Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel
access control.
Label socket IPC objects, permitting security features to be maintained
at the granularity of the socket. Two labels are stored for each
socket: the label of the socket itself, and a cached peer label
permitting interogation of the remote endpoint. Since socket locking
is not yet present in the base tree, these objects are not locked,
but are assumed to follow the same semantics as other modifiable
entries in the socket structure.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Label pipe IPC objects, permitting security information to be
maintained at the granularity of the pipe object. The label is
shared between the two pipe endpoints in the style of the
pipe mutex, and is maintained using similar conventions. The
label is protected by the pipe mutex.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel
access control.
Label process credentials, permitting security information to be
maintained at the granularity of processes and cached credential
objects. cr_label follows the semantics of other entries in struct
ucred: when a credential is exclusively referenced, it may be
modified. Otherwise, it must be treated as immutable. As with
other interesting entries in struct ucred, failing to use the
documented credential management APIs (such as crcopy, crdup, ...)
can result in data corruption or incorrect behavior.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Label file system mount points, permitting security information to be
maintained at the granularity of the file system. Two labels are
currently maintained: a security label for the mount itself, and
a default label for objects in the file system (in particular, for
file systems not supporting per-vnode labeling directly).
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the operating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Introduce two node vnode operations required to support MAC. First,
VOP_REFRESHLABEL(), which will be invoked by callers requiring that
vp->v_label be sufficiently "fresh" for access control purposes.
Second, VOP_SETLABEL(), which be invoked by callers requiring that
the passed label contents be updated. The file system is responsible
for updating v_label if appropriate in coordination with the MAC
framework, as well as committing to disk. File systems that are
not MAC-aware need not implement these VOPs, as the MAC framework
will default to maintaining a single label for all vnodes based
on the label on the file system mount point.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Label vnodes, permitting security information to maintained at the
granularity of the individual file, directory (et al). This data is
protected by the vnode lock and may be read only when holding a shared
lock, or modified only when holding an exclusive lock. Label
information may be considered either the primary copy, or a cached
copy. Individual file systems or kernel services may use the
VCACHEDLABEL flag for accounting purposes to determine which it is.
New VOPs will be introduced to refresh this label on demand, or to
set the label value.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Label mbuf's with packet header data, permitting in-flight datagrams
to be labeled in the TrustedBSD MAC implementation. Add a questionable
recursive #include of sys/mac.h to maintain the current API for
applications and kernel code including mbuf.h to get 'struct mbuf'
definition.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
kern_mac.c contains the body of the MAC framework. Kernel and
user APIs defined in mac.h are implemented here, providing a front end
to loaded security modules. This code implements a module registration
service, state (label) management, security configuration and policy
composition.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
Make reference counting for mbuf clusters [only] work like in RELENG_4.
While I don't think this is the best solution, it certainly is the
fastest and in trying to find bottlenecks in network related code
I want this out of the way, so that I don't have to think about it.
What this means, for mbuf clusters anyway is:
- one less malloc() to do for every cluster allocation (replaced with
a relatively quick calculation + assignment)
- no more free() in the cluster free case (replaced with empty space) :-)
This can offer a substantial throughput improvement, but it may not for
all cases. Particularly noticable for larger buffer sends/recvs.
See http://people.freebsd.org/~bmilekic/code/measure2.txt for a rough
idea.
Remove some additional paranoia which Kirk forgot to remove from his
UFS2 commit.
These bits in essence made any instance of "softupdates expected
corrution", (ie blocks marked allocated but not referenced by an
inode etc) result in a exit value for fsck_ffs of 2.
2 is part of the magic and appearantly undocumented protocol between
fsck_FOO and fsck and means "dump into single user mode ASAP.
Fix some bugs in in-place editing:
(1) errors from freopen were not reported correctly
(2) large files were not handled correctly
(3) read-only files broke things
o In do_sendfile(), replace vm_page_sleep_busy() by vm_page_sleep_if_busy()
and extend the scope of the page queues lock to cover all accesses
to the page's flags and busy fields.
Make M_COPY_PKTHDR() macro into a wrapper for a m_copy_pkthdr()
function. This permits conditionally compiled extensions to the
packet header copying semantic, such as extensions to copy MAC
labels.
If we get 0xffff back when reading the status register, assume the card
has gone away instead of spinning in the interrupt handler. This stops
my machine from hanging when I eject a rl(4)-based cardbus card.
Introduce a mac_policy() system call that will provide MAC policies
with a general purpose front end entry point for user applications
to invoke. The MAC framework will route the system call to the
appropriate policy by name.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
For processes which are set-user-ID or set-group-ID, the kernel performs a few
special actions for safety. One of these is to make sure that file descriptors
0..2 are in use, by opening /dev/null for those that are not already open.
Another is to close any file descriptors 0..2 that reference procfs. However,
these checks were made out of order, so that it was still possible for a
set-user-ID or set-group-ID process to be started with some of the file
descriptors 0..2 unused.
Submitted by: Georgi Guninski <guninski@guninski.com>
Correct links to Handbook's pages:
http://www.freebsd.org/handbook/mirrors.html is not working anymore,
http://www.freebsd.org/doc/handbook/mirrors.html is the new link
Remove many obsolete files. The majority of these are simply no
longer included as part of the OpenSSL distribution. However, a few
we just don't need and are explicitly excluded in FREEBSD-Xlist.
Add a quick check that device actually has sound capabilities. The problem
is that some cards built around fm801 chip have the same device ID, only
have radio tuner onboard, but no sound capabilities. Therefore, with such
card inserted and `device pcm' in kernel the user has a big problem, as
the fm801 driver effectively hangs the machine when trying to initialise
nonexistent ac97 codecs (it does 500 retries with 1 second interval!).
It would be better if MediaForte's engeneers were smart enough to put
different device ID into such cards, but it isn't an option.
des [Tue, 30 Jul 2002 08:32:03 +0000 (08:32 +0000)]
Since pam_get_authtok(3) doesn't know about our options structure, setting
the PAM_ECHO_PASS option on-the-fly is a NOP (though it wasn't with the
old pam_get_pass(3) code). Instead, call pam_prompt(3) directly. This
actually simplifies the code a bit.
o In vm_object_madvise() and vm_object_page_remove() replace
vm_page_sleep_busy() with vm_page_sleep_if_busy(). At the same time,
increase the scope of the page queues lock. (This should significantly
reduce the locking overhead in vm_object_page_remove().)
o Apply some style fixes.
Add a bunch more cards that are known to work.
Add a warning about the Symbol LA-4100 series of cards. You gotta
load special firmware, and the wi driver in the tree doesn't support
that yet.
- Optimize wakeup() and its friends; if a thread waken up is being
swapped in, we do not have to ask for the scheduler thread to do
that.
- Assert that a process is not swapped out in runq functions and
swapout().
- Introduce thread_safetoswapout() for readability.
- In swapout_procs(), perform a test that may block (check of a
thread working on its vm map) first. This lets us call swapout()
with the sched_lock held, providing a better atomicity.
Add definitions for statistical and high-resolution profiling. The calling
conventions for _mcount and __cyg_profile_func_enter are different, so
statistical profiling kernels build and link but don't actually work.
IWBNI one could tell gcc to only generate calls to the former.
Define uintfptr_t properly for userland, but not for the kernel (I hope).
The data cache on UltraSPARC III is not directly mapped, so don't assert
that. This breaks assumptions made by some of the cache flushing code,
but UltraSPARC III has different methods for invalidating cache lines
anyway.
Create a new thread state to describe threads that would be ready to run
except for the fact tha they are presently swapped out. Also add a process
flag to indicate that the process has started the struggle to swap
back in. This will be needed for the case where multiple threads
start the swapin action top a collision. Also add code to stop
a process fropm being swapped out if one of the threads in this
process is actually off running on another CPU.. that might hurt...
mike [Mon, 29 Jul 2002 17:41:23 +0000 (17:41 +0000)]
Create a new header <machine/_stdint.h> for storing MD parts of
<stdint.h>. Previously, parts were defined in <machine/ansi.h> and
<machine/limits.h>. This resulted in two problems:
(1) Defining macros in <machine/ansi.h> gets in the way of that
header only defining types.
(2) Defining C99 limits in <machine/limits.h> adds pollution to
<limits.h>.
If we are in hostap mode, do not go into promisc mode. This causes
problems with the firmware and will result in a) poor performance and
b) the inability to associate certain types of cards (most notibly
cisco).
Idea obtained from OpenBSD, but I implemented it by clearing the
IFF_PROMISC flag rather than the refusing to honor it downstream.
When translating and the -c option is specified, handle the case where the
second string argument is more than one character in length in the way
required by SUSv3 (and the way GNU textutils and SVR4 do it).
Ignore -C, -p, and -S options of install(1) when used with the -d
option. Warn about COPY being phased out. Restore the old method
of always comparing before installing: INSTALL="install -C".
jeff [Mon, 29 Jul 2002 06:26:55 +0000 (06:26 +0000)]
- Backout the patch made in revision 1.75 of vfs_mount.c. The vputs here
were hiding the real problem of the missing unlock in sync_inactive.
- Add the missing unlock in sync_inactive.
o Pass VM_ALLOC_WIRED to vm_page_grab() rather than calling vm_page_wire()
in pmap_new_thread(), pmap_pinit(), and vm_proc_new().
o Lock page queue accesses by vm_page_free() in pmap_object_init_pt().
1.131 is slightly broken, and I would commit the fix to that here, but it
has been reported that any deviation from the original code is causing
problems with some 82557 chips, causing them to lock hard.
Until those issues have been figured out, going back to the original
code is the best plan.
luigi [Mon, 29 Jul 2002 02:48:09 +0000 (02:48 +0000)]
whitespace commit: fix indentation in fxp_intr_body.
This is also done in preparation of a subsequent fix
for the handling of RNR conditions in polling mode.