2464 * We have a corrupted record and are likely
2465 * out of sync. The connection isn't
2466 * recoverable at this point, so abort it.
2469 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_corrupted_records, 1);
2471 ktls_drop(so, error);
2475 /* Is the entire record queued? */
2476 if (sb->sb_tlscc < tls_len)
2480 * Split out the portion of the mbuf chain containing
2483 data = ktls_detach_record(sb, tls_len);
2486 MPASS(sb->sb_tlsdcc == tls_len);
2488 seqno = sb->sb_tls_seqno;
2493 /* get crypto state for this TLS record */
2494 state = ktls_mbuf_crypto_state(data, 0, tls_len);
2497 case KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_MIXED:
2498 error = ktls_ocf_recrypt(tls, hdr, data, seqno);
2502 case KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_ENCRYPTED:
2503 error = ktls_ocf_decrypt(tls, hdr, data, seqno,
2505 if (__predict_true(error == 0)) {
2507 error = tls13_find_record_type(tls, data,
2508 tls_len, &trail_len, &record_type);
2510 record_type = hdr->tls_type;
2514 case KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_DECRYPTED:
2516 * NIC TLS is only supported for AEAD
2517 * ciphersuites which used a fixed sized
2521 trail_len = tls->params.tls_tlen - 1;
2522 error = tls13_find_record_type(tls, data,
2523 tls_len, &trail_len, &record_type);
2525 trail_len = tls->params.tls_tlen;
2527 record_type = hdr->tls_type;
2535 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1);
2538 if (sb->sb_tlsdcc == 0) {
2540 * sbcut/drop/flush discarded these
2548 * Drop this TLS record's data, but keep
2549 * decrypting subsequent records.
2551 sb->sb_ccc -= tls_len;
2554 if (error != EMSGSIZE)
2556 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
2557 so->so_error = error;
2558 sorwakeup_locked(so);
2567 /* Allocate the control mbuf. */
2568 memset(&tgr, 0, sizeof(tgr));
2569 tgr.tls_type = record_type;
2570 tgr.tls_vmajor = hdr->tls_vmajor;
2571 tgr.tls_vminor = hdr->tls_vminor;
2572 tgr.tls_length = htobe16(tls_len - tls->params.tls_hlen -
2574 control = sbcreatecontrol(&tgr, sizeof(tgr),
2575 TLS_GET_RECORD, IPPROTO_TCP, M_WAITOK);
2578 if (sb->sb_tlsdcc == 0) {
2579 /* sbcut/drop/flush discarded these mbufs. */
2580 MPASS(sb->sb_tlscc == 0);
2587 * Clear the 'dcc' accounting in preparation for
2588 * adding the decrypted record.
2590 sb->sb_ccc -= tls_len;
2594 /* If there is no payload, drop all of the data. */
2595 if (tgr.tls_length == htobe16(0)) {
2600 remain = tls->params.tls_hlen;
2601 while (remain > 0) {
2602 if (data->m_len > remain) {
2603 data->m_data += remain;
2604 data->m_len -= remain;
2607 remain -= data->m_len;
2608 data = m_free(data);
2611 /* Trim trailer and clear M_NOTREADY. */
2612 remain = be16toh(tgr.tls_length);
2614 for (m = data; remain > m->m_len; m = m->m_next) {
2615 m->m_flags &= ~(M_NOTREADY | M_DECRYPTED);
2621 m->m_flags &= ~(M_NOTREADY | M_DECRYPTED);
2623 /* Set EOR on the final mbuf. */
2624 m->m_flags |= M_EOR;
2627 sbappendcontrol_locked(sb, data, control, 0);
2629 if (__predict_false(state != KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_DECRYPTED)) {
2630 sb->sb_flags |= SB_TLS_RX_RESYNC;
2632 ktls_resync_ifnet(so, tls_len, seqno);
2634 } else if (__predict_false(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX_RESYNC)) {
2635 sb->sb_flags &= ~SB_TLS_RX_RESYNC;
2637 ktls_resync_ifnet(so, 0, seqno);
2642 sb->sb_flags &= ~SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING;
2644 if ((sb->sb_state & SBS_CANTRCVMORE) != 0 && sb->sb_tlscc > 0)
2645 so->so_error = EMSGSIZE;
2647 sorwakeup_locked(so);
2650 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK_ASSERT(sb);
2652 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
2658 ktls_enqueue_to_free(struct mbuf *m)
2663 /* Mark it for freeing. */
2664 m->m_epg_flags |= EPG_FLAG_2FREE;
2665 wq = &ktls_wq[m->m_epg_tls->wq_index];
2667 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->m_head, m, m_epg_stailq);
2668 running = wq->running;
2669 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx);
2675 ktls_buffer_alloc(struct ktls_wq *wq, struct mbuf *m)
2678 int domain, running;
2680 if (m->m_epg_npgs <= 2)
2682 if (ktls_buffer_zone == NULL)
2684 if ((u_int)(ticks - wq->lastallocfail) < hz) {
2686 * Rate-limit allocation attempts after a failure.
2687 * ktls_buffer_import() will acquire a per-domain mutex to check
2688 * the free page queues and may fail consistently if memory is
2693 buf = uma_zalloc(ktls_buffer_zone, M_NOWAIT | M_NORECLAIM);
2695 domain = PCPU_GET(domain);
2696 wq->lastallocfail = ticks;
2699 * Note that this check is "racy", but the races are
2700 * harmless, and are either a spurious wakeup if
2701 * multiple threads fail allocations before the alloc
2702 * thread wakes, or waiting an extra second in case we
2703 * see an old value of running == true.
2705 if (!VM_DOMAIN_EMPTY(domain)) {
2706 running = atomic_load_int(&ktls_domains[domain].reclaim_td.running);
2708 wakeup(&ktls_domains[domain].reclaim_td);
2715 ktls_encrypt_record(struct ktls_wq *wq, struct mbuf *m,
2716 struct ktls_session *tls, struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state)
2719 int error, i, len, off;
2721 KASSERT((m->m_flags & (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY)) == (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY),
2722 ("%p not unready & nomap mbuf\n", m));
2723 KASSERT(ptoa(m->m_epg_npgs) <= ktls_maxlen,
2724 ("page count %d larger than maximum frame length %d", m->m_epg_npgs,
2727 /* Anonymous mbufs are encrypted in place. */
2728 if ((m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_ANON) != 0)
2729 return (ktls_ocf_encrypt(state, tls, m, NULL, 0));
2732 * For file-backed mbufs (from sendfile), anonymous wired
2733 * pages are allocated and used as the encryption destination.
2735 if ((state->cbuf = ktls_buffer_alloc(wq, m)) != NULL) {
2736 len = ptoa(m->m_epg_npgs - 1) + m->m_epg_last_len -
2738 state->dst_iov[0].iov_base = (char *)state->cbuf +
2740 state->dst_iov[0].iov_len = len;
2741 state->parray[0] = DMAP_TO_PHYS((vm_offset_t)state->cbuf);
2744 off = m->m_epg_1st_off;
2745 for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++, off = 0) {
2746 pg = vm_page_alloc_noobj(VM_ALLOC_NODUMP |
2747 VM_ALLOC_WIRED | VM_ALLOC_WAITOK);
2748 len = m_epg_pagelen(m, i, off);
2749 state->parray[i] = VM_PAGE_TO_PHYS(pg);
2750 state->dst_iov[i].iov_base =
2751 (char *)PHYS_TO_DMAP(state->parray[i]) + off;
2752 state->dst_iov[i].iov_len = len;
2755 KASSERT(i + 1 <= nitems(state->dst_iov), ("dst_iov is too small"));
2756 state->dst_iov[i].iov_base = m->m_epg_trail;
2757 state->dst_iov[i].iov_len = m->m_epg_trllen;
2759 error = ktls_ocf_encrypt(state, tls, m, state->dst_iov, i + 1);
2761 if (__predict_false(error != 0)) {
2762 /* Free the anonymous pages. */
2763 if (state->cbuf != NULL)
2764 uma_zfree(ktls_buffer_zone, state->cbuf);
2766 for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++) {
2767 pg = PHYS_TO_VM_PAGE(state->parray[i]);
2768 (void)vm_page_unwire_noq(pg);
2776 /* Number of TLS records in a batch passed to ktls_enqueue(). */
2778 ktls_batched_records(struct mbuf *m)
2780 int page_count, records;
2783 page_count = m->m_epg_enc_cnt;
2784 while (page_count > 0) {
2786 page_count -= m->m_epg_nrdy;
2789 KASSERT(page_count == 0, ("%s: mismatched page count", __func__));
2794 ktls_enqueue(struct mbuf *m, struct socket *so, int page_count)
2796 struct ktls_session *tls;
2801 KASSERT(((m->m_flags & (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY)) ==
2802 (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY)),
2803 ("ktls_enqueue: %p not unready & nomap mbuf\n", m));
2804 KASSERT(page_count != 0, ("enqueueing TLS mbuf with zero page count"));
2806 KASSERT(m->m_epg_tls->mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_SW, ("!SW TLS mbuf"));
2808 m->m_epg_enc_cnt = page_count;
2811 * Save a pointer to the socket. The caller is responsible
2812 * for taking an additional reference via soref().
2818 wq = &ktls_wq[tls->wq_index];
2820 if (__predict_false(tls->sequential_records)) {
2822 * For TLS 1.0, records must be encrypted
2823 * sequentially. For a given connection, all records
2824 * queued to the associated work queue are processed
2825 * sequentially. However, sendfile(2) might complete
2826 * I/O requests spanning multiple TLS records out of
2827 * order. Here we ensure TLS records are enqueued to
2828 * the work queue in FIFO order.
2830 * tls->next_seqno holds the sequence number of the
2831 * next TLS record that should be enqueued to the work
2832 * queue. If this next record is not tls->next_seqno,
2833 * it must be a future record, so insert it, sorted by
2834 * TLS sequence number, into tls->pending_records and
2837 * If this TLS record matches tls->next_seqno, place
2838 * it in the work queue and then check
2839 * tls->pending_records to see if any
2840 * previously-queued records are now ready for
2843 if (m->m_epg_seqno != tls->next_seqno) {
2847 STAILQ_FOREACH(n, &tls->pending_records, m_epg_stailq) {
2848 if (n->m_epg_seqno > m->m_epg_seqno)
2853 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tls->pending_records, m,
2856 STAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(&tls->pending_records, m,
2859 STAILQ_INSERT_AFTER(&tls->pending_records, p, m,
2861 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx);
2862 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_tx_pending, 1);
2866 tls->next_seqno += ktls_batched_records(m);
2867 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->m_head, m, m_epg_stailq);
2869 while (!STAILQ_EMPTY(&tls->pending_records)) {
2872 n = STAILQ_FIRST(&tls->pending_records);
2873 if (n->m_epg_seqno != tls->next_seqno)
2877 STAILQ_REMOVE_HEAD(&tls->pending_records, m_epg_stailq);
2878 tls->next_seqno += ktls_batched_records(n);
2879 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->m_head, n, m_epg_stailq);
2881 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_tx_pending, -(queued - 1));
2883 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->m_head, m, m_epg_stailq);
2885 running = wq->running;
2886 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx);
2889 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_tx_queued, queued);
2893 * Once a file-backed mbuf (from sendfile) has been encrypted, free
2894 * the pages from the file and replace them with the anonymous pages
2895 * allocated in ktls_encrypt_record().
2898 ktls_finish_nonanon(struct mbuf *m, struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state)
2902 MPASS((m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_ANON) == 0);
2904 /* Free the old pages. */
2905 m->m_ext.ext_free(m);
2907 /* Replace them with the new pages. */
2908 if (state->cbuf != NULL) {
2909 for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++)
2910 m->m_epg_pa[i] = state->parray[0] + ptoa(i);
2912 /* Contig pages should go back to the cache. */
2913 m->m_ext.ext_free = ktls_free_mext_contig;
2915 for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++)
2916 m->m_epg_pa[i] = state->parray[i];
2918 /* Use the basic free routine. */
2919 m->m_ext.ext_free = mb_free_mext_pgs;
2922 /* Pages are now writable. */
2923 m->m_epg_flags |= EPG_FLAG_ANON;
2926 static __noinline void
2927 ktls_encrypt(struct ktls_wq *wq, struct mbuf *top)
2929 struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state state;
2930 struct ktls_session *tls;
2933 int error, npages, total_pages;
2936 tls = top->m_epg_tls;
2937 KASSERT(tls != NULL, ("tls = NULL, top = %p\n", top));
2938 KASSERT(so != NULL, ("so = NULL, top = %p\n", top));
2940 top->m_epg_so = NULL;
2942 total_pages = top->m_epg_enc_cnt;
2946 * Encrypt the TLS records in the chain of mbufs starting with
2947 * 'top'. 'total_pages' gives us a total count of pages and is
2948 * used to know when we have finished encrypting the TLS
2949 * records originally queued with 'top'.
2951 * NB: These mbufs are queued in the socket buffer and
2952 * 'm_next' is traversing the mbufs in the socket buffer. The
2953 * socket buffer lock is not held while traversing this chain.
2954 * Since the mbufs are all marked M_NOTREADY their 'm_next'
2955 * pointers should be stable. However, the 'm_next' of the
2956 * last mbuf encrypted is not necessarily NULL. It can point
2957 * to other mbufs appended while 'top' was on the TLS work
2960 * Each mbuf holds an entire TLS record.
2963 for (m = top; npages != total_pages; m = m->m_next) {
2964 KASSERT(m->m_epg_tls == tls,
2965 ("different TLS sessions in a single mbuf chain: %p vs %p",
2966 tls, m->m_epg_tls));
2967 KASSERT(npages + m->m_epg_npgs <= total_pages,
2968 ("page count mismatch: top %p, total_pages %d, m %p", top,
2971 error = ktls_encrypt_record(wq, m, tls, &state);
2973 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1);
2977 if ((m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_ANON) == 0)
2978 ktls_finish_nonanon(m, &state);
2980 npages += m->m_epg_nrdy;
2983 * Drop a reference to the session now that it is no
2984 * longer needed. Existing code depends on encrypted
2985 * records having no associated session vs
2986 * yet-to-be-encrypted records having an associated
2989 m->m_epg_tls = NULL;
2993 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
2995 (void)so->so_proto->pr_ready(so, top, npages);
2998 mb_free_notready(top, total_pages);
3006 ktls_encrypt_cb(struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state, int error)
3008 struct ktls_session *tls;
3015 if ((m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_ANON) == 0)
3016 ktls_finish_nonanon(m, state);
3019 free(state, M_KTLS);
3022 * Drop a reference to the session now that it is no longer
3023 * needed. Existing code depends on encrypted records having
3024 * no associated session vs yet-to-be-encrypted records having
3025 * an associated session.
3028 m->m_epg_tls = NULL;
3032 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1);
3034 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
3035 npages = m->m_epg_nrdy;
3038 (void)so->so_proto->pr_ready(so, m, npages);
3041 mb_free_notready(m, npages);
3049 * Similar to ktls_encrypt, but used with asynchronous OCF backends
3050 * (coprocessors) where encryption does not use host CPU resources and
3051 * it can be beneficial to queue more requests than CPUs.
3053 static __noinline void
3054 ktls_encrypt_async(struct ktls_wq *wq, struct mbuf *top)
3056 struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state;
3057 struct ktls_session *tls;
3060 int error, mpages, npages, total_pages;
3063 tls = top->m_epg_tls;
3064 KASSERT(tls != NULL, ("tls = NULL, top = %p\n", top));
3065 KASSERT(so != NULL, ("so = NULL, top = %p\n", top));
3067 top->m_epg_so = NULL;
3069 total_pages = top->m_epg_enc_cnt;
3073 for (m = top; npages != total_pages; m = n) {
3074 KASSERT(m->m_epg_tls == tls,
3075 ("different TLS sessions in a single mbuf chain: %p vs %p",
3076 tls, m->m_epg_tls));
3077 KASSERT(npages + m->m_epg_npgs <= total_pages,
3078 ("page count mismatch: top %p, total_pages %d, m %p", top,
3081 state = malloc(sizeof(*state), M_KTLS, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
3086 mpages = m->m_epg_nrdy;
3089 error = ktls_encrypt_record(wq, m, tls, state);
3091 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1);
3092 free(state, M_KTLS);
3093 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
3102 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
3105 mb_free_notready(m, total_pages - npages);
3113 ktls_bind_domain(int domain)
3117 error = cpuset_setthread(curthread->td_tid, &cpuset_domain[domain]);
3120 curthread->td_domain.dr_policy = DOMAINSET_PREF(domain);
3125 ktls_reclaim_thread(void *ctx)
3127 struct ktls_domain_info *ktls_domain = ctx;
3128 struct ktls_reclaim_thread *sc = &ktls_domain->reclaim_td;
3129 struct sysctl_oid *oid;
3133 domain = ktls_domain - ktls_domains;
3135 printf("Starting KTLS reclaim thread for domain %d\n", domain);
3136 error = ktls_bind_domain(domain);
3138 printf("Unable to bind KTLS reclaim thread for domain %d: error %d\n",
3140 snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "domain%d", domain);
3141 oid = SYSCTL_ADD_NODE(NULL, SYSCTL_STATIC_CHILDREN(_kern_ipc_tls), OID_AUTO,
3142 name, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, "");
3143 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(NULL, SYSCTL_CHILDREN(oid), OID_AUTO, "reclaims",
3144 CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->reclaims, 0, "buffers reclaimed");
3145 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(NULL, SYSCTL_CHILDREN(oid), OID_AUTO, "wakeups",
3146 CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->wakeups, 0, "thread wakeups");
3147 SYSCTL_ADD_INT(NULL, SYSCTL_CHILDREN(oid), OID_AUTO, "running",
3148 CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->running, 0, "thread running");
3151 atomic_store_int(&sc->running, 0);
3152 tsleep(sc, PZERO | PNOLOCK, "-", 0);
3153 atomic_store_int(&sc->running, 1);
3156 * Below we attempt to reclaim ktls_max_reclaim
3157 * buffers using vm_page_reclaim_contig_domain_ext().
3158 * We do this here, as this function can take several
3159 * seconds to scan all of memory and it does not
3160 * matter if this thread pauses for a while. If we
3161 * block a ktls worker thread, we risk developing
3162 * backlogs of buffers to be encrypted, leading to
3163 * surges of traffic and potential NIC output drops.
3165 if (vm_page_reclaim_contig_domain_ext(domain, VM_ALLOC_NORMAL,
3166 atop(ktls_maxlen), 0, ~0ul, PAGE_SIZE, 0,
3167 ktls_max_reclaim) != 0) {
3168 vm_wait_domain(domain);
3170 sc->reclaims += ktls_max_reclaim;
3176 ktls_work_thread(void *ctx)
3178 struct ktls_wq *wq = ctx;
3180 struct socket *so, *son;
3181 STAILQ_HEAD(, mbuf) local_m_head;
3182 STAILQ_HEAD(, socket) local_so_head;
3187 printf("Starting KTLS worker thread for CPU %d\n", cpu);
3190 * Bind to a core. If ktls_bind_threads is > 1, then
3191 * we bind to the NUMA domain instead.
3193 if (ktls_bind_threads) {
3196 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1) {
3197 struct pcpu *pc = pcpu_find(cpu);
3199 error = ktls_bind_domain(pc->pc_domain);
3203 CPU_SETOF(cpu, &mask);
3204 error = cpuset_setthread(curthread->td_tid, &mask);
3207 printf("Unable to bind KTLS worker thread for CPU %d: error %d\n",
3210 #if defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__i386__)
3215 while (STAILQ_EMPTY(&wq->m_head) &&
3216 STAILQ_EMPTY(&wq->so_head)) {
3217 wq->running = false;
3218 mtx_sleep(wq, &wq->mtx, 0, "-", 0);
3222 STAILQ_INIT(&local_m_head);
3223 STAILQ_CONCAT(&local_m_head, &wq->m_head);
3224 STAILQ_INIT(&local_so_head);
3225 STAILQ_CONCAT(&local_so_head, &wq->so_head);
3226 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx);
3228 STAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(m, &local_m_head, m_epg_stailq, n) {
3229 if (m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_2FREE) {
3230 ktls_free(m->m_epg_tls);
3233 if (m->m_epg_tls->sync_dispatch)
3234 ktls_encrypt(wq, m);
3236 ktls_encrypt_async(wq, m);
3237 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_tx_queued, -1);
3241 STAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(so, &local_so_head, so_ktls_rx_list, son) {
3243 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_rx_queued, -1);
3249 ktls_disable_ifnet_help(void *context, int pending __unused)
3251 struct ktls_session *tls;
3262 so = inp->inp_socket;
3264 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
3268 if (so->so_snd.sb_tls_info != NULL)
3269 err = ktls_set_tx_mode(so, TCP_TLS_MODE_SW);
3273 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_disable_ok, 1);
3274 /* ktls_set_tx_mode() drops inp wlock, so recheck flags */
3275 if ((inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) == 0 &&
3276 (tp = intotcpcb(inp)) != NULL &&
3277 tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change != NULL)
3278 (*tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change)(tp, 0);
3280 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_disable_fail, 1);
3284 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
3292 * Called when re-transmits are becoming a substantial portion of the
3293 * sends on this connection. When this happens, we transition the
3294 * connection to software TLS. This is needed because most inline TLS
3295 * NICs keep crypto state only for in-order transmits. This means
3296 * that to handle a TCP rexmit (which is out-of-order), the NIC must
3297 * re-DMA the entire TLS record up to and including the current
3298 * segment. This means that when re-transmitting the last ~1448 byte
3299 * segment of a 16KB TLS record, we could wind up re-DMA'ing an order
3300 * of magnitude more data than we are sending. This can cause the
3301 * PCIe link to saturate well before the network, which can cause
3302 * output drops, and a general loss of capacity.
3305 ktls_disable_ifnet(void *arg)
3310 struct ktls_session *tls;
3313 inp = tptoinpcb(tp);
3314 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
3315 so = inp->inp_socket;
3317 tls = so->so_snd.sb_tls_info;
3318 if (tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit_dis == 1) {
3324 * note that t_nic_ktls_xmit_dis is never cleared; disabling
3325 * ifnet can only be done once per connection, so we never want
3329 (void)ktls_hold(tls);
3331 tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit_dis = 1;
3333 TASK_INIT(&tls->disable_ifnet_task, 0, ktls_disable_ifnet_help, tls);
3334 (void)taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &tls->disable_ifnet_task);