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1 /*
2  * validator/val_utils.c - validator utility functions.
3  *
4  * Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved.
5  *
6  * This software is open source.
7  * 
8  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10  * are met:
11  * 
12  * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
13  * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
14  * 
15  * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
16  * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
17  * and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
18  * 
19  * Neither the name of the NLNET LABS nor the names of its contributors may
20  * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
21  * specific prior written permission.
22  * 
23  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
24  * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
25  * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
26  * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
27  * HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
28  * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
29  * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
30  * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
31  * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
32  * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
33  * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
34  */
35
36 /**
37  * \file
38  *
39  * This file contains helper functions for the validator module.
40  */
41 #include "config.h"
42 #include "validator/val_utils.h"
43 #include "validator/validator.h"
44 #include "validator/val_kentry.h"
45 #include "validator/val_sigcrypt.h"
46 #include "validator/val_anchor.h"
47 #include "validator/val_nsec.h"
48 #include "validator/val_neg.h"
49 #include "services/cache/rrset.h"
50 #include "services/cache/dns.h"
51 #include "util/data/msgreply.h"
52 #include "util/data/packed_rrset.h"
53 #include "util/data/dname.h"
54 #include "util/net_help.h"
55 #include "util/module.h"
56 #include "util/regional.h"
57 #include "sldns/wire2str.h"
58 #include "sldns/parseutil.h"
59
60 enum val_classification 
61 val_classify_response(uint16_t query_flags, struct query_info* origqinf,
62         struct query_info* qinf, struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip)
63 {
64         int rcode = (int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(rep->flags);
65         size_t i;
66
67         /* Normal Name Error's are easy to detect -- but don't mistake a CNAME
68          * chain ending in NXDOMAIN. */
69         if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN && rep->an_numrrsets == 0)
70                 return VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR;
71
72         /* check for referral: nonRD query and it looks like a nodata */
73         if(!(query_flags&BIT_RD) && rep->an_numrrsets == 0 &&
74                 rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) {
75                 /* SOA record in auth indicates it is NODATA instead.
76                  * All validation requiring NODATA messages have SOA in 
77                  * authority section. */
78                 /* uses fact that answer section is empty */
79                 int saw_ns = 0;
80                 for(i=0; i<rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
81                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)
82                                 return VAL_CLASS_NODATA;
83                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS)
84                                 return VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL;
85                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS)
86                                 saw_ns = 1;
87                 }
88                 return saw_ns?VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL:VAL_CLASS_NODATA;
89         }
90         /* root referral where NS set is in the answer section */
91         if(!(query_flags&BIT_RD) && rep->ns_numrrsets == 0 &&
92                 rep->an_numrrsets == 1 && rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR &&
93                 ntohs(rep->rrsets[0]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS &&
94                 query_dname_compare(rep->rrsets[0]->rk.dname, 
95                         origqinf->qname) != 0)
96                 return VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL;
97
98         /* dump bad messages */
99         if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN)
100                 return VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN;
101         /* next check if the skip into the answer section shows no answer */
102         if(skip>0 && rep->an_numrrsets <= skip)
103                 return VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER;
104
105         /* Next is NODATA */
106         if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rep->an_numrrsets == 0)
107                 return VAL_CLASS_NODATA;
108         
109         /* We distinguish between CNAME response and other positive/negative
110          * responses because CNAME answers require extra processing. */
111
112         /* We distinguish between ANY and CNAME or POSITIVE because 
113          * ANY responses are validated differently. */
114         if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && qinf->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_ANY)
115                 return VAL_CLASS_ANY;
116         
117         /* Note that DNAMEs will be ignored here, unless qtype=DNAME. Unless
118          * qtype=CNAME, this will yield a CNAME response. */
119         for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
120                 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR &&
121                         ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == qinf->qtype)
122                         return VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE;
123                 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME)
124                         return VAL_CLASS_CNAME;
125         }
126         log_dns_msg("validator: error. failed to classify response message: ",
127                 qinf, rep);
128         return VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN;
129 }
130
131 /** Get signer name from RRSIG */
132 static void
133 rrsig_get_signer(uint8_t* data, size_t len, uint8_t** sname, size_t* slen)
134 {
135         /* RRSIG rdata is not allowed to be compressed, it is stored
136          * uncompressed in memory as well, so return a ptr to the name */
137         if(len < 21) {
138                 /* too short RRSig:
139                  * short, byte, byte, long, long, long, short, "." is
140                  * 2    1       1       4       4  4    2       1 = 19
141                  *                      and a skip of 18 bytes to the name.
142                  * +2 for the rdatalen is 21 bytes len for root label */
143                 *sname = NULL;
144                 *slen = 0;
145                 return;
146         }
147         data += 20; /* skip the fixed size bits */
148         len -= 20;
149         *slen = dname_valid(data, len);
150         if(!*slen) {
151                 /* bad dname in this rrsig. */
152                 *sname = NULL;
153                 return;
154         }
155         *sname = data;
156 }
157
158 void 
159 val_find_rrset_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t** sname,
160         size_t* slen)
161 {
162         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
163                 rrset->entry.data;
164         /* return signer for first signature, or NULL */
165         if(d->rrsig_count == 0) {
166                 *sname = NULL;
167                 *slen = 0;
168                 return;
169         }
170         /* get rrsig signer name out of the signature */
171         rrsig_get_signer(d->rr_data[d->count], d->rr_len[d->count], 
172                 sname, slen);
173 }
174
175 /**
176  * Find best signer name in this set of rrsigs.
177  * @param rrset: which rrsigs to look through.
178  * @param qinf: the query name that needs validation.
179  * @param signer_name: the best signer_name. Updated if a better one is found.
180  * @param signer_len: length of signer name.
181  * @param matchcount: count of current best name (starts at 0 for no match).
182  *      Updated if match is improved.
183  */
184 static void
185 val_find_best_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, 
186         struct query_info* qinf, uint8_t** signer_name, size_t* signer_len, 
187         int* matchcount)
188 {
189         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
190                 rrset->entry.data;
191         uint8_t* sign;
192         size_t i;
193         int m;
194         for(i=d->count; i<d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++) {
195                 sign = d->rr_data[i]+2+18;
196                 /* look at signatures that are valid (long enough),
197                  * and have a signer name that is a superdomain of qname,
198                  * and then check the number of labels in the shared topdomain
199                  * improve the match if possible */
200                 if(d->rr_len[i] > 2+19 && /* rdata, sig + root label*/
201                         dname_subdomain_c(qinf->qname, sign)) {
202                         (void)dname_lab_cmp(qinf->qname, 
203                                 dname_count_labels(qinf->qname), 
204                                 sign, dname_count_labels(sign), &m);
205                         if(m > *matchcount) {
206                                 *matchcount = m;
207                                 *signer_name = sign;
208                                 (void)dname_count_size_labels(*signer_name,
209                                         signer_len);
210                         }
211                 }
212         }
213 }
214
215 void 
216 val_find_signer(enum val_classification subtype, struct query_info* qinf, 
217         struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip, uint8_t** signer_name, 
218         size_t* signer_len)
219 {
220         size_t i;
221         
222         if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE) {
223                 /* check for the answer rrset */
224                 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
225                         if(query_dname_compare(qinf->qname, 
226                                 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0) {
227                                 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], 
228                                         signer_name, signer_len);
229                                 return;
230                         }
231                 }
232                 *signer_name = NULL;
233                 *signer_len = 0;
234         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME) {
235                 /* check for the first signed cname/dname rrset */
236                 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
237                         val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], 
238                                 signer_name, signer_len);
239                         if(*signer_name)
240                                 return;
241                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME)
242                                 break; /* only check CNAME after a DNAME */
243                 }
244                 *signer_name = NULL;
245                 *signer_len = 0;
246         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR 
247                 || subtype == VAL_CLASS_NODATA) {
248                 /*Check to see if the AUTH section NSEC record(s) have rrsigs*/
249                 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<
250                         rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
251                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC
252                                 || ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) ==
253                                 LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
254                                 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], 
255                                         signer_name, signer_len);
256                                 return;
257                         }
258                 }
259         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER) {
260                 /* find closest superdomain signer name in authority section
261                  * NSEC and NSEC3s */
262                 int matchcount = 0;
263                 *signer_name = NULL;
264                 *signer_len = 0;
265                 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->
266                         ns_numrrsets; i++) { 
267                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC
268                                 || ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == 
269                                 LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
270                                 val_find_best_signer(rep->rrsets[i], qinf,
271                                         signer_name, signer_len, &matchcount);
272                         }
273                 }
274         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_ANY) {
275                 /* check for one of the answer rrset that has signatures,
276                  * or potentially a DNAME is in use with a different qname */
277                 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
278                         if(query_dname_compare(qinf->qname, 
279                                 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0) {
280                                 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], 
281                                         signer_name, signer_len);
282                                 if(*signer_name)
283                                         return;
284                         }
285                 }
286                 /* no answer RRSIGs with qname, try a DNAME */
287                 if(skip < rep->an_numrrsets &&
288                         ntohs(rep->rrsets[skip]->rk.type) ==
289                         LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) {
290                         val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[skip], 
291                                 signer_name, signer_len);
292                         if(*signer_name)
293                                 return;
294                 }
295                 *signer_name = NULL;
296                 *signer_len = 0;
297         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) {
298                 /* find keys for the item at skip */
299                 if(skip < rep->rrset_count) {
300                         val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[skip], 
301                                 signer_name, signer_len);
302                         return;
303                 }
304                 *signer_name = NULL;
305                 *signer_len = 0;
306         } else {
307                 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "find_signer: could not find signer name"
308                         " for unknown type response");
309                 *signer_name = NULL;
310                 *signer_len = 0;
311         }
312 }
313
314 /** return number of rrs in an rrset */
315 static size_t
316 rrset_get_count(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset)
317 {
318         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
319                 rrset->entry.data;
320         if(!d) return 0;
321         return d->count;
322 }
323
324 /** return TTL of rrset */
325 static uint32_t
326 rrset_get_ttl(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset)
327 {
328         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
329                 rrset->entry.data;
330         if(!d) return 0;
331         return d->ttl;
332 }
333
334 enum sec_status 
335 val_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
336         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* keys,
337         uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason)
338 {
339         enum sec_status sec;
340         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
341                 entry.data;
342         if(d->security == sec_status_secure) {
343                 /* re-verify all other statuses, because keyset may change*/
344                 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset cached", 
345                         rrset->rk.dname, ntohs(rrset->rk.type), 
346                         ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
347                 return d->security;
348         }
349         /* check in the cache if verification has already been done */
350         rrset_check_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, rrset, *env->now);
351         if(d->security == sec_status_secure) {
352                 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset from cache", 
353                         rrset->rk.dname, ntohs(rrset->rk.type), 
354                         ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
355                 return d->security;
356         }
357         log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset", rrset->rk.dname,
358                 ntohs(rrset->rk.type), ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
359         sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, keys, sigalg, reason);
360         verbose(VERB_ALGO, "verify result: %s", sec_status_to_string(sec));
361         regional_free_all(env->scratch);
362
363         /* update rrset security status 
364          * only improves security status 
365          * and bogus is set only once, even if we rechecked the status */
366         if(sec > d->security) {
367                 d->security = sec;
368                 if(sec == sec_status_secure)
369                         d->trust = rrset_trust_validated;
370                 else if(sec == sec_status_bogus) {
371                         size_t i;
372                         /* update ttl for rrset to fixed value. */
373                         d->ttl = ve->bogus_ttl;
374                         for(i=0; i<d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++)
375                                 d->rr_ttl[i] = ve->bogus_ttl;
376                         /* leave RR specific TTL: not used for determine
377                          * if RRset timed out and clients see proper value. */
378                         lock_basic_lock(&ve->bogus_lock);
379                         ve->num_rrset_bogus++;
380                         lock_basic_unlock(&ve->bogus_lock);
381                 }
382                 /* if status updated - store in cache for reuse */
383                 rrset_update_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, rrset, *env->now);
384         }
385
386         return sec;
387 }
388
389 enum sec_status 
390 val_verify_rrset_entry(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
391         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct key_entry_key* kkey,
392         char** reason)
393 {
394         /* temporary dnskey rrset-key */
395         struct ub_packed_rrset_key dnskey;
396         struct key_entry_data* kd = (struct key_entry_data*)kkey->entry.data;
397         enum sec_status sec;
398         dnskey.rk.type = htons(kd->rrset_type);
399         dnskey.rk.rrset_class = htons(kkey->key_class);
400         dnskey.rk.flags = 0;
401         dnskey.rk.dname = kkey->name;
402         dnskey.rk.dname_len = kkey->namelen;
403         dnskey.entry.key = &dnskey;
404         dnskey.entry.data = kd->rrset_data;
405         sec = val_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, &dnskey, kd->algo, reason);
406         return sec;
407 }
408
409 /** verify that a DS RR hashes to a key and that key signs the set */
410 static enum sec_status
411 verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 
412         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 
413         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, size_t ds_idx, char** reason)
414 {
415         enum sec_status sec = sec_status_bogus;
416         size_t i, num, numchecked = 0, numhashok = 0;
417         num = rrset_get_count(dnskey_rrset);
418         for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
419                 /* Skip DNSKEYs that don't match the basic criteria. */
420                 if(ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx) 
421                    != dnskey_get_algo(dnskey_rrset, i)
422                    || dnskey_calc_keytag(dnskey_rrset, i)
423                    != ds_get_keytag(ds_rrset, ds_idx)) {
424                         continue;
425                 }
426                 numchecked++;
427                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "attempt DS match algo %d keytag %d",
428                         ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx),
429                         ds_get_keytag(ds_rrset, ds_idx));
430
431                 /* Convert the candidate DNSKEY into a hash using the 
432                  * same DS hash algorithm. */
433                 if(!ds_digest_match_dnskey(env, dnskey_rrset, i, ds_rrset, 
434                         ds_idx)) {
435                         verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS match attempt failed");
436                         continue;
437                 }
438                 numhashok++;
439                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS match digest ok, trying signature");
440
441                 /* Otherwise, we have a match! Make sure that the DNSKEY 
442                  * verifies *with this key*  */
443                 sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 
444                         dnskey_rrset, i, reason);
445                 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
446                         return sec;
447                 }
448                 /* If it didn't validate with the DNSKEY, try the next one! */
449         }
450         if(numchecked == 0)
451                 algo_needs_reason(env, ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx),
452                         reason, "no keys have a DS");
453         else if(numhashok == 0)
454                 *reason = "DS hash mismatches key";
455         else if(!*reason)
456                 *reason = "keyset not secured by DNSKEY that matches DS";
457         return sec_status_bogus;
458 }
459
460 int val_favorite_ds_algo(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset)
461 {
462         size_t i, num = rrset_get_count(ds_rrset);
463         int d, digest_algo = 0; /* DS digest algo 0 is not used. */
464         /* find favorite algo, for now, highest number supported */
465         for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
466                 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) ||
467                         !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i)) {
468                         continue;
469                 }
470                 d = ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i);
471                 if(d > digest_algo)
472                         digest_algo = d;
473         }
474         return digest_algo;
475 }
476
477 enum sec_status 
478 val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
479         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
480         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason)
481 {
482         /* as long as this is false, we can consider this DS rrset to be
483          * equivalent to no DS rrset. */
484         int has_useful_ds = 0, digest_algo, alg;
485         struct algo_needs needs;
486         size_t i, num;
487         enum sec_status sec;
488
489         if(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ds_rrset->rk.dname_len ||
490                 query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ds_rrset->rk.dname)
491                 != 0) {
492                 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset "
493                         "by name");
494                 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name";
495                 return sec_status_bogus;
496         }
497
498         if(sigalg) {
499                 /* harden against algo downgrade is enabled */
500                 digest_algo = val_favorite_ds_algo(ds_rrset);
501                 algo_needs_init_ds(&needs, ds_rrset, digest_algo, sigalg);
502         } else {
503                 /* accept any key algo, any digest algo */
504                 digest_algo = -1;
505         }
506         num = rrset_get_count(ds_rrset);
507         for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
508                 /* Check to see if we can understand this DS. 
509                  * And check it is the strongest digest */
510                 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) ||
511                         !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) ||
512                         (sigalg && (ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i) != digest_algo))) {
513                         continue;
514                 }
515
516                 /* Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and 
517                  * algorithm, we cannot return INSECURE (with a 
518                  * "null" KeyEntry). */
519                 has_useful_ds = 1;
520
521                 sec = verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 
522                         ds_rrset, i, reason);
523                 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
524                         if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
525                                 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i))) {
526                                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS matched DNSKEY.");
527                                 return sec_status_secure;
528                         }
529                 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) {
530                         algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs,
531                                 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i));
532                 }
533         }
534
535         /* None of the DS's worked out. */
536
537         /* If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK. */
538         if(!has_useful_ds) {
539                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No usable DS records were found -- "
540                         "treating as insecure.");
541                 return sec_status_insecure;
542         }
543         /* If any were understandable, then it is bad. */
544         verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Failed to match any usable DS to a DNSKEY.");
545         if(sigalg && (alg=algo_needs_missing(&needs)) != 0) {
546                 algo_needs_reason(env, alg, reason, "missing verification of "
547                         "DNSKEY signature");
548         }
549         return sec_status_bogus;
550 }
551
552 struct key_entry_key* 
553 val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(struct regional* region, struct module_env* env, 
554         struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 
555         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, int downprot, char** reason)
556 {
557         uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1];
558         enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(env, ve, 
559                 dnskey_rrset, ds_rrset, downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason);
560
561         if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
562                 return key_entry_create_rrset(region, 
563                         ds_rrset->rk.dname, ds_rrset->rk.dname_len,
564                         ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class), dnskey_rrset,
565                         downprot?sigalg:NULL, *env->now);
566         } else if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
567                 return key_entry_create_null(region, ds_rrset->rk.dname,
568                         ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, 
569                         ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
570                         rrset_get_ttl(ds_rrset), *env->now);
571         }
572         return key_entry_create_bad(region, ds_rrset->rk.dname,
573                 ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
574                 BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *env->now);
575 }
576
577 enum sec_status 
578 val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
579         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
580         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds,
581         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason)
582 {
583         /* as long as this is false, we can consider this anchor to be
584          * equivalent to no anchor. */
585         int has_useful_ta = 0, digest_algo = 0, alg;
586         struct algo_needs needs;
587         size_t i, num;
588         enum sec_status sec;
589
590         if(ta_ds && (dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ta_ds->rk.dname_len ||
591                 query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ta_ds->rk.dname)
592                 != 0)) {
593                 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset "
594                         "by name");
595                 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name";
596                 return sec_status_bogus;
597         }
598         if(ta_dnskey && (dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ta_dnskey->rk.dname_len
599              || query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ta_dnskey->rk.dname)
600                 != 0)) {
601                 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match anchor RRset "
602                         "by name");
603                 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match anchor RRset by name";
604                 return sec_status_bogus;
605         }
606
607         if(ta_ds)
608                 digest_algo = val_favorite_ds_algo(ta_ds);
609         if(sigalg) {
610                 if(ta_ds)
611                         algo_needs_init_ds(&needs, ta_ds, digest_algo, sigalg);
612                 else    memset(&needs, 0, sizeof(needs));
613                 if(ta_dnskey)
614                         algo_needs_init_dnskey_add(&needs, ta_dnskey, sigalg);
615         }
616         if(ta_ds) {
617             num = rrset_get_count(ta_ds);
618             for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
619                 /* Check to see if we can understand this DS. 
620                  * And check it is the strongest digest */
621                 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ta_ds, i) ||
622                         !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ta_ds, i) ||
623                         ds_get_digest_algo(ta_ds, i) != digest_algo)
624                         continue;
625
626                 /* Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and 
627                  * algorithm, we cannot return INSECURE (with a 
628                  * "null" KeyEntry). */
629                 has_useful_ta = 1;
630
631                 sec = verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 
632                         ta_ds, i, reason);
633                 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
634                         if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
635                                 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ta_ds, i))) {
636                                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS matched DNSKEY.");
637                                 return sec_status_secure;
638                         }
639                 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) {
640                         algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs,
641                                 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ta_ds, i));
642                 }
643             }
644         }
645
646         /* None of the DS's worked out: check the DNSKEYs. */
647         if(ta_dnskey) {
648             num = rrset_get_count(ta_dnskey);
649             for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
650                 /* Check to see if we can understand this DNSKEY */
651                 if(!dnskey_algo_is_supported(ta_dnskey, i))
652                         continue;
653
654                 /* we saw a useful TA */
655                 has_useful_ta = 1;
656
657                 sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset,
658                         ta_dnskey, i, reason);
659                 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
660                         if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
661                                 (uint8_t)dnskey_get_algo(ta_dnskey, i))) {
662                                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "anchor matched DNSKEY.");
663                                 return sec_status_secure;
664                         }
665                 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) {
666                         algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs,
667                                 (uint8_t)dnskey_get_algo(ta_dnskey, i));
668                 }
669             }
670         }
671
672         /* If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK. */
673         if(!has_useful_ta) {
674                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No usable trust anchors were found -- "
675                         "treating as insecure.");
676                 return sec_status_insecure;
677         }
678         /* If any were understandable, then it is bad. */
679         verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Failed to match any usable anchor to a DNSKEY.");
680         if(sigalg && (alg=algo_needs_missing(&needs)) != 0) {
681                 algo_needs_reason(env, alg, reason, "missing verification of "
682                         "DNSKEY signature");
683         }
684         return sec_status_bogus;
685 }
686
687 struct key_entry_key* 
688 val_verify_new_DNSKEYs_with_ta(struct regional* region, struct module_env* env,
689         struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 
690         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds_rrset,
691         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey_rrset, int downprot,
692         char** reason)
693 {
694         uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1];
695         enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(env, ve, 
696                 dnskey_rrset, ta_ds_rrset, ta_dnskey_rrset,
697                 downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason);
698
699         if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
700                 return key_entry_create_rrset(region, 
701                         dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len,
702                         ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class), dnskey_rrset,
703                         downprot?sigalg:NULL, *env->now);
704         } else if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
705                 return key_entry_create_null(region, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname,
706                         dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len, 
707                         ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
708                         rrset_get_ttl(dnskey_rrset), *env->now);
709         }
710         return key_entry_create_bad(region, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname,
711                 dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len, ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
712                 BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *env->now);
713 }
714
715 int 
716 val_dsset_isusable(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset)
717 {
718         size_t i;
719         for(i=0; i<rrset_get_count(ds_rrset); i++) {
720                 if(ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) &&
721                         ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i))
722                         return 1;
723         }
724         if(verbosity < VERB_ALGO)
725                 return 0;
726         if(rrset_get_count(ds_rrset) == 0)
727                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS is not usable");
728         else {
729                 /* report usability for the first DS RR */
730                 sldns_lookup_table *lt;
731                 char herr[64], aerr[64];
732                 lt = sldns_lookup_by_id(sldns_hashes,
733                         (int)ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i));
734                 if(lt) snprintf(herr, sizeof(herr), "%s", lt->name);
735                 else snprintf(herr, sizeof(herr), "%d",
736                         (int)ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i));
737                 lt = sldns_lookup_by_id(sldns_algorithms,
738                         (int)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i));
739                 if(lt) snprintf(aerr, sizeof(aerr), "%s", lt->name);
740                 else snprintf(aerr, sizeof(aerr), "%d",
741                         (int)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i));
742                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS unsupported, hash %s %s, "
743                         "key algorithm %s %s", herr,
744                         (ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, 0)?
745                         "(supported)":"(unsupported)"), aerr, 
746                         (ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, 0)?
747                         "(supported)":"(unsupported)"));
748         }
749         return 0;
750 }
751
752 /** get label count for a signature */
753 static uint8_t
754 rrsig_get_labcount(struct packed_rrset_data* d, size_t sig)
755 {
756         if(d->rr_len[sig] < 2+4)
757                 return 0; /* bad sig length */
758         return d->rr_data[sig][2+3];
759 }
760
761 int 
762 val_rrset_wildcard(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t** wc)
763 {
764         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
765                 entry.data;
766         uint8_t labcount;
767         int labdiff;
768         uint8_t* wn;
769         size_t i, wl;
770         if(d->rrsig_count == 0) {
771                 return 1;
772         }
773         labcount = rrsig_get_labcount(d, d->count + 0);
774         /* check rest of signatures identical */
775         for(i=1; i<d->rrsig_count; i++) {
776                 if(labcount != rrsig_get_labcount(d, d->count + i)) {
777                         return 0;
778                 }
779         }
780         /* OK the rrsigs check out */
781         /* if the RRSIG label count is shorter than the number of actual 
782          * labels, then this rrset was synthesized from a wildcard.
783          * Note that the RRSIG label count doesn't count the root label. */
784         wn = rrset->rk.dname;
785         wl = rrset->rk.dname_len;
786         /* skip a leading wildcard label in the dname (RFC4035 2.2) */
787         if(dname_is_wild(wn)) {
788                 wn += 2;
789                 wl -= 2;
790         }
791         labdiff = (dname_count_labels(wn) - 1) - (int)labcount;
792         if(labdiff > 0) {
793                 *wc = wn;
794                 dname_remove_labels(wc, &wl, labdiff);
795                 return 1;
796         }
797         return 1;
798 }
799
800 int
801 val_chase_cname(struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* rep,
802         size_t* cname_skip) {
803         size_t i;
804         /* skip any DNAMEs, go to the CNAME for next part */
805         for(i = *cname_skip; i < rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
806                 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME &&
807                         query_dname_compare(qchase->qname, rep->rrsets[i]->
808                                 rk.dname) == 0) {
809                         qchase->qname = NULL;
810                         get_cname_target(rep->rrsets[i], &qchase->qname,
811                                 &qchase->qname_len);
812                         if(!qchase->qname)
813                                 return 0; /* bad CNAME rdata */
814                         (*cname_skip) = i+1;
815                         return 1;
816                 }
817         }
818         return 0; /* CNAME classified but no matching CNAME ?! */
819 }
820
821 /** see if rrset has signer name as one of the rrsig signers */
822 static int
823 rrset_has_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t* name, size_t len)
824 {
825         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
826                 entry.data;
827         size_t i;
828         for(i = d->count; i< d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++) {
829                 if(d->rr_len[i] > 2+18+len) {
830                         /* at least rdatalen + signature + signame (+1 sig)*/
831                         if(!dname_valid(d->rr_data[i]+2+18, d->rr_len[i]-2-18))
832                                 continue;
833                         if(query_dname_compare(name, d->rr_data[i]+2+18) == 0)
834                         {
835                                 return 1;
836                         }
837                 }
838         }
839         return 0;
840 }
841
842 void 
843 val_fill_reply(struct reply_info* chase, struct reply_info* orig, 
844         size_t skip, uint8_t* name, size_t len, uint8_t* signer)
845 {
846         size_t i;
847         int seen_dname = 0;
848         chase->rrset_count = 0;
849         chase->an_numrrsets = 0;
850         chase->ns_numrrsets = 0;
851         chase->ar_numrrsets = 0;
852         /* ANSWER section */
853         for(i=skip; i<orig->an_numrrsets; i++) {
854                 if(!signer) {
855                         if(query_dname_compare(name, 
856                                 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0)
857                                 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = 
858                                         orig->rrsets[i];
859                 } else if(seen_dname && ntohs(orig->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == 
860                         LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) {
861                         chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
862                         seen_dname = 0;
863                 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) {
864                         chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
865                         if(ntohs(orig->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == 
866                                 LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) {
867                                         seen_dname = 1;
868                         }
869                 }
870         }       
871         /* AUTHORITY section */
872         for(i = (skip > orig->an_numrrsets)?skip:orig->an_numrrsets;
873                 i<orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets; 
874                 i++) {
875                 if(!signer) {
876                         if(query_dname_compare(name, 
877                                 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0)
878                                 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+
879                                     chase->ns_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
880                 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) {
881                         chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+
882                                 chase->ns_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
883                 }
884         }
885         /* ADDITIONAL section */
886         for(i= (skip>orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets)?
887                 skip:orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets; 
888                 i<orig->rrset_count; i++) {
889                 if(!signer) {
890                         if(query_dname_compare(name, 
891                                 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0)
892                             chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets
893                                 +orig->ns_numrrsets+chase->ar_numrrsets++] 
894                                 = orig->rrsets[i];
895                 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) {
896                         chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets+
897                                 chase->ar_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
898                 }
899         }
900         chase->rrset_count = chase->an_numrrsets + chase->ns_numrrsets + 
901                 chase->ar_numrrsets;
902 }
903
904 void val_reply_remove_auth(struct reply_info* rep, size_t index)
905 {
906         log_assert(index < rep->rrset_count);
907         log_assert(index >= rep->an_numrrsets);
908         log_assert(index < rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets);
909         memmove(rep->rrsets+index, rep->rrsets+index+1,
910                 sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*)*
911                 (rep->rrset_count - index - 1));
912         rep->ns_numrrsets--;
913         rep->rrset_count--;
914 }
915
916 void
917 val_check_nonsecure(struct val_env* ve, struct reply_info* rep) 
918 {
919         size_t i;
920         /* authority */
921         for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
922                 if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data)
923                         ->security != sec_status_secure) {
924                         /* because we want to return the authentic original
925                          * message when presented with CD-flagged queries,
926                          * we need to preserve AUTHORITY section data.
927                          * However, this rrset is not signed or signed
928                          * with the wrong keys. Validation has tried to
929                          * verify this rrset with the keysets of import.
930                          * But this rrset did not verify.
931                          * Therefore the message is bogus.
932                          */
933
934                         /* check if authority consists of only an NS record
935                          * which is bad, and there is an answer section with
936                          * data.  In that case, delete NS and additional to 
937                          * be lenient and make a minimal response */
938                         if(rep->an_numrrsets != 0 && rep->ns_numrrsets == 1 &&
939                                 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) 
940                                 == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) {
941                                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "truncate to minimal");
942                                 rep->ns_numrrsets = 0;
943                                 rep->ar_numrrsets = 0;
944                                 rep->rrset_count = rep->an_numrrsets;
945                                 return;
946                         }
947
948                         log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "message is bogus, "
949                                 "non secure rrset",
950                                 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, 
951                                 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type),
952                                 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.rrset_class));
953                         rep->security = sec_status_bogus;
954                         return;
955                 }
956         }
957         /* additional */
958         if(!ve->clean_additional)
959                 return;
960         for(i=rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
961                 if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data)
962                         ->security != sec_status_secure) {
963                         /* This does not cause message invalidation. It was
964                          * simply unsigned data in the additional. The
965                          * RRSIG must have been truncated off the message.
966                          *
967                          * However, we do not want to return possible bogus
968                          * data to clients that rely on this service for
969                          * their authentication.
970                          */
971                         /* remove this unneeded additional rrset */
972                         memmove(rep->rrsets+i, rep->rrsets+i+1, 
973                                 sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*)*
974                                 (rep->rrset_count - i - 1));
975                         rep->ar_numrrsets--;
976                         rep->rrset_count--;
977                         i--;
978                 }
979         }
980 }
981
982 /** check no anchor and unlock */
983 static int
984 check_no_anchor(struct val_anchors* anchors, uint8_t* nm, size_t l, uint16_t c)
985 {
986         struct trust_anchor* ta;
987         if((ta=anchors_lookup(anchors, nm, l, c))) {
988                 lock_basic_unlock(&ta->lock);
989         }
990         return !ta;
991 }
992
993 void 
994 val_mark_indeterminate(struct reply_info* rep, struct val_anchors* anchors, 
995         struct rrset_cache* r, struct module_env* env)
996 {
997         size_t i;
998         struct packed_rrset_data* d;
999         for(i=0; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
1000                 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
1001                 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked &&
1002                    check_no_anchor(anchors, rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname,
1003                         rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname_len, 
1004                         ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.rrset_class))) 
1005                 {       
1006                         /* mark as indeterminate */
1007                         d->security = sec_status_indeterminate;
1008                         rrset_update_sec_status(r, rep->rrsets[i], *env->now);
1009                 }
1010         }
1011 }
1012
1013 void 
1014 val_mark_insecure(struct reply_info* rep, uint8_t* kname,
1015         struct rrset_cache* r, struct module_env* env)
1016 {
1017         size_t i;
1018         struct packed_rrset_data* d;
1019         for(i=0; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
1020                 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
1021                 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked &&
1022                    dname_subdomain_c(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, kname)) {
1023                         /* mark as insecure */
1024                         d->security = sec_status_insecure;
1025                         rrset_update_sec_status(r, rep->rrsets[i], *env->now);
1026                 }
1027         }
1028 }
1029
1030 size_t 
1031 val_next_unchecked(struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip)
1032 {
1033         size_t i;
1034         struct packed_rrset_data* d;
1035         for(i=skip+1; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
1036                 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
1037                 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked) {
1038                         return i;
1039                 }
1040         }
1041         return rep->rrset_count;
1042 }
1043
1044 const char*
1045 val_classification_to_string(enum val_classification subtype)
1046 {
1047         switch(subtype) {
1048                 case VAL_CLASS_UNTYPED:         return "untyped";
1049                 case VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN:         return "unknown";
1050                 case VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE:        return "positive";
1051                 case VAL_CLASS_CNAME:           return "cname";
1052                 case VAL_CLASS_NODATA:          return "nodata";
1053                 case VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR:       return "nameerror";
1054                 case VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER:   return "cnamenoanswer";
1055                 case VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL:        return "referral";
1056                 case VAL_CLASS_ANY:             return "qtype_any";
1057                 default:
1058                         return "bad_val_classification";
1059         }
1060 }
1061
1062 /** log a sock_list entry */
1063 static void
1064 sock_list_logentry(enum verbosity_value v, const char* s, struct sock_list* p)
1065 {
1066         if(p->len)
1067                 log_addr(v, s, &p->addr, p->len);
1068         else    verbose(v, "%s cache", s);
1069 }
1070
1071 void val_blacklist(struct sock_list** blacklist, struct regional* region,
1072         struct sock_list* origin, int cross)
1073 {
1074         /* debug printout */
1075         if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) {
1076                 struct sock_list* p;
1077                 for(p=*blacklist; p; p=p->next)
1078                         sock_list_logentry(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist", p);
1079                 if(!origin)
1080                         verbose(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist add: cache");
1081                 for(p=origin; p; p=p->next)
1082                         sock_list_logentry(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist add", p);
1083         }
1084         /* blacklist the IPs or the cache */
1085         if(!origin) {
1086                 /* only add if nothing there. anything else also stops cache*/
1087                 if(!*blacklist)
1088                         sock_list_insert(blacklist, NULL, 0, region);
1089         } else if(!cross)
1090                 sock_list_prepend(blacklist, origin);
1091         else    sock_list_merge(blacklist, region, origin);
1092 }
1093
1094 int val_has_signed_nsecs(struct reply_info* rep, char** reason)
1095 {
1096         size_t i, num_nsec = 0, num_nsec3 = 0;
1097         struct packed_rrset_data* d;
1098         for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
1099                 if(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type == htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC))
1100                         num_nsec++;
1101                 else if(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type == htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3))
1102                         num_nsec3++;
1103                 else continue;
1104                 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
1105                 if(d && d->rrsig_count != 0) {
1106                         return 1;
1107                 }
1108         }
1109         if(num_nsec == 0 && num_nsec3 == 0)
1110                 *reason = "no DNSSEC records";
1111         else if(num_nsec != 0)
1112                 *reason = "no signatures over NSECs";
1113         else    *reason = "no signatures over NSEC3s";
1114         return 0;
1115 }
1116
1117 struct dns_msg* 
1118 val_find_DS(struct module_env* env, uint8_t* nm, size_t nmlen, uint16_t c, 
1119         struct regional* region, uint8_t* topname)
1120 {
1121         struct dns_msg* msg;
1122         struct query_info qinfo;
1123         struct ub_packed_rrset_key *rrset = rrset_cache_lookup(
1124                 env->rrset_cache, nm, nmlen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, c, 0, 
1125                 *env->now, 0);
1126         if(rrset) {
1127                 /* DS rrset exists. Return it to the validator immediately*/
1128                 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* copy = packed_rrset_copy_region(
1129                         rrset, region, *env->now);
1130                 lock_rw_unlock(&rrset->entry.lock);
1131                 if(!copy)
1132                         return NULL;
1133                 msg = dns_msg_create(nm, nmlen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, c, region, 1);
1134                 if(!msg)
1135                         return NULL;
1136                 msg->rep->rrsets[0] = copy;
1137                 msg->rep->rrset_count++;
1138                 msg->rep->an_numrrsets++;
1139                 return msg;
1140         }
1141         /* lookup in rrset and negative cache for NSEC/NSEC3 */
1142         qinfo.qname = nm;
1143         qinfo.qname_len = nmlen;
1144         qinfo.qtype = LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS;
1145         qinfo.qclass = c;
1146         qinfo.local_alias = NULL;
1147         /* do not add SOA to reply message, it is going to be used internal */
1148         msg = val_neg_getmsg(env->neg_cache, &qinfo, region, env->rrset_cache,
1149                 env->scratch_buffer, *env->now, 0, topname);
1150         return msg;
1151 }