2 * Copyright (c) 2001-2008, by Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2008-2012, by Randall Stewart. All rights reserved.
4 * Copyright (c) 2008-2012, by Michael Tuexen. All rights reserved.
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
9 * a) Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
10 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12 * b) Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
14 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
16 * c) Neither the name of Cisco Systems, Inc. nor the names of its
17 * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
18 * from this software without specific prior written permission.
20 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
21 * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
22 * THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
23 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
24 * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
25 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
26 * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
27 * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
28 * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
29 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF
30 * THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
33 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
34 __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
36 #include <netinet/sctp_os.h>
37 #include <netinet/sctp.h>
38 #include <netinet/sctp_header.h>
39 #include <netinet/sctp_pcb.h>
40 #include <netinet/sctp_var.h>
41 #include <netinet/sctp_sysctl.h>
42 #include <netinet/sctputil.h>
43 #include <netinet/sctp_indata.h>
44 #include <netinet/sctp_output.h>
45 #include <netinet/sctp_auth.h>
48 #define SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG (SCTP_BASE_SYSCTL(sctp_debug_on) & SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1)
49 #define SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG2 (SCTP_BASE_SYSCTL(sctp_debug_on) & SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2)
50 #endif /* SCTP_DEBUG */
54 sctp_clear_chunklist(sctp_auth_chklist_t * chklist)
56 bzero(chklist, sizeof(*chklist));
57 /* chklist->num_chunks = 0; */
61 sctp_alloc_chunklist(void)
63 sctp_auth_chklist_t *chklist;
65 SCTP_MALLOC(chklist, sctp_auth_chklist_t *, sizeof(*chklist),
67 if (chklist == NULL) {
68 SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, "sctp_alloc_chunklist: failed to get memory!\n");
70 sctp_clear_chunklist(chklist);
76 sctp_free_chunklist(sctp_auth_chklist_t * list)
79 SCTP_FREE(list, SCTP_M_AUTH_CL);
83 sctp_copy_chunklist(sctp_auth_chklist_t * list)
85 sctp_auth_chklist_t *new_list;
91 new_list = sctp_alloc_chunklist();
95 bcopy(list, new_list, sizeof(*new_list));
102 * add a chunk to the required chunks list
105 sctp_auth_add_chunk(uint8_t chunk, sctp_auth_chklist_t * list)
110 /* is chunk restricted? */
111 if ((chunk == SCTP_INITIATION) ||
112 (chunk == SCTP_INITIATION_ACK) ||
113 (chunk == SCTP_SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE) ||
114 (chunk == SCTP_AUTHENTICATION)) {
117 if (list->chunks[chunk] == 0) {
118 list->chunks[chunk] = 1;
120 SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
121 "SCTP: added chunk %u (0x%02x) to Auth list\n",
128 * delete a chunk from the required chunks list
131 sctp_auth_delete_chunk(uint8_t chunk, sctp_auth_chklist_t * list)
136 if (list->chunks[chunk] == 1) {
137 list->chunks[chunk] = 0;
139 SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
140 "SCTP: deleted chunk %u (0x%02x) from Auth list\n",
147 sctp_auth_get_chklist_size(const sctp_auth_chklist_t * list)
152 return (list->num_chunks);
156 * return the current number and list of required chunks caller must
157 * guarantee ptr has space for up to 256 bytes
160 sctp_serialize_auth_chunks(const sctp_auth_chklist_t * list, uint8_t * ptr)
167 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
168 if (list->chunks[i] != 0) {
177 sctp_pack_auth_chunks(const sctp_auth_chklist_t * list, uint8_t * ptr)
184 if (list->num_chunks <= 32) {
185 /* just list them, one byte each */
186 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
187 if (list->chunks[i] != 0) {
195 /* pack into a 32 byte bitfield */
196 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
197 if (list->chunks[i] != 0) {
200 ptr[index] |= (1 << offset);
209 sctp_unpack_auth_chunks(const uint8_t * ptr, uint8_t num_chunks,
210 sctp_auth_chklist_t * list)
218 if (num_chunks <= 32) {
219 /* just pull them, one byte each */
220 for (i = 0; i < num_chunks; i++) {
221 (void)sctp_auth_add_chunk(*ptr++, list);
227 /* unpack from a 32 byte bitfield */
228 for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
229 for (offset = 0; offset < 8; offset++) {
230 if (ptr[index] & (1 << offset)) {
231 (void)sctp_auth_add_chunk((index * 8) + offset, list);
242 * allocate structure space for a key of length keylen
245 sctp_alloc_key(uint32_t keylen)
249 SCTP_MALLOC(new_key, sctp_key_t *, sizeof(*new_key) + keylen,
251 if (new_key == NULL) {
255 new_key->keylen = keylen;
260 sctp_free_key(sctp_key_t * key)
263 SCTP_FREE(key, SCTP_M_AUTH_KY);
267 sctp_print_key(sctp_key_t * key, const char *str)
272 SCTP_PRINTF("%s: [Null key]\n", str);
275 SCTP_PRINTF("%s: len %u, ", str, key->keylen);
277 for (i = 0; i < key->keylen; i++)
278 SCTP_PRINTF("%02x", key->key[i]);
281 SCTP_PRINTF("[Null key]\n");
286 sctp_show_key(sctp_key_t * key, const char *str)
291 SCTP_PRINTF("%s: [Null key]\n", str);
294 SCTP_PRINTF("%s: len %u, ", str, key->keylen);
296 for (i = 0; i < key->keylen; i++)
297 SCTP_PRINTF("%02x", key->key[i]);
300 SCTP_PRINTF("[Null key]\n");
305 sctp_get_keylen(sctp_key_t * key)
308 return (key->keylen);
314 * generate a new random key of length 'keylen'
317 sctp_generate_random_key(uint32_t keylen)
321 new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
322 if (new_key == NULL) {
326 SCTP_READ_RANDOM(new_key->key, keylen);
327 new_key->keylen = keylen;
332 sctp_set_key(uint8_t * key, uint32_t keylen)
336 new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
337 if (new_key == NULL) {
341 bcopy(key, new_key->key, keylen);
346 * given two keys of variable size, compute which key is "larger/smaller"
347 * returns: 1 if key1 > key2
352 sctp_compare_key(sctp_key_t * key1, sctp_key_t * key2)
356 uint32_t key1len, key2len;
357 uint8_t *key_1, *key_2;
360 /* sanity/length check */
361 key1len = sctp_get_keylen(key1);
362 key2len = sctp_get_keylen(key2);
363 if ((key1len == 0) && (key2len == 0))
365 else if (key1len == 0)
367 else if (key2len == 0)
370 if (key1len < key2len) {
377 /* check for numeric equality */
378 for (i = 0; i < maxlen; i++) {
379 /* left-pad with zeros */
380 val1 = (i < (maxlen - key1len)) ? 0 : *(key_1++);
381 val2 = (i < (maxlen - key2len)) ? 0 : *(key_2++);
384 } else if (val1 < val2) {
388 /* keys are equal value, so check lengths */
389 if (key1len == key2len)
391 else if (key1len < key2len)
398 * generate the concatenated keying material based on the two keys and the
399 * shared key (if available). draft-ietf-tsvwg-auth specifies the specific
400 * order for concatenation
403 sctp_compute_hashkey(sctp_key_t * key1, sctp_key_t * key2, sctp_key_t * shared)
409 keylen = sctp_get_keylen(key1) + sctp_get_keylen(key2) +
410 sctp_get_keylen(shared);
413 /* get space for the new key */
414 new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
415 if (new_key == NULL) {
419 new_key->keylen = keylen;
420 key_ptr = new_key->key;
422 /* all keys empty/null?! */
426 /* concatenate the keys */
427 if (sctp_compare_key(key1, key2) <= 0) {
428 /* key is shared + key1 + key2 */
429 if (sctp_get_keylen(shared)) {
430 bcopy(shared->key, key_ptr, shared->keylen);
431 key_ptr += shared->keylen;
433 if (sctp_get_keylen(key1)) {
434 bcopy(key1->key, key_ptr, key1->keylen);
435 key_ptr += key1->keylen;
437 if (sctp_get_keylen(key2)) {
438 bcopy(key2->key, key_ptr, key2->keylen);
441 /* key is shared + key2 + key1 */
442 if (sctp_get_keylen(shared)) {
443 bcopy(shared->key, key_ptr, shared->keylen);
444 key_ptr += shared->keylen;
446 if (sctp_get_keylen(key2)) {
447 bcopy(key2->key, key_ptr, key2->keylen);
448 key_ptr += key2->keylen;
450 if (sctp_get_keylen(key1)) {
451 bcopy(key1->key, key_ptr, key1->keylen);
459 sctp_alloc_sharedkey(void)
461 sctp_sharedkey_t *new_key;
463 SCTP_MALLOC(new_key, sctp_sharedkey_t *, sizeof(*new_key),
465 if (new_key == NULL) {
471 new_key->refcount = 1;
472 new_key->deactivated = 0;
477 sctp_free_sharedkey(sctp_sharedkey_t * skey)
482 if (SCTP_DECREMENT_AND_CHECK_REFCOUNT(&skey->refcount)) {
483 if (skey->key != NULL)
484 sctp_free_key(skey->key);
485 SCTP_FREE(skey, SCTP_M_AUTH_KY);
490 sctp_find_sharedkey(struct sctp_keyhead *shared_keys, uint16_t key_id)
492 sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
494 LIST_FOREACH(skey, shared_keys, next) {
495 if (skey->keyid == key_id)
502 sctp_insert_sharedkey(struct sctp_keyhead *shared_keys,
503 sctp_sharedkey_t * new_skey)
505 sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
507 if ((shared_keys == NULL) || (new_skey == NULL))
510 /* insert into an empty list? */
511 if (LIST_EMPTY(shared_keys)) {
512 LIST_INSERT_HEAD(shared_keys, new_skey, next);
515 /* insert into the existing list, ordered by key id */
516 LIST_FOREACH(skey, shared_keys, next) {
517 if (new_skey->keyid < skey->keyid) {
518 /* insert it before here */
519 LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(skey, new_skey, next);
521 } else if (new_skey->keyid == skey->keyid) {
522 /* replace the existing key */
523 /* verify this key *can* be replaced */
524 if ((skey->deactivated) && (skey->refcount > 1)) {
525 SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
526 "can't replace shared key id %u\n",
530 SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
531 "replacing shared key id %u\n",
533 LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(skey, new_skey, next);
534 LIST_REMOVE(skey, next);
535 sctp_free_sharedkey(skey);
538 if (LIST_NEXT(skey, next) == NULL) {
539 /* belongs at the end of the list */
540 LIST_INSERT_AFTER(skey, new_skey, next);
544 /* shouldn't reach here */
549 sctp_auth_key_acquire(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t key_id)
551 sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
553 /* find the shared key */
554 skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, key_id);
556 /* bump the ref count */
558 atomic_add_int(&skey->refcount, 1);
559 SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2,
560 "%s: stcb %p key %u refcount acquire to %d\n",
561 __FUNCTION__, (void *)stcb, key_id, skey->refcount);
566 sctp_auth_key_release(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t key_id, int so_locked
567 #if !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(SCTP_SO_LOCK_TESTING)
572 sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
574 /* find the shared key */
575 skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, key_id);
577 /* decrement the ref count */
579 sctp_free_sharedkey(skey);
580 SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2,
581 "%s: stcb %p key %u refcount release to %d\n",
582 __FUNCTION__, (void *)stcb, key_id, skey->refcount);
584 /* see if a notification should be generated */
585 if ((skey->refcount <= 1) && (skey->deactivated)) {
586 /* notify ULP that key is no longer used */
587 sctp_ulp_notify(SCTP_NOTIFY_AUTH_FREE_KEY, stcb,
588 key_id, 0, so_locked);
589 SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2,
590 "%s: stcb %p key %u no longer used, %d\n",
591 __FUNCTION__, (void *)stcb, key_id, skey->refcount);
596 static sctp_sharedkey_t *
597 sctp_copy_sharedkey(const sctp_sharedkey_t * skey)
599 sctp_sharedkey_t *new_skey;
603 new_skey = sctp_alloc_sharedkey();
604 if (new_skey == NULL)
606 if (skey->key != NULL)
607 new_skey->key = sctp_set_key(skey->key->key, skey->key->keylen);
609 new_skey->key = NULL;
610 new_skey->keyid = skey->keyid;
615 sctp_copy_skeylist(const struct sctp_keyhead *src, struct sctp_keyhead *dest)
617 sctp_sharedkey_t *skey, *new_skey;
620 if ((src == NULL) || (dest == NULL))
622 LIST_FOREACH(skey, src, next) {
623 new_skey = sctp_copy_sharedkey(skey);
624 if (new_skey != NULL) {
625 (void)sctp_insert_sharedkey(dest, new_skey);
634 sctp_alloc_hmaclist(uint16_t num_hmacs)
636 sctp_hmaclist_t *new_list;
639 alloc_size = sizeof(*new_list) + num_hmacs * sizeof(new_list->hmac[0]);
640 SCTP_MALLOC(new_list, sctp_hmaclist_t *, alloc_size,
642 if (new_list == NULL) {
646 new_list->max_algo = num_hmacs;
647 new_list->num_algo = 0;
652 sctp_free_hmaclist(sctp_hmaclist_t * list)
655 SCTP_FREE(list, SCTP_M_AUTH_HL);
661 sctp_auth_add_hmacid(sctp_hmaclist_t * list, uint16_t hmac_id)
667 if (list->num_algo == list->max_algo) {
668 SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
669 "SCTP: HMAC id list full, ignoring add %u\n", hmac_id);
672 if ((hmac_id != SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) &&
673 (hmac_id != SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256)) {
676 /* Now is it already in the list */
677 for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++) {
678 if (list->hmac[i] == hmac_id) {
679 /* already in list */
683 SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, "SCTP: add HMAC id %u to list\n", hmac_id);
684 list->hmac[list->num_algo++] = hmac_id;
689 sctp_copy_hmaclist(sctp_hmaclist_t * list)
691 sctp_hmaclist_t *new_list;
697 new_list = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(list->max_algo);
698 if (new_list == NULL)
701 new_list->max_algo = list->max_algo;
702 new_list->num_algo = list->num_algo;
703 for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++)
704 new_list->hmac[i] = list->hmac[i];
709 sctp_default_supported_hmaclist(void)
711 sctp_hmaclist_t *new_list;
713 new_list = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(2);
714 if (new_list == NULL)
716 /* We prefer SHA256, so list it first */
717 (void)sctp_auth_add_hmacid(new_list, SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256);
718 (void)sctp_auth_add_hmacid(new_list, SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1);
723 * HMAC algos are listed in priority/preference order
724 * find the best HMAC id to use for the peer based on local support
727 sctp_negotiate_hmacid(sctp_hmaclist_t * peer, sctp_hmaclist_t * local)
731 if ((local == NULL) || (peer == NULL))
732 return (SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD);
734 for (i = 0; i < peer->num_algo; i++) {
735 for (j = 0; j < local->num_algo; j++) {
736 if (peer->hmac[i] == local->hmac[j]) {
737 /* found the "best" one */
738 SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
739 "SCTP: negotiated peer HMAC id %u\n",
741 return (peer->hmac[i]);
745 /* didn't find one! */
746 return (SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD);
750 * serialize the HMAC algo list and return space used
751 * caller must guarantee ptr has appropriate space
754 sctp_serialize_hmaclist(sctp_hmaclist_t * list, uint8_t * ptr)
762 for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++) {
763 hmac_id = htons(list->hmac[i]);
764 bcopy(&hmac_id, ptr, sizeof(hmac_id));
765 ptr += sizeof(hmac_id);
767 return (list->num_algo * sizeof(hmac_id));
771 sctp_verify_hmac_param(struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *hmacs, uint32_t num_hmacs)
775 for (i = 0; i < num_hmacs; i++) {
776 if (ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]) == SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) {
784 sctp_alloc_authinfo(void)
786 sctp_authinfo_t *new_authinfo;
788 SCTP_MALLOC(new_authinfo, sctp_authinfo_t *, sizeof(*new_authinfo),
791 if (new_authinfo == NULL) {
795 bzero(new_authinfo, sizeof(*new_authinfo));
796 return (new_authinfo);
800 sctp_free_authinfo(sctp_authinfo_t * authinfo)
802 if (authinfo == NULL)
805 if (authinfo->random != NULL)
806 sctp_free_key(authinfo->random);
807 if (authinfo->peer_random != NULL)
808 sctp_free_key(authinfo->peer_random);
809 if (authinfo->assoc_key != NULL)
810 sctp_free_key(authinfo->assoc_key);
811 if (authinfo->recv_key != NULL)
812 sctp_free_key(authinfo->recv_key);
814 /* We are NOT dynamically allocating authinfo's right now... */
815 /* SCTP_FREE(authinfo, SCTP_M_AUTH_??); */
820 sctp_get_auth_chunk_len(uint16_t hmac_algo)
824 size = sizeof(struct sctp_auth_chunk) + sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
825 return (SCTP_SIZE32(size));
829 sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(uint16_t hmac_algo)
832 case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
833 return (SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA1);
834 case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
835 return (SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA256);
837 /* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
843 sctp_get_hmac_block_len(uint16_t hmac_algo)
846 case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
848 case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
850 case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD:
852 /* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
858 sctp_hmac_init(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_hash_context_t * ctx)
861 case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
862 SCTP_SHA1_INIT(&ctx->sha1);
864 case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
865 SCTP_SHA256_INIT(&ctx->sha256);
867 case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD:
869 /* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
875 sctp_hmac_update(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_hash_context_t * ctx,
876 uint8_t * text, uint32_t textlen)
879 case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
880 SCTP_SHA1_UPDATE(&ctx->sha1, text, textlen);
882 case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
883 SCTP_SHA256_UPDATE(&ctx->sha256, text, textlen);
885 case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD:
887 /* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
893 sctp_hmac_final(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_hash_context_t * ctx,
897 case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
898 SCTP_SHA1_FINAL(digest, &ctx->sha1);
900 case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
901 SCTP_SHA256_FINAL(digest, &ctx->sha256);
903 case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD:
905 /* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
911 * Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication: FIPS 198 (RFC 2104)
913 * Compute the HMAC digest using the desired hash key, text, and HMAC
914 * algorithm. Resulting digest is placed in 'digest' and digest length
915 * is returned, if the HMAC was performed.
917 * WARNING: it is up to the caller to supply sufficient space to hold the
921 sctp_hmac(uint16_t hmac_algo, uint8_t * key, uint32_t keylen,
922 uint8_t * text, uint32_t textlen, uint8_t * digest)
926 sctp_hash_context_t ctx;
927 uint8_t ipad[128], opad[128]; /* keyed hash inner/outer pads */
928 uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
931 /* sanity check the material and length */
932 if ((key == NULL) || (keylen == 0) || (text == NULL) ||
933 (textlen == 0) || (digest == NULL)) {
934 /* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */
937 /* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */
938 digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
942 /* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */
943 blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo);
944 if (keylen > blocklen) {
945 sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
946 sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key, keylen);
947 sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
948 /* set the hashed key as the key */
952 /* initialize the inner/outer pads with the key and "append" zeroes */
953 bzero(ipad, blocklen);
954 bzero(opad, blocklen);
955 bcopy(key, ipad, keylen);
956 bcopy(key, opad, keylen);
958 /* XOR the key with ipad and opad values */
959 for (i = 0; i < blocklen; i++) {
964 /* perform inner hash */
965 sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
966 sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, ipad, blocklen);
967 sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, text, textlen);
968 sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
970 /* perform outer hash */
971 sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
972 sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, opad, blocklen);
973 sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp, digestlen);
974 sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, digest);
981 sctp_hmac_m(uint16_t hmac_algo, uint8_t * key, uint32_t keylen,
982 struct mbuf *m, uint32_t m_offset, uint8_t * digest, uint32_t trailer)
986 sctp_hash_context_t ctx;
987 uint8_t ipad[128], opad[128]; /* keyed hash inner/outer pads */
988 uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
992 /* sanity check the material and length */
993 if ((key == NULL) || (keylen == 0) || (m == NULL) || (digest == NULL)) {
994 /* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */
997 /* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */
998 digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
1002 /* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */
1003 blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo);
1004 if (keylen > blocklen) {
1005 sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
1006 sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key, keylen);
1007 sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
1008 /* set the hashed key as the key */
1012 /* initialize the inner/outer pads with the key and "append" zeroes */
1013 bzero(ipad, blocklen);
1014 bzero(opad, blocklen);
1015 bcopy(key, ipad, keylen);
1016 bcopy(key, opad, keylen);
1018 /* XOR the key with ipad and opad values */
1019 for (i = 0; i < blocklen; i++) {
1024 /* perform inner hash */
1025 sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
1026 sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, ipad, blocklen);
1027 /* find the correct starting mbuf and offset (get start of text) */
1029 while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (m_offset >= (uint32_t) SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp))) {
1030 m_offset -= SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp);
1031 m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
1033 /* now use the rest of the mbuf chain for the text */
1034 while (m_tmp != NULL) {
1035 if ((SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp) == NULL) && trailer) {
1036 sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, mtod(m_tmp, uint8_t *) + m_offset,
1037 SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp) - (trailer + m_offset));
1039 sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, mtod(m_tmp, uint8_t *) + m_offset,
1040 SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp) - m_offset);
1043 /* clear the offset since it's only for the first mbuf */
1045 m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
1047 sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
1049 /* perform outer hash */
1050 sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
1051 sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, opad, blocklen);
1052 sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp, digestlen);
1053 sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, digest);
1059 * verify the HMAC digest using the desired hash key, text, and HMAC
1061 * Returns -1 on error, 0 on success.
1064 sctp_verify_hmac(uint16_t hmac_algo, uint8_t * key, uint32_t keylen,
1065 uint8_t * text, uint32_t textlen,
1066 uint8_t * digest, uint32_t digestlen)
1069 uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
1071 /* sanity check the material and length */
1072 if ((key == NULL) || (keylen == 0) ||
1073 (text == NULL) || (textlen == 0) || (digest == NULL)) {
1074 /* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest */
1077 len = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
1078 if ((len == 0) || (digestlen != len))
1081 /* compute the expected hash */
1082 if (sctp_hmac(hmac_algo, key, keylen, text, textlen, temp) != len)
1085 if (memcmp(digest, temp, digestlen) != 0)
1093 * computes the requested HMAC using a key struct (which may be modified if
1094 * the keylen exceeds the HMAC block len).
1097 sctp_compute_hmac(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_key_t * key, uint8_t * text,
1098 uint32_t textlen, uint8_t * digest)
1102 sctp_hash_context_t ctx;
1103 uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
1106 if ((key == NULL) || (text == NULL) || (textlen == 0) ||
1108 /* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */
1111 /* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */
1112 digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
1116 /* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */
1117 blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo);
1118 if (key->keylen > blocklen) {
1119 sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
1120 sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key->key, key->keylen);
1121 sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
1122 /* save the hashed key as the new key */
1123 key->keylen = digestlen;
1124 bcopy(temp, key->key, key->keylen);
1126 return (sctp_hmac(hmac_algo, key->key, key->keylen, text, textlen,
1132 sctp_compute_hmac_m(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_key_t * key, struct mbuf *m,
1133 uint32_t m_offset, uint8_t * digest)
1137 sctp_hash_context_t ctx;
1138 uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
1141 if ((key == NULL) || (m == NULL) || (digest == NULL)) {
1142 /* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */
1145 /* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */
1146 digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
1150 /* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */
1151 blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo);
1152 if (key->keylen > blocklen) {
1153 sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
1154 sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key->key, key->keylen);
1155 sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
1156 /* save the hashed key as the new key */
1157 key->keylen = digestlen;
1158 bcopy(temp, key->key, key->keylen);
1160 return (sctp_hmac_m(hmac_algo, key->key, key->keylen, m, m_offset, digest, 0));
1164 sctp_auth_is_supported_hmac(sctp_hmaclist_t * list, uint16_t id)
1168 if ((list == NULL) || (id == SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD))
1171 for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++)
1172 if (list->hmac[i] == id)
1175 /* not in the list */
1181 * clear any cached key(s) if they match the given key id on an association.
1182 * the cached key(s) will be recomputed and re-cached at next use.
1183 * ASSUMES TCB_LOCK is already held
1186 sctp_clear_cachedkeys(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
1191 if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid) {
1192 sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key);
1193 stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key = NULL;
1195 if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid) {
1196 sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key);
1197 stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key = NULL;
1202 * clear any cached key(s) if they match the given key id for all assocs on
1204 * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
1207 sctp_clear_cachedkeys_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid)
1209 struct sctp_tcb *stcb;
1214 /* clear the cached keys on all assocs on this instance */
1215 LIST_FOREACH(stcb, &inp->sctp_asoc_list, sctp_tcblist) {
1216 SCTP_TCB_LOCK(stcb);
1217 sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, keyid);
1218 SCTP_TCB_UNLOCK(stcb);
1223 * delete a shared key from an association
1224 * ASSUMES TCB_LOCK is already held
1227 sctp_delete_sharedkey(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
1229 sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
1234 /* is the keyid the assoc active sending key */
1235 if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid)
1238 /* does the key exist? */
1239 skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid);
1243 /* are there other refcount holders on the key? */
1244 if (skey->refcount > 1)
1248 LIST_REMOVE(skey, next);
1249 sctp_free_sharedkey(skey); /* frees skey->key as well */
1251 /* clear any cached keys */
1252 sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, keyid);
1257 * deletes a shared key from the endpoint
1258 * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
1261 sctp_delete_sharedkey_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid)
1263 sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
1268 /* is the keyid the active sending key on the endpoint */
1269 if (keyid == inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid)
1272 /* does the key exist? */
1273 skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys, keyid);
1277 /* endpoint keys are not refcounted */
1280 LIST_REMOVE(skey, next);
1281 sctp_free_sharedkey(skey); /* frees skey->key as well */
1283 /* clear any cached keys */
1284 sctp_clear_cachedkeys_ep(inp, keyid);
1289 * set the active key on an association
1290 * ASSUMES TCB_LOCK is already held
1293 sctp_auth_setactivekey(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
1295 sctp_sharedkey_t *skey = NULL;
1297 /* find the key on the assoc */
1298 skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid);
1300 /* that key doesn't exist */
1303 if ((skey->deactivated) && (skey->refcount > 1)) {
1304 /* can't reactivate a deactivated key with other refcounts */
1307 /* set the (new) active key */
1308 stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid = keyid;
1309 /* reset the deactivated flag */
1310 skey->deactivated = 0;
1316 * set the active key on an endpoint
1317 * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
1320 sctp_auth_setactivekey_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid)
1322 sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
1325 skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys, keyid);
1327 /* that key doesn't exist */
1330 inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid = keyid;
1335 * deactivates a shared key from the association
1336 * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
1339 sctp_deact_sharedkey(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
1341 sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
1346 /* is the keyid the assoc active sending key */
1347 if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid)
1350 /* does the key exist? */
1351 skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid);
1355 /* are there other refcount holders on the key? */
1356 if (skey->refcount == 1) {
1357 /* no other users, send a notification for this key */
1358 sctp_ulp_notify(SCTP_NOTIFY_AUTH_FREE_KEY, stcb, keyid, 0,
1361 /* mark the key as deactivated */
1362 skey->deactivated = 1;
1368 * deactivates a shared key from the endpoint
1369 * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
1372 sctp_deact_sharedkey_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid)
1374 sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
1379 /* is the keyid the active sending key on the endpoint */
1380 if (keyid == inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid)
1383 /* does the key exist? */
1384 skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys, keyid);
1388 /* endpoint keys are not refcounted */
1391 LIST_REMOVE(skey, next);
1392 sctp_free_sharedkey(skey); /* frees skey->key as well */
1398 * get local authentication parameters from cookie (from INIT-ACK)
1401 sctp_auth_get_cookie_params(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, struct mbuf *m,
1402 uint32_t offset, uint32_t length)
1404 struct sctp_paramhdr *phdr, tmp_param;
1405 uint16_t plen, ptype;
1406 uint8_t random_store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
1407 struct sctp_auth_random *p_random = NULL;
1408 uint16_t random_len = 0;
1409 uint8_t hmacs_store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
1410 struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *hmacs = NULL;
1411 uint16_t hmacs_len = 0;
1412 uint8_t chunks_store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
1413 struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *chunks = NULL;
1414 uint16_t num_chunks = 0;
1415 sctp_key_t *new_key;
1418 /* convert to upper bound */
1421 phdr = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)sctp_m_getptr(m, offset,
1422 sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr), (uint8_t *) & tmp_param);
1423 while (phdr != NULL) {
1424 ptype = ntohs(phdr->param_type);
1425 plen = ntohs(phdr->param_length);
1427 if ((plen == 0) || (offset + plen > length))
1430 if (ptype == SCTP_RANDOM) {
1431 if (plen > sizeof(random_store))
1433 phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
1434 (struct sctp_paramhdr *)random_store, min(plen, sizeof(random_store)));
1437 /* save the random and length for the key */
1438 p_random = (struct sctp_auth_random *)phdr;
1439 random_len = plen - sizeof(*p_random);
1440 } else if (ptype == SCTP_HMAC_LIST) {
1444 if (plen > sizeof(hmacs_store))
1446 phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
1447 (struct sctp_paramhdr *)hmacs_store, min(plen, sizeof(hmacs_store)));
1450 /* save the hmacs list and num for the key */
1451 hmacs = (struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *)phdr;
1452 hmacs_len = plen - sizeof(*hmacs);
1453 num_hmacs = hmacs_len / sizeof(hmacs->hmac_ids[0]);
1454 if (stcb->asoc.local_hmacs != NULL)
1455 sctp_free_hmaclist(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs);
1456 stcb->asoc.local_hmacs = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(num_hmacs);
1457 if (stcb->asoc.local_hmacs != NULL) {
1458 for (i = 0; i < num_hmacs; i++) {
1459 (void)sctp_auth_add_hmacid(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs,
1460 ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]));
1463 } else if (ptype == SCTP_CHUNK_LIST) {
1466 if (plen > sizeof(chunks_store))
1468 phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
1469 (struct sctp_paramhdr *)chunks_store, min(plen, sizeof(chunks_store)));
1472 chunks = (struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *)phdr;
1473 num_chunks = plen - sizeof(*chunks);
1474 /* save chunks list and num for the key */
1475 if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks != NULL)
1476 sctp_clear_chunklist(stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks);
1478 stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks = sctp_alloc_chunklist();
1479 for (i = 0; i < num_chunks; i++) {
1480 (void)sctp_auth_add_chunk(chunks->chunk_types[i],
1481 stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks);
1484 /* get next parameter */
1485 offset += SCTP_SIZE32(plen);
1486 if (offset + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) > length)
1488 phdr = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)sctp_m_getptr(m, offset, sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr),
1489 (uint8_t *) & tmp_param);
1491 /* concatenate the full random key */
1492 keylen = sizeof(*p_random) + random_len + sizeof(*hmacs) + hmacs_len;
1493 if (chunks != NULL) {
1494 keylen += sizeof(*chunks) + num_chunks;
1496 new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
1497 if (new_key != NULL) {
1498 /* copy in the RANDOM */
1499 if (p_random != NULL) {
1500 keylen = sizeof(*p_random) + random_len;
1501 bcopy(p_random, new_key->key, keylen);
1503 /* append in the AUTH chunks */
1504 if (chunks != NULL) {
1505 bcopy(chunks, new_key->key + keylen,
1506 sizeof(*chunks) + num_chunks);
1507 keylen += sizeof(*chunks) + num_chunks;
1509 /* append in the HMACs */
1510 if (hmacs != NULL) {
1511 bcopy(hmacs, new_key->key + keylen,
1512 sizeof(*hmacs) + hmacs_len);
1515 if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.random != NULL)
1516 sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random);
1517 stcb->asoc.authinfo.random = new_key;
1518 stcb->asoc.authinfo.random_len = random_len;
1519 sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid);
1520 sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid);
1522 /* negotiate what HMAC to use for the peer */
1523 stcb->asoc.peer_hmac_id = sctp_negotiate_hmacid(stcb->asoc.peer_hmacs,
1524 stcb->asoc.local_hmacs);
1526 /* copy defaults from the endpoint */
1527 /* FIX ME: put in cookie? */
1528 stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid = stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_ep.default_keyid;
1529 /* copy out the shared key list (by reference) from the endpoint */
1530 (void)sctp_copy_skeylist(&stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_ep.shared_keys,
1531 &stcb->asoc.shared_keys);
1535 * compute and fill in the HMAC digest for a packet
1538 sctp_fill_hmac_digest_m(struct mbuf *m, uint32_t auth_offset,
1539 struct sctp_auth_chunk *auth, struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
1542 sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
1545 if ((stcb == NULL) || (auth == NULL))
1548 /* zero the digest + chunk padding */
1549 digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(stcb->asoc.peer_hmac_id);
1550 bzero(auth->hmac, SCTP_SIZE32(digestlen));
1552 /* is the desired key cached? */
1553 if ((keyid != stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid) ||
1554 (stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key == NULL)) {
1555 if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key != NULL) {
1556 /* free the old cached key */
1557 sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key);
1559 skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid);
1560 /* the only way skey is NULL is if null key id 0 is used */
1565 /* compute a new assoc key and cache it */
1566 stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key =
1567 sctp_compute_hashkey(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random,
1568 stcb->asoc.authinfo.peer_random, key);
1569 stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid = keyid;
1570 SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, "caching key id %u\n",
1571 stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid);
1573 if (SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG)
1574 sctp_print_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key,
1578 /* set in the active key id */
1579 auth->shared_key_id = htons(keyid);
1581 /* compute and fill in the digest */
1582 (void)sctp_compute_hmac_m(stcb->asoc.peer_hmac_id, stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key,
1583 m, auth_offset, auth->hmac);
1588 sctp_bzero_m(struct mbuf *m, uint32_t m_offset, uint32_t size)
1597 /* find the correct starting mbuf and offset (get start position) */
1599 while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (m_offset >= (uint32_t) SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp))) {
1600 m_offset -= SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp);
1601 m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
1603 /* now use the rest of the mbuf chain */
1604 while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (size > 0)) {
1605 data = mtod(m_tmp, uint8_t *) + m_offset;
1606 if (size > (uint32_t) SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp)) {
1607 bzero(data, SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp));
1608 size -= SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp);
1613 /* clear the offset since it's only for the first mbuf */
1615 m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
1620 * process the incoming Authentication chunk
1622 * -1 on any authentication error
1623 * 0 on authentication verification
1626 sctp_handle_auth(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, struct sctp_auth_chunk *auth,
1627 struct mbuf *m, uint32_t offset)
1630 uint16_t shared_key_id;
1632 sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
1634 uint8_t digest[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
1635 uint8_t computed_digest[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
1637 /* auth is checked for NULL by caller */
1638 chunklen = ntohs(auth->ch.chunk_length);
1639 if (chunklen < sizeof(*auth)) {
1640 SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauthfailed);
1643 SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauth);
1645 /* get the auth params */
1646 shared_key_id = ntohs(auth->shared_key_id);
1647 hmac_id = ntohs(auth->hmac_id);
1648 SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
1649 "SCTP AUTH Chunk: shared key %u, HMAC id %u\n",
1650 shared_key_id, hmac_id);
1652 /* is the indicated HMAC supported? */
1653 if (!sctp_auth_is_supported_hmac(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs, hmac_id)) {
1655 struct sctp_auth_invalid_hmac *err;
1657 SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvivalhmacid);
1658 SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
1659 "SCTP Auth: unsupported HMAC id %u\n",
1662 * report this in an Error Chunk: Unsupported HMAC
1665 m_err = sctp_get_mbuf_for_msg(sizeof(*err), 0, M_NOWAIT,
1667 if (m_err != NULL) {
1668 /* pre-reserve some space */
1669 SCTP_BUF_RESV_UF(m_err, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
1670 /* fill in the error */
1671 err = mtod(m_err, struct sctp_auth_invalid_hmac *);
1672 bzero(err, sizeof(*err));
1673 err->ph.param_type = htons(SCTP_CAUSE_UNSUPPORTED_HMACID);
1674 err->ph.param_length = htons(sizeof(*err));
1675 err->hmac_id = ntohs(hmac_id);
1676 SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_err) = sizeof(*err);
1678 sctp_queue_op_err(stcb, m_err);
1682 /* get the indicated shared key, if available */
1683 if ((stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key == NULL) ||
1684 (stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid != shared_key_id)) {
1685 /* find the shared key on the assoc first */
1686 skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys,
1688 /* if the shared key isn't found, discard the chunk */
1690 SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvivalkeyid);
1691 SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
1692 "SCTP Auth: unknown key id %u\n",
1696 /* generate a notification if this is a new key id */
1697 if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid != shared_key_id)
1699 * sctp_ulp_notify(SCTP_NOTIFY_AUTH_NEW_KEY, stcb,
1700 * shared_key_id, (void
1701 * *)stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid);
1703 sctp_notify_authentication(stcb, SCTP_AUTH_NEW_KEY,
1704 shared_key_id, stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid,
1705 SCTP_SO_NOT_LOCKED);
1706 /* compute a new recv assoc key and cache it */
1707 if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key != NULL)
1708 sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key);
1709 stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key =
1710 sctp_compute_hashkey(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random,
1711 stcb->asoc.authinfo.peer_random, skey->key);
1712 stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid = shared_key_id;
1714 if (SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG)
1715 sctp_print_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key, "Recv Key");
1718 /* validate the digest length */
1719 digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_id);
1720 if (chunklen < (sizeof(*auth) + digestlen)) {
1721 /* invalid digest length */
1722 SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauthfailed);
1723 SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
1724 "SCTP Auth: chunk too short for HMAC\n");
1727 /* save a copy of the digest, zero the pseudo header, and validate */
1728 bcopy(auth->hmac, digest, digestlen);
1729 sctp_bzero_m(m, offset + sizeof(*auth), SCTP_SIZE32(digestlen));
1730 (void)sctp_compute_hmac_m(hmac_id, stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key,
1731 m, offset, computed_digest);
1733 /* compare the computed digest with the one in the AUTH chunk */
1734 if (memcmp(digest, computed_digest, digestlen) != 0) {
1735 SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauthfailed);
1736 SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
1737 "SCTP Auth: HMAC digest check failed\n");
1744 * Generate NOTIFICATION
1747 sctp_notify_authentication(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint32_t indication,
1748 uint16_t keyid, uint16_t alt_keyid, int so_locked
1749 #if !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(SCTP_SO_LOCK_TESTING)
1754 struct mbuf *m_notify;
1755 struct sctp_authkey_event *auth;
1756 struct sctp_queued_to_read *control;
1758 if ((stcb == NULL) ||
1759 (stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_flags & SCTP_PCB_FLAGS_SOCKET_GONE) ||
1760 (stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_flags & SCTP_PCB_FLAGS_SOCKET_ALLGONE) ||
1761 (stcb->asoc.state & SCTP_STATE_CLOSED_SOCKET)
1763 /* If the socket is gone we are out of here */
1766 if (sctp_stcb_is_feature_off(stcb->sctp_ep, stcb, SCTP_PCB_FLAGS_AUTHEVNT))
1767 /* event not enabled */
1770 m_notify = sctp_get_mbuf_for_msg(sizeof(struct sctp_authkey_event),
1771 0, M_NOWAIT, 1, MT_HEADER);
1772 if (m_notify == NULL)
1776 SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_notify) = 0;
1777 auth = mtod(m_notify, struct sctp_authkey_event *);
1778 memset(auth, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_authkey_event));
1779 auth->auth_type = SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT;
1780 auth->auth_flags = 0;
1781 auth->auth_length = sizeof(*auth);
1782 auth->auth_keynumber = keyid;
1783 auth->auth_altkeynumber = alt_keyid;
1784 auth->auth_indication = indication;
1785 auth->auth_assoc_id = sctp_get_associd(stcb);
1787 SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_notify) = sizeof(*auth);
1788 SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_notify) = NULL;
1790 /* append to socket */
1791 control = sctp_build_readq_entry(stcb, stcb->asoc.primary_destination,
1792 0, 0, stcb->asoc.context, 0, 0, 0, m_notify);
1793 if (control == NULL) {
1795 sctp_m_freem(m_notify);
1798 control->spec_flags = M_NOTIFICATION;
1799 control->length = SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_notify);
1800 /* not that we need this */
1801 control->tail_mbuf = m_notify;
1802 sctp_add_to_readq(stcb->sctp_ep, stcb, control,
1803 &stcb->sctp_socket->so_rcv, 1, SCTP_READ_LOCK_NOT_HELD, so_locked);
1808 * validates the AUTHentication related parameters in an INIT/INIT-ACK
1809 * Note: currently only used for INIT as INIT-ACK is handled inline
1810 * with sctp_load_addresses_from_init()
1813 sctp_validate_init_auth_params(struct mbuf *m, int offset, int limit)
1815 struct sctp_paramhdr *phdr, parm_buf;
1816 uint16_t ptype, plen;
1817 int peer_supports_asconf = 0;
1818 int peer_supports_auth = 0;
1819 int got_random = 0, got_hmacs = 0, got_chklist = 0;
1820 uint8_t saw_asconf = 0;
1821 uint8_t saw_asconf_ack = 0;
1823 /* go through each of the params. */
1824 phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset, &parm_buf, sizeof(parm_buf));
1826 ptype = ntohs(phdr->param_type);
1827 plen = ntohs(phdr->param_length);
1829 if (offset + plen > limit) {
1832 if (plen < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) {
1835 if (ptype == SCTP_SUPPORTED_CHUNK_EXT) {
1836 /* A supported extension chunk */
1837 struct sctp_supported_chunk_types_param *pr_supported;
1838 uint8_t local_store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
1841 phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
1842 (struct sctp_paramhdr *)&local_store, min(plen, sizeof(local_store)));
1846 pr_supported = (struct sctp_supported_chunk_types_param *)phdr;
1847 num_ent = plen - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr);
1848 for (i = 0; i < num_ent; i++) {
1849 switch (pr_supported->chunk_types[i]) {
1851 case SCTP_ASCONF_ACK:
1852 peer_supports_asconf = 1;
1855 /* one we don't care about */
1859 } else if (ptype == SCTP_RANDOM) {
1861 /* enforce the random length */
1862 if (plen != (sizeof(struct sctp_auth_random) +
1863 SCTP_AUTH_RANDOM_SIZE_REQUIRED)) {
1864 SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
1865 "SCTP: invalid RANDOM len\n");
1868 } else if (ptype == SCTP_HMAC_LIST) {
1869 uint8_t store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
1870 struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *hmacs;
1873 if (plen > sizeof(store))
1875 phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
1876 (struct sctp_paramhdr *)store, min(plen, sizeof(store)));
1879 hmacs = (struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *)phdr;
1880 num_hmacs = (plen - sizeof(*hmacs)) /
1881 sizeof(hmacs->hmac_ids[0]);
1882 /* validate the hmac list */
1883 if (sctp_verify_hmac_param(hmacs, num_hmacs)) {
1884 SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
1885 "SCTP: invalid HMAC param\n");
1889 } else if (ptype == SCTP_CHUNK_LIST) {
1891 uint8_t chunks_store[SCTP_SMALL_CHUNK_STORE];
1893 /* did the peer send a non-empty chunk list? */
1894 struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *chunks = NULL;
1896 phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
1897 (struct sctp_paramhdr *)chunks_store,
1898 min(plen, sizeof(chunks_store)));
1903 * Flip through the list and mark that the
1904 * peer supports asconf/asconf_ack.
1906 chunks = (struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *)phdr;
1907 num_chunks = plen - sizeof(*chunks);
1908 for (i = 0; i < num_chunks; i++) {
1909 /* record asconf/asconf-ack if listed */
1910 if (chunks->chunk_types[i] == SCTP_ASCONF)
1912 if (chunks->chunk_types[i] == SCTP_ASCONF_ACK)
1919 offset += SCTP_SIZE32(plen);
1920 if (offset >= limit) {
1923 phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset, &parm_buf,
1926 /* validate authentication required parameters */
1927 if (got_random && got_hmacs) {
1928 peer_supports_auth = 1;
1930 peer_supports_auth = 0;
1932 if (!peer_supports_auth && got_chklist) {
1933 SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
1934 "SCTP: peer sent chunk list w/o AUTH\n");
1937 if (peer_supports_asconf && !peer_supports_auth) {
1938 SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
1939 "SCTP: peer supports ASCONF but not AUTH\n");
1941 } else if ((peer_supports_asconf) && (peer_supports_auth) &&
1942 ((saw_asconf == 0) || (saw_asconf_ack == 0))) {
1949 sctp_initialize_auth_params(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, struct sctp_tcb *stcb)
1951 uint16_t chunks_len = 0;
1952 uint16_t hmacs_len = 0;
1953 uint16_t random_len = SCTP_AUTH_RANDOM_SIZE_DEFAULT;
1954 sctp_key_t *new_key;
1957 /* initialize hmac list from endpoint */
1958 stcb->asoc.local_hmacs = sctp_copy_hmaclist(inp->sctp_ep.local_hmacs);
1959 if (stcb->asoc.local_hmacs != NULL) {
1960 hmacs_len = stcb->asoc.local_hmacs->num_algo *
1961 sizeof(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs->hmac[0]);
1963 /* initialize auth chunks list from endpoint */
1964 stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks =
1965 sctp_copy_chunklist(inp->sctp_ep.local_auth_chunks);
1966 if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks != NULL) {
1969 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
1970 if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks->chunks[i])
1974 /* copy defaults from the endpoint */
1975 stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid = inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid;
1977 /* copy out the shared key list (by reference) from the endpoint */
1978 (void)sctp_copy_skeylist(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys,
1979 &stcb->asoc.shared_keys);
1981 /* now set the concatenated key (random + chunks + hmacs) */
1982 /* key includes parameter headers */
1983 keylen = (3 * sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) + random_len + chunks_len +
1985 new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
1986 if (new_key != NULL) {
1987 struct sctp_paramhdr *ph;
1990 /* generate and copy in the RANDOM */
1991 ph = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)new_key->key;
1992 ph->param_type = htons(SCTP_RANDOM);
1993 plen = sizeof(*ph) + random_len;
1994 ph->param_length = htons(plen);
1995 SCTP_READ_RANDOM(new_key->key + sizeof(*ph), random_len);
1998 /* append in the AUTH chunks */
1999 /* NOTE: currently we always have chunks to list */
2000 ph = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)(new_key->key + keylen);
2001 ph->param_type = htons(SCTP_CHUNK_LIST);
2002 plen = sizeof(*ph) + chunks_len;
2003 ph->param_length = htons(plen);
2004 keylen += sizeof(*ph);
2005 if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks) {
2008 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
2009 if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks->chunks[i])
2010 new_key->key[keylen++] = i;
2013 /* append in the HMACs */
2014 ph = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)(new_key->key + keylen);
2015 ph->param_type = htons(SCTP_HMAC_LIST);
2016 plen = sizeof(*ph) + hmacs_len;
2017 ph->param_length = htons(plen);
2018 keylen += sizeof(*ph);
2019 (void)sctp_serialize_hmaclist(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs,
2020 new_key->key + keylen);
2022 if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.random != NULL)
2023 sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random);
2024 stcb->asoc.authinfo.random = new_key;
2025 stcb->asoc.authinfo.random_len = random_len;