2 * validator/val_utils.c - validator utility functions.
4 * Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved.
6 * This software is open source.
8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
12 * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
13 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15 * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
16 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
17 * and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
19 * Neither the name of the NLNET LABS nor the names of its contributors may
20 * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
21 * specific prior written permission.
23 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
24 * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
25 * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
26 * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
27 * HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
28 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
29 * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
30 * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
31 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
32 * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
33 * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
39 * This file contains helper functions for the validator module.
42 #include "validator/val_utils.h"
43 #include "validator/validator.h"
44 #include "validator/val_kentry.h"
45 #include "validator/val_sigcrypt.h"
46 #include "validator/val_anchor.h"
47 #include "validator/val_nsec.h"
48 #include "validator/val_neg.h"
49 #include "services/cache/rrset.h"
50 #include "services/cache/dns.h"
51 #include "util/data/msgreply.h"
52 #include "util/data/packed_rrset.h"
53 #include "util/data/dname.h"
54 #include "util/net_help.h"
55 #include "util/module.h"
56 #include "util/regional.h"
57 #include "sldns/wire2str.h"
58 #include "sldns/parseutil.h"
60 enum val_classification
61 val_classify_response(uint16_t query_flags, struct query_info* origqinf,
62 struct query_info* qinf, struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip)
64 int rcode = (int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(rep->flags);
67 /* Normal Name Error's are easy to detect -- but don't mistake a CNAME
68 * chain ending in NXDOMAIN. */
69 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN && rep->an_numrrsets == 0)
70 return VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR;
72 /* check for referral: nonRD query and it looks like a nodata */
73 if(!(query_flags&BIT_RD) && rep->an_numrrsets == 0 &&
74 rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) {
75 /* SOA record in auth indicates it is NODATA instead.
76 * All validation requiring NODATA messages have SOA in
77 * authority section. */
78 /* uses fact that answer section is empty */
80 for(i=0; i<rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
81 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)
82 return VAL_CLASS_NODATA;
83 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS)
84 return VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL;
85 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS)
88 return saw_ns?VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL:VAL_CLASS_NODATA;
90 /* root referral where NS set is in the answer section */
91 if(!(query_flags&BIT_RD) && rep->ns_numrrsets == 0 &&
92 rep->an_numrrsets == 1 && rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR &&
93 ntohs(rep->rrsets[0]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS &&
94 query_dname_compare(rep->rrsets[0]->rk.dname,
95 origqinf->qname) != 0)
96 return VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL;
98 /* dump bad messages */
99 if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN)
100 return VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN;
101 /* next check if the skip into the answer section shows no answer */
102 if(skip>0 && rep->an_numrrsets <= skip)
103 return VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER;
106 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rep->an_numrrsets == 0)
107 return VAL_CLASS_NODATA;
109 /* We distinguish between CNAME response and other positive/negative
110 * responses because CNAME answers require extra processing. */
112 /* We distinguish between ANY and CNAME or POSITIVE because
113 * ANY responses are validated differently. */
114 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && qinf->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_ANY)
115 return VAL_CLASS_ANY;
117 /* Note that DNAMEs will be ignored here, unless qtype=DNAME. Unless
118 * qtype=CNAME, this will yield a CNAME response. */
119 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
120 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR &&
121 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == qinf->qtype)
122 return VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE;
123 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME)
124 return VAL_CLASS_CNAME;
126 log_dns_msg("validator: error. failed to classify response message: ",
128 return VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN;
131 /** Get signer name from RRSIG */
133 rrsig_get_signer(uint8_t* data, size_t len, uint8_t** sname, size_t* slen)
135 /* RRSIG rdata is not allowed to be compressed, it is stored
136 * uncompressed in memory as well, so return a ptr to the name */
139 * short, byte, byte, long, long, long, short, "." is
140 * 2 1 1 4 4 4 2 1 = 19
141 * and a skip of 18 bytes to the name.
142 * +2 for the rdatalen is 21 bytes len for root label */
147 data += 20; /* skip the fixed size bits */
149 *slen = dname_valid(data, len);
151 /* bad dname in this rrsig. */
159 val_find_rrset_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t** sname,
162 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
164 /* return signer for first signature, or NULL */
165 if(d->rrsig_count == 0) {
170 /* get rrsig signer name out of the signature */
171 rrsig_get_signer(d->rr_data[d->count], d->rr_len[d->count],
176 * Find best signer name in this set of rrsigs.
177 * @param rrset: which rrsigs to look through.
178 * @param qinf: the query name that needs validation.
179 * @param signer_name: the best signer_name. Updated if a better one is found.
180 * @param signer_len: length of signer name.
181 * @param matchcount: count of current best name (starts at 0 for no match).
182 * Updated if match is improved.
185 val_find_best_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset,
186 struct query_info* qinf, uint8_t** signer_name, size_t* signer_len,
189 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
194 for(i=d->count; i<d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++) {
195 sign = d->rr_data[i]+2+18;
196 /* look at signatures that are valid (long enough),
197 * and have a signer name that is a superdomain of qname,
198 * and then check the number of labels in the shared topdomain
199 * improve the match if possible */
200 if(d->rr_len[i] > 2+19 && /* rdata, sig + root label*/
201 dname_subdomain_c(qinf->qname, sign)) {
202 (void)dname_lab_cmp(qinf->qname,
203 dname_count_labels(qinf->qname),
204 sign, dname_count_labels(sign), &m);
205 if(m > *matchcount) {
208 (void)dname_count_size_labels(*signer_name,
216 val_find_signer(enum val_classification subtype, struct query_info* qinf,
217 struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip, uint8_t** signer_name,
222 if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE) {
223 /* check for the answer rrset */
224 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
225 if(query_dname_compare(qinf->qname,
226 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0) {
227 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i],
228 signer_name, signer_len);
234 } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME) {
235 /* check for the first signed cname/dname rrset */
236 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
237 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i],
238 signer_name, signer_len);
241 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME)
242 break; /* only check CNAME after a DNAME */
246 } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR
247 || subtype == VAL_CLASS_NODATA) {
248 /*Check to see if the AUTH section NSEC record(s) have rrsigs*/
249 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<
250 rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
251 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC
252 || ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) ==
253 LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
254 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i],
255 signer_name, signer_len);
259 } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER) {
260 /* find closest superdomain signer name in authority section
265 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->
267 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC
268 || ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) ==
269 LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
270 val_find_best_signer(rep->rrsets[i], qinf,
271 signer_name, signer_len, &matchcount);
274 } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_ANY) {
275 /* check for one of the answer rrset that has signatures,
276 * or potentially a DNAME is in use with a different qname */
277 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
278 if(query_dname_compare(qinf->qname,
279 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0) {
280 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i],
281 signer_name, signer_len);
286 /* no answer RRSIGs with qname, try a DNAME */
287 if(skip < rep->an_numrrsets &&
288 ntohs(rep->rrsets[skip]->rk.type) ==
289 LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) {
290 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[skip],
291 signer_name, signer_len);
297 } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) {
298 /* find keys for the item at skip */
299 if(skip < rep->rrset_count) {
300 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[skip],
301 signer_name, signer_len);
307 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "find_signer: could not find signer name"
308 " for unknown type response");
314 /** return number of rrs in an rrset */
316 rrset_get_count(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset)
318 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
324 /** return TTL of rrset */
326 rrset_get_ttl(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset)
328 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
335 val_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
336 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* keys,
337 uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason)
340 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
342 if(d->security == sec_status_secure) {
343 /* re-verify all other statuses, because keyset may change*/
344 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset cached",
345 rrset->rk.dname, ntohs(rrset->rk.type),
346 ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
349 /* check in the cache if verification has already been done */
350 rrset_check_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, rrset, *env->now);
351 if(d->security == sec_status_secure) {
352 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset from cache",
353 rrset->rk.dname, ntohs(rrset->rk.type),
354 ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
357 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset", rrset->rk.dname,
358 ntohs(rrset->rk.type), ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
359 sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, keys, sigalg, reason);
360 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "verify result: %s", sec_status_to_string(sec));
361 regional_free_all(env->scratch);
363 /* update rrset security status
364 * only improves security status
365 * and bogus is set only once, even if we rechecked the status */
366 if(sec > d->security) {
368 if(sec == sec_status_secure)
369 d->trust = rrset_trust_validated;
370 else if(sec == sec_status_bogus) {
372 /* update ttl for rrset to fixed value. */
373 d->ttl = ve->bogus_ttl;
374 for(i=0; i<d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++)
375 d->rr_ttl[i] = ve->bogus_ttl;
376 /* leave RR specific TTL: not used for determine
377 * if RRset timed out and clients see proper value. */
378 lock_basic_lock(&ve->bogus_lock);
379 ve->num_rrset_bogus++;
380 lock_basic_unlock(&ve->bogus_lock);
382 /* if status updated - store in cache for reuse */
383 rrset_update_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, rrset, *env->now);
390 val_verify_rrset_entry(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
391 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct key_entry_key* kkey,
394 /* temporary dnskey rrset-key */
395 struct ub_packed_rrset_key dnskey;
396 struct key_entry_data* kd = (struct key_entry_data*)kkey->entry.data;
398 dnskey.rk.type = htons(kd->rrset_type);
399 dnskey.rk.rrset_class = htons(kkey->key_class);
401 dnskey.rk.dname = kkey->name;
402 dnskey.rk.dname_len = kkey->namelen;
403 dnskey.entry.key = &dnskey;
404 dnskey.entry.data = kd->rrset_data;
405 sec = val_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, &dnskey, kd->algo, reason);
409 /** verify that a DS RR hashes to a key and that key signs the set */
410 static enum sec_status
411 verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
412 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
413 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, size_t ds_idx, char** reason)
415 enum sec_status sec = sec_status_bogus;
416 size_t i, num, numchecked = 0, numhashok = 0;
417 num = rrset_get_count(dnskey_rrset);
418 for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
419 /* Skip DNSKEYs that don't match the basic criteria. */
420 if(ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx)
421 != dnskey_get_algo(dnskey_rrset, i)
422 || dnskey_calc_keytag(dnskey_rrset, i)
423 != ds_get_keytag(ds_rrset, ds_idx)) {
427 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "attempt DS match algo %d keytag %d",
428 ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx),
429 ds_get_keytag(ds_rrset, ds_idx));
431 /* Convert the candidate DNSKEY into a hash using the
432 * same DS hash algorithm. */
433 if(!ds_digest_match_dnskey(env, dnskey_rrset, i, ds_rrset,
435 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS match attempt failed");
439 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS match digest ok, trying signature");
441 /* Otherwise, we have a match! Make sure that the DNSKEY
442 * verifies *with this key* */
443 sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset,
444 dnskey_rrset, i, reason);
445 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
448 /* If it didn't validate with the DNSKEY, try the next one! */
451 algo_needs_reason(env, ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx),
452 reason, "no keys have a DS");
453 else if(numhashok == 0)
454 *reason = "DS hash mismatches key";
456 *reason = "keyset not secured by DNSKEY that matches DS";
457 return sec_status_bogus;
460 int val_favorite_ds_algo(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset)
462 size_t i, num = rrset_get_count(ds_rrset);
463 int d, digest_algo = 0; /* DS digest algo 0 is not used. */
464 /* find favorite algo, for now, highest number supported */
465 for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
466 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) ||
467 !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i)) {
470 d = ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i);
478 val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
479 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
480 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason)
482 /* as long as this is false, we can consider this DS rrset to be
483 * equivalent to no DS rrset. */
484 int has_useful_ds = 0, digest_algo, alg;
485 struct algo_needs needs;
489 if(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ds_rrset->rk.dname_len ||
490 query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ds_rrset->rk.dname)
492 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset "
494 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name";
495 return sec_status_bogus;
499 /* harden against algo downgrade is enabled */
500 digest_algo = val_favorite_ds_algo(ds_rrset);
501 algo_needs_init_ds(&needs, ds_rrset, digest_algo, sigalg);
503 /* accept any key algo, any digest algo */
506 num = rrset_get_count(ds_rrset);
507 for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
508 /* Check to see if we can understand this DS.
509 * And check it is the strongest digest */
510 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) ||
511 !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) ||
512 (sigalg && (ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i) != digest_algo))) {
516 /* Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and
517 * algorithm, we cannot return INSECURE (with a
518 * "null" KeyEntry). */
521 sec = verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(env, ve, dnskey_rrset,
522 ds_rrset, i, reason);
523 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
524 if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
525 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i))) {
526 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS matched DNSKEY.");
527 return sec_status_secure;
529 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) {
530 algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs,
531 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i));
535 /* None of the DS's worked out. */
537 /* If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK. */
539 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No usable DS records were found -- "
540 "treating as insecure.");
541 return sec_status_insecure;
543 /* If any were understandable, then it is bad. */
544 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Failed to match any usable DS to a DNSKEY.");
545 if(sigalg && (alg=algo_needs_missing(&needs)) != 0) {
546 algo_needs_reason(env, alg, reason, "missing verification of "
549 return sec_status_bogus;
552 struct key_entry_key*
553 val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(struct regional* region, struct module_env* env,
554 struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
555 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, int downprot, char** reason)
557 uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1];
558 enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(env, ve,
559 dnskey_rrset, ds_rrset, downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason);
561 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
562 return key_entry_create_rrset(region,
563 ds_rrset->rk.dname, ds_rrset->rk.dname_len,
564 ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class), dnskey_rrset,
565 downprot?sigalg:NULL, *env->now);
566 } else if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
567 return key_entry_create_null(region, ds_rrset->rk.dname,
568 ds_rrset->rk.dname_len,
569 ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
570 rrset_get_ttl(ds_rrset), *env->now);
572 return key_entry_create_bad(region, ds_rrset->rk.dname,
573 ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
574 BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *env->now);
578 val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
579 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
580 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds,
581 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason)
583 /* as long as this is false, we can consider this anchor to be
584 * equivalent to no anchor. */
585 int has_useful_ta = 0, digest_algo = 0, alg;
586 struct algo_needs needs;
590 if(ta_ds && (dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ta_ds->rk.dname_len ||
591 query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ta_ds->rk.dname)
593 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset "
595 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name";
596 return sec_status_bogus;
598 if(ta_dnskey && (dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ta_dnskey->rk.dname_len
599 || query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ta_dnskey->rk.dname)
601 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match anchor RRset "
603 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match anchor RRset by name";
604 return sec_status_bogus;
608 digest_algo = val_favorite_ds_algo(ta_ds);
611 algo_needs_init_ds(&needs, ta_ds, digest_algo, sigalg);
612 else memset(&needs, 0, sizeof(needs));
614 algo_needs_init_dnskey_add(&needs, ta_dnskey, sigalg);
617 num = rrset_get_count(ta_ds);
618 for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
619 /* Check to see if we can understand this DS.
620 * And check it is the strongest digest */
621 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ta_ds, i) ||
622 !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ta_ds, i) ||
623 ds_get_digest_algo(ta_ds, i) != digest_algo)
626 /* Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and
627 * algorithm, we cannot return INSECURE (with a
628 * "null" KeyEntry). */
631 sec = verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(env, ve, dnskey_rrset,
633 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
634 if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
635 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ta_ds, i))) {
636 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS matched DNSKEY.");
637 return sec_status_secure;
639 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) {
640 algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs,
641 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ta_ds, i));
646 /* None of the DS's worked out: check the DNSKEYs. */
648 num = rrset_get_count(ta_dnskey);
649 for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
650 /* Check to see if we can understand this DNSKEY */
651 if(!dnskey_algo_is_supported(ta_dnskey, i))
654 /* we saw a useful TA */
657 sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset,
658 ta_dnskey, i, reason);
659 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
660 if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
661 (uint8_t)dnskey_get_algo(ta_dnskey, i))) {
662 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "anchor matched DNSKEY.");
663 return sec_status_secure;
665 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) {
666 algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs,
667 (uint8_t)dnskey_get_algo(ta_dnskey, i));
672 /* If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK. */
674 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No usable trust anchors were found -- "
675 "treating as insecure.");
676 return sec_status_insecure;
678 /* If any were understandable, then it is bad. */
679 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Failed to match any usable anchor to a DNSKEY.");
680 if(sigalg && (alg=algo_needs_missing(&needs)) != 0) {
681 algo_needs_reason(env, alg, reason, "missing verification of "
684 return sec_status_bogus;
687 struct key_entry_key*
688 val_verify_new_DNSKEYs_with_ta(struct regional* region, struct module_env* env,
689 struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
690 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds_rrset,
691 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey_rrset, int downprot,
694 uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1];
695 enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(env, ve,
696 dnskey_rrset, ta_ds_rrset, ta_dnskey_rrset,
697 downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason);
699 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
700 return key_entry_create_rrset(region,
701 dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len,
702 ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class), dnskey_rrset,
703 downprot?sigalg:NULL, *env->now);
704 } else if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
705 return key_entry_create_null(region, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname,
706 dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len,
707 ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
708 rrset_get_ttl(dnskey_rrset), *env->now);
710 return key_entry_create_bad(region, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname,
711 dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len, ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
712 BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *env->now);
716 val_dsset_isusable(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset)
719 for(i=0; i<rrset_get_count(ds_rrset); i++) {
720 if(ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) &&
721 ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i))
724 if(verbosity < VERB_ALGO)
726 if(rrset_get_count(ds_rrset) == 0)
727 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS is not usable");
729 /* report usability for the first DS RR */
730 sldns_lookup_table *lt;
731 char herr[64], aerr[64];
732 lt = sldns_lookup_by_id(sldns_hashes,
733 (int)ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i));
734 if(lt) snprintf(herr, sizeof(herr), "%s", lt->name);
735 else snprintf(herr, sizeof(herr), "%d",
736 (int)ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i));
737 lt = sldns_lookup_by_id(sldns_algorithms,
738 (int)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i));
739 if(lt) snprintf(aerr, sizeof(aerr), "%s", lt->name);
740 else snprintf(aerr, sizeof(aerr), "%d",
741 (int)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i));
742 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS unsupported, hash %s %s, "
743 "key algorithm %s %s", herr,
744 (ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, 0)?
745 "(supported)":"(unsupported)"), aerr,
746 (ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, 0)?
747 "(supported)":"(unsupported)"));
752 /** get label count for a signature */
754 rrsig_get_labcount(struct packed_rrset_data* d, size_t sig)
756 if(d->rr_len[sig] < 2+4)
757 return 0; /* bad sig length */
758 return d->rr_data[sig][2+3];
762 val_rrset_wildcard(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t** wc)
764 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
770 if(d->rrsig_count == 0) {
773 labcount = rrsig_get_labcount(d, d->count + 0);
774 /* check rest of signatures identical */
775 for(i=1; i<d->rrsig_count; i++) {
776 if(labcount != rrsig_get_labcount(d, d->count + i)) {
780 /* OK the rrsigs check out */
781 /* if the RRSIG label count is shorter than the number of actual
782 * labels, then this rrset was synthesized from a wildcard.
783 * Note that the RRSIG label count doesn't count the root label. */
784 wn = rrset->rk.dname;
785 wl = rrset->rk.dname_len;
786 /* skip a leading wildcard label in the dname (RFC4035 2.2) */
787 if(dname_is_wild(wn)) {
791 labdiff = (dname_count_labels(wn) - 1) - (int)labcount;
794 dname_remove_labels(wc, &wl, labdiff);
801 val_chase_cname(struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* rep,
802 size_t* cname_skip) {
804 /* skip any DNAMEs, go to the CNAME for next part */
805 for(i = *cname_skip; i < rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
806 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME &&
807 query_dname_compare(qchase->qname, rep->rrsets[i]->
809 qchase->qname = NULL;
810 get_cname_target(rep->rrsets[i], &qchase->qname,
813 return 0; /* bad CNAME rdata */
818 return 0; /* CNAME classified but no matching CNAME ?! */
821 /** see if rrset has signer name as one of the rrsig signers */
823 rrset_has_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t* name, size_t len)
825 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
828 for(i = d->count; i< d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++) {
829 if(d->rr_len[i] > 2+18+len) {
830 /* at least rdatalen + signature + signame (+1 sig)*/
831 if(!dname_valid(d->rr_data[i]+2+18, d->rr_len[i]-2-18))
833 if(query_dname_compare(name, d->rr_data[i]+2+18) == 0)
843 val_fill_reply(struct reply_info* chase, struct reply_info* orig,
844 size_t skip, uint8_t* name, size_t len, uint8_t* signer)
848 chase->rrset_count = 0;
849 chase->an_numrrsets = 0;
850 chase->ns_numrrsets = 0;
851 chase->ar_numrrsets = 0;
853 for(i=skip; i<orig->an_numrrsets; i++) {
855 if(query_dname_compare(name,
856 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0)
857 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] =
859 } else if(seen_dname && ntohs(orig->rrsets[i]->rk.type) ==
860 LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) {
861 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
863 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) {
864 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
865 if(ntohs(orig->rrsets[i]->rk.type) ==
866 LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) {
871 /* AUTHORITY section */
872 for(i = (skip > orig->an_numrrsets)?skip:orig->an_numrrsets;
873 i<orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets;
876 if(query_dname_compare(name,
877 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0)
878 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+
879 chase->ns_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
880 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) {
881 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+
882 chase->ns_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
885 /* ADDITIONAL section */
886 for(i= (skip>orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets)?
887 skip:orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets;
888 i<orig->rrset_count; i++) {
890 if(query_dname_compare(name,
891 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0)
892 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets
893 +orig->ns_numrrsets+chase->ar_numrrsets++]
895 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) {
896 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets+
897 chase->ar_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
900 chase->rrset_count = chase->an_numrrsets + chase->ns_numrrsets +
904 void val_reply_remove_auth(struct reply_info* rep, size_t index)
906 log_assert(index < rep->rrset_count);
907 log_assert(index >= rep->an_numrrsets);
908 log_assert(index < rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets);
909 memmove(rep->rrsets+index, rep->rrsets+index+1,
910 sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*)*
911 (rep->rrset_count - index - 1));
917 val_check_nonsecure(struct val_env* ve, struct reply_info* rep)
921 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
922 if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data)
923 ->security != sec_status_secure) {
924 /* because we want to return the authentic original
925 * message when presented with CD-flagged queries,
926 * we need to preserve AUTHORITY section data.
927 * However, this rrset is not signed or signed
928 * with the wrong keys. Validation has tried to
929 * verify this rrset with the keysets of import.
930 * But this rrset did not verify.
931 * Therefore the message is bogus.
934 /* check if authority consists of only an NS record
935 * which is bad, and there is an answer section with
936 * data. In that case, delete NS and additional to
937 * be lenient and make a minimal response */
938 if(rep->an_numrrsets != 0 && rep->ns_numrrsets == 1 &&
939 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type)
940 == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) {
941 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "truncate to minimal");
942 rep->ns_numrrsets = 0;
943 rep->ar_numrrsets = 0;
944 rep->rrset_count = rep->an_numrrsets;
948 log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "message is bogus, "
950 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname,
951 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type),
952 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.rrset_class));
953 rep->security = sec_status_bogus;
958 if(!ve->clean_additional)
960 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
961 if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data)
962 ->security != sec_status_secure) {
963 /* This does not cause message invalidation. It was
964 * simply unsigned data in the additional. The
965 * RRSIG must have been truncated off the message.
967 * However, we do not want to return possible bogus
968 * data to clients that rely on this service for
969 * their authentication.
971 /* remove this unneeded additional rrset */
972 memmove(rep->rrsets+i, rep->rrsets+i+1,
973 sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*)*
974 (rep->rrset_count - i - 1));
982 /** check no anchor and unlock */
984 check_no_anchor(struct val_anchors* anchors, uint8_t* nm, size_t l, uint16_t c)
986 struct trust_anchor* ta;
987 if((ta=anchors_lookup(anchors, nm, l, c))) {
988 lock_basic_unlock(&ta->lock);
994 val_mark_indeterminate(struct reply_info* rep, struct val_anchors* anchors,
995 struct rrset_cache* r, struct module_env* env)
998 struct packed_rrset_data* d;
999 for(i=0; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
1000 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
1001 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked &&
1002 check_no_anchor(anchors, rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname,
1003 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname_len,
1004 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.rrset_class)))
1006 /* mark as indeterminate */
1007 d->security = sec_status_indeterminate;
1008 rrset_update_sec_status(r, rep->rrsets[i], *env->now);
1014 val_mark_insecure(struct reply_info* rep, uint8_t* kname,
1015 struct rrset_cache* r, struct module_env* env)
1018 struct packed_rrset_data* d;
1019 for(i=0; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
1020 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
1021 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked &&
1022 dname_subdomain_c(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, kname)) {
1023 /* mark as insecure */
1024 d->security = sec_status_insecure;
1025 rrset_update_sec_status(r, rep->rrsets[i], *env->now);
1031 val_next_unchecked(struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip)
1034 struct packed_rrset_data* d;
1035 for(i=skip+1; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
1036 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
1037 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked) {
1041 return rep->rrset_count;
1045 val_classification_to_string(enum val_classification subtype)
1048 case VAL_CLASS_UNTYPED: return "untyped";
1049 case VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN: return "unknown";
1050 case VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE: return "positive";
1051 case VAL_CLASS_CNAME: return "cname";
1052 case VAL_CLASS_NODATA: return "nodata";
1053 case VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR: return "nameerror";
1054 case VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER: return "cnamenoanswer";
1055 case VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL: return "referral";
1056 case VAL_CLASS_ANY: return "qtype_any";
1058 return "bad_val_classification";
1062 /** log a sock_list entry */
1064 sock_list_logentry(enum verbosity_value v, const char* s, struct sock_list* p)
1067 log_addr(v, s, &p->addr, p->len);
1068 else verbose(v, "%s cache", s);
1071 void val_blacklist(struct sock_list** blacklist, struct regional* region,
1072 struct sock_list* origin, int cross)
1074 /* debug printout */
1075 if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) {
1076 struct sock_list* p;
1077 for(p=*blacklist; p; p=p->next)
1078 sock_list_logentry(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist", p);
1080 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist add: cache");
1081 for(p=origin; p; p=p->next)
1082 sock_list_logentry(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist add", p);
1084 /* blacklist the IPs or the cache */
1086 /* only add if nothing there. anything else also stops cache*/
1088 sock_list_insert(blacklist, NULL, 0, region);
1090 sock_list_prepend(blacklist, origin);
1091 else sock_list_merge(blacklist, region, origin);
1094 int val_has_signed_nsecs(struct reply_info* rep, char** reason)
1096 size_t i, num_nsec = 0, num_nsec3 = 0;
1097 struct packed_rrset_data* d;
1098 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
1099 if(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type == htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC))
1101 else if(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type == htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3))
1104 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
1105 if(d && d->rrsig_count != 0) {
1109 if(num_nsec == 0 && num_nsec3 == 0)
1110 *reason = "no DNSSEC records";
1111 else if(num_nsec != 0)
1112 *reason = "no signatures over NSECs";
1113 else *reason = "no signatures over NSEC3s";
1118 val_find_DS(struct module_env* env, uint8_t* nm, size_t nmlen, uint16_t c,
1119 struct regional* region, uint8_t* topname)
1121 struct dns_msg* msg;
1122 struct query_info qinfo;
1123 struct ub_packed_rrset_key *rrset = rrset_cache_lookup(
1124 env->rrset_cache, nm, nmlen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, c, 0,
1127 /* DS rrset exists. Return it to the validator immediately*/
1128 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* copy = packed_rrset_copy_region(
1129 rrset, region, *env->now);
1130 lock_rw_unlock(&rrset->entry.lock);
1133 msg = dns_msg_create(nm, nmlen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, c, region, 1);
1136 msg->rep->rrsets[0] = copy;
1137 msg->rep->rrset_count++;
1138 msg->rep->an_numrrsets++;
1141 /* lookup in rrset and negative cache for NSEC/NSEC3 */
1143 qinfo.qname_len = nmlen;
1144 qinfo.qtype = LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS;
1146 qinfo.local_alias = NULL;
1147 /* do not add SOA to reply message, it is going to be used internal */
1148 msg = val_neg_getmsg(env->neg_cache, &qinfo, region, env->rrset_cache,
1149 env->scratch_buffer, *env->now, 0, topname);