2 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD
4 * Copyright (c) 2001 McAfee, Inc.
5 * Copyright (c) 2006,2013 Andre Oppermann, Internet Business Solutions AG
8 * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Jonathan Lemon
9 * and McAfee Research, the Security Research Division of McAfee, Inc. under
10 * DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
11 * DARPA CHATS research program. [2001 McAfee, Inc.]
13 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
14 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
16 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
18 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
19 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
20 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
22 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
23 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
24 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
25 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
26 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
27 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
28 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
29 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
30 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
31 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
35 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
36 __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
39 #include "opt_inet6.h"
40 #include "opt_ipsec.h"
41 #include "opt_pcbgroup.h"
43 #include <sys/param.h>
44 #include <sys/systm.h>
46 #include <sys/refcount.h>
47 #include <sys/kernel.h>
48 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
49 #include <sys/limits.h>
51 #include <sys/mutex.h>
52 #include <sys/malloc.h>
54 #include <sys/proc.h> /* for proc0 declaration */
55 #include <sys/random.h>
56 #include <sys/socket.h>
57 #include <sys/socketvar.h>
58 #include <sys/syslog.h>
59 #include <sys/ucred.h>
62 #include <crypto/siphash/siphash.h>
67 #include <net/if_var.h>
68 #include <net/route.h>
71 #include <netinet/in.h>
72 #include <netinet/in_kdtrace.h>
73 #include <netinet/in_systm.h>
74 #include <netinet/ip.h>
75 #include <netinet/in_var.h>
76 #include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
77 #include <netinet/ip_var.h>
78 #include <netinet/ip_options.h>
80 #include <netinet/ip6.h>
81 #include <netinet/icmp6.h>
82 #include <netinet6/nd6.h>
83 #include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
84 #include <netinet6/in6_pcb.h>
86 #include <netinet/tcp.h>
87 #include <netinet/tcp_fastopen.h>
88 #include <netinet/tcp_fsm.h>
89 #include <netinet/tcp_seq.h>
90 #include <netinet/tcp_timer.h>
91 #include <netinet/tcp_var.h>
92 #include <netinet/tcp_syncache.h>
94 #include <netinet6/tcp6_var.h>
97 #include <netinet/toecore.h>
100 #include <netipsec/ipsec_support.h>
102 #include <machine/in_cksum.h>
104 #include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
106 VNET_DEFINE_STATIC(int, tcp_syncookies) = 1;
107 #define V_tcp_syncookies VNET(tcp_syncookies)
108 SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_tcp, OID_AUTO, syncookies, CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW,
109 &VNET_NAME(tcp_syncookies), 0,
110 "Use TCP SYN cookies if the syncache overflows");
112 VNET_DEFINE_STATIC(int, tcp_syncookiesonly) = 0;
113 #define V_tcp_syncookiesonly VNET(tcp_syncookiesonly)
114 SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_tcp, OID_AUTO, syncookies_only, CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW,
115 &VNET_NAME(tcp_syncookiesonly), 0,
116 "Use only TCP SYN cookies");
118 VNET_DEFINE_STATIC(int, functions_inherit_listen_socket_stack) = 1;
119 #define V_functions_inherit_listen_socket_stack \
120 VNET(functions_inherit_listen_socket_stack)
121 SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_tcp, OID_AUTO, functions_inherit_listen_socket_stack,
122 CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW,
123 &VNET_NAME(functions_inherit_listen_socket_stack), 0,
124 "Inherit listen socket's stack");
127 #define ADDED_BY_TOE(sc) ((sc)->sc_tod != NULL)
130 static void syncache_drop(struct syncache *, struct syncache_head *);
131 static void syncache_free(struct syncache *);
132 static void syncache_insert(struct syncache *, struct syncache_head *);
133 static int syncache_respond(struct syncache *, struct syncache_head *, int,
134 const struct mbuf *);
135 static struct socket *syncache_socket(struct syncache *, struct socket *,
137 static void syncache_timeout(struct syncache *sc, struct syncache_head *sch,
139 static void syncache_timer(void *);
141 static uint32_t syncookie_mac(struct in_conninfo *, tcp_seq, uint8_t,
142 uint8_t *, uintptr_t);
143 static tcp_seq syncookie_generate(struct syncache_head *, struct syncache *);
144 static struct syncache
145 *syncookie_lookup(struct in_conninfo *, struct syncache_head *,
146 struct syncache *, struct tcphdr *, struct tcpopt *,
148 static void syncookie_reseed(void *);
150 static int syncookie_cmp(struct in_conninfo *inc, struct syncache_head *sch,
151 struct syncache *sc, struct tcphdr *th, struct tcpopt *to,
156 * Transmit the SYN,ACK fewer times than TCP_MAXRXTSHIFT specifies.
157 * 3 retransmits corresponds to a timeout of 3 * (1 + 2 + 4 + 8) == 45 seconds,
158 * the odds are that the user has given up attempting to connect by then.
160 #define SYNCACHE_MAXREXMTS 3
162 /* Arbitrary values */
163 #define TCP_SYNCACHE_HASHSIZE 512
164 #define TCP_SYNCACHE_BUCKETLIMIT 30
166 VNET_DEFINE_STATIC(struct tcp_syncache, tcp_syncache);
167 #define V_tcp_syncache VNET(tcp_syncache)
169 static SYSCTL_NODE(_net_inet_tcp, OID_AUTO, syncache, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
172 SYSCTL_UINT(_net_inet_tcp_syncache, OID_AUTO, bucketlimit, CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
173 &VNET_NAME(tcp_syncache.bucket_limit), 0,
174 "Per-bucket hash limit for syncache");
176 SYSCTL_UINT(_net_inet_tcp_syncache, OID_AUTO, cachelimit, CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
177 &VNET_NAME(tcp_syncache.cache_limit), 0,
178 "Overall entry limit for syncache");
180 SYSCTL_UMA_CUR(_net_inet_tcp_syncache, OID_AUTO, count, CTLFLAG_VNET,
181 &VNET_NAME(tcp_syncache.zone), "Current number of entries in syncache");
183 SYSCTL_UINT(_net_inet_tcp_syncache, OID_AUTO, hashsize, CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
184 &VNET_NAME(tcp_syncache.hashsize), 0,
185 "Size of TCP syncache hashtable");
188 sysctl_net_inet_tcp_syncache_rexmtlimit_check(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
193 new = V_tcp_syncache.rexmt_limit;
194 error = sysctl_handle_int(oidp, &new, 0, req);
195 if ((error == 0) && (req->newptr != NULL)) {
196 if (new > TCP_MAXRXTSHIFT)
199 V_tcp_syncache.rexmt_limit = new;
204 SYSCTL_PROC(_net_inet_tcp_syncache, OID_AUTO, rexmtlimit,
205 CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLTYPE_UINT | CTLFLAG_RW,
206 &VNET_NAME(tcp_syncache.rexmt_limit), 0,
207 sysctl_net_inet_tcp_syncache_rexmtlimit_check, "UI",
208 "Limit on SYN/ACK retransmissions");
210 VNET_DEFINE(int, tcp_sc_rst_sock_fail) = 1;
211 SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_tcp_syncache, OID_AUTO, rst_on_sock_fail,
212 CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW, &VNET_NAME(tcp_sc_rst_sock_fail), 0,
213 "Send reset on socket allocation failure");
215 static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_SYNCACHE, "syncache", "TCP syncache");
217 #define SCH_LOCK(sch) mtx_lock(&(sch)->sch_mtx)
218 #define SCH_UNLOCK(sch) mtx_unlock(&(sch)->sch_mtx)
219 #define SCH_LOCK_ASSERT(sch) mtx_assert(&(sch)->sch_mtx, MA_OWNED)
222 * Requires the syncache entry to be already removed from the bucket list.
225 syncache_free(struct syncache *sc)
229 (void) m_free(sc->sc_ipopts);
233 mac_syncache_destroy(&sc->sc_label);
236 uma_zfree(V_tcp_syncache.zone, sc);
244 V_tcp_syncache.hashsize = TCP_SYNCACHE_HASHSIZE;
245 V_tcp_syncache.bucket_limit = TCP_SYNCACHE_BUCKETLIMIT;
246 V_tcp_syncache.rexmt_limit = SYNCACHE_MAXREXMTS;
247 V_tcp_syncache.hash_secret = arc4random();
249 TUNABLE_INT_FETCH("net.inet.tcp.syncache.hashsize",
250 &V_tcp_syncache.hashsize);
251 TUNABLE_INT_FETCH("net.inet.tcp.syncache.bucketlimit",
252 &V_tcp_syncache.bucket_limit);
253 if (!powerof2(V_tcp_syncache.hashsize) ||
254 V_tcp_syncache.hashsize == 0) {
255 printf("WARNING: syncache hash size is not a power of 2.\n");
256 V_tcp_syncache.hashsize = TCP_SYNCACHE_HASHSIZE;
258 V_tcp_syncache.hashmask = V_tcp_syncache.hashsize - 1;
261 V_tcp_syncache.cache_limit =
262 V_tcp_syncache.hashsize * V_tcp_syncache.bucket_limit;
263 TUNABLE_INT_FETCH("net.inet.tcp.syncache.cachelimit",
264 &V_tcp_syncache.cache_limit);
266 /* Allocate the hash table. */
267 V_tcp_syncache.hashbase = malloc(V_tcp_syncache.hashsize *
268 sizeof(struct syncache_head), M_SYNCACHE, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
271 V_tcp_syncache.vnet = curvnet;
274 /* Initialize the hash buckets. */
275 for (i = 0; i < V_tcp_syncache.hashsize; i++) {
276 TAILQ_INIT(&V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i].sch_bucket);
277 mtx_init(&V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i].sch_mtx, "tcp_sc_head",
279 callout_init_mtx(&V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i].sch_timer,
280 &V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i].sch_mtx, 0);
281 V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i].sch_length = 0;
282 V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i].sch_sc = &V_tcp_syncache;
283 V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i].sch_last_overflow =
284 -(SYNCOOKIE_LIFETIME + 1);
287 /* Create the syncache entry zone. */
288 V_tcp_syncache.zone = uma_zcreate("syncache", sizeof(struct syncache),
289 NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, UMA_ALIGN_PTR, 0);
290 V_tcp_syncache.cache_limit = uma_zone_set_max(V_tcp_syncache.zone,
291 V_tcp_syncache.cache_limit);
293 /* Start the SYN cookie reseeder callout. */
294 callout_init(&V_tcp_syncache.secret.reseed, 1);
295 arc4rand(V_tcp_syncache.secret.key[0], SYNCOOKIE_SECRET_SIZE, 0);
296 arc4rand(V_tcp_syncache.secret.key[1], SYNCOOKIE_SECRET_SIZE, 0);
297 callout_reset(&V_tcp_syncache.secret.reseed, SYNCOOKIE_LIFETIME * hz,
298 syncookie_reseed, &V_tcp_syncache);
303 syncache_destroy(void)
305 struct syncache_head *sch;
306 struct syncache *sc, *nsc;
310 * Stop the re-seed timer before freeing resources. No need to
311 * possibly schedule it another time.
313 callout_drain(&V_tcp_syncache.secret.reseed);
315 /* Cleanup hash buckets: stop timers, free entries, destroy locks. */
316 for (i = 0; i < V_tcp_syncache.hashsize; i++) {
318 sch = &V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i];
319 callout_drain(&sch->sch_timer);
322 TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(sc, &sch->sch_bucket, sc_hash, nsc)
323 syncache_drop(sc, sch);
325 KASSERT(TAILQ_EMPTY(&sch->sch_bucket),
326 ("%s: sch->sch_bucket not empty", __func__));
327 KASSERT(sch->sch_length == 0, ("%s: sch->sch_length %d not 0",
328 __func__, sch->sch_length));
329 mtx_destroy(&sch->sch_mtx);
332 KASSERT(uma_zone_get_cur(V_tcp_syncache.zone) == 0,
333 ("%s: cache_count not 0", __func__));
335 /* Free the allocated global resources. */
336 uma_zdestroy(V_tcp_syncache.zone);
337 free(V_tcp_syncache.hashbase, M_SYNCACHE);
342 * Inserts a syncache entry into the specified bucket row.
343 * Locks and unlocks the syncache_head autonomously.
346 syncache_insert(struct syncache *sc, struct syncache_head *sch)
348 struct syncache *sc2;
353 * Make sure that we don't overflow the per-bucket limit.
354 * If the bucket is full, toss the oldest element.
356 if (sch->sch_length >= V_tcp_syncache.bucket_limit) {
357 KASSERT(!TAILQ_EMPTY(&sch->sch_bucket),
358 ("sch->sch_length incorrect"));
359 sc2 = TAILQ_LAST(&sch->sch_bucket, sch_head);
360 sch->sch_last_overflow = time_uptime;
361 syncache_drop(sc2, sch);
362 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_bucketoverflow);
365 /* Put it into the bucket. */
366 TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(&sch->sch_bucket, sc, sc_hash);
370 if (ADDED_BY_TOE(sc)) {
371 struct toedev *tod = sc->sc_tod;
373 tod->tod_syncache_added(tod, sc->sc_todctx);
377 /* Reinitialize the bucket row's timer. */
378 if (sch->sch_length == 1)
379 sch->sch_nextc = ticks + INT_MAX;
380 syncache_timeout(sc, sch, 1);
384 TCPSTATES_INC(TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED);
385 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_added);
389 * Remove and free entry from syncache bucket row.
390 * Expects locked syncache head.
393 syncache_drop(struct syncache *sc, struct syncache_head *sch)
396 SCH_LOCK_ASSERT(sch);
398 TCPSTATES_DEC(TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED);
399 TAILQ_REMOVE(&sch->sch_bucket, sc, sc_hash);
403 if (ADDED_BY_TOE(sc)) {
404 struct toedev *tod = sc->sc_tod;
406 tod->tod_syncache_removed(tod, sc->sc_todctx);
414 * Engage/reengage time on bucket row.
417 syncache_timeout(struct syncache *sc, struct syncache_head *sch, int docallout)
421 if (sc->sc_rxmits == 0)
422 rexmt = TCPTV_RTOBASE;
424 TCPT_RANGESET(rexmt, TCPTV_RTOBASE * tcp_syn_backoff[sc->sc_rxmits],
425 tcp_rexmit_min, TCPTV_REXMTMAX);
426 sc->sc_rxttime = ticks + rexmt;
428 if (TSTMP_LT(sc->sc_rxttime, sch->sch_nextc)) {
429 sch->sch_nextc = sc->sc_rxttime;
431 callout_reset(&sch->sch_timer, sch->sch_nextc - ticks,
432 syncache_timer, (void *)sch);
437 * Walk the timer queues, looking for SYN,ACKs that need to be retransmitted.
438 * If we have retransmitted an entry the maximum number of times, expire it.
439 * One separate timer for each bucket row.
442 syncache_timer(void *xsch)
444 struct syncache_head *sch = (struct syncache_head *)xsch;
445 struct syncache *sc, *nsc;
449 CURVNET_SET(sch->sch_sc->vnet);
451 /* NB: syncache_head has already been locked by the callout. */
452 SCH_LOCK_ASSERT(sch);
455 * In the following cycle we may remove some entries and/or
456 * advance some timeouts, so re-initialize the bucket timer.
458 sch->sch_nextc = tick + INT_MAX;
460 TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(sc, &sch->sch_bucket, sc_hash, nsc) {
462 * We do not check if the listen socket still exists
463 * and accept the case where the listen socket may be
464 * gone by the time we resend the SYN/ACK. We do
465 * not expect this to happens often. If it does,
466 * then the RST will be sent by the time the remote
467 * host does the SYN/ACK->ACK.
469 if (TSTMP_GT(sc->sc_rxttime, tick)) {
470 if (TSTMP_LT(sc->sc_rxttime, sch->sch_nextc))
471 sch->sch_nextc = sc->sc_rxttime;
474 if (sc->sc_rxmits > V_tcp_syncache.rexmt_limit) {
475 if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(&sc->sc_inc, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
476 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Retransmits exhausted, "
477 "giving up and removing syncache entry\n",
481 syncache_drop(sc, sch);
482 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_stale);
485 if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(&sc->sc_inc, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
486 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Response timeout, "
487 "retransmitting (%u) SYN|ACK\n",
488 s, __func__, sc->sc_rxmits);
492 syncache_respond(sc, sch, 1, NULL);
493 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_retransmitted);
494 syncache_timeout(sc, sch, 0);
496 if (!TAILQ_EMPTY(&(sch)->sch_bucket))
497 callout_reset(&(sch)->sch_timer, (sch)->sch_nextc - tick,
498 syncache_timer, (void *)(sch));
503 * Find an entry in the syncache.
504 * Returns always with locked syncache_head plus a matching entry or NULL.
506 static struct syncache *
507 syncache_lookup(struct in_conninfo *inc, struct syncache_head **schp)
510 struct syncache_head *sch;
514 * The hash is built on foreign port + local port + foreign address.
515 * We rely on the fact that struct in_conninfo starts with 16 bits
516 * of foreign port, then 16 bits of local port then followed by 128
517 * bits of foreign address. In case of IPv4 address, the first 3
518 * 32-bit words of the address always are zeroes.
520 hash = jenkins_hash32((uint32_t *)&inc->inc_ie, 5,
521 V_tcp_syncache.hash_secret) & V_tcp_syncache.hashmask;
523 sch = &V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[hash];
527 /* Circle through bucket row to find matching entry. */
528 TAILQ_FOREACH(sc, &sch->sch_bucket, sc_hash)
529 if (bcmp(&inc->inc_ie, &sc->sc_inc.inc_ie,
530 sizeof(struct in_endpoints)) == 0)
533 return (sc); /* Always returns with locked sch. */
537 * This function is called when we get a RST for a
538 * non-existent connection, so that we can see if the
539 * connection is in the syn cache. If it is, zap it.
542 syncache_chkrst(struct in_conninfo *inc, struct tcphdr *th)
545 struct syncache_head *sch;
548 sc = syncache_lookup(inc, &sch); /* returns locked sch */
549 SCH_LOCK_ASSERT(sch);
552 * Any RST to our SYN|ACK must not carry ACK, SYN or FIN flags.
553 * See RFC 793 page 65, section SEGMENT ARRIVES.
555 if (th->th_flags & (TH_ACK|TH_SYN|TH_FIN)) {
556 if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL)))
557 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Spurious RST with ACK, SYN or "
558 "FIN flag set, segment ignored\n", s, __func__);
559 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_badrst);
564 * No corresponding connection was found in syncache.
565 * If syncookies are enabled and possibly exclusively
566 * used, or we are under memory pressure, a valid RST
567 * may not find a syncache entry. In that case we're
568 * done and no SYN|ACK retransmissions will happen.
569 * Otherwise the RST was misdirected or spoofed.
572 if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL)))
573 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Spurious RST without matching "
574 "syncache entry (possibly syncookie only), "
575 "segment ignored\n", s, __func__);
576 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_badrst);
581 * If the RST bit is set, check the sequence number to see
582 * if this is a valid reset segment.
584 * In all states except SYN-SENT, all reset (RST) segments
585 * are validated by checking their SEQ-fields. A reset is
586 * valid if its sequence number is in the window.
588 * The sequence number in the reset segment is normally an
589 * echo of our outgoing acknowlegement numbers, but some hosts
590 * send a reset with the sequence number at the rightmost edge
591 * of our receive window, and we have to handle this case.
593 if (SEQ_GEQ(th->th_seq, sc->sc_irs) &&
594 SEQ_LEQ(th->th_seq, sc->sc_irs + sc->sc_wnd)) {
595 syncache_drop(sc, sch);
596 if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL)))
597 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Our SYN|ACK was rejected, "
598 "connection attempt aborted by remote endpoint\n",
600 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_reset);
602 if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL)))
603 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: RST with invalid SEQ %u != "
604 "IRS %u (+WND %u), segment ignored\n",
605 s, __func__, th->th_seq, sc->sc_irs, sc->sc_wnd);
606 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_badrst);
616 syncache_badack(struct in_conninfo *inc)
619 struct syncache_head *sch;
621 sc = syncache_lookup(inc, &sch); /* returns locked sch */
622 SCH_LOCK_ASSERT(sch);
624 syncache_drop(sc, sch);
625 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_badack);
631 syncache_unreach(struct in_conninfo *inc, tcp_seq th_seq)
634 struct syncache_head *sch;
636 sc = syncache_lookup(inc, &sch); /* returns locked sch */
637 SCH_LOCK_ASSERT(sch);
641 /* If the sequence number != sc_iss, then it's a bogus ICMP msg */
642 if (ntohl(th_seq) != sc->sc_iss)
646 * If we've rertransmitted 3 times and this is our second error,
647 * we remove the entry. Otherwise, we allow it to continue on.
648 * This prevents us from incorrectly nuking an entry during a
649 * spurious network outage.
653 if ((sc->sc_flags & SCF_UNREACH) == 0 || sc->sc_rxmits < 3 + 1) {
654 sc->sc_flags |= SCF_UNREACH;
657 syncache_drop(sc, sch);
658 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_unreach);
664 * Build a new TCP socket structure from a syncache entry.
666 * On success return the newly created socket with its underlying inp locked.
668 static struct socket *
669 syncache_socket(struct syncache *sc, struct socket *lso, struct mbuf *m)
671 struct tcp_function_block *blk;
672 struct inpcb *inp = NULL;
678 INP_INFO_RLOCK_ASSERT(&V_tcbinfo);
681 * Ok, create the full blown connection, and set things up
682 * as they would have been set up if we had created the
683 * connection when the SYN arrived. If we can't create
684 * the connection, abort it.
686 so = sonewconn(lso, 0);
689 * Drop the connection; we will either send a RST or
690 * have the peer retransmit its SYN again after its
693 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_listendrop);
694 if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(&sc->sc_inc, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
695 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Socket create failed "
696 "due to limits or memory shortage\n",
703 mac_socketpeer_set_from_mbuf(m, so);
707 inp->inp_inc.inc_fibnum = so->so_fibnum;
710 * Exclusive pcbinfo lock is not required in syncache socket case even
711 * if two inpcb locks can be acquired simultaneously:
712 * - the inpcb in LISTEN state,
713 * - the newly created inp.
715 * In this case, an inp cannot be at same time in LISTEN state and
716 * just created by an accept() call.
718 INP_HASH_WLOCK(&V_tcbinfo);
720 /* Insert new socket into PCB hash list. */
721 inp->inp_inc.inc_flags = sc->sc_inc.inc_flags;
723 if (sc->sc_inc.inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6) {
724 inp->inp_vflag &= ~INP_IPV4;
725 inp->inp_vflag |= INP_IPV6;
726 inp->in6p_laddr = sc->sc_inc.inc6_laddr;
728 inp->inp_vflag &= ~INP_IPV6;
729 inp->inp_vflag |= INP_IPV4;
731 inp->inp_laddr = sc->sc_inc.inc_laddr;
737 * If there's an mbuf and it has a flowid, then let's initialise the
738 * inp with that particular flowid.
740 if (m != NULL && M_HASHTYPE_GET(m) != M_HASHTYPE_NONE) {
741 inp->inp_flowid = m->m_pkthdr.flowid;
742 inp->inp_flowtype = M_HASHTYPE_GET(m);
746 * Install in the reservation hash table for now, but don't yet
747 * install a connection group since the full 4-tuple isn't yet
750 inp->inp_lport = sc->sc_inc.inc_lport;
751 if ((error = in_pcbinshash_nopcbgroup(inp)) != 0) {
753 * Undo the assignments above if we failed to
754 * put the PCB on the hash lists.
757 if (sc->sc_inc.inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6)
758 inp->in6p_laddr = in6addr_any;
761 inp->inp_laddr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
763 if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(&sc->sc_inc, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
764 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: in_pcbinshash failed "
769 INP_HASH_WUNLOCK(&V_tcbinfo);
773 if (inp->inp_vflag & INP_IPV6PROTO) {
774 struct inpcb *oinp = sotoinpcb(lso);
777 * Inherit socket options from the listening socket.
778 * Note that in6p_inputopts are not (and should not be)
779 * copied, since it stores previously received options and is
780 * used to detect if each new option is different than the
781 * previous one and hence should be passed to a user.
782 * If we copied in6p_inputopts, a user would not be able to
783 * receive options just after calling the accept system call.
785 inp->inp_flags |= oinp->inp_flags & INP_CONTROLOPTS;
786 if (oinp->in6p_outputopts)
787 inp->in6p_outputopts =
788 ip6_copypktopts(oinp->in6p_outputopts, M_NOWAIT);
791 if (sc->sc_inc.inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6) {
792 struct in6_addr laddr6;
793 struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
795 sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
796 sin6.sin6_len = sizeof(sin6);
797 sin6.sin6_addr = sc->sc_inc.inc6_faddr;
798 sin6.sin6_port = sc->sc_inc.inc_fport;
799 sin6.sin6_flowinfo = sin6.sin6_scope_id = 0;
800 laddr6 = inp->in6p_laddr;
801 if (IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&inp->in6p_laddr))
802 inp->in6p_laddr = sc->sc_inc.inc6_laddr;
803 if ((error = in6_pcbconnect_mbuf(inp, (struct sockaddr *)&sin6,
804 thread0.td_ucred, m)) != 0) {
805 inp->in6p_laddr = laddr6;
806 if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(&sc->sc_inc, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
807 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: in6_pcbconnect failed "
812 INP_HASH_WUNLOCK(&V_tcbinfo);
815 /* Override flowlabel from in6_pcbconnect. */
816 inp->inp_flow &= ~IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK;
817 inp->inp_flow |= sc->sc_flowlabel;
820 #if defined(INET) && defined(INET6)
825 struct in_addr laddr;
826 struct sockaddr_in sin;
828 inp->inp_options = (m) ? ip_srcroute(m) : NULL;
830 if (inp->inp_options == NULL) {
831 inp->inp_options = sc->sc_ipopts;
832 sc->sc_ipopts = NULL;
835 sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
836 sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin);
837 sin.sin_addr = sc->sc_inc.inc_faddr;
838 sin.sin_port = sc->sc_inc.inc_fport;
839 bzero((caddr_t)sin.sin_zero, sizeof(sin.sin_zero));
840 laddr = inp->inp_laddr;
841 if (inp->inp_laddr.s_addr == INADDR_ANY)
842 inp->inp_laddr = sc->sc_inc.inc_laddr;
843 if ((error = in_pcbconnect_mbuf(inp, (struct sockaddr *)&sin,
844 thread0.td_ucred, m)) != 0) {
845 inp->inp_laddr = laddr;
846 if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(&sc->sc_inc, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
847 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: in_pcbconnect failed "
852 INP_HASH_WUNLOCK(&V_tcbinfo);
857 #if defined(IPSEC) || defined(IPSEC_SUPPORT)
858 /* Copy old policy into new socket's. */
859 if (ipsec_copy_pcbpolicy(sotoinpcb(lso), inp) != 0)
860 printf("syncache_socket: could not copy policy\n");
862 INP_HASH_WUNLOCK(&V_tcbinfo);
864 tcp_state_change(tp, TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED);
865 tp->iss = sc->sc_iss;
866 tp->irs = sc->sc_irs;
869 blk = sototcpcb(lso)->t_fb;
870 if (V_functions_inherit_listen_socket_stack && blk != tp->t_fb) {
872 * Our parents t_fb was not the default,
873 * we need to release our ref on tp->t_fb and
874 * pickup one on the new entry.
876 struct tcp_function_block *rblk;
878 rblk = find_and_ref_tcp_fb(blk);
879 KASSERT(rblk != NULL,
880 ("cannot find blk %p out of syncache?", blk));
881 if (tp->t_fb->tfb_tcp_fb_fini)
882 (*tp->t_fb->tfb_tcp_fb_fini)(tp, 0);
883 refcount_release(&tp->t_fb->tfb_refcnt);
886 * XXXrrs this is quite dangerous, it is possible
887 * for the new function to fail to init. We also
888 * are not asking if the handoff_is_ok though at
889 * the very start thats probalbly ok.
891 if (tp->t_fb->tfb_tcp_fb_init) {
892 (*tp->t_fb->tfb_tcp_fb_init)(tp);
895 tp->snd_wl1 = sc->sc_irs;
896 tp->snd_max = tp->iss + 1;
897 tp->snd_nxt = tp->iss + 1;
898 tp->rcv_up = sc->sc_irs + 1;
899 tp->rcv_wnd = sc->sc_wnd;
900 tp->rcv_adv += tp->rcv_wnd;
901 tp->last_ack_sent = tp->rcv_nxt;
903 tp->t_flags = sototcpcb(lso)->t_flags & (TF_NOPUSH|TF_NODELAY);
904 if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_NOOPT)
905 tp->t_flags |= TF_NOOPT;
907 if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_WINSCALE) {
908 tp->t_flags |= TF_REQ_SCALE|TF_RCVD_SCALE;
909 tp->snd_scale = sc->sc_requested_s_scale;
910 tp->request_r_scale = sc->sc_requested_r_scale;
912 if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_TIMESTAMP) {
913 tp->t_flags |= TF_REQ_TSTMP|TF_RCVD_TSTMP;
914 tp->ts_recent = sc->sc_tsreflect;
915 tp->ts_recent_age = tcp_ts_getticks();
916 tp->ts_offset = sc->sc_tsoff;
918 #if defined(IPSEC_SUPPORT) || defined(TCP_SIGNATURE)
919 if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_SIGNATURE)
920 tp->t_flags |= TF_SIGNATURE;
922 if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_SACK)
923 tp->t_flags |= TF_SACK_PERMIT;
926 if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_ECN)
927 tp->t_flags |= TF_ECN_PERMIT;
930 * Set up MSS and get cached values from tcp_hostcache.
931 * This might overwrite some of the defaults we just set.
933 tcp_mss(tp, sc->sc_peer_mss);
936 * If the SYN,ACK was retransmitted, indicate that CWND to be
937 * limited to one segment in cc_conn_init().
938 * NB: sc_rxmits counts all SYN,ACK transmits, not just retransmits.
940 if (sc->sc_rxmits > 1)
945 * Allow a TOE driver to install its hooks. Note that we hold the
946 * pcbinfo lock too and that prevents tcp_usr_accept from accepting a
947 * new connection before the TOE driver has done its thing.
949 if (ADDED_BY_TOE(sc)) {
950 struct toedev *tod = sc->sc_tod;
952 tod->tod_offload_socket(tod, sc->sc_todctx, so);
956 * Copy and activate timers.
958 tp->t_keepinit = sototcpcb(lso)->t_keepinit;
959 tp->t_keepidle = sototcpcb(lso)->t_keepidle;
960 tp->t_keepintvl = sototcpcb(lso)->t_keepintvl;
961 tp->t_keepcnt = sototcpcb(lso)->t_keepcnt;
962 tcp_timer_activate(tp, TT_KEEP, TP_KEEPINIT(tp));
964 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_accepts);
976 * This function gets called when we receive an ACK for a
977 * socket in the LISTEN state. We look up the connection
978 * in the syncache, and if its there, we pull it out of
979 * the cache and turn it into a full-blown connection in
980 * the SYN-RECEIVED state.
982 * On syncache_socket() success the newly created socket
983 * has its underlying inp locked.
986 syncache_expand(struct in_conninfo *inc, struct tcpopt *to, struct tcphdr *th,
987 struct socket **lsop, struct mbuf *m)
990 struct syncache_head *sch;
995 * Global TCP locks are held because we manipulate the PCB lists
996 * and create a new socket.
998 INP_INFO_RLOCK_ASSERT(&V_tcbinfo);
999 KASSERT((th->th_flags & (TH_RST|TH_ACK|TH_SYN)) == TH_ACK,
1000 ("%s: can handle only ACK", __func__));
1002 sc = syncache_lookup(inc, &sch); /* returns locked sch */
1003 SCH_LOCK_ASSERT(sch);
1007 * Test code for syncookies comparing the syncache stored
1008 * values with the reconstructed values from the cookie.
1011 syncookie_cmp(inc, sch, sc, th, to, *lsop);
1016 * There is no syncache entry, so see if this ACK is
1017 * a returning syncookie. To do this, first:
1018 * A. Check if syncookies are used in case of syncache
1020 * B. See if this socket has had a syncache entry dropped in
1021 * the recent past. We don't want to accept a bogus
1022 * syncookie if we've never received a SYN or accept it
1024 * C. check that the syncookie is valid. If it is, then
1025 * cobble up a fake syncache entry, and return.
1027 if (!V_tcp_syncookies) {
1029 if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL)))
1030 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Spurious ACK, "
1031 "segment rejected (syncookies disabled)\n",
1035 if (!V_tcp_syncookiesonly &&
1036 sch->sch_last_overflow < time_uptime - SYNCOOKIE_LIFETIME) {
1038 if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL)))
1039 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Spurious ACK, "
1040 "segment rejected (no syncache entry)\n",
1044 bzero(&scs, sizeof(scs));
1045 sc = syncookie_lookup(inc, sch, &scs, th, to, *lsop);
1048 if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL)))
1049 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Segment failed "
1050 "SYNCOOKIE authentication, segment rejected "
1051 "(probably spoofed)\n", s, __func__);
1054 #if defined(IPSEC_SUPPORT) || defined(TCP_SIGNATURE)
1055 /* If received ACK has MD5 signature, check it. */
1056 if ((to->to_flags & TOF_SIGNATURE) != 0 &&
1057 (!TCPMD5_ENABLED() ||
1058 TCPMD5_INPUT(m, th, to->to_signature) != 0)) {
1060 if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL))) {
1061 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Segment rejected, "
1062 "MD5 signature doesn't match.\n",
1066 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sig_err_sigopt);
1067 return (-1); /* Do not send RST */
1069 #endif /* TCP_SIGNATURE */
1071 #if defined(IPSEC_SUPPORT) || defined(TCP_SIGNATURE)
1073 * If listening socket requested TCP digests, check that
1074 * received ACK has signature and it is correct.
1075 * If not, drop the ACK and leave sc entry in th cache,
1076 * because SYN was received with correct signature.
1078 if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_SIGNATURE) {
1079 if ((to->to_flags & TOF_SIGNATURE) == 0) {
1081 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sig_err_nosigopt);
1083 if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL))) {
1084 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Segment "
1085 "rejected, MD5 signature wasn't "
1086 "provided.\n", s, __func__);
1089 return (-1); /* Do not send RST */
1091 if (!TCPMD5_ENABLED() ||
1092 TCPMD5_INPUT(m, th, to->to_signature) != 0) {
1093 /* Doesn't match or no SA */
1095 if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL))) {
1096 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Segment "
1097 "rejected, MD5 signature doesn't "
1098 "match.\n", s, __func__);
1101 return (-1); /* Do not send RST */
1104 #endif /* TCP_SIGNATURE */
1106 * Pull out the entry to unlock the bucket row.
1108 * NOTE: We must decrease TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED count here, not
1109 * tcp_state_change(). The tcpcb is not existent at this
1110 * moment. A new one will be allocated via syncache_socket->
1111 * sonewconn->tcp_usr_attach in TCPS_CLOSED state, then
1112 * syncache_socket() will change it to TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED.
1114 TCPSTATES_DEC(TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED);
1115 TAILQ_REMOVE(&sch->sch_bucket, sc, sc_hash);
1118 if (ADDED_BY_TOE(sc)) {
1119 struct toedev *tod = sc->sc_tod;
1121 tod->tod_syncache_removed(tod, sc->sc_todctx);
1128 * Segment validation:
1129 * ACK must match our initial sequence number + 1 (the SYN|ACK).
1131 if (th->th_ack != sc->sc_iss + 1) {
1132 if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL)))
1133 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: ACK %u != ISS+1 %u, segment "
1134 "rejected\n", s, __func__, th->th_ack, sc->sc_iss);
1139 * The SEQ must fall in the window starting at the received
1140 * initial receive sequence number + 1 (the SYN).
1142 if (SEQ_LEQ(th->th_seq, sc->sc_irs) ||
1143 SEQ_GT(th->th_seq, sc->sc_irs + sc->sc_wnd)) {
1144 if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL)))
1145 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: SEQ %u != IRS+1 %u, segment "
1146 "rejected\n", s, __func__, th->th_seq, sc->sc_irs);
1151 * If timestamps were not negotiated during SYN/ACK they
1152 * must not appear on any segment during this session.
1154 if (!(sc->sc_flags & SCF_TIMESTAMP) && (to->to_flags & TOF_TS)) {
1155 if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL)))
1156 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Timestamp not expected, "
1157 "segment rejected\n", s, __func__);
1162 * If timestamps were negotiated during SYN/ACK they should
1163 * appear on every segment during this session.
1164 * XXXAO: This is only informal as there have been unverified
1165 * reports of non-compliants stacks.
1167 if ((sc->sc_flags & SCF_TIMESTAMP) && !(to->to_flags & TOF_TS)) {
1168 if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL))) {
1169 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Timestamp missing, "
1170 "no action\n", s, __func__);
1176 *lsop = syncache_socket(sc, *lsop, m);
1179 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_aborted);
1181 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_completed);
1183 /* how do we find the inp for the new socket? */
1188 if (sc != NULL && sc != &scs)
1197 syncache_tfo_expand(struct syncache *sc, struct socket **lsop, struct mbuf *m,
1198 uint64_t response_cookie)
1202 unsigned int *pending_counter;
1205 * Global TCP locks are held because we manipulate the PCB lists
1206 * and create a new socket.
1208 INP_INFO_RLOCK_ASSERT(&V_tcbinfo);
1210 pending_counter = intotcpcb(sotoinpcb(*lsop))->t_tfo_pending;
1211 *lsop = syncache_socket(sc, *lsop, m);
1212 if (*lsop == NULL) {
1213 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_aborted);
1214 atomic_subtract_int(pending_counter, 1);
1216 soisconnected(*lsop);
1217 inp = sotoinpcb(*lsop);
1218 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
1219 tp->t_flags |= TF_FASTOPEN;
1220 tp->t_tfo_cookie.server = response_cookie;
1221 tp->snd_max = tp->iss;
1222 tp->snd_nxt = tp->iss;
1223 tp->t_tfo_pending = pending_counter;
1224 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_completed);
1229 * Given a LISTEN socket and an inbound SYN request, add
1230 * this to the syn cache, and send back a segment:
1231 * <SEQ=ISS><ACK=RCV_NXT><CTL=SYN,ACK>
1234 * IMPORTANT NOTE: We do _NOT_ ACK data that might accompany the SYN.
1235 * Doing so would require that we hold onto the data and deliver it
1236 * to the application. However, if we are the target of a SYN-flood
1237 * DoS attack, an attacker could send data which would eventually
1238 * consume all available buffer space if it were ACKed. By not ACKing
1239 * the data, we avoid this DoS scenario.
1241 * The exception to the above is when a SYN with a valid TCP Fast Open (TFO)
1242 * cookie is processed and a new socket is created. In this case, any data
1243 * accompanying the SYN will be queued to the socket by tcp_input() and will
1244 * be ACKed either when the application sends response data or the delayed
1245 * ACK timer expires, whichever comes first.
1248 syncache_add(struct in_conninfo *inc, struct tcpopt *to, struct tcphdr *th,
1249 struct inpcb *inp, struct socket **lsop, struct mbuf *m, void *tod,
1254 struct syncache *sc = NULL;
1255 struct syncache_head *sch;
1256 struct mbuf *ipopts = NULL;
1258 int win, ip_ttl, ip_tos;
1262 int autoflowlabel = 0;
1265 struct label *maclabel;
1267 struct syncache scs;
1269 uint64_t tfo_response_cookie;
1270 unsigned int *tfo_pending = NULL;
1271 int tfo_cookie_valid = 0;
1272 int tfo_response_cookie_valid = 0;
1274 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp); /* listen socket */
1275 KASSERT((th->th_flags & (TH_RST|TH_ACK|TH_SYN)) == TH_SYN,
1276 ("%s: unexpected tcp flags", __func__));
1279 * Combine all so/tp operations very early to drop the INP lock as
1283 KASSERT(SOLISTENING(so), ("%s: %p not listening", __func__, so));
1285 cred = crhold(so->so_cred);
1288 if ((inc->inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6) &&
1289 (inp->inp_flags & IN6P_AUTOFLOWLABEL))
1292 ip_ttl = inp->inp_ip_ttl;
1293 ip_tos = inp->inp_ip_tos;
1294 win = so->sol_sbrcv_hiwat;
1295 ltflags = (tp->t_flags & (TF_NOOPT | TF_SIGNATURE));
1297 if (V_tcp_fastopen_server_enable && IS_FASTOPEN(tp->t_flags) &&
1298 (tp->t_tfo_pending != NULL) &&
1299 (to->to_flags & TOF_FASTOPEN)) {
1301 * Limit the number of pending TFO connections to
1302 * approximately half of the queue limit. This prevents TFO
1303 * SYN floods from starving the service by filling the
1304 * listen queue with bogus TFO connections.
1306 if (atomic_fetchadd_int(tp->t_tfo_pending, 1) <=
1307 (so->sol_qlimit / 2)) {
1310 result = tcp_fastopen_check_cookie(inc,
1311 to->to_tfo_cookie, to->to_tfo_len,
1312 &tfo_response_cookie);
1313 tfo_cookie_valid = (result > 0);
1314 tfo_response_cookie_valid = (result >= 0);
1318 * Remember the TFO pending counter as it will have to be
1319 * decremented below if we don't make it to syncache_tfo_expand().
1321 tfo_pending = tp->t_tfo_pending;
1324 /* By the time we drop the lock these should no longer be used. */
1329 if (mac_syncache_init(&maclabel) != 0) {
1333 mac_syncache_create(maclabel, inp);
1335 if (!tfo_cookie_valid)
1339 * Remember the IP options, if any.
1342 if (!(inc->inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6))
1345 ipopts = (m) ? ip_srcroute(m) : NULL;
1350 #if defined(IPSEC_SUPPORT) || defined(TCP_SIGNATURE)
1352 * If listening socket requested TCP digests, check that received
1353 * SYN has signature and it is correct. If signature doesn't match
1354 * or TCP_SIGNATURE support isn't enabled, drop the packet.
1356 if (ltflags & TF_SIGNATURE) {
1357 if ((to->to_flags & TOF_SIGNATURE) == 0) {
1358 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sig_err_nosigopt);
1361 if (!TCPMD5_ENABLED() ||
1362 TCPMD5_INPUT(m, th, to->to_signature) != 0)
1365 #endif /* TCP_SIGNATURE */
1367 * See if we already have an entry for this connection.
1368 * If we do, resend the SYN,ACK, and reset the retransmit timer.
1370 * XXX: should the syncache be re-initialized with the contents
1371 * of the new SYN here (which may have different options?)
1373 * XXX: We do not check the sequence number to see if this is a
1374 * real retransmit or a new connection attempt. The question is
1375 * how to handle such a case; either ignore it as spoofed, or
1376 * drop the current entry and create a new one?
1378 sc = syncache_lookup(inc, &sch); /* returns locked entry */
1379 SCH_LOCK_ASSERT(sch);
1381 if (tfo_cookie_valid)
1383 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_dupsyn);
1386 * If we were remembering a previous source route,
1387 * forget it and use the new one we've been given.
1390 (void) m_free(sc->sc_ipopts);
1391 sc->sc_ipopts = ipopts;
1394 * Update timestamp if present.
1396 if ((sc->sc_flags & SCF_TIMESTAMP) && (to->to_flags & TOF_TS))
1397 sc->sc_tsreflect = to->to_tsval;
1399 sc->sc_flags &= ~SCF_TIMESTAMP;
1402 * Since we have already unconditionally allocated label
1403 * storage, free it up. The syncache entry will already
1404 * have an initialized label we can use.
1406 mac_syncache_destroy(&maclabel);
1408 TCP_PROBE5(receive, NULL, NULL, m, NULL, th);
1409 /* Retransmit SYN|ACK and reset retransmit count. */
1410 if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(&sc->sc_inc, th, NULL, NULL))) {
1411 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: Received duplicate SYN, "
1412 "resetting timer and retransmitting SYN|ACK\n",
1416 if (syncache_respond(sc, sch, 1, m) == 0) {
1418 syncache_timeout(sc, sch, 1);
1419 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sndacks);
1420 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sndtotal);
1426 if (tfo_cookie_valid) {
1427 bzero(&scs, sizeof(scs));
1432 sc = uma_zalloc(V_tcp_syncache.zone, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
1435 * The zone allocator couldn't provide more entries.
1436 * Treat this as if the cache was full; drop the oldest
1437 * entry and insert the new one.
1439 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_zonefail);
1440 if ((sc = TAILQ_LAST(&sch->sch_bucket, sch_head)) != NULL) {
1441 sch->sch_last_overflow = time_uptime;
1442 syncache_drop(sc, sch);
1444 sc = uma_zalloc(V_tcp_syncache.zone, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
1446 if (V_tcp_syncookies) {
1447 bzero(&scs, sizeof(scs));
1452 (void) m_free(ipopts);
1459 if (!tfo_cookie_valid && tfo_response_cookie_valid)
1460 sc->sc_tfo_cookie = &tfo_response_cookie;
1463 * Fill in the syncache values.
1466 sc->sc_label = maclabel;
1470 sc->sc_ipopts = ipopts;
1471 bcopy(inc, &sc->sc_inc, sizeof(struct in_conninfo));
1473 if (!(inc->inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6))
1476 sc->sc_ip_tos = ip_tos;
1477 sc->sc_ip_ttl = ip_ttl;
1481 sc->sc_todctx = todctx;
1483 sc->sc_irs = th->th_seq;
1484 sc->sc_iss = arc4random();
1486 sc->sc_flowlabel = 0;
1489 * Initial receive window: clip sbspace to [0 .. TCP_MAXWIN].
1490 * win was derived from socket earlier in the function.
1493 win = imin(win, TCP_MAXWIN);
1496 if (V_tcp_do_rfc1323) {
1498 * A timestamp received in a SYN makes
1499 * it ok to send timestamp requests and replies.
1501 if (to->to_flags & TOF_TS) {
1502 sc->sc_tsreflect = to->to_tsval;
1503 sc->sc_flags |= SCF_TIMESTAMP;
1504 sc->sc_tsoff = tcp_new_ts_offset(inc);
1506 if (to->to_flags & TOF_SCALE) {
1510 * Pick the smallest possible scaling factor that
1511 * will still allow us to scale up to sb_max, aka
1512 * kern.ipc.maxsockbuf.
1514 * We do this because there are broken firewalls that
1515 * will corrupt the window scale option, leading to
1516 * the other endpoint believing that our advertised
1517 * window is unscaled. At scale factors larger than
1518 * 5 the unscaled window will drop below 1500 bytes,
1519 * leading to serious problems when traversing these
1522 * With the default maxsockbuf of 256K, a scale factor
1523 * of 3 will be chosen by this algorithm. Those who
1524 * choose a larger maxsockbuf should watch out
1525 * for the compatibility problems mentioned above.
1527 * RFC1323: The Window field in a SYN (i.e., a <SYN>
1528 * or <SYN,ACK>) segment itself is never scaled.
1530 while (wscale < TCP_MAX_WINSHIFT &&
1531 (TCP_MAXWIN << wscale) < sb_max)
1533 sc->sc_requested_r_scale = wscale;
1534 sc->sc_requested_s_scale = to->to_wscale;
1535 sc->sc_flags |= SCF_WINSCALE;
1538 #if defined(IPSEC_SUPPORT) || defined(TCP_SIGNATURE)
1540 * If listening socket requested TCP digests, flag this in the
1541 * syncache so that syncache_respond() will do the right thing
1544 if (ltflags & TF_SIGNATURE)
1545 sc->sc_flags |= SCF_SIGNATURE;
1546 #endif /* TCP_SIGNATURE */
1547 if (to->to_flags & TOF_SACKPERM)
1548 sc->sc_flags |= SCF_SACK;
1549 if (to->to_flags & TOF_MSS)
1550 sc->sc_peer_mss = to->to_mss; /* peer mss may be zero */
1551 if (ltflags & TF_NOOPT)
1552 sc->sc_flags |= SCF_NOOPT;
1553 if ((th->th_flags & (TH_ECE|TH_CWR)) && V_tcp_do_ecn)
1554 sc->sc_flags |= SCF_ECN;
1556 if (V_tcp_syncookies)
1557 sc->sc_iss = syncookie_generate(sch, sc);
1559 if (autoflowlabel) {
1560 if (V_tcp_syncookies)
1561 sc->sc_flowlabel = sc->sc_iss;
1563 sc->sc_flowlabel = ip6_randomflowlabel();
1564 sc->sc_flowlabel = htonl(sc->sc_flowlabel) & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK;
1569 if (tfo_cookie_valid) {
1570 syncache_tfo_expand(sc, lsop, m, tfo_response_cookie);
1571 /* INP_WUNLOCK(inp) will be performed by the caller */
1576 TCP_PROBE5(receive, NULL, NULL, m, NULL, th);
1578 * Do a standard 3-way handshake.
1580 if (syncache_respond(sc, sch, 0, m) == 0) {
1581 if (V_tcp_syncookies && V_tcp_syncookiesonly && sc != &scs)
1583 else if (sc != &scs)
1584 syncache_insert(sc, sch); /* locks and unlocks sch */
1585 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sndacks);
1586 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sndtotal);
1590 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_dropped);
1595 TCP_PROBE5(receive, NULL, NULL, m, NULL, th);
1602 * If tfo_pending is not NULL here, then a TFO SYN that did not
1603 * result in a new socket was processed and the associated pending
1604 * counter has not yet been decremented. All such TFO processing paths
1605 * transit this point.
1607 if (tfo_pending != NULL)
1608 tcp_fastopen_decrement_counter(tfo_pending);
1615 mac_syncache_destroy(&maclabel);
1621 * Send SYN|ACK to the peer. Either in response to the peer's SYN,
1622 * i.e. m0 != NULL, or upon 3WHS ACK timeout, i.e. m0 == NULL.
1625 syncache_respond(struct syncache *sc, struct syncache_head *sch, int locked,
1626 const struct mbuf *m0)
1628 struct ip *ip = NULL;
1630 struct tcphdr *th = NULL;
1631 int optlen, error = 0; /* Make compiler happy */
1632 u_int16_t hlen, tlen, mssopt;
1635 struct ip6_hdr *ip6 = NULL;
1639 (sc->sc_inc.inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6) ? sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) :
1642 tlen = hlen + sizeof(struct tcphdr);
1644 /* Determine MSS we advertize to other end of connection. */
1645 mssopt = max(tcp_mssopt(&sc->sc_inc), V_tcp_minmss);
1647 /* XXX: Assume that the entire packet will fit in a header mbuf. */
1648 KASSERT(max_linkhdr + tlen + TCP_MAXOLEN <= MHLEN,
1649 ("syncache: mbuf too small"));
1651 /* Create the IP+TCP header from scratch. */
1652 m = m_gethdr(M_NOWAIT, MT_DATA);
1656 mac_syncache_create_mbuf(sc->sc_label, m);
1658 m->m_data += max_linkhdr;
1660 m->m_pkthdr.len = tlen;
1661 m->m_pkthdr.rcvif = NULL;
1664 if (sc->sc_inc.inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6) {
1665 ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
1666 ip6->ip6_vfc = IPV6_VERSION;
1667 ip6->ip6_nxt = IPPROTO_TCP;
1668 ip6->ip6_src = sc->sc_inc.inc6_laddr;
1669 ip6->ip6_dst = sc->sc_inc.inc6_faddr;
1670 ip6->ip6_plen = htons(tlen - hlen);
1671 /* ip6_hlim is set after checksum */
1672 ip6->ip6_flow &= ~IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK;
1673 ip6->ip6_flow |= sc->sc_flowlabel;
1675 th = (struct tcphdr *)(ip6 + 1);
1678 #if defined(INET6) && defined(INET)
1683 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
1684 ip->ip_v = IPVERSION;
1685 ip->ip_hl = sizeof(struct ip) >> 2;
1686 ip->ip_len = htons(tlen);
1690 ip->ip_p = IPPROTO_TCP;
1691 ip->ip_src = sc->sc_inc.inc_laddr;
1692 ip->ip_dst = sc->sc_inc.inc_faddr;
1693 ip->ip_ttl = sc->sc_ip_ttl;
1694 ip->ip_tos = sc->sc_ip_tos;
1697 * See if we should do MTU discovery. Route lookups are
1698 * expensive, so we will only unset the DF bit if:
1700 * 1) path_mtu_discovery is disabled
1701 * 2) the SCF_UNREACH flag has been set
1703 if (V_path_mtu_discovery && ((sc->sc_flags & SCF_UNREACH) == 0))
1704 ip->ip_off |= htons(IP_DF);
1706 th = (struct tcphdr *)(ip + 1);
1709 th->th_sport = sc->sc_inc.inc_lport;
1710 th->th_dport = sc->sc_inc.inc_fport;
1712 th->th_seq = htonl(sc->sc_iss);
1713 th->th_ack = htonl(sc->sc_irs + 1);
1714 th->th_off = sizeof(struct tcphdr) >> 2;
1716 th->th_flags = TH_SYN|TH_ACK;
1717 th->th_win = htons(sc->sc_wnd);
1720 if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_ECN) {
1721 th->th_flags |= TH_ECE;
1722 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_ecn_shs);
1725 /* Tack on the TCP options. */
1726 if ((sc->sc_flags & SCF_NOOPT) == 0) {
1730 to.to_flags = TOF_MSS;
1731 if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_WINSCALE) {
1732 to.to_wscale = sc->sc_requested_r_scale;
1733 to.to_flags |= TOF_SCALE;
1735 if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_TIMESTAMP) {
1736 to.to_tsval = sc->sc_tsoff + tcp_ts_getticks();
1737 to.to_tsecr = sc->sc_tsreflect;
1738 to.to_flags |= TOF_TS;
1740 if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_SACK)
1741 to.to_flags |= TOF_SACKPERM;
1742 #if defined(IPSEC_SUPPORT) || defined(TCP_SIGNATURE)
1743 if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_SIGNATURE)
1744 to.to_flags |= TOF_SIGNATURE;
1746 if (sc->sc_tfo_cookie) {
1747 to.to_flags |= TOF_FASTOPEN;
1748 to.to_tfo_len = TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_LEN;
1749 to.to_tfo_cookie = sc->sc_tfo_cookie;
1750 /* don't send cookie again when retransmitting response */
1751 sc->sc_tfo_cookie = NULL;
1753 optlen = tcp_addoptions(&to, (u_char *)(th + 1));
1755 /* Adjust headers by option size. */
1756 th->th_off = (sizeof(struct tcphdr) + optlen) >> 2;
1758 m->m_pkthdr.len += optlen;
1760 if (sc->sc_inc.inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6)
1761 ip6->ip6_plen = htons(ntohs(ip6->ip6_plen) + optlen);
1764 ip->ip_len = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_len) + optlen);
1765 #if defined(IPSEC_SUPPORT) || defined(TCP_SIGNATURE)
1766 if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_SIGNATURE) {
1767 KASSERT(to.to_flags & TOF_SIGNATURE,
1768 ("tcp_addoptions() didn't set tcp_signature"));
1770 /* NOTE: to.to_signature is inside of mbuf */
1771 if (!TCPMD5_ENABLED() ||
1772 TCPMD5_OUTPUT(m, th, to.to_signature) != 0) {
1781 M_SETFIB(m, sc->sc_inc.inc_fibnum);
1782 m->m_pkthdr.csum_data = offsetof(struct tcphdr, th_sum);
1784 * If we have peer's SYN and it has a flowid, then let's assign it to
1785 * our SYN|ACK. ip6_output() and ip_output() will not assign flowid
1786 * to SYN|ACK due to lack of inp here.
1788 if (m0 != NULL && M_HASHTYPE_GET(m0) != M_HASHTYPE_NONE) {
1789 m->m_pkthdr.flowid = m0->m_pkthdr.flowid;
1790 M_HASHTYPE_SET(m, M_HASHTYPE_GET(m0));
1793 if (sc->sc_inc.inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6) {
1794 m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags = CSUM_TCP_IPV6;
1795 th->th_sum = in6_cksum_pseudo(ip6, tlen + optlen - hlen,
1797 ip6->ip6_hlim = in6_selecthlim(NULL, NULL);
1799 if (ADDED_BY_TOE(sc)) {
1800 struct toedev *tod = sc->sc_tod;
1802 error = tod->tod_syncache_respond(tod, sc->sc_todctx, m);
1807 TCP_PROBE5(send, NULL, NULL, ip6, NULL, th);
1808 error = ip6_output(m, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
1811 #if defined(INET6) && defined(INET)
1816 m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags = CSUM_TCP;
1817 th->th_sum = in_pseudo(ip->ip_src.s_addr, ip->ip_dst.s_addr,
1818 htons(tlen + optlen - hlen + IPPROTO_TCP));
1820 if (ADDED_BY_TOE(sc)) {
1821 struct toedev *tod = sc->sc_tod;
1823 error = tod->tod_syncache_respond(tod, sc->sc_todctx, m);
1828 TCP_PROBE5(send, NULL, NULL, ip, NULL, th);
1829 error = ip_output(m, sc->sc_ipopts, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
1836 * The purpose of syncookies is to handle spoofed SYN flooding DoS attacks
1837 * that exceed the capacity of the syncache by avoiding the storage of any
1838 * of the SYNs we receive. Syncookies defend against blind SYN flooding
1839 * attacks where the attacker does not have access to our responses.
1841 * Syncookies encode and include all necessary information about the
1842 * connection setup within the SYN|ACK that we send back. That way we
1843 * can avoid keeping any local state until the ACK to our SYN|ACK returns
1844 * (if ever). Normally the syncache and syncookies are running in parallel
1845 * with the latter taking over when the former is exhausted. When matching
1846 * syncache entry is found the syncookie is ignored.
1848 * The only reliable information persisting the 3WHS is our initial sequence
1849 * number ISS of 32 bits. Syncookies embed a cryptographically sufficient
1850 * strong hash (MAC) value and a few bits of TCP SYN options in the ISS
1851 * of our SYN|ACK. The MAC can be recomputed when the ACK to our SYN|ACK
1852 * returns and signifies a legitimate connection if it matches the ACK.
1854 * The available space of 32 bits to store the hash and to encode the SYN
1855 * option information is very tight and we should have at least 24 bits for
1856 * the MAC to keep the number of guesses by blind spoofing reasonably high.
1858 * SYN option information we have to encode to fully restore a connection:
1859 * MSS: is imporant to chose an optimal segment size to avoid IP level
1860 * fragmentation along the path. The common MSS values can be encoded
1861 * in a 3-bit table. Uncommon values are captured by the next lower value
1862 * in the table leading to a slight increase in packetization overhead.
1863 * WSCALE: is necessary to allow large windows to be used for high delay-
1864 * bandwidth product links. Not scaling the window when it was initially
1865 * negotiated is bad for performance as lack of scaling further decreases
1866 * the apparent available send window. We only need to encode the WSCALE
1867 * we received from the remote end. Our end can be recalculated at any
1868 * time. The common WSCALE values can be encoded in a 3-bit table.
1869 * Uncommon values are captured by the next lower value in the table
1870 * making us under-estimate the available window size halving our
1871 * theoretically possible maximum throughput for that connection.
1872 * SACK: Greatly assists in packet loss recovery and requires 1 bit.
1873 * TIMESTAMP and SIGNATURE is not encoded because they are permanent options
1874 * that are included in all segments on a connection. We enable them when
1877 * Security of syncookies and attack vectors:
1879 * The MAC is computed over (faddr||laddr||fport||lport||irs||flags||secmod)
1880 * together with the gloabl secret to make it unique per connection attempt.
1881 * Thus any change of any of those parameters results in a different MAC output
1882 * in an unpredictable way unless a collision is encountered. 24 bits of the
1883 * MAC are embedded into the ISS.
1885 * To prevent replay attacks two rotating global secrets are updated with a
1886 * new random value every 15 seconds. The life-time of a syncookie is thus
1889 * Vector 1: Attacking the secret. This requires finding a weakness in the
1890 * MAC itself or the way it is used here. The attacker can do a chosen plain
1891 * text attack by varying and testing the all parameters under his control.
1892 * The strength depends on the size and randomness of the secret, and the
1893 * cryptographic security of the MAC function. Due to the constant updating
1894 * of the secret the attacker has at most 29.999 seconds to find the secret
1895 * and launch spoofed connections. After that he has to start all over again.
1897 * Vector 2: Collision attack on the MAC of a single ACK. With a 24 bit MAC
1898 * size an average of 4,823 attempts are required for a 50% chance of success
1899 * to spoof a single syncookie (birthday collision paradox). However the
1900 * attacker is blind and doesn't know if one of his attempts succeeded unless
1901 * he has a side channel to interfere success from. A single connection setup
1902 * success average of 90% requires 8,790 packets, 99.99% requires 17,578 packets.
1903 * This many attempts are required for each one blind spoofed connection. For
1904 * every additional spoofed connection he has to launch another N attempts.
1905 * Thus for a sustained rate 100 spoofed connections per second approximately
1906 * 1,800,000 packets per second would have to be sent.
1908 * NB: The MAC function should be fast so that it doesn't become a CPU
1909 * exhaustion attack vector itself.
1912 * RFC4987 TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common Mitigations
1913 * SYN cookies were first proposed by cryptographer Dan J. Bernstein in 1996
1914 * http://cr.yp.to/syncookies.html (overview)
1915 * http://cr.yp.to/syncookies/archive (details)
1918 * Schematic construction of a syncookie enabled Initial Sequence Number:
1920 * 12345678901234567890123456789012
1921 * |xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxWWWMMMSP|
1923 * x 24 MAC (truncated)
1924 * W 3 Send Window Scale index
1926 * S 1 SACK permitted
1927 * P 1 Odd/even secret
1931 * Distribution and probability of certain MSS values. Those in between are
1932 * rounded down to the next lower one.
1933 * [An Analysis of TCP Maximum Segment Sizes, S. Alcock and R. Nelson, 2011]
1934 * .2% .3% 5% 7% 7% 20% 15% 45%
1936 static int tcp_sc_msstab[] = { 216, 536, 1200, 1360, 1400, 1440, 1452, 1460 };
1939 * Distribution and probability of certain WSCALE values. We have to map the
1940 * (send) window scale (shift) option with a range of 0-14 from 4 bits into 3
1941 * bits based on prevalence of certain values. Where we don't have an exact
1942 * match for are rounded down to the next lower one letting us under-estimate
1943 * the true available window. At the moment this would happen only for the
1944 * very uncommon values 3, 5 and those above 8 (more than 16MB socket buffer
1945 * and window size). The absence of the WSCALE option (no scaling in either
1946 * direction) is encoded with index zero.
1947 * [WSCALE values histograms, Allman, 2012]
1948 * X 10 10 35 5 6 14 10% by host
1949 * X 11 4 5 5 18 49 3% by connections
1951 static int tcp_sc_wstab[] = { 0, 0, 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 };
1954 * Compute the MAC for the SYN cookie. SIPHASH-2-4 is chosen for its speed
1955 * and good cryptographic properties.
1958 syncookie_mac(struct in_conninfo *inc, tcp_seq irs, uint8_t flags,
1959 uint8_t *secbits, uintptr_t secmod)
1962 uint32_t siphash[2];
1964 SipHash24_Init(&ctx);
1965 SipHash_SetKey(&ctx, secbits);
1966 switch (inc->inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6) {
1969 SipHash_Update(&ctx, &inc->inc_faddr, sizeof(inc->inc_faddr));
1970 SipHash_Update(&ctx, &inc->inc_laddr, sizeof(inc->inc_laddr));
1975 SipHash_Update(&ctx, &inc->inc6_faddr, sizeof(inc->inc6_faddr));
1976 SipHash_Update(&ctx, &inc->inc6_laddr, sizeof(inc->inc6_laddr));
1980 SipHash_Update(&ctx, &inc->inc_fport, sizeof(inc->inc_fport));
1981 SipHash_Update(&ctx, &inc->inc_lport, sizeof(inc->inc_lport));
1982 SipHash_Update(&ctx, &irs, sizeof(irs));
1983 SipHash_Update(&ctx, &flags, sizeof(flags));
1984 SipHash_Update(&ctx, &secmod, sizeof(secmod));
1985 SipHash_Final((u_int8_t *)&siphash, &ctx);
1987 return (siphash[0] ^ siphash[1]);
1991 syncookie_generate(struct syncache_head *sch, struct syncache *sc)
1993 u_int i, secbit, wscale;
1996 union syncookie cookie;
1998 SCH_LOCK_ASSERT(sch);
2002 /* Map our computed MSS into the 3-bit index. */
2003 for (i = nitems(tcp_sc_msstab) - 1;
2004 tcp_sc_msstab[i] > sc->sc_peer_mss && i > 0;
2007 cookie.flags.mss_idx = i;
2010 * Map the send window scale into the 3-bit index but only if
2011 * the wscale option was received.
2013 if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_WINSCALE) {
2014 wscale = sc->sc_requested_s_scale;
2015 for (i = nitems(tcp_sc_wstab) - 1;
2016 tcp_sc_wstab[i] > wscale && i > 0;
2019 cookie.flags.wscale_idx = i;
2022 /* Can we do SACK? */
2023 if (sc->sc_flags & SCF_SACK)
2024 cookie.flags.sack_ok = 1;
2026 /* Which of the two secrets to use. */
2027 secbit = sch->sch_sc->secret.oddeven & 0x1;
2028 cookie.flags.odd_even = secbit;
2030 secbits = sch->sch_sc->secret.key[secbit];
2031 hash = syncookie_mac(&sc->sc_inc, sc->sc_irs, cookie.cookie, secbits,
2035 * Put the flags into the hash and XOR them to get better ISS number
2036 * variance. This doesn't enhance the cryptographic strength and is
2037 * done to prevent the 8 cookie bits from showing up directly on the
2041 iss |= cookie.cookie ^ (hash >> 24);
2043 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_sendcookie);
2047 static struct syncache *
2048 syncookie_lookup(struct in_conninfo *inc, struct syncache_head *sch,
2049 struct syncache *sc, struct tcphdr *th, struct tcpopt *to,
2055 int wnd, wscale = 0;
2056 union syncookie cookie;
2058 SCH_LOCK_ASSERT(sch);
2061 * Pull information out of SYN-ACK/ACK and revert sequence number
2064 ack = th->th_ack - 1;
2065 seq = th->th_seq - 1;
2068 * Unpack the flags containing enough information to restore the
2071 cookie.cookie = (ack & 0xff) ^ (ack >> 24);
2073 /* Which of the two secrets to use. */
2074 secbits = sch->sch_sc->secret.key[cookie.flags.odd_even];
2076 hash = syncookie_mac(inc, seq, cookie.cookie, secbits, (uintptr_t)sch);
2078 /* The recomputed hash matches the ACK if this was a genuine cookie. */
2079 if ((ack & ~0xff) != (hash & ~0xff))
2082 /* Fill in the syncache values. */
2084 bcopy(inc, &sc->sc_inc, sizeof(struct in_conninfo));
2085 sc->sc_ipopts = NULL;
2090 switch (inc->inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6) {
2093 sc->sc_ip_ttl = sotoinpcb(lso)->inp_ip_ttl;
2094 sc->sc_ip_tos = sotoinpcb(lso)->inp_ip_tos;
2099 if (sotoinpcb(lso)->inp_flags & IN6P_AUTOFLOWLABEL)
2100 sc->sc_flowlabel = sc->sc_iss & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK;
2105 sc->sc_peer_mss = tcp_sc_msstab[cookie.flags.mss_idx];
2107 /* We can simply recompute receive window scale we sent earlier. */
2108 while (wscale < TCP_MAX_WINSHIFT && (TCP_MAXWIN << wscale) < sb_max)
2111 /* Only use wscale if it was enabled in the orignal SYN. */
2112 if (cookie.flags.wscale_idx > 0) {
2113 sc->sc_requested_r_scale = wscale;
2114 sc->sc_requested_s_scale = tcp_sc_wstab[cookie.flags.wscale_idx];
2115 sc->sc_flags |= SCF_WINSCALE;
2118 wnd = lso->sol_sbrcv_hiwat;
2120 wnd = imin(wnd, TCP_MAXWIN);
2123 if (cookie.flags.sack_ok)
2124 sc->sc_flags |= SCF_SACK;
2126 if (to->to_flags & TOF_TS) {
2127 sc->sc_flags |= SCF_TIMESTAMP;
2128 sc->sc_tsreflect = to->to_tsval;
2129 sc->sc_tsoff = tcp_new_ts_offset(inc);
2132 if (to->to_flags & TOF_SIGNATURE)
2133 sc->sc_flags |= SCF_SIGNATURE;
2137 TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sc_recvcookie);
2143 syncookie_cmp(struct in_conninfo *inc, struct syncache_head *sch,
2144 struct syncache *sc, struct tcphdr *th, struct tcpopt *to,
2147 struct syncache scs, *scx;
2150 bzero(&scs, sizeof(scs));
2151 scx = syncookie_lookup(inc, sch, &scs, th, to, lso);
2153 if ((s = tcp_log_addrs(inc, th, NULL, NULL)) == NULL)
2157 if (sc->sc_peer_mss != scx->sc_peer_mss)
2158 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: mss different %i vs %i\n",
2159 s, __func__, sc->sc_peer_mss, scx->sc_peer_mss);
2161 if (sc->sc_requested_r_scale != scx->sc_requested_r_scale)
2162 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: rwscale different %i vs %i\n",
2163 s, __func__, sc->sc_requested_r_scale,
2164 scx->sc_requested_r_scale);
2166 if (sc->sc_requested_s_scale != scx->sc_requested_s_scale)
2167 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: swscale different %i vs %i\n",
2168 s, __func__, sc->sc_requested_s_scale,
2169 scx->sc_requested_s_scale);
2171 if ((sc->sc_flags & SCF_SACK) != (scx->sc_flags & SCF_SACK))
2172 log(LOG_DEBUG, "%s; %s: SACK different\n", s, __func__);
2179 #endif /* INVARIANTS */
2182 syncookie_reseed(void *arg)
2184 struct tcp_syncache *sc = arg;
2189 * Reseeding the secret doesn't have to be protected by a lock.
2190 * It only must be ensured that the new random values are visible
2191 * to all CPUs in a SMP environment. The atomic with release
2192 * semantics ensures that.
2194 secbit = (sc->secret.oddeven & 0x1) ? 0 : 1;
2195 secbits = sc->secret.key[secbit];
2196 arc4rand(secbits, SYNCOOKIE_SECRET_SIZE, 0);
2197 atomic_add_rel_int(&sc->secret.oddeven, 1);
2199 /* Reschedule ourself. */
2200 callout_schedule(&sc->secret.reseed, SYNCOOKIE_LIFETIME * hz);
2204 * Exports the syncache entries to userland so that netstat can display
2205 * them alongside the other sockets. This function is intended to be
2206 * called only from tcp_pcblist.
2208 * Due to concurrency on an active system, the number of pcbs exported
2209 * may have no relation to max_pcbs. max_pcbs merely indicates the
2210 * amount of space the caller allocated for this function to use.
2213 syncache_pcblist(struct sysctl_req *req, int max_pcbs, int *pcbs_exported)
2216 struct syncache *sc;
2217 struct syncache_head *sch;
2218 int count, error, i;
2220 for (count = 0, error = 0, i = 0; i < V_tcp_syncache.hashsize; i++) {
2221 sch = &V_tcp_syncache.hashbase[i];
2223 TAILQ_FOREACH(sc, &sch->sch_bucket, sc_hash) {
2224 if (count >= max_pcbs) {
2228 if (cr_cansee(req->td->td_ucred, sc->sc_cred) != 0)
2230 bzero(&xt, sizeof(xt));
2231 xt.xt_len = sizeof(xt);
2232 if (sc->sc_inc.inc_flags & INC_ISIPV6)
2233 xt.xt_inp.inp_vflag = INP_IPV6;
2235 xt.xt_inp.inp_vflag = INP_IPV4;
2236 bcopy(&sc->sc_inc, &xt.xt_inp.inp_inc,
2237 sizeof (struct in_conninfo));
2238 xt.t_state = TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED;
2239 xt.xt_inp.xi_socket.xso_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
2240 xt.xt_inp.xi_socket.xso_len = sizeof (struct xsocket);
2241 xt.xt_inp.xi_socket.so_type = SOCK_STREAM;
2242 xt.xt_inp.xi_socket.so_state = SS_ISCONNECTING;
2243 error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &xt, sizeof xt);
2253 *pcbs_exported = count;