brd [Wed, 15 Aug 2018 23:18:34 +0000 (23:18 +0000)]
Revert parts of r337849 and r337857
This fixes the build and I will redo these changes as part of a future review
that organizes them differently. The way I tried to do it here could be done
better. Sorry for the noise.
Approved by: will (mentor)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D16737
tsoome [Wed, 15 Aug 2018 21:21:16 +0000 (21:21 +0000)]
libi386: remove BD_SUPPORT_FRAGS
BD_SUPPORT_FRAGS is preprocessor knob to allow partial reads in bioscd/biosdisk
level. However, we already have support for partial reads in bcache, and there
is no need to have duplication via preprocessor controls.
Note that bioscd/biosdisk interface is assumed to perform IO in 512B blocks,
so the only translation we have to do is 512 <-> native block size.
We were doing count_block() twice inside this function, once
unconditionally at the beginning (intended to catch the embedded block
case) and once near the end after processing the block.
The double-accounting caused the "zpool scrub" progress statistics in
"zpool status" to climb from 0% to 200% instead of 0% to 100%, and
showed double the I/O rate it was actually seeing.
This was apparently a regression introduced in commit 00c405b4b5e8,
which was an incorrect port of this OpenZFS commit:
imp [Wed, 15 Aug 2018 20:31:11 +0000 (20:31 +0000)]
stand: Use -Oz/-Os for all loader/stand builds.
While we're not super size constrained, the x86 BIOS /boot/loader has
to be less than about 520k-530k to be reliable. The LUA loader is at
this size today. -Oz saves 15-20% on the size, keeping us safely small
enough (comparable to where we were with the 4th loader). This will
also help with sjg's work on bringing in bearssl, though we may again
be looking for space in the LUA loader.
mmacy [Wed, 15 Aug 2018 20:23:08 +0000 (20:23 +0000)]
Fix in6_multi double free
This is actually several different bugs:
- The code is not designed to handle inpcb deletion after interface deletion
- add reference for inpcb membership
- The multicast address has to be removed from interface lists when the refcount
goes to zero OR when the interface goes away
- decouple list disconnect from refcount (v6 only for now)
- ifmultiaddr can exist past being on interface lists
- add flag for tracking whether or not it's enqueued
- deferring freeing moptions makes the incpb cleanup code simpler but opens the
door wider still to races
- call inp_gcmoptions synchronously after dropping the the inpcb lock
Fundamentally multicast needs a rewrite - but keep applying band-aids for now.
kevans [Wed, 15 Aug 2018 19:46:13 +0000 (19:46 +0000)]
dd: Incorporate some changes from imp for status=progress
Notable changes from what landed in r337505:
- sigalarm handler isn't setup unless we're actually using it
- Humanized versions of the amount of data transferred in the progress
update
andrew [Wed, 15 Aug 2018 13:40:16 +0000 (13:40 +0000)]
Start to remove XScale support from the ARMv4/v5 pmap. Support for XScale
has been removed from the kernel so we can remove it from here to help
simplify the code.
will [Wed, 15 Aug 2018 13:05:04 +0000 (13:05 +0000)]
zfs: add ztest to the kyua test suite.
This program is currently failing, and has been for >6 months on HEAD.
Ideally, this should be run 24x7 in CI, to discover hard-to-find bugs that
only manifest with concurrent i/o.
np [Wed, 15 Aug 2018 03:03:01 +0000 (03:03 +0000)]
cxgbe(4): Use two hashes instead of a table to keep track of
hashfilters. Two because the driver needs to look up a hashfilter by
its 4-tuple or tid.
A couple of fixes while here:
- Reject attempts to add duplicate hashfilters.
- Do not assume that any part of the 4-tuple that isn't specified is 0.
This makes it consistent with all other mandatory parameters that
already require explicit user input.
cy [Tue, 14 Aug 2018 20:24:10 +0000 (20:24 +0000)]
MFV r337818:
WPA: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data
Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant
processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted
flag set, but not the MIC flag.
When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but
not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying
the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when
negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that
unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary
could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information
in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key).
(CVE-2018-14526)
imp [Tue, 14 Aug 2018 18:45:20 +0000 (18:45 +0000)]
When the LUA floating point model is INT64, we don't need to do the
overflow dance. This avoids compile errors on latter-day gcc compilers
as well as simplifies the generated code.
imp [Tue, 14 Aug 2018 18:44:41 +0000 (18:44 +0000)]
Create a loader for each interpreter for x86 BIOS and all EFI
Create loader_{4th,lua,simp}{,.efi}. All of these are installed by
default. Create LOADER_DEFAULT_INTERP to specify the default
interpreter when no other is specified. LOADER_INTERP is the current
interpreter language building. Turn building of lua on by default to
match 4th. simploader is a simplified loader build w/o any interpreter
language (but with a simple loader). This is the historic behavir you
got with WITHOUT_FORTH. Make a hard link to the default loader. This
has to be a hard link rather than the more desirable soft link because
older zfsboot blocks don't support symlinks.
kevans [Tue, 14 Aug 2018 18:35:33 +0000 (18:35 +0000)]
bectl(8): Check jailparam_* return values
Previous iteration of this assumed that these won't fail because we've
already setup the jail param to this point, but the allocations could still
fail in pretty bad conditions.
Admit that it's possible and return (ENOENT, EINVAL, ENOMEM, or 0) when
deleting arguments. EINVAL shouldn't happen since we're passing optarg;
which may satisfy *optarg == '\0' but never optarg == NULL.
jtl [Tue, 14 Aug 2018 17:32:07 +0000 (17:32 +0000)]
Lower the default limits on the IPv6 reassembly queue.
Currently, the limits are quite high. On machines with millions of
mbuf clusters, the reassembly queue limits can also run into
the millions. Lower these values.
Also, try to ensure that no bucket will have a reassembly
queue larger than approximately 100 items. This limits the cost to
find the correct reassembly queue when processing an incoming
fragment.
Due to the low limits on each bucket's length, increase the size of
the hash table from 64 to 1024.
jtl [Tue, 14 Aug 2018 17:30:46 +0000 (17:30 +0000)]
Lower the default limits on the IPv4 reassembly queue.
In particular, try to ensure that no bucket will have a reassembly
queue larger than approximately 100 items. This limits the cost to
find the correct reassembly queue when processing an incoming
fragment.
Due to the low limits on each bucket's length, increase the size of
the hash table from 64 to 1024.
kib [Tue, 14 Aug 2018 17:29:41 +0000 (17:29 +0000)]
Provide part of the mitigation for L1TF-VMM.
On the guest entry in bhyve, flush L1 data cache, using either L1D
flush command MSR if available, or by reading enough uninteresting
data to fill whole cache.
Flush is automatically enabled on CPUs which do not report RDCL_NO,
and can be disabled with the hw.vmm.l1d_flush tunable/kenv.
Security: CVE-2018-3646
Reviewed by: emaste. jhb, Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
jtl [Tue, 14 Aug 2018 17:29:22 +0000 (17:29 +0000)]
Drop 0-byte IPv6 fragments.
Currently, we process IPv6 fragments with 0 bytes of payload, add them
to the reassembly queue, and do not recognize them as duplicating or
overlapping with adjacent 0-byte fragments. An attacker can exploit this
to create long fragment queues.
There is no legitimate reason for a fragment with no payload. However,
because IPv6 packets with an empty payload are acceptable, allow an
"atomic" fragment with no payload.
jtl [Tue, 14 Aug 2018 17:27:41 +0000 (17:27 +0000)]
Implement a limit on on the number of IPv6 reassembly queues per bucket.
There is a hashing algorithm which should distribute IPv6 reassembly
queues across the available buckets in a relatively even way. However,
if there is a flaw in the hashing algorithm which allows a large number
of IPv6 fragment reassembly queues to end up in a single bucket, a per-
bucket limit could help mitigate the performance impact of this flaw.
Implement such a limit, with a default of twice the maximum number of
reassembly queues divided by the number of buckets. Recalculate the
limit any time the maximum number of reassembly queues changes.
However, allow the user to override the value using a sysctl
(net.inet6.ip6.maxfragbucketsize).
jtl [Tue, 14 Aug 2018 17:26:07 +0000 (17:26 +0000)]
Add a limit of the number of fragments per IPv6 packet.
The IPv4 fragment reassembly code supports a limit on the number of
fragments per packet. The default limit is currently 17 fragments.
Among other things, this limit serves to limit the number of fragments
the code must parse when trying to reassembly a packet.
Add a limit to the IPv6 reassembly code. By default, limit a packet
to 65 fragments (64 on the queue, plus one final fragment to complete
the packet). This allows an average fragment size of 1,008 bytes, which
should be sufficient to hold a fragment. (Recall that the IPv6 minimum
MTU is 1280 bytes. Therefore, this configuration allows a full-size
IPv6 packet to be fragmented on a link with the minimum MTU and still
carry approximately 272 bytes of headers before the fragmented portion
of the packet.)
Users can adjust this limit using the net.inet6.ip6.maxfragsperpacket
sysctl.
jtl [Tue, 14 Aug 2018 17:24:26 +0000 (17:24 +0000)]
Make the IPv6 fragment limits be global, rather than per-VNET, limits.
The IPv6 reassembly fragment limit is based on the number of mbuf clusters,
which are a global resource. However, the limit is currently applied
on a per-VNET basis. Given enough VNETs (or given sufficient customization
on enough VNETs), it is possible that the sum of all the VNET fragment
limits will exceed the number of mbuf clusters available in the system.
Given the fact that the fragment limits are intended (at least in part) to
regulate access to a global resource, the IPv6 fragment limit should
be applied on a global basis.
Note that it is still possible to disable fragmentation for a particular
VNET by setting the net.inet6.ip6.maxfragpackets sysctl to 0 for that
VNET. In addition, it is now possible to disable fragmentation globally
by setting the net.inet6.ip6.maxfrags sysctl to 0.
jtl [Tue, 14 Aug 2018 17:23:05 +0000 (17:23 +0000)]
Implement a limit on on the number of IPv4 reassembly queues per bucket.
There is a hashing algorithm which should distribute IPv4 reassembly
queues across the available buckets in a relatively even way. However,
if there is a flaw in the hashing algorithm which allows a large number
of IPv4 fragment reassembly queues to end up in a single bucket, a per-
bucket limit could help mitigate the performance impact of this flaw.
Implement such a limit, with a default of twice the maximum number of
reassembly queues divided by the number of buckets. Recalculate the
limit any time the maximum number of reassembly queues changes.
However, allow the user to override the value using a sysctl
(net.inet.ip.maxfragbucketsize).
jtl [Tue, 14 Aug 2018 17:19:49 +0000 (17:19 +0000)]
Add a global limit on the number of IPv4 fragments.
The IP reassembly fragment limit is based on the number of mbuf clusters,
which are a global resource. However, the limit is currently applied
on a per-VNET basis. Given enough VNETs (or given sufficient customization
of enough VNETs), it is possible that the sum of all the VNET limits
will exceed the number of mbuf clusters available in the system.
Given the fact that the fragment limit is intended (at least in part) to
regulate access to a global resource, the fragment limit should
be applied on a global basis.
VNET-specific limits can be adjusted by modifying the
net.inet.ip.maxfragpackets and net.inet.ip.maxfragsperpacket
sysctls.
To disable fragment reassembly globally, set net.inet.ip.maxfrags to 0.
To disable fragment reassembly for a particular VNET, set
net.inet.ip.maxfragpackets to 0.
jtl [Tue, 14 Aug 2018 17:17:37 +0000 (17:17 +0000)]
Improve IPv6 reassembly performance by hashing fragments into buckets.
Currently, all IPv6 fragment reassembly queues are kept in a flat
linked list. This has a number of implications. Two significant
implications are: all reassembly operations share a common lock,
and it is possible for the linked list to grow quite large.
Improve IPv6 reassembly performance by hashing fragments into buckets,
each of which has its own lock. Calculate the hash key using a Jenkins
hash with a random seed.
jtl [Tue, 14 Aug 2018 17:15:47 +0000 (17:15 +0000)]
Improve hashing of IPv4 fragments.
Currently, IPv4 fragments are hashed into buckets based on a 32-bit
key which is calculated by (src_ip ^ ip_id) and combined with a random
seed. However, because an attacker can control the values of src_ip
and ip_id, it is possible to construct an attack which causes very
deep chains to form in a given bucket.
To ensure more uniform distribution (and lower predictability for
an attacker), calculate the hash based on a key which includes all
the fields we use to identify a reassembly queue (dst_ip, src_ip,
ip_id, and the ip protocol) as well as a random seed.
kib [Tue, 14 Aug 2018 17:14:33 +0000 (17:14 +0000)]
Reserve page at the physical address zero on amd64.
We always zero the invalidated PTE/PDE for superpage, which means that
L1TF CPU vulnerability (CVE-2018-3620) can be only used for reading
from the page at zero.
Note that both i386 and amd64 exclude the page from phys_avail[]
array, so this change is redundant, but I think that phys_avail[] on
UEFI-boot does not need to do that. Eventually the blacklisting
should be made conditional on CPUs which report that they are not
vulnerable to L1TF.
Reviewed by: emaste. jhb
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
kib [Tue, 14 Aug 2018 16:37:14 +0000 (16:37 +0000)]
amd64: ensure that curproc->p_vmspace pmap always matches PCPU
curpmap.
When performing context switch on a machine without PCID, if current
%cr3 equals to the new pmap %cr3, which is typical for kernel_pmap
vs. kernel process, I overlooked to update PCPU curpmap value. Remove
check for %cr3 not equal to pm_cr3 for doing the update. It is
believed that this case cannot happen at all, due to other changes in
this revision.
Also, do not set the very first curpmap to kernel_pmap, it should be
vmspace0 pmap instead to match curproc.
Move the common code to activate the initial pmap both on BSP and APs
into pmap_activate_boot() helper.
markj [Tue, 14 Aug 2018 14:02:53 +0000 (14:02 +0000)]
Don't use memcpy() in the early microcode loading code.
At some point memcpy() may be an ifunc, ifunc resolution cannot be done
until CPU identification has been performed, and CPU identification must
be done after loading any microcode updates.
X-MFC with: r337715
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
andrew [Tue, 14 Aug 2018 11:00:54 +0000 (11:00 +0000)]
Support reading from the arm64 ID registers from userspace.
Trap reads to the arm64 ID registers and write a safe value into them. This
will allow us to put more useful values in these later and have userland
check them to find what features the hardware supports.
These are currently safe defaults, but will later be populated with better
values from the hardware.
ae [Tue, 14 Aug 2018 07:54:14 +0000 (07:54 +0000)]
Restore ability to send ICMP and ICMPv6 redirects.
It was lost when tryforward appeared. Now ip[6]_tryforward will be enabled
only when sending redirects for corresponding IP version is disabled via
sysctl. Otherwise will be used default forwarding function.
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