Juli Mallett [Wed, 6 Nov 2002 14:53:35 +0000 (14:53 +0000)]
Remove what was a temporary bogus assignment of bits of siginfo_t, as it does
not look like the prerequisites to fill it in properly will be in the tree
for the upcoming release, but it's mostly done, so there is no need for these
to stay around to remind us.
Juli Mallett [Wed, 6 Nov 2002 14:01:08 +0000 (14:01 +0000)]
Add a MAINTAINERS entry for make(1), to the make@ alias, which anyone can use
to run patches to make(1) by. Hopefully this will make it easier to get bugs
fixed in make(1), as well as get review by people with experience working on,
in, around, etc., make(1).
Currently it points to two people who have demonstrated maintainership (ru@
and myself) and one person interested in helping (alane@). That list is
subject to expansion and contraction.
Doug Barton [Wed, 6 Nov 2002 09:21:39 +0000 (09:21 +0000)]
Import the latest hints file from Internic. The most important change
is that J has moved, however I'm sure you'll all be very disappointed
to hear that you can no longer retrieve this file via gopher.
Check the FSLABEL argument and invoke the generic doFS.sh script
if it's not defined as efi. This makes sure we create a proper
MFS root filesystem and still allow the boot disk to be EFI
based.
At this time EFI auto boot works and we're properly loading the
MFS root file system. Time to create drivers.conf and get this
show on the road!
Kelly Yancey [Tue, 5 Nov 2002 18:52:25 +0000 (18:52 +0000)]
Spotted a couple of places where the socket buffer's counters were being
manipulated directly (rather than using sballoc()/sbfree()); update them
to tweak the new sb_ctl field too.
o Introduce variable DOFS_SH to hold the path of the doFS.sh.
o ia64: Set DOFS_SH to point to an alternate version.
o ia64: Lower BIGBOOTSIZE from 120M (LS-120) to ~5M.
o ia64: Set BIGBOOTLABEL to efi so that we can check for it
in the alternate doFS.sh script. If the label is not efi, we
can invoke the generic doFS.sh.
Robert Watson [Tue, 5 Nov 2002 17:52:42 +0000 (17:52 +0000)]
Update policy modules for changes in arguments associated with support
for label access on the interpreter, not just the shell script. No
policies currently present in the system rely on the new labels.
Robert Watson [Tue, 5 Nov 2002 17:51:56 +0000 (17:51 +0000)]
Bring in two sets of changes:
(1) Permit userland applications to request a change of label atomic
with an execve() via mac_execve(). This is required for the
SEBSD port of SELinux/FLASK. Attempts to invoke this without
MAC compiled in result in ENOSYS, as with all other MAC system
calls. Complexity, if desired, is present in policy modules,
rather than the framework.
(2) Permit policies to have access to both the label of the vnode
being executed as well as the interpreter if it's a shell
script or related UNIX nonsense. Because we can't hold both
vnode locks at the same time, cache the interpreter label.
SEBSD relies on this because it supports secure transitioning
via shell script executables. Other policies might want to
take both labels into account during an integrity or
confidentiality decision at execve()-time.
Robert Watson [Tue, 5 Nov 2002 15:11:33 +0000 (15:11 +0000)]
Assert that appropriate vnodes are locked in mac_execve_will_transition().
Allow transitioning to be twiddled off using the process and fs enforcement
flags, although at some point this should probably be its own flag.
Robert Watson [Tue, 5 Nov 2002 14:57:49 +0000 (14:57 +0000)]
Hook up the mac_will_execve_transition() and mac_execve_transition()
entrypoints, #ifdef MAC. The supporting logic already existed in
kern_mac.c, so no change there. This permits MAC policies to cause
a process label change as the result of executing a binary --
typically, as a result of executing a specially labeled binary.
For example, the SEBSD port of SELinux/FLASK uses this functionality
to implement TE type transitions on processes using transitioning
binaries, in a manner similar to setuid. Policies not implementing
a notion of transition (all the ones in the tree right now) require
no changes, since the old label data is copied to the new label
via mac_create_cred() even if a transition does occur.
Create a special version for ia64. For auto-boot to work, we need
the loader in an EFI partition. This automaticly means we need the
kernel there as well.
In order to avoid having to worry about a geometry as much as
possible, we partition the disk with GPT.
With this, auto-boot works, but we have a problem mounting the
MFS.
Brooks Davis [Tue, 5 Nov 2002 05:58:31 +0000 (05:58 +0000)]
Test for the existance of kernel ppp support by seeing if the kernel has
the module compiled in or loaded instead of bogusly checking for ppp0.
Also if and only if the caller is actually root and the kernel does not
have ppp support, try to load the ppp module before giving up.
Robert Watson [Tue, 5 Nov 2002 01:59:56 +0000 (01:59 +0000)]
Remove reference to struct execve_args from struct imgact, which
describes an image activation instance. Instead, make use of the
existing fname structure entry, and introduce two new entries,
userspace_argv, and userspace_envv. With the addition of
mac_execve(), this divorces the image structure from the specifics
of the execve() system call, removes a redundant pointer, etc.
No semantic change from current behavior, but it means that the
structure doesn't depend on syscalls.master-generated includes.
There seems to be some redundant initialization of imgact entries,
which I have maintained, but which could probably use some cleaning
up at some point.
Robert Watson [Mon, 4 Nov 2002 20:52:09 +0000 (20:52 +0000)]
Clarify language relating to ACLs, Capabtilities, and MAC, since the
implementation status of these services has changed substantially
since this man page was last updated.
Nick Sayer [Mon, 4 Nov 2002 19:30:04 +0000 (19:30 +0000)]
After waiting for help with the markup, I finally decided to just patch
the page myself. The new language is more accurate than what was there
before, but the most accurate way of describing the funcionality eludes
me.
Robert Watson [Mon, 4 Nov 2002 17:50:52 +0000 (17:50 +0000)]
Implement mpo_check_system_acct and mpo_check_system_settime() for Biba:
require Biba privilege to configure either, and require that accounting
files be high integrity. Note that this does allow implicit information
flow from low to high integrity, but it also protects the integrity
of accounting data.
Robert Watson [Mon, 4 Nov 2002 15:13:36 +0000 (15:13 +0000)]
Permit MAC policies to instrument the access control decisions for
system accounting configuration and for nfsd server thread attach.
Policies might use this to protect the integrity or confidentiality
of accounting data, limit the ability to turn on or off accounting,
as well as to prevent inappropriately labeled threads from becoming nfs
server threads.
Replace ARC4 with SHA2-512.
Change lock-structure encoding to use random ordering rather for obscurity.
Encrypt lock-structure with AES/256 instead of AES/128.
Change kkey derivation to be MD5 hash based.
Watch for malloc(M_NOWAIT) failures and ditch our cache when they happen.
Remove clause 3 of the license with NAI Labs consent.
Many thanks to "Lucky Green" <shamrock@cypherpunks.to> and "David
Wagner" <daw@cs.berkeley.edu>, for code reading, inputs and
suggestions.
This code has still not been stared at for 10 years by a gang of
hard-core cryptographers. Discretion advised.
NB: These changes result in the on-disk format changing: dump/restore needed.
projects / FreeBSD / FreeBSD.git / log