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Fix patch(1) shell injection vulnerability via ed(1). [SA-15:18]
[FreeBSD/releng/10.2.git] / sbin / routed / input.c
1 /*
2  * Copyright (c) 1983, 1988, 1993
3  *      The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
6  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
7  * are met:
8  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
9  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
10  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
11  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
12  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
13  * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
14  *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
15  *    without specific prior written permission.
16  *
17  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
18  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
19  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
20  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
21  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
22  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
23  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
24  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
25  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
26  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
27  * SUCH DAMAGE.
28  *
29  * $FreeBSD$
30  */
31
32 #include "defs.h"
33
34 #ifdef __NetBSD__
35 __RCSID("$NetBSD$");
36 #elif defined(__FreeBSD__)
37 __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
38 #else
39 __RCSID("$Revision: 2.26 $");
40 #ident "$Revision: 2.26 $"
41 #endif
42
43 static void input(struct sockaddr_in *, struct interface *, struct interface *,
44                   struct rip *, int);
45 static void input_route(naddr, naddr, struct rt_spare *, struct netinfo *);
46 static int ck_passwd(struct interface *, struct rip *, void *,
47                      naddr, struct msg_limit *);
48
49
50 /* process RIP input
51  */
52 void
53 read_rip(int sock,
54          struct interface *sifp)
55 {
56         struct sockaddr_in from;
57         struct interface *aifp;
58         socklen_t fromlen;
59         int cc;
60 #ifdef USE_PASSIFNAME
61         static struct msg_limit  bad_name;
62         struct {
63                 char    ifname[IFNAMSIZ];
64                 union pkt_buf pbuf;
65         } inbuf;
66 #else
67         struct {
68                 union pkt_buf pbuf;
69         } inbuf;
70 #endif
71
72
73         for (;;) {
74                 fromlen = sizeof(from);
75                 cc = recvfrom(sock, &inbuf, sizeof(inbuf), 0,
76                               (struct sockaddr*)&from, &fromlen);
77                 if (cc <= 0) {
78                         if (cc < 0 && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
79                                 LOGERR("recvfrom(rip)");
80                         break;
81                 }
82                 if (fromlen != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
83                         logbad(1,"impossible recvfrom(rip) fromlen=%d",
84                                (int)fromlen);
85
86                 /* aifp is the "authenticated" interface via which the packet
87                  *      arrived.  In fact, it is only the interface on which
88                  *      the packet should have arrived based on is source
89                  *      address.
90                  * sifp is interface associated with the socket through which
91                  *      the packet was received.
92                  */
93 #ifdef USE_PASSIFNAME
94                 if ((cc -= sizeof(inbuf.ifname)) < 0)
95                         logbad(0,"missing USE_PASSIFNAME; only %d bytes",
96                                cc+sizeof(inbuf.ifname));
97
98                 /* check the remote interfaces first */
99                 LIST_FOREACH(aifp, &remote_if, remote_list) {
100                         if (aifp->int_addr == from.sin_addr.s_addr)
101                                 break;
102                 }
103                 if (aifp == 0) {
104                         aifp = ifwithname(inbuf.ifname, 0);
105                         if (aifp == 0) {
106                                 msglim(&bad_name, from.sin_addr.s_addr,
107                                        "impossible interface name %.*s",
108                                        IFNAMSIZ, inbuf.ifname);
109                         } else if (((aifp->int_if_flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT)
110                                     && aifp->int_dstaddr!=from.sin_addr.s_addr)
111                                    || (!(aifp->int_if_flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT)
112                                        && !on_net(from.sin_addr.s_addr,
113                                                   aifp->int_net,
114                                                   aifp->int_mask))) {
115                                 /* If it came via the wrong interface, do not
116                                  * trust it.
117                                  */
118                                 aifp = 0;
119                         }
120                 }
121 #else
122                 aifp = iflookup(from.sin_addr.s_addr);
123 #endif
124                 if (sifp == 0)
125                         sifp = aifp;
126
127                 input(&from, sifp, aifp, &inbuf.pbuf.rip, cc);
128         }
129 }
130
131
132 /* Process a RIP packet
133  */
134 static void
135 input(struct sockaddr_in *from,         /* received from this IP address */
136       struct interface *sifp,           /* interface of incoming socket */
137       struct interface *aifp,           /* "authenticated" interface */
138       struct rip *rip,
139       int cc)
140 {
141 #       define FROM_NADDR from->sin_addr.s_addr
142         static struct msg_limit use_auth, bad_len, bad_mask;
143         static struct msg_limit unk_router, bad_router, bad_nhop;
144
145         struct rt_entry *rt;
146         struct rt_spare new;
147         struct netinfo *n, *lim;
148         struct interface *ifp1;
149         naddr gate, mask, v1_mask, dst, ddst_h = 0;
150         struct auth *ap;
151         struct tgate *tg = 0;
152         struct tgate_net *tn;
153         int i, j;
154
155         /* Notice when we hear from a remote gateway
156          */
157         if (aifp != 0
158             && (aifp->int_state & IS_REMOTE))
159                 aifp->int_act_time = now.tv_sec;
160
161         trace_rip("Recv", "from", from, sifp, rip, cc);
162
163         if (sifp == 0) {
164                 trace_pkt("    discard a request from an indirect router"
165                     " (possibly an attack)");
166                 return;
167         }
168
169         if (rip->rip_vers == 0) {
170                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
171                        "RIP version 0, cmd %d, packet received from %s",
172                        rip->rip_cmd, naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
173                 return;
174         } else if (rip->rip_vers > RIPv2) {
175                 rip->rip_vers = RIPv2;
176         }
177         if (cc > (int)OVER_MAXPACKETSIZE) {
178                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
179                        "packet at least %d bytes too long received from %s",
180                        cc-MAXPACKETSIZE, naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
181                 return;
182         }
183
184         n = rip->rip_nets;
185         lim = (struct netinfo *)((char*)rip + cc);
186
187         /* Notice authentication.
188          * As required by section 4.2 in RFC 1723, discard authenticated
189          * RIPv2 messages, but only if configured for that silliness.
190          *
191          * RIPv2 authentication is lame.  Why authenticate queries?
192          * Why should a RIPv2 implementation with authentication disabled
193          * not be able to listen to RIPv2 packets with authentication, while
194          * RIPv1 systems will listen?  Crazy!
195          */
196         if (!auth_ok
197             && rip->rip_vers == RIPv2
198             && n < lim && n->n_family == RIP_AF_AUTH) {
199                 msglim(&use_auth, FROM_NADDR,
200                        "RIPv2 message with authentication from %s discarded",
201                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
202                 return;
203         }
204
205         switch (rip->rip_cmd) {
206         case RIPCMD_REQUEST:
207                 /* For mere requests, be a little sloppy about the source
208                  */
209                 if (aifp == 0)
210                         aifp = sifp;
211
212                 /* Are we talking to ourself or a remote gateway?
213                  */
214                 ifp1 = ifwithaddr(FROM_NADDR, 0, 1);
215                 if (ifp1) {
216                         if (ifp1->int_state & IS_REMOTE) {
217                                 /* remote gateway */
218                                 aifp = ifp1;
219                                 if (check_remote(aifp)) {
220                                         aifp->int_act_time = now.tv_sec;
221                                         (void)if_ok(aifp, "remote ");
222                                 }
223                         } else if (from->sin_port == htons(RIP_PORT)) {
224                                 trace_pkt("    discard our own RIP request");
225                                 return;
226                         }
227                 }
228
229                 /* did the request come from a router?
230                  */
231                 if (from->sin_port == htons(RIP_PORT)) {
232                         /* yes, ignore the request if RIP is off so that
233                          * the router does not depend on us.
234                          */
235                         if (rip_sock < 0
236                             || (aifp != 0
237                                 && IS_RIP_OUT_OFF(aifp->int_state))) {
238                                 trace_pkt("    discard request while RIP off");
239                                 return;
240                         }
241                 }
242
243                 /* According to RFC 1723, we should ignore unauthenticated
244                  * queries.  That is too silly to bother with.  Sheesh!
245                  * Are forwarding tables supposed to be secret, when
246                  * a bad guy can infer them with test traffic?  When RIP
247                  * is still the most common router-discovery protocol
248                  * and so hosts need to send queries that will be answered?
249                  * What about `rtquery`?
250                  * Maybe on firewalls you'd care, but not enough to
251                  * give up the diagnostic facilities of remote probing.
252                  */
253
254                 if (n >= lim) {
255                         msglim(&bad_len, FROM_NADDR, "empty request from %s",
256                                naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
257                         return;
258                 }
259                 if (cc%sizeof(*n) != sizeof(struct rip)%sizeof(*n)) {
260                         msglim(&bad_len, FROM_NADDR,
261                                "request of bad length (%d) from %s",
262                                cc, naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
263                 }
264
265                 if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv2
266                     && (aifp == 0 || (aifp->int_state & IS_NO_RIPV1_OUT))) {
267                         v12buf.buf->rip_vers = RIPv2;
268                         /* If we have a secret but it is a cleartext secret,
269                          * do not disclose our secret unless the other guy
270                          * already knows it.
271                          */
272                         ap = find_auth(aifp);
273                         if (ap != 0 && ap->type == RIP_AUTH_PW
274                             && n->n_family == RIP_AF_AUTH
275                             && !ck_passwd(aifp,rip,lim,FROM_NADDR,&use_auth))
276                                 ap = 0;
277                 } else {
278                         v12buf.buf->rip_vers = RIPv1;
279                         ap = 0;
280                 }
281                 clr_ws_buf(&v12buf, ap);
282
283                 do {
284                         n->n_metric = ntohl(n->n_metric);
285
286                         /* A single entry with family RIP_AF_UNSPEC and
287                          * metric HOPCNT_INFINITY means "all routes".
288                          * We respond to routers only if we are acting
289                          * as a supplier, or to anyone other than a router
290                          * (i.e. a query).
291                          */
292                         if (n->n_family == RIP_AF_UNSPEC
293                             && n->n_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY) {
294                                 /* Answer a query from a utility program
295                                  * with all we know.
296                                  */
297                                 if (from->sin_port != htons(RIP_PORT)) {
298                                         /*
299                                          * insecure: query from non-router node
300                                          *   > 1: allow from distant node
301                                          *   > 0: allow from neighbor node
302                                          *  == 0: deny
303                                          */
304                                         if ((aifp != NULL && insecure > 0) ||
305                                             (aifp == NULL && insecure > 1))
306                                                 supply(from, aifp, OUT_QUERY, 0,
307                                                        rip->rip_vers, ap != 0);
308                                         else
309                                                 trace_pkt("Warning: "
310                                                     "possible attack detected");
311                                         return;
312                                 }
313
314                                 /* A router trying to prime its tables.
315                                  * Filter the answer in the about same way
316                                  * broadcasts are filtered.
317                                  *
318                                  * Only answer a router if we are a supplier
319                                  * to keep an unwary host that is just starting
320                                  * from picking us as a router.
321                                  */
322                                 if (aifp == 0) {
323                                         trace_pkt("ignore distant router");
324                                         return;
325                                 }
326                                 if (!supplier
327                                     || IS_RIP_OFF(aifp->int_state)) {
328                                         trace_pkt("ignore; not supplying");
329                                         return;
330                                 }
331
332                                 /* Do not answer a RIPv1 router if
333                                  * we are sending RIPv2.  But do offer
334                                  * poor man's router discovery.
335                                  */
336                                 if ((aifp->int_state & IS_NO_RIPV1_OUT)
337                                     && rip->rip_vers == RIPv1) {
338                                         if (!(aifp->int_state & IS_PM_RDISC)) {
339                                             trace_pkt("ignore; sending RIPv2");
340                                             return;
341                                         }
342
343                                         v12buf.n->n_family = RIP_AF_INET;
344                                         v12buf.n->n_dst = RIP_DEFAULT;
345                                         i = aifp->int_d_metric;
346                                         if (0 != (rt = rtget(RIP_DEFAULT, 0))) {
347                                             j = (rt->rt_metric
348                                                  +aifp->int_metric
349                                                  +aifp->int_adj_outmetric
350                                                  +1);
351                                             if (i > j)
352                                                 i = j;
353                                         }
354                                         v12buf.n->n_metric = htonl(i);
355                                         v12buf.n++;
356                                         break;
357                                 }
358
359                                 /* Respond with RIPv1 instead of RIPv2 if
360                                  * that is what we are broadcasting on the
361                                  * interface to keep the remote router from
362                                  * getting the wrong initial idea of the
363                                  * routes we send.
364                                  */
365                                 supply(from, aifp, OUT_UNICAST, 0,
366                                        (aifp->int_state & IS_NO_RIPV1_OUT)
367                                        ? RIPv2 : RIPv1,
368                                        ap != 0);
369                                 return;
370                         }
371
372                         /* Ignore authentication */
373                         if (n->n_family == RIP_AF_AUTH)
374                                 continue;
375
376                         if (n->n_family != RIP_AF_INET) {
377                                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
378                                        "request from %s for unsupported"
379                                        " (af %d) %s",
380                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
381                                        ntohs(n->n_family),
382                                        naddr_ntoa(n->n_dst));
383                                 return;
384                         }
385
386                         /* We are being asked about a specific destination.
387                          */
388                         dst = n->n_dst;
389                         if (!check_dst(dst)) {
390                                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
391                                        "bad queried destination %s from %s",
392                                        naddr_ntoa(dst),
393                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
394                                 return;
395                         }
396
397                         /* decide what mask was intended */
398                         if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv1
399                             || 0 == (mask = ntohl(n->n_mask))
400                             || 0 != (ntohl(dst) & ~mask))
401                                 mask = ripv1_mask_host(dst, aifp);
402
403                         /* try to find the answer */
404                         rt = rtget(dst, mask);
405                         if (!rt && dst != RIP_DEFAULT)
406                                 rt = rtfind(n->n_dst);
407
408                         if (v12buf.buf->rip_vers != RIPv1)
409                                 v12buf.n->n_mask = mask;
410                         if (rt == 0) {
411                                 /* we do not have the answer */
412                                 v12buf.n->n_metric = HOPCNT_INFINITY;
413                         } else {
414                                 /* we have the answer, so compute the
415                                  * right metric and next hop.
416                                  */
417                                 v12buf.n->n_family = RIP_AF_INET;
418                                 v12buf.n->n_dst = dst;
419                                 j = rt->rt_metric+1;
420                                 if (!aifp)
421                                         ++j;
422                                 else
423                                         j += (aifp->int_metric
424                                               + aifp->int_adj_outmetric);
425                                 if (j < HOPCNT_INFINITY)
426                                         v12buf.n->n_metric = j;
427                                 else
428                                         v12buf.n->n_metric = HOPCNT_INFINITY;
429                                 if (v12buf.buf->rip_vers != RIPv1) {
430                                         v12buf.n->n_tag = rt->rt_tag;
431                                         v12buf.n->n_mask = mask;
432                                         if (aifp != 0
433                                             && on_net(rt->rt_gate,
434                                                       aifp->int_net,
435                                                       aifp->int_mask)
436                                             && rt->rt_gate != aifp->int_addr)
437                                             v12buf.n->n_nhop = rt->rt_gate;
438                                 }
439                         }
440                         v12buf.n->n_metric = htonl(v12buf.n->n_metric);
441
442                         /* Stop paying attention if we fill the output buffer.
443                          */
444                         if (++v12buf.n >= v12buf.lim)
445                                 break;
446                 } while (++n < lim);
447
448                 /* Send the answer about specific routes.
449                  */
450                 if (ap != 0 && ap->type == RIP_AUTH_MD5)
451                         end_md5_auth(&v12buf, ap);
452
453                 if (from->sin_port != htons(RIP_PORT)) {
454                         /* query */
455                         (void)output(OUT_QUERY, from, aifp,
456                                      v12buf.buf,
457                                      ((char *)v12buf.n - (char*)v12buf.buf));
458                 } else if (supplier) {
459                         (void)output(OUT_UNICAST, from, aifp,
460                                      v12buf.buf,
461                                      ((char *)v12buf.n - (char*)v12buf.buf));
462                 } else {
463                         /* Only answer a router if we are a supplier
464                          * to keep an unwary host that is just starting
465                          * from picking us an a router.
466                          */
467                         ;
468                 }
469                 return;
470
471         case RIPCMD_TRACEON:
472         case RIPCMD_TRACEOFF:
473                 /* Notice that trace messages are turned off for all possible
474                  * abuse if _PATH_TRACE is undefined in pathnames.h.
475                  * Notice also that because of the way the trace file is
476                  * handled in trace.c, no abuse is plausible even if
477                  * _PATH_TRACE_ is defined.
478                  *
479                  * First verify message came from a privileged port. */
480                 if (ntohs(from->sin_port) > IPPORT_RESERVED) {
481                         msglog("trace command from untrusted port on %s",
482                                naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
483                         return;
484                 }
485                 if (aifp == 0) {
486                         msglog("trace command from unknown router %s",
487                                naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
488                         return;
489                 }
490                 if (rip->rip_cmd == RIPCMD_TRACEON) {
491                         rip->rip_tracefile[cc-4] = '\0';
492                         set_tracefile((char*)rip->rip_tracefile,
493                                       "trace command: %s\n", 0);
494                 } else {
495                         trace_off("tracing turned off by %s",
496                                   naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
497                 }
498                 return;
499
500         case RIPCMD_RESPONSE:
501                 if (cc%sizeof(*n) != sizeof(struct rip)%sizeof(*n)) {
502                         msglim(&bad_len, FROM_NADDR,
503                                "response of bad length (%d) from %s",
504                                cc, naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
505                 }
506
507                 /* verify message came from a router */
508                 if (from->sin_port != ntohs(RIP_PORT)) {
509                         msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
510                                "    discard RIP response from unknown port"
511                                " %d on %s",
512                                ntohs(from->sin_port), naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
513                         return;
514                 }
515
516                 if (rip_sock < 0) {
517                         trace_pkt("    discard response while RIP off");
518                         return;
519                 }
520
521                 /* Are we talking to ourself or a remote gateway?
522                  */
523                 ifp1 = ifwithaddr(FROM_NADDR, 0, 1);
524                 if (ifp1) {
525                         if (ifp1->int_state & IS_REMOTE) {
526                                 /* remote gateway */
527                                 aifp = ifp1;
528                                 if (check_remote(aifp)) {
529                                         aifp->int_act_time = now.tv_sec;
530                                         (void)if_ok(aifp, "remote ");
531                                 }
532                         } else {
533                                 trace_pkt("    discard our own RIP response");
534                                 return;
535                         }
536                 }
537
538                 /* Accept routing packets from routers directly connected
539                  * via broadcast or point-to-point networks, and from
540                  * those listed in /etc/gateways.
541                  */
542                 if (aifp == 0) {
543                         msglim(&unk_router, FROM_NADDR,
544                                "   discard response from %s"
545                                " via unexpected interface",
546                                naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
547                         return;
548                 }
549                 if (IS_RIP_IN_OFF(aifp->int_state)) {
550                         trace_pkt("    discard RIPv%d response"
551                                   " via disabled interface %s",
552                                   rip->rip_vers, aifp->int_name);
553                         return;
554                 }
555
556                 if (n >= lim) {
557                         msglim(&bad_len, FROM_NADDR, "empty response from %s",
558                                naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
559                         return;
560                 }
561
562                 if (((aifp->int_state & IS_NO_RIPV1_IN)
563                      && rip->rip_vers == RIPv1)
564                     || ((aifp->int_state & IS_NO_RIPV2_IN)
565                         && rip->rip_vers != RIPv1)) {
566                         trace_pkt("    discard RIPv%d response",
567                                   rip->rip_vers);
568                         return;
569                 }
570
571                 /* Ignore routes via dead interface.
572                  */
573                 if (aifp->int_state & IS_BROKE) {
574                         trace_pkt("discard response via broken interface %s",
575                                   aifp->int_name);
576                         return;
577                 }
578
579                 /* If the interface cares, ignore bad routers.
580                  * Trace but do not log this problem, because where it
581                  * happens, it happens frequently.
582                  */
583                 if (aifp->int_state & IS_DISTRUST) {
584                         tg = tgates;
585                         while (tg->tgate_addr != FROM_NADDR) {
586                                 tg = tg->tgate_next;
587                                 if (tg == 0) {
588                                         trace_pkt("    discard RIP response"
589                                                   " from untrusted router %s",
590                                                   naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
591                                         return;
592                                 }
593                         }
594                 }
595
596                 /* Authenticate the packet if we have a secret.
597                  * If we do not have any secrets, ignore the error in
598                  * RFC 1723 and accept it regardless.
599                  */
600                 if (aifp->int_auth[0].type != RIP_AUTH_NONE
601                     && rip->rip_vers != RIPv1
602                     && !ck_passwd(aifp,rip,lim,FROM_NADDR,&use_auth))
603                         return;
604
605                 do {
606                         if (n->n_family == RIP_AF_AUTH)
607                                 continue;
608
609                         n->n_metric = ntohl(n->n_metric);
610                         dst = n->n_dst;
611                         if (n->n_family != RIP_AF_INET
612                             && (n->n_family != RIP_AF_UNSPEC
613                                 || dst != RIP_DEFAULT)) {
614                                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
615                                        "route from %s to unsupported"
616                                        " address family=%d destination=%s",
617                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
618                                        n->n_family,
619                                        naddr_ntoa(dst));
620                                 continue;
621                         }
622                         if (!check_dst(dst)) {
623                                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
624                                        "bad destination %s from %s",
625                                        naddr_ntoa(dst),
626                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
627                                 return;
628                         }
629                         if (n->n_metric == 0
630                             || n->n_metric > HOPCNT_INFINITY) {
631                                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
632                                        "bad metric %d from %s"
633                                        " for destination %s",
634                                        n->n_metric,
635                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
636                                        naddr_ntoa(dst));
637                                 return;
638                         }
639
640                         /* Notice the next-hop.
641                          */
642                         gate = FROM_NADDR;
643                         if (n->n_nhop != 0) {
644                                 if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv1) {
645                                         n->n_nhop = 0;
646                                 } else {
647                                     /* Use it only if it is valid. */
648                                     if (on_net(n->n_nhop,
649                                                aifp->int_net, aifp->int_mask)
650                                         && check_dst(n->n_nhop)) {
651                                             gate = n->n_nhop;
652                                     } else {
653                                             msglim(&bad_nhop, FROM_NADDR,
654                                                    "router %s to %s"
655                                                    " has bad next hop %s",
656                                                    naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
657                                                    naddr_ntoa(dst),
658                                                    naddr_ntoa(n->n_nhop));
659                                             n->n_nhop = 0;
660                                     }
661                                 }
662                         }
663
664                         if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv1
665                             || 0 == (mask = ntohl(n->n_mask))) {
666                                 mask = ripv1_mask_host(dst,aifp);
667                         } else if ((ntohl(dst) & ~mask) != 0) {
668                                 msglim(&bad_mask, FROM_NADDR,
669                                        "router %s sent bad netmask"
670                                        " %#lx with %s",
671                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
672                                        (u_long)mask,
673                                        naddr_ntoa(dst));
674                                 continue;
675                         }
676                         if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv1)
677                                 n->n_tag = 0;
678
679                         /* Adjust metric according to incoming interface..
680                          */
681                         n->n_metric += (aifp->int_metric
682                                         + aifp->int_adj_inmetric);
683                         if (n->n_metric > HOPCNT_INFINITY)
684                                 n->n_metric = HOPCNT_INFINITY;
685
686                         /* Should we trust this route from this router? */
687                         if (tg && (tn = tg->tgate_nets)->mask != 0) {
688                                 for (i = 0; i < MAX_TGATE_NETS; i++, tn++) {
689                                         if (on_net(dst, tn->net, tn->mask)
690                                             && tn->mask <= mask)
691                                             break;
692                                 }
693                                 if (i >= MAX_TGATE_NETS || tn->mask == 0) {
694                                         trace_pkt("   ignored unauthorized %s",
695                                                   addrname(dst,mask,0));
696                                         continue;
697                                 }
698                         }
699
700                         /* Recognize and ignore a default route we faked
701                          * which is being sent back to us by a machine with
702                          * broken split-horizon.
703                          * Be a little more paranoid than that, and reject
704                          * default routes with the same metric we advertised.
705                          */
706                         if (aifp->int_d_metric != 0
707                             && dst == RIP_DEFAULT
708                             && (int)n->n_metric >= aifp->int_d_metric)
709                                 continue;
710
711                         /* We can receive aggregated RIPv2 routes that must
712                          * be broken down before they are transmitted by
713                          * RIPv1 via an interface on a subnet.
714                          * We might also receive the same routes aggregated
715                          * via other RIPv2 interfaces.
716                          * This could cause duplicate routes to be sent on
717                          * the RIPv1 interfaces.  "Longest matching variable
718                          * length netmasks" lets RIPv2 listeners understand,
719                          * but breaking down the aggregated routes for RIPv1
720                          * listeners can produce duplicate routes.
721                          *
722                          * Breaking down aggregated routes here bloats
723                          * the daemon table, but does not hurt the kernel
724                          * table, since routes are always aggregated for
725                          * the kernel.
726                          *
727                          * Notice that this does not break down network
728                          * routes corresponding to subnets.  This is part
729                          * of the defense against RS_NET_SYN.
730                          */
731                         if (have_ripv1_out
732                             && (((rt = rtget(dst,mask)) == 0
733                                  || !(rt->rt_state & RS_NET_SYN)))
734                             && (v1_mask = ripv1_mask_net(dst,0)) > mask) {
735                                 ddst_h = v1_mask & -v1_mask;
736                                 i = (v1_mask & ~mask)/ddst_h;
737                                 if (i >= 511) {
738                                         /* Punt if we would have to generate
739                                          * an unreasonable number of routes.
740                                          */
741                                         if (TRACECONTENTS)
742                                             trace_misc("accept %s-->%s as 1"
743                                                        " instead of %d routes",
744                                                        addrname(dst,mask,0),
745                                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
746                                                        i+1);
747                                         i = 0;
748                                 } else {
749                                         mask = v1_mask;
750                                 }
751                         } else {
752                                 i = 0;
753                         }
754
755                         new.rts_gate = gate;
756                         new.rts_router = FROM_NADDR;
757                         new.rts_metric = n->n_metric;
758                         new.rts_tag = n->n_tag;
759                         new.rts_time = now.tv_sec;
760                         new.rts_ifp = aifp;
761                         new.rts_de_ag = i;
762                         j = 0;
763                         for (;;) {
764                                 input_route(dst, mask, &new, n);
765                                 if (++j > i)
766                                         break;
767                                 dst = htonl(ntohl(dst) + ddst_h);
768                         }
769                 } while (++n < lim);
770                 break;
771         }
772 #undef FROM_NADDR
773 }
774
775
776 /* Process a single input route.
777  */
778 static void
779 input_route(naddr dst,                  /* network order */
780             naddr mask,
781             struct rt_spare *new,
782             struct netinfo *n)
783 {
784         int i;
785         struct rt_entry *rt;
786         struct rt_spare *rts, *rts0;
787         struct interface *ifp1;
788
789
790         /* See if the other guy is telling us to send our packets to him.
791          * Sometimes network routes arrive over a point-to-point link for
792          * the network containing the address(es) of the link.
793          *
794          * If our interface is broken, switch to using the other guy.
795          */
796         ifp1 = ifwithaddr(dst, 1, 1);
797         if (ifp1 != 0
798             && (!(ifp1->int_state & IS_BROKE)
799                 || (ifp1->int_state & IS_PASSIVE)))
800                 return;
801
802         /* Look for the route in our table.
803          */
804         rt = rtget(dst, mask);
805
806         /* Consider adding the route if we do not already have it.
807          */
808         if (rt == 0) {
809                 /* Ignore unknown routes being poisoned.
810                  */
811                 if (new->rts_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY)
812                         return;
813
814                 /* Ignore the route if it points to us */
815                 if (n->n_nhop != 0
816                     && 0 != ifwithaddr(n->n_nhop, 1, 0))
817                         return;
818
819                 /* If something has not gone crazy and tried to fill
820                  * our memory, accept the new route.
821                  */
822                 if (total_routes < MAX_ROUTES)
823                         rtadd(dst, mask, 0, new);
824                 return;
825         }
826
827         /* We already know about the route.  Consider this update.
828          *
829          * If (rt->rt_state & RS_NET_SYN), then this route
830          * is the same as a network route we have inferred
831          * for subnets we know, in order to tell RIPv1 routers
832          * about the subnets.
833          *
834          * It is impossible to tell if the route is coming
835          * from a distant RIPv2 router with the standard
836          * netmask because that router knows about the entire
837          * network, or if it is a round-about echo of a
838          * synthetic, RIPv1 network route of our own.
839          * The worst is that both kinds of routes might be
840          * received, and the bad one might have the smaller
841          * metric.  Partly solve this problem by never
842          * aggregating into such a route.  Also keep it
843          * around as long as the interface exists.
844          */
845
846         rts0 = rt->rt_spares;
847         for (rts = rts0, i = NUM_SPARES; i != 0; i--, rts++) {
848                 if (rts->rts_router == new->rts_router)
849                         break;
850                 /* Note the worst slot to reuse,
851                  * other than the current slot.
852                  */
853                 if (rts0 == rt->rt_spares
854                     || BETTER_LINK(rt, rts0, rts))
855                         rts0 = rts;
856         }
857         if (i != 0) {
858                 /* Found a route from the router already in the table.
859                  */
860
861                 /* If the new route is a route broken down from an
862                  * aggregated route, and if the previous route is either
863                  * not a broken down route or was broken down from a finer
864                  * netmask, and if the previous route is current,
865                  * then forget this one.
866                  */
867                 if (new->rts_de_ag > rts->rts_de_ag
868                     && now_stale <= rts->rts_time)
869                         return;
870
871                 /* Keep poisoned routes around only long enough to pass
872                  * the poison on.  Use a new timestamp for good routes.
873                  */
874                 if (rts->rts_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY
875                     && new->rts_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY)
876                         new->rts_time = rts->rts_time;
877
878                 /* If this is an update for the router we currently prefer,
879                  * then note it.
880                  */
881                 if (i == NUM_SPARES) {
882                         rtchange(rt, rt->rt_state, new, 0);
883                         /* If the route got worse, check for something better.
884                          */
885                         if (new->rts_metric > rts->rts_metric)
886                                 rtswitch(rt, 0);
887                         return;
888                 }
889
890                 /* This is an update for a spare route.
891                  * Finished if the route is unchanged.
892                  */
893                 if (rts->rts_gate == new->rts_gate
894                     && rts->rts_metric == new->rts_metric
895                     && rts->rts_tag == new->rts_tag) {
896                         trace_upslot(rt, rts, new);
897                         *rts = *new;
898                         return;
899                 }
900                 /* Forget it if it has gone bad.
901                  */
902                 if (new->rts_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY) {
903                         rts_delete(rt, rts);
904                         return;
905                 }
906
907         } else {
908                 /* The update is for a route we know about,
909                  * but not from a familiar router.
910                  *
911                  * Ignore the route if it points to us.
912                  */
913                 if (n->n_nhop != 0
914                     && 0 != ifwithaddr(n->n_nhop, 1, 0))
915                         return;
916
917                 /* the loop above set rts0=worst spare */
918                 rts = rts0;
919
920                 /* Save the route as a spare only if it has
921                  * a better metric than our worst spare.
922                  * This also ignores poisoned routes (those
923                  * received with metric HOPCNT_INFINITY).
924                  */
925                 if (new->rts_metric >= rts->rts_metric)
926                         return;
927         }
928
929         trace_upslot(rt, rts, new);
930         *rts = *new;
931
932         /* try to switch to a better route */
933         rtswitch(rt, rts);
934 }
935
936
937 static int                              /* 0 if bad */
938 ck_passwd(struct interface *aifp,
939           struct rip *rip,
940           void *lim,
941           naddr from,
942           struct msg_limit *use_authp)
943 {
944 #       define NA (rip->rip_auths)
945         struct netauth *na2;
946         struct auth *ap;
947         MD5_CTX md5_ctx;
948         u_char hash[RIP_AUTH_PW_LEN];
949         int i, len;
950
951         assert(aifp != NULL);
952         if ((void *)NA >= lim || NA->a_family != RIP_AF_AUTH) {
953                 msglim(use_authp, from, "missing password from %s",
954                        naddr_ntoa(from));
955                 return 0;
956         }
957
958         /* accept any current (+/- 24 hours) password
959          */
960         for (ap = aifp->int_auth, i = 0; i < MAX_AUTH_KEYS; i++, ap++) {
961                 if (ap->type != NA->a_type
962                     || (u_long)ap->start > (u_long)clk.tv_sec+DAY
963                     || (u_long)ap->end+DAY < (u_long)clk.tv_sec)
964                         continue;
965
966                 if (NA->a_type == RIP_AUTH_PW) {
967                         if (!memcmp(NA->au.au_pw, ap->key, RIP_AUTH_PW_LEN))
968                                 return 1;
969
970                 } else {
971                         /* accept MD5 secret with the right key ID
972                          */
973                         if (NA->au.a_md5.md5_keyid != ap->keyid)
974                                 continue;
975
976                         len = ntohs(NA->au.a_md5.md5_pkt_len);
977                         if ((len-sizeof(*rip)) % sizeof(*NA) != 0
978                             || len != (char *)lim-(char*)rip-(int)sizeof(*NA)) {
979                                 msglim(use_authp, from,
980                                        "wrong MD5 RIPv2 packet length of %d"
981                                        " instead of %d from %s",
982                                        len, (int)((char *)lim-(char *)rip
983                                                   -sizeof(*NA)),
984                                        naddr_ntoa(from));
985                                 return 0;
986                         }
987                         na2 = (struct netauth *)((char *)rip+len);
988
989                         /* Given a good hash value, these are not security
990                          * problems so be generous and accept the routes,
991                          * after complaining.
992                          */
993                         if (TRACEPACKETS) {
994                                 if (NA->au.a_md5.md5_auth_len
995                                     != RIP_AUTH_MD5_HASH_LEN)
996                                         msglim(use_authp, from,
997                                                "unknown MD5 RIPv2 auth len %#x"
998                                                " instead of %#x from %s",
999                                                NA->au.a_md5.md5_auth_len,
1000                                                (unsigned)RIP_AUTH_MD5_HASH_LEN,
1001                                                naddr_ntoa(from));
1002                                 if (na2->a_family != RIP_AF_AUTH)
1003                                         msglim(use_authp, from,
1004                                                "unknown MD5 RIPv2 family %#x"
1005                                                " instead of %#x from %s",
1006                                                na2->a_family, RIP_AF_AUTH,
1007                                                naddr_ntoa(from));
1008                                 if (na2->a_type != ntohs(1))
1009                                         msglim(use_authp, from,
1010                                                "MD5 RIPv2 hash has %#x"
1011                                                " instead of %#x from %s",
1012                                                na2->a_type, ntohs(1),
1013                                                naddr_ntoa(from));
1014                         }
1015
1016                         MD5Init(&md5_ctx);
1017                         MD5Update(&md5_ctx, (u_char *)rip,
1018                                   len + RIP_AUTH_MD5_HASH_XTRA);
1019                         MD5Update(&md5_ctx, ap->key, RIP_AUTH_MD5_KEY_LEN);
1020                         MD5Final(hash, &md5_ctx);
1021                         if (!memcmp(hash, na2->au.au_pw, sizeof(hash)))
1022                                 return 1;
1023                 }
1024         }
1025
1026         msglim(use_authp, from, "bad password from %s",
1027                naddr_ntoa(from));
1028         return 0;
1029 #undef NA
1030 }